Bill Longley
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Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
The emerging collaboration between the TTP and Punjabi Taliban of southern Punjab means that one cannot end the war by simply driving terrorists out of the tribal areas and that Pakistan must prepare itself to fight on several fronts
The most disquieting aspect of the recent spate of terrorist activity in Pakistan (including Fridays massacre in Lahore) and abroad is that the planning seems to be the work of the Pashtun Taliban and Punjabi groups originating in southern Punjab, possibly at the behest of al Qaeda. Apparently, the North Waziristan operation will not be the Pakistani Armys final task now that Pakistans heartland is gradually becoming embroiled as well. Furthermore, the Western media is once again pointing fingers at what they perceive as military-extremist collusion.
Conventional wisdom, which says that once the US exits from Afghanistan, the extremists in Pakistan will simply disband and all will be well, is fast losing validity. The reality, on the contrary, is that Pakistani extremists, Taliban militants and the Punjabi jihadists are not going anywhere soon. Only one simple fact is required to prove this: the Punjabi jihadists, like the Pakistani Taliban, have lost faith in the Pakistani Army. The result is an increasing number of attacks on civilian and military targets across the country. The North Waziristan operation might very well succeed in destroying any residual trust the Afghan Taliban extremists might still feel regarding the Pakistani Army. If this happens, the focus of the war could dramatically shift from Afghanistan to Pakistan.
If we study the evolution of major political parties views on the extremist threat since the end of Musharrafs rule, we will see a disturbing pattern emerging. As the US pressure increases on Pakistan to act in North Waziristan, political parties of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are taking different positions on how to approach and tackle the grave issues at hand. From the recent statements emanating from the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), one might conclude that the situation in FATA is the cause of all the troubles and that once these areas have been properly dealt with, the extremist threat will vanish. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) has exhibited similar views, as it relates to the situation in Karachi. On the other hand, the Awami National Partys (ANPs) stance makes some form of military operation necessary in southern Punjab as well, as it believes it is here that the masterminds and chief ideologues of local and regional extremism reside. The ANPs position is closer to the views of some in the Balochistan province, India and Afghanistan. The Pashtuns are paying a very heavy price indeed for the armys endeavours since the days of the Afghan jihad against the Soviets.
If these new fronts open in the manner we anticipate, the fissures within the Pakistan Army will obviously grow. The alienation of the Pashtun and Punjabi elements in the military will make it impossible to avoid an adverse outcome for the Pakistani state. The emerging collaboration between the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Punjabi Taliban of southern Punjab means that one cannot end the war by simply driving terrorists out of the tribal areas and that Pakistan must prepare itself to fight on several fronts.
Similarly, there is increasing evidence of the collusion between international terrorists and the local extremists in the region. This is extending the war against extremism into new territories, thus reinforcing the perception that it is not confined to the Pak-Afghan region alone. General Petraeus is well aware of this. Recently, the New York Times revealed that, in late 2009, he signed a secret order, which authorises special operations forces to increase their activities in both allied and hostile nations in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa. This newly unveiled US national security strategy has dispensed with the limitations imposed by current international borders. The US appears to have finally reached the conclusion that if the extremists refuse to accept international borders, any effort to counter terrorism must do likewise.
Obviously, militarisation of society, a result of the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and FATA, has yet to be fully actualised. Just like the consequences of the 1980s Afghan jihad continue to manifest themselves in the region, the fallout of what is occurring now will take many years to fully emerge. Faced with these scenarios, the US exit strategy has focused on weakening the local and global extremists, but without much success in addressing the causes which leads them to adopt extreme positions in the first place. Add to this the worsening crisis in Iran and the Horn of Africa and it appears that the region is heading towards chaos. It may well take decades before any semblance of order finally emerges.
It seems that if events continue on their present trajectory, the region will gradually revert to the condition it was in prior to the establishment of nation-states. The next phase of the war against extremism will probably involve cross-border strategies; the actors will no longer be restricted by the nation-state mindset. The unpopular and often undemocratic governments of these regions will be caught in the crossfire between extremists and the coalition of the willing, with both exerting tremendous pressure on the often ineffective and corrupt governments. These tensions inadvertently weaken the basic structures and institutions that sustain the nation-state system, as we see in the case of Pakistan. If history is any lesson and the nation-state-based order prevailing in this region since the end of World War II was to go, religion and tribalism will, perhaps, replace it as the glue, holding society together.
The emerging collaboration between the TTP and Punjabi Taliban of southern Punjab means that one cannot end the war by simply driving terrorists out of the tribal areas and that Pakistan must prepare itself to fight on several fronts
The most disquieting aspect of the recent spate of terrorist activity in Pakistan (including Fridays massacre in Lahore) and abroad is that the planning seems to be the work of the Pashtun Taliban and Punjabi groups originating in southern Punjab, possibly at the behest of al Qaeda. Apparently, the North Waziristan operation will not be the Pakistani Armys final task now that Pakistans heartland is gradually becoming embroiled as well. Furthermore, the Western media is once again pointing fingers at what they perceive as military-extremist collusion.
Conventional wisdom, which says that once the US exits from Afghanistan, the extremists in Pakistan will simply disband and all will be well, is fast losing validity. The reality, on the contrary, is that Pakistani extremists, Taliban militants and the Punjabi jihadists are not going anywhere soon. Only one simple fact is required to prove this: the Punjabi jihadists, like the Pakistani Taliban, have lost faith in the Pakistani Army. The result is an increasing number of attacks on civilian and military targets across the country. The North Waziristan operation might very well succeed in destroying any residual trust the Afghan Taliban extremists might still feel regarding the Pakistani Army. If this happens, the focus of the war could dramatically shift from Afghanistan to Pakistan.
If we study the evolution of major political parties views on the extremist threat since the end of Musharrafs rule, we will see a disturbing pattern emerging. As the US pressure increases on Pakistan to act in North Waziristan, political parties of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are taking different positions on how to approach and tackle the grave issues at hand. From the recent statements emanating from the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), one might conclude that the situation in FATA is the cause of all the troubles and that once these areas have been properly dealt with, the extremist threat will vanish. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) has exhibited similar views, as it relates to the situation in Karachi. On the other hand, the Awami National Partys (ANPs) stance makes some form of military operation necessary in southern Punjab as well, as it believes it is here that the masterminds and chief ideologues of local and regional extremism reside. The ANPs position is closer to the views of some in the Balochistan province, India and Afghanistan. The Pashtuns are paying a very heavy price indeed for the armys endeavours since the days of the Afghan jihad against the Soviets.
If these new fronts open in the manner we anticipate, the fissures within the Pakistan Army will obviously grow. The alienation of the Pashtun and Punjabi elements in the military will make it impossible to avoid an adverse outcome for the Pakistani state. The emerging collaboration between the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Punjabi Taliban of southern Punjab means that one cannot end the war by simply driving terrorists out of the tribal areas and that Pakistan must prepare itself to fight on several fronts.
Similarly, there is increasing evidence of the collusion between international terrorists and the local extremists in the region. This is extending the war against extremism into new territories, thus reinforcing the perception that it is not confined to the Pak-Afghan region alone. General Petraeus is well aware of this. Recently, the New York Times revealed that, in late 2009, he signed a secret order, which authorises special operations forces to increase their activities in both allied and hostile nations in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa. This newly unveiled US national security strategy has dispensed with the limitations imposed by current international borders. The US appears to have finally reached the conclusion that if the extremists refuse to accept international borders, any effort to counter terrorism must do likewise.
Obviously, militarisation of society, a result of the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and FATA, has yet to be fully actualised. Just like the consequences of the 1980s Afghan jihad continue to manifest themselves in the region, the fallout of what is occurring now will take many years to fully emerge. Faced with these scenarios, the US exit strategy has focused on weakening the local and global extremists, but without much success in addressing the causes which leads them to adopt extreme positions in the first place. Add to this the worsening crisis in Iran and the Horn of Africa and it appears that the region is heading towards chaos. It may well take decades before any semblance of order finally emerges.
It seems that if events continue on their present trajectory, the region will gradually revert to the condition it was in prior to the establishment of nation-states. The next phase of the war against extremism will probably involve cross-border strategies; the actors will no longer be restricted by the nation-state mindset. The unpopular and often undemocratic governments of these regions will be caught in the crossfire between extremists and the coalition of the willing, with both exerting tremendous pressure on the often ineffective and corrupt governments. These tensions inadvertently weaken the basic structures and institutions that sustain the nation-state system, as we see in the case of Pakistan. If history is any lesson and the nation-state-based order prevailing in this region since the end of World War II was to go, religion and tribalism will, perhaps, replace it as the glue, holding society together.
