US appoints 19 brigadiers and colonels to lead ANA - 16 of which fought for the communist Afghan Army AGAINST the Mujahideen
KABUL—The fledgling Afghan National Army has been created from scratch by the U.S. and its allies. But, at least in its senior ranks, it increasingly resembles an Afghan army of old—one the U.S. helped rout two decades ago.
The Afghan government is dominated by former mujahedeen guerrillas; both the minister of defense and the army chief of staff are former anti-Soviet insurgents. Most ANA generals and colonels appointed to serve just below them, however, are veterans of the Soviet-built Afghan military that hunted these insurgents through the 1980s.
Facing a dearth of professional officers, the U.S.-led coalition is bringing these former foes in from the cold, restoring their Soviet-era rank and giving them command positions. American officers say few other Afghans have the formal military training and know-how to run conventional divisions and brigades.
Numbering just over 100,000 soldiers, the ANA is slated to grow to 172,000 by the autumn of 2011. Turning it into a serious fighting force is a priority for the Obama administration—offering the only exit strategy for the U.S.-led coalition as Western public opinion sours on the Afghan war.
In this mission, grooming senior ANA commanders is just as important as bulking up the ranks with recruits.
"If you don't develop leaders, this military cannot succeed," says U.S. Lt. Gen. William Caldwell IV, the commander of the coalition's program to build up Afghan security forces.
Soviet-era veterans—many of them exiled or unemployed during the tumult of recent years—offer a ready reservoir of such leaders.
"Former army officers are very experienced, and the more we expand our army, the more we need them," says Brig. Gen. Ali Ahmad Popal, commander of the Kabul Military Training Center, a sprawling facility that churns out thousands of new ANA soldiers every month.
The deputy corps commander of Kandahar in Communist times, Gen. Popal himself lived in exile in India until joining the ANA in 2008.
"The only difference between the old army and the new army is that before we had conscription, and now it's all-volunteer," he says. "We fight the enemies of our country and anyone who attacks our soil."
President Hamid Karzai said this week he is considering a reintroduction of the draft in Afghanistan.
This reliance on Soviet-era officers was evident at a recent graduation ceremony from a senior ANA command course. Nineteen colonels and brigadiers in their 50s and 60s graduated after several months of study with American and French instructors. Among them, 16 had fought in the Communist Afghan army, and only three hailed from mujahedeen backgrounds.
These Afghan Army veterans—most of whom were educated in Russia—often espouse a top-down, bureaucratic approach that can clash with the American military culture, which gives more leeway to individual commanders and puts more authority in the hands of noncommissioned officers.
U.S. Enlists Former Foes to Lead Afghan Army - WSJ.com
KABUL—The fledgling Afghan National Army has been created from scratch by the U.S. and its allies. But, at least in its senior ranks, it increasingly resembles an Afghan army of old—one the U.S. helped rout two decades ago.
The Afghan government is dominated by former mujahedeen guerrillas; both the minister of defense and the army chief of staff are former anti-Soviet insurgents. Most ANA generals and colonels appointed to serve just below them, however, are veterans of the Soviet-built Afghan military that hunted these insurgents through the 1980s.
Facing a dearth of professional officers, the U.S.-led coalition is bringing these former foes in from the cold, restoring their Soviet-era rank and giving them command positions. American officers say few other Afghans have the formal military training and know-how to run conventional divisions and brigades.
Numbering just over 100,000 soldiers, the ANA is slated to grow to 172,000 by the autumn of 2011. Turning it into a serious fighting force is a priority for the Obama administration—offering the only exit strategy for the U.S.-led coalition as Western public opinion sours on the Afghan war.
In this mission, grooming senior ANA commanders is just as important as bulking up the ranks with recruits.
"If you don't develop leaders, this military cannot succeed," says U.S. Lt. Gen. William Caldwell IV, the commander of the coalition's program to build up Afghan security forces.
Soviet-era veterans—many of them exiled or unemployed during the tumult of recent years—offer a ready reservoir of such leaders.
"Former army officers are very experienced, and the more we expand our army, the more we need them," says Brig. Gen. Ali Ahmad Popal, commander of the Kabul Military Training Center, a sprawling facility that churns out thousands of new ANA soldiers every month.
The deputy corps commander of Kandahar in Communist times, Gen. Popal himself lived in exile in India until joining the ANA in 2008.
"The only difference between the old army and the new army is that before we had conscription, and now it's all-volunteer," he says. "We fight the enemies of our country and anyone who attacks our soil."
President Hamid Karzai said this week he is considering a reintroduction of the draft in Afghanistan.
This reliance on Soviet-era officers was evident at a recent graduation ceremony from a senior ANA command course. Nineteen colonels and brigadiers in their 50s and 60s graduated after several months of study with American and French instructors. Among them, 16 had fought in the Communist Afghan army, and only three hailed from mujahedeen backgrounds.
These Afghan Army veterans—most of whom were educated in Russia—often espouse a top-down, bureaucratic approach that can clash with the American military culture, which gives more leeway to individual commanders and puts more authority in the hands of noncommissioned officers.
U.S. Enlists Former Foes to Lead Afghan Army - WSJ.com
