dadeechi
BANNED
- Joined
- Sep 12, 2015
- Messages
- 4,281
- Reaction score
- -8
- Country
- Location
What is holding up India-US foundational agreements - Part 1
Logistics Support Agreement - A case of bad history and turf battles
Abhijit Iyer-Mitra April 18, 2016 Last Updated at 12:40 IST
The last week was excellent for India related defence news but bad for India related defence facts. This was almost entirely to do with rumours of the so called “foundational” agreements being signed. This two part series will examine the documents and the objections they face in the Indian context. The first part looks at the LSA and the internal turf battles that prevent its signing. The second part looks at CISMOA & BECA and the huge educational backwardness our military and defence bureaucracy are encumbered with.
As usual the op-ed columns on either got almost all their facts wrong or avoided facts altogether in favour of the “we need to debate this more” card. Clearly it had the desired effect and the joint statement between the two ministers skipped any mention whatsoever of these. The problem with the “more debate” argument is as one of America’s senior-most officials said in an off the record briefing last year “I wish someone here would tell me what India’s exact objections to these agreements are factually”. The facts are easy to dig out – versions of the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), Basic Exchange of Communications Agreement (BECA) & Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) with Korea, Sweden and Norway are available on the internet.
To start with all of these are agreements – not treaties and the dispute clauses in them specifically ask to avoid arbitration or international adjudication; preferring instead to settle then “at the lowest level possible”. This means disagreements keep getting escalated up the normal command chain till such time agreement is found – in effect both parties have a veto & actions can only happen with mutual consent.
Read more from our special coverage on "DEFENCE"
Take the case of the LSA. It gives the US access to Indian bases and India access to US bases and all the facilities associated with bases – such a maintenance, refuelling, etc. There are two arguments peddled against this accord in the public discourse. The first is of a conflict of interest; hypothetically what happens if the US has to carry out a mission against our old friend Russia. The second is and argument of reciprocity; will India for example get access to Oman if and when we choose to blockade Gwadar.
Both are based on an exceptionally poor reading of both history and facts. All US alliances and agreements take into account such conflicts of interest and allow opt out clauses. Take for example NATO – an organisation bound together by a far more robust treaty than any of these agreements we are being asked to sign. During the 1986 Anglo-American bombing of Libya – France, Spain and Italy (all NATO allies) all refused to allow US bases located in their territory to be used, and further denied overflight to planes operating out of US bases in the UK. Similarly the US, France and NATO declared solidarity with the UK when the Argentines took over the Falklands in 1982 but did not provide support to the Royal Navy; on the contrary French technicians continued to assist the Argentines with the anti-ship Exocet missiles causing hundreds of British fatalities. This was done to secure French commercial interests in the region. Britain paid back America in the same coin a year later in 1983 when the US invaded Grenada, leading the furious international condemnation that followed. The conclusion is inescapable - both we and the United States can deny each other facilities for operations that we perceive to be against our interests.
Reciprocity is a trickier issue. India is demanding reciprocal facilities in US bases not on US territory but rather in 3rd countries such as Oman and Bahrain. India will have to negotiate bilaterally with both Bahrain and Oman to access those bases as they still retain sovereign right of refusal to 3rd countries, and then ask the US to expand the LSA to those bases. It is surprising that the Ministry of External Affairs that is so guarded about India’s sovereignty seems to think Bahraini and Omani sovereignty are the US’ to get away. Reciprocally India allowing US access to Indian bases is not the same as India allowing other US allies such as Saudi Arabia access to our bases. Evidently the Indian position is aimed at forcing Oman and Bahrain to cede access of those bases to India. This is a sign of India’s extraordinarily impotent and superficial diplomacy in the region. The reciprocity question forces us to introspect - why is it that India has not carried out military action against Pakistan despite repeated provocations in the past? Has it been because of a denial of basing facilities at Bahrain and Oman or to do with a lack of will, a nuclear stalemate and a military in disarray back home? How would access to the US base in Bahrain for example strengthen our position? How would it ease the virtual hostage situation our Middle East policy is trapped in, with our migrant workers in West Asia and their remittances home? Why have we not offered military services to the Government of Yemen in return for a long term lease on the strategically far more important Socotra Island?
The stand out curiosity has been India’s insistence on a “case by case approval” for this agreement. Little understood this is in fact key to understanding India’s institutional opposition to the LSA that has to do with our own deep internal divisions. The LSA effectively puts interactions between the two militaries – mostly the two navies on autopilot on all issues that they agree on. This near constant interaction brings enormous educational, operational and capability benefits to the navy, but it also effectively denies the IFS and IAS of their most potent power – the power to block either in return for transactional benefits or as is the case in India – just for the sake of blocking. In the case of the IFS this agreement is an existential danger since the Navy is effectively the second diplomatic service of the country. With 55,000 troops as opposed to the MEA’s 700, the Navy is both better funded, better manned and infinitely more capable. Is it any surprise then that since LSA negotiations began the MEA has been trying to usurp decision making on some key naval capabilities such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) as well as floating the canard of India being a “security provider” to West Asia? This is a turf war that is natural in every country on earth. What is dangerous however is conflating narrow sectional interests with the national interest.
Abhijit Iyer-Mitra is an independent defence analyst. He has coordinated the National Security at the Observer Research Foundation & been visiting fellow at Sandia National Laboratories and the Stimson Centre. He writes about defence policy, technology & defence cooperation on his blog, Tarkash, a part of Business Standard's platform
http://www.business-standard.com/ar...ational-agreements-part-1-116041800319_1.html
Logistics Support Agreement - A case of bad history and turf battles
Abhijit Iyer-Mitra April 18, 2016 Last Updated at 12:40 IST
The last week was excellent for India related defence news but bad for India related defence facts. This was almost entirely to do with rumours of the so called “foundational” agreements being signed. This two part series will examine the documents and the objections they face in the Indian context. The first part looks at the LSA and the internal turf battles that prevent its signing. The second part looks at CISMOA & BECA and the huge educational backwardness our military and defence bureaucracy are encumbered with.
As usual the op-ed columns on either got almost all their facts wrong or avoided facts altogether in favour of the “we need to debate this more” card. Clearly it had the desired effect and the joint statement between the two ministers skipped any mention whatsoever of these. The problem with the “more debate” argument is as one of America’s senior-most officials said in an off the record briefing last year “I wish someone here would tell me what India’s exact objections to these agreements are factually”. The facts are easy to dig out – versions of the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), Basic Exchange of Communications Agreement (BECA) & Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) with Korea, Sweden and Norway are available on the internet.
To start with all of these are agreements – not treaties and the dispute clauses in them specifically ask to avoid arbitration or international adjudication; preferring instead to settle then “at the lowest level possible”. This means disagreements keep getting escalated up the normal command chain till such time agreement is found – in effect both parties have a veto & actions can only happen with mutual consent.
Read more from our special coverage on "DEFENCE"
- India, US agree on 2 new pathfinder projects
- India, US give nod for military logistic agreement
- India, Maldives resolve to expand defence cooperation
- India to discuss DTTI with US Defence Secretary on his visit: Manohar Parrikar
- New policy pushes defence stocks
Take the case of the LSA. It gives the US access to Indian bases and India access to US bases and all the facilities associated with bases – such a maintenance, refuelling, etc. There are two arguments peddled against this accord in the public discourse. The first is of a conflict of interest; hypothetically what happens if the US has to carry out a mission against our old friend Russia. The second is and argument of reciprocity; will India for example get access to Oman if and when we choose to blockade Gwadar.
Both are based on an exceptionally poor reading of both history and facts. All US alliances and agreements take into account such conflicts of interest and allow opt out clauses. Take for example NATO – an organisation bound together by a far more robust treaty than any of these agreements we are being asked to sign. During the 1986 Anglo-American bombing of Libya – France, Spain and Italy (all NATO allies) all refused to allow US bases located in their territory to be used, and further denied overflight to planes operating out of US bases in the UK. Similarly the US, France and NATO declared solidarity with the UK when the Argentines took over the Falklands in 1982 but did not provide support to the Royal Navy; on the contrary French technicians continued to assist the Argentines with the anti-ship Exocet missiles causing hundreds of British fatalities. This was done to secure French commercial interests in the region. Britain paid back America in the same coin a year later in 1983 when the US invaded Grenada, leading the furious international condemnation that followed. The conclusion is inescapable - both we and the United States can deny each other facilities for operations that we perceive to be against our interests.
Reciprocity is a trickier issue. India is demanding reciprocal facilities in US bases not on US territory but rather in 3rd countries such as Oman and Bahrain. India will have to negotiate bilaterally with both Bahrain and Oman to access those bases as they still retain sovereign right of refusal to 3rd countries, and then ask the US to expand the LSA to those bases. It is surprising that the Ministry of External Affairs that is so guarded about India’s sovereignty seems to think Bahraini and Omani sovereignty are the US’ to get away. Reciprocally India allowing US access to Indian bases is not the same as India allowing other US allies such as Saudi Arabia access to our bases. Evidently the Indian position is aimed at forcing Oman and Bahrain to cede access of those bases to India. This is a sign of India’s extraordinarily impotent and superficial diplomacy in the region. The reciprocity question forces us to introspect - why is it that India has not carried out military action against Pakistan despite repeated provocations in the past? Has it been because of a denial of basing facilities at Bahrain and Oman or to do with a lack of will, a nuclear stalemate and a military in disarray back home? How would access to the US base in Bahrain for example strengthen our position? How would it ease the virtual hostage situation our Middle East policy is trapped in, with our migrant workers in West Asia and their remittances home? Why have we not offered military services to the Government of Yemen in return for a long term lease on the strategically far more important Socotra Island?
The stand out curiosity has been India’s insistence on a “case by case approval” for this agreement. Little understood this is in fact key to understanding India’s institutional opposition to the LSA that has to do with our own deep internal divisions. The LSA effectively puts interactions between the two militaries – mostly the two navies on autopilot on all issues that they agree on. This near constant interaction brings enormous educational, operational and capability benefits to the navy, but it also effectively denies the IFS and IAS of their most potent power – the power to block either in return for transactional benefits or as is the case in India – just for the sake of blocking. In the case of the IFS this agreement is an existential danger since the Navy is effectively the second diplomatic service of the country. With 55,000 troops as opposed to the MEA’s 700, the Navy is both better funded, better manned and infinitely more capable. Is it any surprise then that since LSA negotiations began the MEA has been trying to usurp decision making on some key naval capabilities such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) as well as floating the canard of India being a “security provider” to West Asia? This is a turf war that is natural in every country on earth. What is dangerous however is conflating narrow sectional interests with the national interest.
Abhijit Iyer-Mitra is an independent defence analyst. He has coordinated the National Security at the Observer Research Foundation & been visiting fellow at Sandia National Laboratories and the Stimson Centre. He writes about defence policy, technology & defence cooperation on his blog, Tarkash, a part of Business Standard's platform
http://www.business-standard.com/ar...ational-agreements-part-1-116041800319_1.html
