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Remove US Forces from Pakistan
By ABID ULLAH JAN
Published: Nov. 2002
Qazi Hussain Ahmad became the first voice in the National Assembly demanding sovereignty of the parliament. The demand to have sovereign institutions in an un-sovereign state is no more than wishful thinking. But Pakistan is a sovereign state, someone may argue. The question is: Can foreign forces be indefinitely imposed on a sovereign state against its will? Of course not, is the right answer. Have, then, we willingly allowed the US troops and agents to station and act as they may wish in Pakistan? We are not a sovereign state if the answer is: "We have allowed them to save Pakistan from the direct American or indirect Indian military attack."
Pakistan was the strategic cat's-paw for United States ever since the days of CENTO and SEATO. The picture of Pak-US military-to-military relations in 2001-2002 is, however, different and stands out in stark comparison, inviting in depth analysis to look into implications of US military presence in Pakistan.
It is important to note that even at the height of Pak-US strategic relationship, we did not give access to US military personnel and the CIA to our military facilities, dumps and bases. The US military presence in Pakistan today is in thousands, located at strategic Pakistani military bases around the country. Most importantly, the American military presence was brought about not by Pakistan Army's willingness but under dire American coercive pressures and threats.
Both Pakistan Army and public cannot be said to have been unmoved by the impact of US military presence in Pakistan and the circumstances under which it was brought about. This symbol of our armed forced emasculation was definitely not brought about under any military alliance - except an alliance with an Army Chief, who represents nobody.
The reality that cannot be brushed aside is that the US's policy of intervention in Afghanistan is not viewed with favor in Pakistan. Apart from the results of recent elections, a CNN poll reveals that over 56 per cent of the people are not supportive of Musharraf's pro-US policies. In fact, they are more than 56 per cent.
It is hyperbole to portray Musharraf's decision to allow US bases in Pakistan as a courageous, de Gaulle-like gesture. Instead, Musharraf can be compared to another military dictator, Hungary's Adm. Nikolaus Horthy de Nagybanya, who attempted to defect from his alliance with Adolf Hitler and switch his support to the Allies. Horthy failed in his gamble, whereas Musharraf has been successful (so far). But that success should not diminish the significance of the historical analogy. Horthy and Musharraf were simply switching to the winning side, well aware that the alternative would bring about their own political destruction. (1)
There was no conversion of the masses to alien values or forces on native lands in either case. Like most of his predecessors, Musharraf's knew that Islamabad's ties with Washington were dictated by specific political-military interests and lacked any deep ideological roots. When US officials were hailing Pak-US cooperation in providing support to Afghan Mujahideen, Pakistani leaders seemed to have no illusions about their relationship with Washington. Unlike Musharraf, they recognized that after a short marriage of convenience, the two governments would eventually have to deal with the reality of their diverging core national interests and values.
During a December 6, 1982 meeting in Washington, General Zia told Secretary of State George Shultz in clear terms that the two countries were a "union of unequals" and "incompatible" in terms of culture, geography, and national power, even though they had strong common interests.(2) The cautionary remarks Zia made probably apply more to the current Pak-US relationship, in which Musharraf is the more enthusiastic partner, surrendering everything for prolonging his stay in power.
Of course, a client state can secure support and increase its leverage over the US by accentuating common strategic interests. However, there needs to be a limit to conceding our sovereignty. The erosion of our independence leads to continuing political instability, leading to the weakening of our fragile governing system. Existence of US bases in Pakistan has tarnished Pakistan's image even in Washington and contributed to the volatility of bilateral relationship.
Cold War rhetoric aside, Pakistan and US not only lack common historical and cultural ties, they are not operating on the same strategic wavelength. After September 11, the Bush administration decided, not only to target Pakistan's strategic and ideological ally in Kabul, but also to destroy the entire education system for the fear of Jihad against its double standards, injustice and state terrorism.
Musharraf made Pakistan a big loser after September 11 with the misconception that it had no other option but to accept that outcome. From a systemic perspective, September 11 helped Washington establish its military presence in Pakistan and also reestablish the "red lines" that had disappeared after the collapse of the Soviet superpower, impelling Washington to restrain its Pakistani client state.
From the American perspective, US military bases in Pakistan are necessary to keep an eye on "fundamentalist forces" taking control of sensitive locations, the ISI and some "cells" in the military that may get out of control and act like "rogue" institutions.(3) Musharraf's strategy of reaping rewards of his appeasement has miserably failed. From day one, Washington didn't pay any attention to his calls, such as those for a halt to bombing in Ramadan, or not to let Northern Alliance taking full control in Kabul.
Instead the Bush administration decided to continue pursuing the war during Ramadan and gave a green light to Northern Alliance forces to occupy Kabul. Musharraf again tried to reduce losses by demanding that Kabul be "demilitarized" and the Northern Alliance forces "must not" hold it.(4) Pakistan couldn't play a role in formation of a new government in Kabul and today Islamabad is totally sidelined from whatever good or bad is happening in Afghanistan.
Pakistan has become one of the strategic losers in the international system that has evolved since September 11. Yet the US has continued to portray Islamabad as a "friend," and has provided economic and military assistance on the basis of promises to unconditionally support its "anti-terrorism" campaign. US military bases are the strings attaches to this assistance.
The case of US bases in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait is based on the premise to defend these countries against Iraq. In our case, Afghanistan is fully occupied with a CIA man on throne in Kabul and American forces dug in military bases throughout the country. There is no justification for continued US military presence in Pakistan because unlike pre-Afghanistan-occupation, the Allied forces do not need any additional support from US bases in Pakistan.
Those of us who have turned a blind eye to the presence of US forces on Pakistani soil under different pretext must not ignore the reality that they are here to stay indefinitely. They are here to ensure that unlike the 1980s, Pakistan does not get a blank check from the US to combat terrorism, and spend it on building up forces that may threaten US adventures in the region.(5)
The conflicting national interests of Washington and Islamabad have become more obvious during the past year. The US has openly rejected Pakistan's position vis-ÃÂ -vis Kashmir. Pakistan's nuclear programme has become the prime target of the US government. The US establishment-backed analysts have declared Pakistan "the most dangers place on earth."(6) Permanent induction of armed forced in Pakistan's governance mechanism has been fully supported by the US and we have gladly accepted it on "something is better than nothing" bases. Furthermore, the US has a clear interest in establishing strong ties with India.(7) Pakistan, on the other hand, is increasingly considered as a "potential long-term adversary."(8)
At a time when American policy makers are planning for a disengagement from Pakistan, we need not host American bases on Pakistani soil any longer. Even some of the US policymakers reject any idea of continuing American military bases in the existing political environment of Pakistan, which could lead to an escalation of violence and a perfect ruse for a war on Pakistan. (9)
We do not need any American forces for taking steps that are in our own interest, such as reforming our political and economic system, arresting actual terrorists, or reducing tensions with India. Rewards for Musharraf's cooperation is not establishment of military bases in Pakistan but growing diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties without any strings attached for domination. It's time for Americans and Pakistanis to bring a sense of normalcy and dignity into their relationship by removing both American military and agents from different agencies from Pakistan. That means ending the invisible occupation of Pakistan.
If there is any lesson in the words of Tipu Sultan for us, it is: A few days of living in a sovereign Pakistan is better than a thousand years under invisible occupation embraced only to avoid American or Indian military adventures.
Notes
For a historical analysis of Horthy's strategy, see Ian Kershaw, Hitler (1936-45): Nemesis (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), pp. 734-35.
Quoted in Kux, p. 268. The quotes are taken from a State Department memorandum and talking points for Secretary Shultz's meeting with Zia that Kux obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.
See, for example, Douglas Frantz, "The Rogue to Fear Most Is the One Following Orders," New York Times, January 13, 2002, p. WK1.
"Now for an Equally Hard Part," The Economist, November 17, 2001, p. 15.
Fear expressed by many, such as Christopher Hitchens, "On the Frontier of Apocalypse," Vanity Fai, January 2002, p. 153.
Jim Hoagland, Nuclear Enabler, Pakistan today is the most dangerous place on Earth, Washington Post, Thursday, October 24, 2002; Page A35.
As analyst Victor M. Gorbarev argued in a recent policy paper, "India could become a strategic counterweight to China and a crucial part of a stable balance of power in both East Asia and South Asia." Victor M. Gobarev, "India as a World Power: Changing Washington's Myopic Policy," Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 381, September 11, 2000, p. 2.
Leon T. Hadar, Pakistan: Strategic Ally or Unreliable Client? Policy Analysis, No 436, May 08, 2002.
Kamran Khan and Thomas E. Ricks, "U.S. Military Begins Shift from Bases in Pakistan," Washington Post, January 11, 2002.
By ABID ULLAH JAN
Published: Nov. 2002
Qazi Hussain Ahmad became the first voice in the National Assembly demanding sovereignty of the parliament. The demand to have sovereign institutions in an un-sovereign state is no more than wishful thinking. But Pakistan is a sovereign state, someone may argue. The question is: Can foreign forces be indefinitely imposed on a sovereign state against its will? Of course not, is the right answer. Have, then, we willingly allowed the US troops and agents to station and act as they may wish in Pakistan? We are not a sovereign state if the answer is: "We have allowed them to save Pakistan from the direct American or indirect Indian military attack."
Pakistan was the strategic cat's-paw for United States ever since the days of CENTO and SEATO. The picture of Pak-US military-to-military relations in 2001-2002 is, however, different and stands out in stark comparison, inviting in depth analysis to look into implications of US military presence in Pakistan.
It is important to note that even at the height of Pak-US strategic relationship, we did not give access to US military personnel and the CIA to our military facilities, dumps and bases. The US military presence in Pakistan today is in thousands, located at strategic Pakistani military bases around the country. Most importantly, the American military presence was brought about not by Pakistan Army's willingness but under dire American coercive pressures and threats.
Both Pakistan Army and public cannot be said to have been unmoved by the impact of US military presence in Pakistan and the circumstances under which it was brought about. This symbol of our armed forced emasculation was definitely not brought about under any military alliance - except an alliance with an Army Chief, who represents nobody.
The reality that cannot be brushed aside is that the US's policy of intervention in Afghanistan is not viewed with favor in Pakistan. Apart from the results of recent elections, a CNN poll reveals that over 56 per cent of the people are not supportive of Musharraf's pro-US policies. In fact, they are more than 56 per cent.
It is hyperbole to portray Musharraf's decision to allow US bases in Pakistan as a courageous, de Gaulle-like gesture. Instead, Musharraf can be compared to another military dictator, Hungary's Adm. Nikolaus Horthy de Nagybanya, who attempted to defect from his alliance with Adolf Hitler and switch his support to the Allies. Horthy failed in his gamble, whereas Musharraf has been successful (so far). But that success should not diminish the significance of the historical analogy. Horthy and Musharraf were simply switching to the winning side, well aware that the alternative would bring about their own political destruction. (1)
There was no conversion of the masses to alien values or forces on native lands in either case. Like most of his predecessors, Musharraf's knew that Islamabad's ties with Washington were dictated by specific political-military interests and lacked any deep ideological roots. When US officials were hailing Pak-US cooperation in providing support to Afghan Mujahideen, Pakistani leaders seemed to have no illusions about their relationship with Washington. Unlike Musharraf, they recognized that after a short marriage of convenience, the two governments would eventually have to deal with the reality of their diverging core national interests and values.
During a December 6, 1982 meeting in Washington, General Zia told Secretary of State George Shultz in clear terms that the two countries were a "union of unequals" and "incompatible" in terms of culture, geography, and national power, even though they had strong common interests.(2) The cautionary remarks Zia made probably apply more to the current Pak-US relationship, in which Musharraf is the more enthusiastic partner, surrendering everything for prolonging his stay in power.
Of course, a client state can secure support and increase its leverage over the US by accentuating common strategic interests. However, there needs to be a limit to conceding our sovereignty. The erosion of our independence leads to continuing political instability, leading to the weakening of our fragile governing system. Existence of US bases in Pakistan has tarnished Pakistan's image even in Washington and contributed to the volatility of bilateral relationship.
Cold War rhetoric aside, Pakistan and US not only lack common historical and cultural ties, they are not operating on the same strategic wavelength. After September 11, the Bush administration decided, not only to target Pakistan's strategic and ideological ally in Kabul, but also to destroy the entire education system for the fear of Jihad against its double standards, injustice and state terrorism.
Musharraf made Pakistan a big loser after September 11 with the misconception that it had no other option but to accept that outcome. From a systemic perspective, September 11 helped Washington establish its military presence in Pakistan and also reestablish the "red lines" that had disappeared after the collapse of the Soviet superpower, impelling Washington to restrain its Pakistani client state.
From the American perspective, US military bases in Pakistan are necessary to keep an eye on "fundamentalist forces" taking control of sensitive locations, the ISI and some "cells" in the military that may get out of control and act like "rogue" institutions.(3) Musharraf's strategy of reaping rewards of his appeasement has miserably failed. From day one, Washington didn't pay any attention to his calls, such as those for a halt to bombing in Ramadan, or not to let Northern Alliance taking full control in Kabul.
Instead the Bush administration decided to continue pursuing the war during Ramadan and gave a green light to Northern Alliance forces to occupy Kabul. Musharraf again tried to reduce losses by demanding that Kabul be "demilitarized" and the Northern Alliance forces "must not" hold it.(4) Pakistan couldn't play a role in formation of a new government in Kabul and today Islamabad is totally sidelined from whatever good or bad is happening in Afghanistan.
Pakistan has become one of the strategic losers in the international system that has evolved since September 11. Yet the US has continued to portray Islamabad as a "friend," and has provided economic and military assistance on the basis of promises to unconditionally support its "anti-terrorism" campaign. US military bases are the strings attaches to this assistance.
The case of US bases in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait is based on the premise to defend these countries against Iraq. In our case, Afghanistan is fully occupied with a CIA man on throne in Kabul and American forces dug in military bases throughout the country. There is no justification for continued US military presence in Pakistan because unlike pre-Afghanistan-occupation, the Allied forces do not need any additional support from US bases in Pakistan.
Those of us who have turned a blind eye to the presence of US forces on Pakistani soil under different pretext must not ignore the reality that they are here to stay indefinitely. They are here to ensure that unlike the 1980s, Pakistan does not get a blank check from the US to combat terrorism, and spend it on building up forces that may threaten US adventures in the region.(5)
The conflicting national interests of Washington and Islamabad have become more obvious during the past year. The US has openly rejected Pakistan's position vis-ÃÂ -vis Kashmir. Pakistan's nuclear programme has become the prime target of the US government. The US establishment-backed analysts have declared Pakistan "the most dangers place on earth."(6) Permanent induction of armed forced in Pakistan's governance mechanism has been fully supported by the US and we have gladly accepted it on "something is better than nothing" bases. Furthermore, the US has a clear interest in establishing strong ties with India.(7) Pakistan, on the other hand, is increasingly considered as a "potential long-term adversary."(8)
At a time when American policy makers are planning for a disengagement from Pakistan, we need not host American bases on Pakistani soil any longer. Even some of the US policymakers reject any idea of continuing American military bases in the existing political environment of Pakistan, which could lead to an escalation of violence and a perfect ruse for a war on Pakistan. (9)
We do not need any American forces for taking steps that are in our own interest, such as reforming our political and economic system, arresting actual terrorists, or reducing tensions with India. Rewards for Musharraf's cooperation is not establishment of military bases in Pakistan but growing diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties without any strings attached for domination. It's time for Americans and Pakistanis to bring a sense of normalcy and dignity into their relationship by removing both American military and agents from different agencies from Pakistan. That means ending the invisible occupation of Pakistan.
If there is any lesson in the words of Tipu Sultan for us, it is: A few days of living in a sovereign Pakistan is better than a thousand years under invisible occupation embraced only to avoid American or Indian military adventures.
Notes
For a historical analysis of Horthy's strategy, see Ian Kershaw, Hitler (1936-45): Nemesis (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), pp. 734-35.
Quoted in Kux, p. 268. The quotes are taken from a State Department memorandum and talking points for Secretary Shultz's meeting with Zia that Kux obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.
See, for example, Douglas Frantz, "The Rogue to Fear Most Is the One Following Orders," New York Times, January 13, 2002, p. WK1.
"Now for an Equally Hard Part," The Economist, November 17, 2001, p. 15.
Fear expressed by many, such as Christopher Hitchens, "On the Frontier of Apocalypse," Vanity Fai, January 2002, p. 153.
Jim Hoagland, Nuclear Enabler, Pakistan today is the most dangerous place on Earth, Washington Post, Thursday, October 24, 2002; Page A35.
As analyst Victor M. Gorbarev argued in a recent policy paper, "India could become a strategic counterweight to China and a crucial part of a stable balance of power in both East Asia and South Asia." Victor M. Gobarev, "India as a World Power: Changing Washington's Myopic Policy," Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 381, September 11, 2000, p. 2.
Leon T. Hadar, Pakistan: Strategic Ally or Unreliable Client? Policy Analysis, No 436, May 08, 2002.
Kamran Khan and Thomas E. Ricks, "U.S. Military Begins Shift from Bases in Pakistan," Washington Post, January 11, 2002.
