The Way It Was

[EagleEyes]

THE WAY IT WAS
za-khan

DJ continues publishing extracts from
Brig (Retd) ZA KHAN'S
very readable forthcoming book

Indian troop movement in reaction to 'Grand Slam' started on 1 September. Reports of the Indian build-up on the borders started coming in on 3 September, a Pakistani 'lashkar' patrol operating on the Pathankot-Jammu road ambushed a dispatch rider and captured documents that revealed that the Indian 1 Armoured Division had concentrated in area Samba on the Pathankot-Jammu road. Rangers and Field Intelligence Units observing the road Pathankot-Jammu had also observed tanks off loading from tank transporters. One story that went around the army after the ceasefire was that the situation map in the Military Intelligence Directorate showed the Indian armoured division at Samba, that when General Musa, commonly referred to as Moses, saw the Indian deployment he ordered the armoured division markings removed saying it is spoiling our plans.

On Saturday, 4 September, GHQ and 1 Corps Headquarters sent instructions to all formations to be 'vigilant' but did not state that the Indians were likely to attack. All the formations decided to occupy their defensive positions except 10 Division where Major General Sarfarz Khan decided to deploy on the night 5/6 September. At 0320 hours on the night 5/6 September the Indians attacked across the international borders, artillery opened fire and a brigade attacked 3 Punjab located in an enclave across the Jassar bridge over the Ravi. On the Wagah-Lahore and the Burki-Lahore roads, 15 and 7 Indian divisions crossed the border and advanced on Lahore. In the Kasur area the Indian 4 Mountain Division launched attacks at three points.

At the Jassar bridge the two companies of 3 Punjab, in the enclave across the river, a part of 115 Brigade, attacked by two battalions of the Indian 29 Independent Brigade, fled across the bridge. In the morning the Signal Company commander of 115 Brigade, Major Mansur-ul Haq Malik induced two tanks of 33 TDU and a section of the Punjab battalion to advance across the bridge. Seeing the tanks rumbling across the bridge, the Indian infantry who had stacked their arms to dig defences, abandoned their positions and 3 Punjab re-occupied their positions. The two tanks after crossing the bridge got bogged down, their pictures were printed in newspapers worldwide.

At 15 Division headquarters, the GOC, Brigadier Ismail, a Service Corps officer, and the Colonel Staff, Colonel S. G. Mehdi concerned about the practicability of the plans of 15 Division, drawn up by Major General A. M. Yahya, the former GOC, tried frantically to decentralise command to brigades but could not do so due to logistic difficulties.

1 Corps headquarters had moved back to Kharian after the Rann of Kutch disengagement. At about 0700 hours on 6 September, the GSO 2 (Mujahid) went to the officers mess to buy a packet of cigarettes, there the GHQ liaison officer met him and told him that the Indians had attacked across the border. The GSO 2 hurried to the Corps Headquarters and found sweepers cleaning and office orderlies dusting offices, he telephoned the Corps Commander and the Corps Chief of Staff at their residences and gave them the news. The Corps Commander and the Chief of Staff hurried to the headquarters, held a conference and decided to move the headquarters to Gujranwala and 6 Armoured Division to its forward concentration area.

Major General Sarfaraz Khan, GOC 10 Division, on the receipt of the instruction to be 'vigilant' held a conference at which it was decided to deploy the division after the weekend, on the night 5/6 September. Major Arif Jan, from the 4th PMA course, commanding a company of 11 FF, Recce and Support battalion, was ordered to move after midnight on the night 5/6 September and take up a screen position near Wagah. After discussing with his senior JCO he decided to move at 2100 hours on the night 5/6 September because if he moved after midnight the troops could neither rest before or after the move started. Elements of the Indian 15 Division crossed the border away from the Wagah border post, circled back to the GT Road and ran into the Major Jan's company, in the skirmish he was killed. On the Burki-Lahore road elements of the Indian 7 Division contacted a company of 12 Punjab and one of 11 FF on the Hudiara Drain.

On the Lahore front it was said that the GSO 1 (Intelligence) of the Indian corps headquarters, had had the Grand Trunk Road reconnoitered from Wagah to the Shalimar Garden, found no signs of any Pakistani troop deployment and had assured the formation that they could drive to Lahore, probably this caused the Indian C-in-C to remark that he would be having his evening in the Shalimar gardens on 6th evening. Contacting the Pakistan Army on both roads the Indians became cautious but were able to advance up to the BRB Canal, the main defensive position of 10 Division. On the Wagah-Lahore road a Lahore Omnibus bus was captured and pictures of it appeared all over the world to show that Lahore had fallen. On the 11 Division front, commanded by Major General Abdul Hamid Khan, the Indians attacked at three points, all the attacks were repulsed.

The Indian Air Force attacked railways and road movement, a dawn patrol flown by PAF aircraft intercepted Indian aircraft attacking a train at Rahwali, my brother Flight Lieutenant Aftab Alam, flying a F-104, shot down an Indian aircraft. The PAF was also called upon to fly ground support sorties to prevent the Indians crossing the BRB at the places where they had reached it.

By about 1000 hours on 6 September, to everyone in the operations room of the Military Operations Directorate in GHQ, it should have been clear that the Indian attack across the borders of Pakistan had failed to achieve any critical gains, the Indians had been effectively stopped at all the places where they had attacked, even on the Lahore front where the enemy had contacted the main defenses on the BRB there was no cause to worry. With the Pakistan Army on the defensive from Sialkot to Sulemanki a sustained effort at Akhnur could have been decisive, the all weather route to Kashmir would have been cut and Rajauri where the uprising had succeeded could have been linked up.

At the GHQ the Indian attack on Pakistan had a stunning effect, the 'Grand Slam' operation was halted and 1 Armoured Division was ordered to break out from a bridge head to be established by 11 Division. The limited 'aim' of creating a favourable situation in Kashmir had changed into an ambitious one of defeating the much larger Indian army. Someone should have remembered that maintenance of the aim is the first principle of war.

After the deployment of the army as a result of the Rann of Kutch dispute, the Military Operations Directorate, at Kharian, reviewed the operational plans of the army and indicated the targets it wanted destroyed by the SSG. Every major bridge and other vital areas were required to be destroyed. Colonel S. G. Mehdi, who had commanded the SSG for about two years had apparently exaggerated the capabilities of the SSG, he was promoted, the SSG was reorganised into three commando battalions, there were great expectations from the SSG but when he was confronted with the Military Operations Directorate requirements, he backed out. General Musa who was attending the presentation, is said to have screamed you have cheated me and Colonel Mehdi was posted out.

A few hours after the Indians attacked across the borders of Pakistan, the SSG received orders to paradrop the commandos on the three main Indian air bases, Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara on the night 6/7 September, to destroy aircraft and put these bases out of action. This was a requirement given by the PAF at some earlier date and had been accepted by the SSG. The Headquarters SSG had carried out no preliminary planning for these operations, no intelligence had been gathered, no maps and air photos were collected and no troops had been earmarked and trained. Lieutenant Colonel Matin, Punjab Regiment, who had not served in the SSG but had been selected as a SSG battalion commander by Colonel S. G. Mehdi, was the officiating commander of the SSG on 6 September, the orders came without any warning and caught the SSG without any plans and troops earmarked for the operation. The officiating SSG commander and the GSO 2 (Operations), Major Dar, Punjab Regiment, later major general, who had also not served with the SSG but was made responsible for operational planning and supervision of the launching of operations, proceeded to launch the operation, officers and men going about their normal duties were hurriedly collected, taken down to the Peshawar airfield, grouped in three batches, given a perfunctory briefing with some air photographs, and were readied for dispatch. After innumerable delays the C-130s took off at 0330 hours on the morning of 7 September, giving the commandos about two and a half hours before daylight to complete an operation which required about eight hours. One team, commanded by Captain Durrani, FF, was given a bundle of quarter-inch maps, printed in 1923, of the Adampur air base area, after they had boarded the aircraft. The party which was dropped at Pathankot, commanded by Major Khalid Gulrez Butt landed on the Amritsar-Pathankot road at a considerable distance from the Pathankot airbase. Major Butt, who was commanding this drop, was not able to assemble the troops and he and most of the men surrendered when contacted by Indian troops. Two men, Pathans from the Frontier made their way back to Pakistan. This para-drop, though it had failed in its mission, had a serious impact on the planned Indian operations, 14 Indian Division was moving from Amritsar to Samba to take part in operations in conjunction with the Indian 1 Armoured Division, the Division was stopped on the road and was employed to hunt for paratroopers, the next morning the PAF found the road clogged with transport and inflicted a heavy toll. At Adampur, Captain Durrani was able to assemble the force and move towards the air base but found himself at the wrong end of the base, very soon it was daylight and armoured cars began patrolling, during the day Indian troops searched the area, some para-troopers were caught. That evening, Captain Durrani ordered his force to ex-filtrate back in small groups, he, with a small group, was captured at the junction of the Beas and the Sutlej rivers. The third drop took place at Halwara, the paratroopers landed on the roof of houses in a large village. The force commander, Major Hazur Hasnain, later brigadier, could not assemble his men but with two men made his way to the air base, he got to the perimeter fence, while he was there a PAF bomber attacked the base, unable to do anything he decided to make his way back to Pakistan, hiding during the day, moving at night. On the second night his party captured an Indian Air Force jeep in which they drove to the border and crossed over.

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Apart from Kashmir, two main fronts developed, one between the Chenab and Ravi Rivers, extending from the Pukhlian Salient to the Jassar Bridge over the Ravi, held by 15 Division, with 6 Armoured Division in reserve and controlled by 1 Corps, the second between the Ravi and the Sutlej Rivers, extending from the Siphon of the BRB Canal on the Ravi to Husseiniwala Headworks, this area was held by 10 and 11 Divisions with 1 Armoured Division in the area as Army reserve.

During the night 6/7 September, the Indians attacked the two companies of 3 Punjab, deployed across the Jassar bridge, three times and in the fourth attack on 7 September they captured the end of the bridge. 1 Corps had ordered the preparation of the bridge for demolition and authorised 15 Division to blow it when necessary. GOC 15 Division now ordered the bridge to be demolished in such a hurry that the 3 Punjab companies across the river had to abandon their heavy weapons.

 

[EagleEyes]

101 Brigade in the Sialkot area observed tanks and infantry forming up to attack and asked for artillery fire to break up the attack but was over-ruled by the GOC with the remark no provocation. At 1800 on 7 September, GOC and Colonel Staff 15 Division after pre-conceiving the idea of a major Indian attack at Jassar, ordered 22 Brigade and 25 Cavalry, deployed at Charwa to intercept any Indian attack from the Pathankot-Samba-Jammu road, to move to Narowal to counter attack the Indians if they captured the Jassar bridge. On the morning of 8 September, while the GOC 15 Division was planning his counter attack for the re-capture of Jassar bridge, information was received that the Indians had launched a major attack with tanks at Bajragarhi and Charwa.

The move of 24 Brigade had created a gap of about 18,000 yards in the Charwa defences which had now to be defended by three companies of 3 FF, one company of 2 Punjab and a company of 13 FF (R&S). While the defences were being adjusted the Indian attack started, by 0600 hours on 8 September, the Indian Red Route Charwa-Chobara-Phillaurah was open for Indian tanks. Bajragarhe-Maharajke-Charwa held by &#39;B Company 13 FF was over-run by tanks, 69 and 99 Mountain Brigades, to form the firm base for the Indian 1 Armoured Division which advanced with 17 Poona Horse on the Kakhnal-Dograi route and 16 Cavalry on the Chobra-Philaurah route, 43 Lorried Brigade of the Armoured Division formed the second prong of the attack, 2 Lancers and 62 Cavalry protected the flanks. At 1000 hours the Indians had come eight miles from the border when they were contacted by 25 Cavalry.

On receipt of the news of the Indian attack, GOC 15 Division ordered 24 Brigade and 25 Cavalry to return and re-occupy their defences. After re-fueling 25 Cavalry was moving back on the route Narowal-Pasrur-Chawinda, it had just cleared the Degh Nadi when at about 0800 hours it was informed that Indian tanks were advancing south with their location not known. The commanding officer 25 Cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel Nisar Ahmad Khan, later brigadier, ordered his regiment, moving east to west, to turn right and move northward. Turning from line of march the regiment covered a front of about 12,000 yards with the right flank resting on the Degh Nadi. &#39;C&#39; Squadron commanded by Major Effendi on the right, did not contact the enemy, in the centre the squadron commanded by Major Mohammad Ahmad, later brigadier, contacted and engaged 17 Poona Horse on the Tharoh-Durgi track, the left hand squadron commanded by Major Raza, later lieutenant colonel, contacted 16 Cavalry at Wachoke. One troop of this squadron had continued to move westwards till the squadron commander realized that the order had not been obeyed and again ordered the troop leader to turn right and advance, the troop turned where it was, started moving northwards and contacted the Indian 69 Mountain Brigade at Maharajke.

A tank versus tank engagement followed with the PAF joining in, the Indians broke contact and took up a defensive line Bhago-Chobara-Phillaraurah. GOC 15 Division, after ordering 24 Brigade and 25 Cavalry to return to Charwa, returned to his headquarters at Sialkot and found reports that the Indians after forming up were attacking 101 Brigade without provocation on the Sialkot-Jammu road and Bajrajgarhe-Maharajke-Charwa road, he ordered his headquarters to withdraw to Sambrial. 1 Corps informed GHQ of this impending withdrawal and Brigadier Ismail was relieved of his command. Major-General Tikka Khan who was in Kharian assumed the command of 15 Division.

In the Sialkot area Indian 18 Cavalry tanks approaching from Bajragarhe were repulsed by a squadron of 31 TDU, on the Sialkot-Jammu road, the Indians captured the advance positions of 101 Brigade but three attacks on the main position were repulsed. On the morning of 9 September, Major General Tikka Khan launched counter attack to capture Suchetgarh with 20th Lancers less squadron, the corps reconnaissance regiment, a squadron of 31 TDU, two companies of 19 Baluch, a company of 14 Baluch and some elements of 13 FF, the Indians repulsed the attack knocking out four light and two medium tanks. Also on this day 24 Brigade attempt to recapture Chobara was repulsed, but 3 FF recaptured Rurki Kalan and Sardanwali. The Indian 43 Lorried Brigade occupied Bhagowal, and their 16 Cavalry attacked Gadgor but was repulsed by 25 Cavalry, who were now reduced to two squadrons.

Major Effendi while rummaging in the 16 Cavalry commanding officer&#39;s abandoned tank found a copy of the Indian 1 Armoured Division operation order which confirmed the Division was operating in the area. 24 Brigade, at once, asked for reinforcement from 15 Division which made a squadron of 31 TDU available and asked 1 Corps for reinforcements. 1 Corps on their part asked GHQ for reinforcements. GHQ placed 6 Armoured Division and 14 (para) Brigade under 1 Corps who divided the responsibility in the area between Chenab and Ravi, 15 Division with three infantry brigades, two armoured regiments 31 and 33 TDUs and 20 Lancers, Corps Reconnaissance Regiment was made responsible for Sialkot and Jassar, and 6 Armoured Division with 14 (para) Brigade, commanded by Brigadier AAK Niazi, later lieutenant general and 24 Brigade was made responsible for Pasrur-Chawinda area from the night of 9/10 September.

On the 15 Division front, 10 Brigade, withdrawn from Chamb and deployed at Faizgarh-Pattanwali area on 10 September, captured Kalarwanda on 12 September but lost it to a counter attack. On 16 September, 15 Division was ordered to relieve the pressure on 6 Armoured Division, it attacked Kalarwanda but failed to capture it . A 20 Lancers squadron, commanded by Major Durrani, given the task of holding a dominating feature called &#39;bench mark&#39; between 101 and 104 Brigades, made it a habit of occupying it during the day and withdrawing to a leaguer at night, on the night of 18/19 September the Indians occupied the feature. After the ceasefire negotiations began, 15 Division was ordered to recapture before the ceasefire, the feature was captured after a heavy artillery bombardment but was lost again to a counter attack.

On the front that was to be taken over by 6 Armoured Division, the Indian 1 Armoured Division, on the morning of 10 September, renewed its attack on Gadgor and Philaurah but was repulsed by 24 Brigade and 25 Cavalry. On this day Major General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan who was appointed &#39;adviser&#39; to 1 Corps Commander, advised the deployment of a brigade at Zafarwal and another at Pasur and an armoured regiment with a motor battalion to hold the Deg Nadi-Philaurah-Badiana Line. 4 FF from 14 (para) brigade was to deploy at Zafarwal, 24 Brigade at Pasrur, 11 Cavalry with 7 FF was to take over the Gadgor-Philaurah front from 24 Brigade and 25 Cavalry. Guides Cavalry and 14 FF were placed in reserve at Badiana and 22 Cavalry was to cover the gap between 6 Armoured Division and 15 Division. The deployment was defensive.

11 Cavalry and 7 FF relieved 25 Cavalry and 24 Brigade on the night between 10/11 September. At 0500 hours on 11 September, artillery fire on Gadgor and Phillaurah started, the Indian 1 Armoured Division renewed its attack in this sector. At 0800 hours 17 Poona Horse contacted &#39;C&#39; Squadron 11 Cavalry at Wachoke, 4 (Hodson&#39;s) Horse passing west of Rurki Kalan contacted &#39;A&#39; Squadron 11 Cavalry and &#39;A&#39; Company 9 FF at Josun, in the tank battle that developed &#39;C&#39; Squadron 11 Cavalry equipped with M36B2 &#39;tank destroyers&#39; was shot out. &#39;B&#39; Squadron at Maral was ordered to reinforce &#39;C&#39; Squadron, &#39;B&#39; Squadron moved and contacted 17 (Poona) Horse at Kotli Khadim Shah, &#39;A&#39; Company 9 FF contacted by 4 (Hodson&#39;s) Horse abandoned its position. 2nd Lancers, protecting the eastern flank of the Indian armoured division contacted &#39;C&#39; Company 9 FF, out-flanked it, advanced towards Maral, found the gap created by the move of &#39;B Squadron 11 Cavalry and trapped A Squadron 11 Cavalry between itself and 4 (Hodson&#39;s) Horse, totally destroying it and isolating 9 FF in area Gadgor. The Indian 43 Lorried Brigade, moving behind the armoured brigade, advanced from Rurki Kalan towards Libbe. &#39;B&#39; Squadron 11 Cavalry was the only organised force left in the area. At about 1130 hours 6 Armoured Division counter attacked with two squadrons of Guides cavalry to clear Chahr and Libbe occupied by the 43 Lorried Brigade, Chahr was captured by &#39;A&#39; Squadron, &#39;B&#39; Squadron attacking Libbe came under heavy fire, moved towards Bhagowal, contacted 62 Cavalry protecting the western flank of the armoured division and captured Bhagowal. At about mid-day 11 Cavalry withdrew from Phillaurah to Chawinda, 17 (Poona) Horse occupied Phillaurah, was relieved by 43 Lorried Brigade and the lorried brigade in turn was relieved by the 99 and 6 Mountain Brigades which formed the firm base for the Indian armoured division. 25 Cavalry was called into the battle line again and again checked the Indian tanks south of Phillaurah. On the night 11/12 September, 9 FF, withdrawing from Gadgor where they were cut off, were ambushed by 5 Jats while passing through Phillaurah, lost 10 killed, 27 captured and became useless for the rest of the war. In the day&#39;s fighting 6 Armoured Division lost two squadrons of one regiment, one squadron from another and one motor battalion was badly mauled. The five armoured regiments of the Indian armoured division were concentrated, ours were fed into the battle one squadron at a time. Also the route of withdrawal of 9 FF through a village held by the Indians was ridiculous.

As the battle swayed 1 Corps placed 10 Brigade under 6 Armoured Division but Major General Tikka Khan protested very strongly and the order was cancelled. On the evening of 11 September, 1 Corps Commander ordered 6 Armoured Division to recapture Phillaurah, 6 Armoured Division commander advised the corps commander that he had barely adequate troops to hold the existing front, an attack could not be mounted without reconnaissance and additional infantry. The Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Rana, then asked the GOC 6 Armoured Division to inform General Musa personally about this and a telephone call was made to the Chief of General Staff.

My friend Major Z. U. Abbasi was killed on this day when an artillery shell went through the open turret hatch of his tank. He was awarded the Sitara-e-Jurrat for the successful attack that he had led.

On the night 11/12 September and on 12 September, 6 Armoured Division adjusted defences, on the right at Chawinda, 24 Brigade with 25 Cavalry held the front from Jassoran on the right to Dogranwali on the left. In the centre Guides Cavalry with the remaining squadron of 11 Cavalry under command and a company of 14 FF, held about 6000 yards of front, on the left 22 Cavalry with one company 14 FF held 5000 yards from Jheje to Gunna Kalan, linking up with 15 Division, in depth at Pasrur, 14 (Para) Brigade was deployed with 9 FF under command.

&#39;A&#39; Company SSG, operating from Zafarwal, prevented movement on the Pathankot Samba-Jammu road at night. When the operations started Subedar Khudadad (KD), the senior JCO of the company prevented the company from crossing the border because he thought that the company would be destroyed and had to be taken to task for it. &#39;J&#39; Company was also deployed in this area but was withdrawn into GHQ reserve. On 12 September civilians rushing through Zafarwal informed &#39;A&#39; Company that a large body of Indian soldiers were resting in a nullah bed and gave the location. Major Shamim Alam, later General, took the SSG jeeps fitted with machine guns and engaged them till they withdrew in confusion.

In the adjustment of defences on 11 September, Zafarwal had been left undefended, on 12 September an Army Aviation aircraft reported Indian tanks moving towards it, 6 Armoured Division hurriedly moved 4 FF and a squadron of 22 Cavalry, two troops of 33 TDU and a platoon of 15 Division R&S battalion. The Indians attacked twice with a battalion and a squadron of tanks and were repulsed. 4 FF was undergoing a change of command when the Indians attacked again with two squadrons of tanks and an infantry battalion, the out-going lieutenant colonel ordered the defences abandoned. Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Hayat, later brigadier, the incoming commanding officer, with great difficulty managed to keep the battalion and a troop of the squadron of 22 Cavalry in position, the Indian attack was repulsed. Lieutenant Colonel Hayat and the troop leader were awarded the SJ and the 22 Cavalry squadron commander was court martialed after the cease fire.

With 14 (Para) Brigade under command of 6 Armoured Division, an ad hoc armoured brigade headquarters was created to control the armour of the division. This headquarters called &#39;Wajahat Force&#39; was the regimental headquarters of 11 Cavalry and the force consisted of the remaining armour elements of 6 Armoured Division, Guides Cavalry, 22 Cavalry and 14 FF.

On 13 September the Indians captured Bhagowal and in reaction Wajahat Force was ordered to capture Phillaurah. Movement started late in the afternoon and our tanks withdrew after nightfall, the Indians occupied Vinjal, Wadianwali, Alhar, Fatehpur, Rakh Baba Bhure Shah and Koga. The next morning 22 Cavalry moving towards Bhagowal was engaged by 16 Cavalry, the Guides by 4 (Hodson&#39;s) Horse at Alhar and 25 Cavalry by 17 (Poona) Horse. During the night Alhar, Fatehpur, some ground between Sialkot-Phillaurah and Sialkot-Narowal was lost because contact was not maintained at night when tanks withdrew to their leaguers.

On 15 September, 6 Armoured Division with Guides Cavalry, now two squadrons, 22 Cavalry and 19 Lancers, ex-1 Armoured Division tried to recapture Fatehpur and Rakh Bhure Shah but failed to do so. The Indians attacked Chawinda, Jassorian and Badiana but were repulsed. 19 Lancers knocked out some of their own tanks by mistake. The news of Indian tanks at Badiana, made Brigadier Hisam-el-Effendi, attached as advisor to the GOC 6 Armoured Division, ordered a withdrawal of the division headquarters but this was countermanded by the GOC and Brigadier Effendi was removed from the headquarters.

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1 Corps, now with 1 Armoured Division less 5 Armoured Brigade under command, planned to recapture Phillaurah, Chobara and Maharjke. No plan to cut the Pathakot-Samba-Jammu road by advancing north from Zafarwal was made which would have had the same effect as the capture of Akhnur. GHQ had forgotten the purpose of the whole affair, 1 Corps and its advisor played safe and showed no boldness.

On 16 September the Indians captured Jassorian and Buttar Dograndi and almost achieved their aim of cutting the Chawinda-Pasrur road. The Indian GOC encouraged 17 (Poona) Horse to cut the road at mile 3 by promising the &#39;Maha Vir Chakra&#39;, the highest Indian gallantry award to the commanding officer. The Indian tanks advanced towards Chawinda railway station and were engaged by 1 (SP) Field Regiment over open sights by Major Rashid till 25 Cavalry tanks arrived and in the tank battle, the tank of the commanding officer of 17 (Poona) Horse was knocked out, the commanding officer was killed and the attack fizzled out. With Jassorian and Butter Dograndi lost, Chawinda, defended by 24 Brigade, was outflanked from the west and the brigade commander had doubts about holding on.

The Headquarters 4 Armoured Brigade was now made available to 6 Armoured Division to command its armour elements which now consisted of 19 Lancers, 22 Cavalry and 14 FF and was given the task of containing the salient across the Sialkot-Narowal railway line. 22 Cavalry was deployed between Badiana and Gunna Kalan, linking up with 15 Division and 19 Lancers between Badiana and Chawinda linking up with 24 Brigade.

On 18 September, 1 Corps reorganised the command between the Chenab and the Ravi rivers, 15 Division with 51, 101 and 104 Brigades was to defend Sialkot, 6 Armoured Division with 4 Armoured Brigade and 14 (Para) Brigade was made responsible for the area up to Chawinda and 8 Division, now commanded by Major General Naseer who had been removed from the command of 1 Armoured Division, with 10, 24 and 115 Brigades, was made responsible for Chawinda, Zafarwal and Narowal.

 

[EagleEyes]

6 Armoured Division attacked on 18 September to eliminate the salient across the Sialkot-Narowal railway line. 3 FF captured Buttar Dograndi, 19 Lancers cleared Mundeke Berian, Khurpa, Sadroke and Jassorian, 3 FF was ordered to occupy Jassorian but failed to do so. On the night 18/19 September, the Indian 4 Mountain Division, reinforced with 35 and 58 Brigades from the Indian 14 Division, attacked Chawinda from the west, 35 Brigade captured Jassorian as it had not been occupied by 3 FF, and the Chawinda Railway Station, which was counter attacked by 2 Punjab and 25 Cavalry and recaptured. On 20 September, 4 Armoured Brigade, now commanded by Brigadier Riaz-ul-Karim, cleared the salient south of the Sialkot-Narowal railway line.

With the ceasefire being negotiated 1 Corps ordered lost territory to be recaptured. 15 Division was to recapture &#39;Bench Mark&#39;, it failed. 6 Armoured Division was to clear the salient Kalarwanda-Bhagowal-Akh Bhure Shah, the attack was postponed on the 21st and cancelled on the 22nd. The Indian 1 Armoured Division handed over the front to 6 Mountain Division and disappeared until it was located by a SSG patrol. At 0300 hours the ceasefire became effective.

The defence of the border from the point where the Ravi enters Pakistan to Husseiniwala on the Sutlej River, was divided between 10 and 11 Divisions. 10 Division consisting seven infantry battalions, 23 Cavalry and 30 TDU and some Rangers had 51,000 yards of front, the Staff College teaching for a division was 10,000 yards.

Major General Sarfaraz Khan, GOC 10 Division, had planned a screen at Wagah and the Hudiara Drain, the first line of defence east of the BRB, protected by a minefield, a second line of defence on the eastern bank of the BRB and the main defence on the western bank of the BRB. On the left 114 Brigade with three battalions and a squadron of 30 TDU was to hold 25,000 yards of front with three crossings of the BRB, Bhaini Bridge, Grant Trunk Road and the Lahore -Amritsar railway line crossing. 103 brigade with two battalions and a squadron of 30 TDU had about 20,000 yards of front with the Burki Road and Hudiara Siphon crossings of the BRB. The rangers held 6,000 yards of the division&#39;s front on the right. 22 Brigade with two battalions of infantry and 23 Cavalry was the divisional reserve with ten counter attack tasks west of the BRB and two east of the BRB, one company from the brigade was deployed on the Shadara Bridge over the Ravi. All units, like the rest of army, had 25% per cent of personnel on leave.

The Indians attacked with 15 Infantry Division, 50 (Para) Brigade and 14 (Scinde) Horse on the Amritsar - Lahore Road and with 7 Infantry Division with Central India Horse on the Harike-Burki-Lahore Road.

In the north, the Indian 96 Brigade captured the Ichogil Border Post, contacted 11 Baluch at 0600 hours at the Bhaini Bridge and were repulsed in the attempt to capture the bridge; the bridge was blown at 1100 hours. On the Amritsar-Lahore Road the Indian 54 Brigade, at about 0330 hours, contacted the 11 FF company commanded by Major Jan, the company scattered but the Indians became cautious and reached the Jallo/Batapur bridge at 0600 hours.

Surprised, confused and threatened by the imminent loss of the Bhaini and Batapur Bridges, 10 Division requested the PAF for support and the PAF responded effectively. C Squadron, 23 Cavalry, after the squadron commander&#39;s tank was knocked out, was taken over by Risaldar Siddiq who reached the Batapur Bridge and with 18 Baluch and 11 FF companies prevented the Indians from crossing the canal.

On the Harike-Burki-Lahore Road, the Indian 7 Infantry Division contacted the 103 Brigade advance position at 0530 where a company of 12 Punjab and one of 11 FF firmly held their positions till 1400 when the position had to be abandoned because it was outflanked. However the Indians did not contact the next position till the night 7/8 September.

On the night 7/8 September Major General Sarfaraz decided to counter attack. The Indians launched a brigade attack at Batapur and battalion attack at Bhaini Bridge, while the Indian attacks were in progress 23 Cavalry, with two companies of 18 Baluch mounted on the tanks drove 3 miles on the west bank of the canal, in full view of the Indians, crossed the BRB at the Siphon, at a crossing secured by 15 Baluch, drove one mile on the east bank of the BRB, again in full view of the Indians. The leading tank was knocked out by anti-tank fire and blocked the canal bank road, the troop leader pushed the burning tank off the canal bank with his tank and the advance continued on the canal bank till a place was found where the tanks could get off the canal bank. Indian artillery came down and the infantry dismounted from the tanks.

After getting off the canal bank 23 Cavalry attacked with three squadrons up, B Squadron, commanded by Major Sarwar, on the right, with Dogari as the objective, A Squadron on the left with Wagah as the objective, C Squadron in the middle linking the two. B Squadron secured Dograi at about 1200 hours without any infantry, Major Moghal commanding C Squadron from his rover, came under artillery fire and lost contact with the squadron, Risaldar Siddiq again assumed command and finding that A Squadron had not reached their objective, extended his flank and secured Wagah. The counter attack recaptured the entire area lost in this sector on 6 September. 114 Brigade attacked in coordination with 22 Brigade and reached the Chugavan Drain. On the Burki Road the Indians contacted the 103 Brigade defences at Burki which was held by a company of 17 Punjab.

After 22 Brigade and 114 Brigade recaptured the lost areas, 10 Division failed to exploit the success by exploiting to the UBDC or organising defences on the east bank of the BRB. 23 Cavalry waited on their objectives without infantry, when squadron commanders asked for instructions for the night, Lieutenant Colonel Ghulam Mohammad gave the position where the regiment was to leaguer and left it to the discretion of squadron commanders to stay on the objective or to return to the regimental leaguer. B Squadron stayed at Dograi, mounted their &#39;bow&#39; machine guns on tripods and held the village till 16 Punjab joined them the next day.

The Indian 15 Division, when it realised its withdrawal was not being followed up, returned and contacted the Dograi and 114 Brigade positions east of the BRB. After the Indians re-established contact at Dograi, B Squadron was ordered to probe towards Dial and found the Indians dug in. 15 Baluch and a squadron of 30 TDU who had occupied Rani, Kakar and Hatampur were withdrawn.

On the 103 Brigade front the Indians attacked Burki, a 12 Punjab company held out till the company commander was killed, then bolted across the canal.

On the evening of 10 September, the GOC 10 division ordered 22 Brigade to counter attack the Indian 7 Division from Dograi and link up with 103 Brigade at Burki. The brigade made its preliminary move but because of the &#39;Hudiara Siphon&#39; flap it was ordered to move to Walton.

On 11 September an artillery observer reported that Indian tanks had passed under the Hudiara Siphon, the brigade major of 103 brigade reported this to 10 Division and ordered 103 Brigade headquarters to prepare to withdraw. An NCO heard this order being given and passed it to his battalion, 12 Punjab, the battalion abandoned its positions and bolted to its unit lines in Lahore from where they were rounded up and brought back.

10 Division on being informed by 103 Brigade that Indian tanks had crossed the Hudiara Siphon, informed GHQ who detached 3rd Armoured Brigade from 1 Armoured Division to counter attack. The 3rd Armoured Brigade moved from Khem Karan to Lahore by rail, formed up east of the airport to attack the Hudiara Siphon. Brigadier Moinuddin, the brigade commander while carrying out his reconnaissance noticed that the tanks at the Siphon had their guns facing east and ordered 19 Lancers not to fire unless fired upon. 19 Lancers reached Siphon without any hindrance, there, Major Benoy Biswas, formerly of Guides Cavalry, now commanding the 30 TDU squadron attached to 103 Brigade, inquired very curiously what&#39;s going on? The 30 TDU squadron grouped with 103 Brigade had not been marked on the brigade and division&#39;s maps and no action was taken to confirm the artillery observer&#39;s report. The initiative now passed to the Indians and they attacked all along the front but without success.

On the night 11/12 September, 16 Punjab lost some ground and tried to recapture it with tanks the next day. B Squadron, 23 Cavalry, while advancing along the GT Road ran into an anti-tank screen, Major Sarwar in his tank, crossed the road to check a troop leader who was not advancing, while re-crossing the road an anti tank recoilless rifle knocked out his M 48 tank which blew up killing all the crew.

For about a week B Squadron remained without a squadron commander. Every night the Indians put in an attack to capture Dograi but were repulsed. On the night 21/22 September, A Squadron, commanded by Major Nazar, was ordered to relieve B Squadron at Dograi but instead of going to Dograi A squadron went to the 18 Baluch position on the west bank of the canal and reported that it was in the 16 Punjab position. 16 Punjab had allowed B Squadron to move back but when A Squadron did not come, the commanding officer of 16 Punjab, Lt Col Golwala, sent his intelligence officer and informed 22 Brigade who tried to contact the squadron but could not. That night the Indians attacked again with a battalion and captured the northern end of Dograi, passed through the village and overran 16 Punjab. 22 Brigade learnt of the fall of Dograi when 8 Punjab at Bhasin reported that it was being fired upon from Dograi.

The GOC, on hearing of the fall of Dograi, ordered an immediate counter attack by 22 Brigade with 1 Baluch and C Squadron, 23 Cavalry. 1 Baluch, who had arrived in the area during the night did not follow the normal battle procedure, the battalion crossed the BRB and attacked Dial with the Indians at Dograi enfilading. Captain Afridi, a company commander, wounded after crossing the start line, was himself carried by his havaldar major and accompanied his company, in spite of the elan of the battalion the attack failed.

C Squadron, 23 Cavalry, which was to support 1 Baluch, now commanded by Major Nazir, crossed the BRB and ran his tank into a minefield on the east bank of the BRB about which he had been warned, the rest of the squadron continued towards Dograi but stopped short of it. The 22 Brigade commander who, with the RHQ of 23 Cavalry were observing the attack, ordered Major Waheed Qadir, the second in command of 23 Cavalry, to take over the command of the Squadron. Major Qadir drove in his jeep to a tank, got into it and found that its wireless set was not working. He got out of the tank and climbed into another but by this time the Indian tank squadron that had pulled out of Dograi was brought back to Dial from where it enfiladed C Squadron attacking Dograi and knocked out six tanks in quick succession. A very well conducted battle by Major General Sarfaraz Khan ended on the sour note of the loss of Dograi.

In continuation of the 10 Division front, 11 Division was responsible from Bedian to Gandasinghwala. This division consisted of 21, 52 and 106 Brigades of two battalions each, 6 Lancers as the integral armoured regiment and the artillery was one heavy regiment and it had 15 Lancers, a corps reconnaissance regiment was also under command. The border defences from Gandasinghwala to Sulemanki were also the responsibility of the division but were handed over to the Rangers. The operational task of the division was the defence of Kasur, attacks along the Ferozepur-Kasur and the Khem-Karan -Kasur roads and the securing of Pajoke-Bahadur Nagar line to facilitate the operations of the Army reserve.

The Army Reserve consisting of 1 Armoured Division and 7 Division was located in the area Changa Manga Forest to operate south of Sulemanki, in the Ravi-Sutlej corridor and in the Chenab-Ravi corridor. 7 Division, commanded by Major General A.M. Yahya detached 25 Brigade to 6 Armoured Division, 10 Brigade was despatched to 12 Division for operation &#39;Grand Slam&#39; and the Headquarters 7 Division moved to Bhimber leaving 14 (Para) Brigade which also moved to Chawinda leaving 1 Armoured Division without any infantry.

1 Armoured Division, the elite armoured formation of the Pakistan Army, evolved from the 3rd Independent Armoured Brigade, it had two armoured brigades of an armoured regiment and an armoured/motorised infantry battalion, one brigade of two armoured regiments and an armoured infantry battalion and a reconnaissance regiment. The division was formed under Major General Haq Nawaz Khan, an infantry officer who did not get along with the armoured corps officers that he commanded. Major General Sarfaraz Khan and Major General Sahibzada Yakub commanded the division later. In 1965 Major General Naseer had commanded the division for about three years but had failed to get the cooperation and respect from the division. He became known as the general who employed informers; maintenance of equipment deteriorated and hundreds of vehicles broke down on the roads when the division moved to its war location and many were left in garages as non-runners, a special workshop was created to repair these vehicles.

1 Armoured Division and 11 division received a warning order on 1 September, when operation Grand Slam started , 11 Division to establish a bridgehead in the Khem Karan and 1 Armoured Division to break out of the bridgehead and capture the bridge over the Beas River at Raya. On 4 September, on receiving the &#39;remain vigilant&#39; instruction, 11 Division deployed 106 Brigade at Bedian, 52 Brigade at Kasur and 21 Brigade at Husseiniwala. On the night 5/6 September, the Indian 4 Mountain Division, consisting of 7 and 62 Mountain Brigades and 9 Royal Deccan Horse, attacked 11 Divison at seven places. All the attacks were repulsed.

1 Armoured Division after receiving the warning order apparently did not take any action, on the morning of 6 September it received an order to break out of the bridgehead being established by 11 Division. To go to the bridgehead 1 Armoured Division had to construct a bridge over the Rohi Nullah, the Engineer Battalion of 1 Armoured Division was distributed to the brigades and took time to collect. 11 Division established the bridgehead, 5 Armoured Brigade was ordered to move up to the bridge site but when it arrived it found that the bridge had not been completed and due to bad traffic control the brigade lined up, head to tail, at the bridging site. When the bridge was ready it was found that tanks could not climb the Nullah bank because of the steep gradient and more time was lost while earth was piled.

The bridge across the BRB was a few inches wider than a M 48 tank, the leading tank of 6 Lancers, ex-11 Division, under command 5 Armoured Brigade, commanded by Major Dost Mohammad Utra, fell into the canal and the crew drowned. A doubt arose about the suitability of the bridge and two hours were wasted before the crossing started again.

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5 Armoured Brigade completed its concentration in the bridge head during the night and was ordered by the GOC 11 Division to advance on the roads Khem Karan-Bhikkiwind and Khem Karan-Voltoha. Brigadier Bashir ordered 6 Lancers less squadron and a company of 1 FF to advance along the Khem Karan-Voltoha railway line to capture Voltoha, 1 FF less two companies with a squadron of 6 Lancers and a squadron of 15 Lancers to advance on the road Khem Karan-Voltoha, on the left 24 Cavalry with a company 1 FF was ordered to advance on the road Khem Karan-Bhikkiwind to capture Chima.

On 8 September, 6 Lancers, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Sahibzad Gul, outflanked Khem Karan, advanced along the railway line and reached Voltoha Railway Station and contacted the Indian defences, only one platoon of 1 FF was with them, the commanding officer requested the brigade commander for additional infantry. The brigade commander ordered 6 Lancers to bypass Voltoha and go to Warnole, Lieutenant Colonel Sahibzad Gul refused to leave a large force in his rear, and did not do so. At nightfall an argument arose between the commanding officer of 6 Lancers and the brigade commander, the former wanted to hold his position at Voltoha but the later said he could not supply the regiment because 1 FF had failed to clear the road through Khem Karan. Finally 6 Lancers was ordered back to Khem Karan, but on the way back seven tanks out of seventeen which had reached Voltoha, got bogged down because of broken banks of the water channels that the tanks crossed on the way to Voltoha. Three tanks were recovered and four were destroyed by the Indians.

The 1 FF group moved at about mid-day, advanced about 800 yards, contacted the Indian defences at Khem Karan and took up a defensive position and did not open the route for 6 Lancers.

 

[EagleEyes]

24 Cavalry advanced without the 1 FF Company which was grouped with them, reached Munawan from where wheeled vehicles were sent back, and then contacted the Indian defences between Munavan and Chima with one squadron. The second squadron on the Khem Karan-Bhikkiwind contacted the Indian defences south of Chima, and the third squadron contacted the Indian defences at Bhure Khuna, between Chima and Voltoha. These were the main Indian defences, each position was held by a battalion and the brigade had an armoured regiment in support. 24 Cavalry asked for infantry and wanted to concentrate on Chima but the brigade commander ordered the main road cleared. The regiment attacked Bhure Kuhna, the Indians abandoned it but it could not be occupied because there was no infantry. At nightfall 24 Cavalry was also ordered to fall back to Khem Karan.

On the night 8/9 September, Brigadier Bashir, while going to the 11 Division headquarters, was fired upon by a jittery guard on the BRB bridge and returned to his headquarters. The commanding officers had collected for orders and were asked to report the state of their equipment. The brigade commander then asked the GOC 11 Division to call off the operations for the next day, the GOC told brigade commander that written orders were being sent. The brigade commander taking this as an approval of his request, dispersed his commanding officers without any orders for the next day. At 0400 hours on 9 September the orders from the GOC arrived to capture Assal Uttar and Voltoha. The commanding officers were asked to reassemble at the brigade headquarters but they could not find the headquarters till 1200 because it was hidden from infiltrators and had no marking.

At about mid-day on 9 September, commander 5 Armoured Brigade ordered 6 Lancers with two companies 1 FF to capture Voltoha, 24 Cavalry with two companies 5 FF to advance on the road Khem Karan-Bhikkiwind and 1 FF less two companies to establish a firm base at the junction of the roads Khem Karan-Voltoha and Khem Karan- Bhikkiwind.

1 FF quickly established the firm base and contacted the Indians at Assal Uttar, 6 Lancers advanced and contacted the Indians at Voltoha, Lieutenant Colonel Sahibzad Gul, while standing on turret of his tank and observing the Indian position was shot dead, Major I. B. Khan, the second in command refused to assume command and none of the squadron commanders rose to the occasion. 6 Lancers became paralysed. 24 Cavalry advanced to Bhure Kuhna, there under Indian shelling the commanding officer collapsed and this regiment also went out of control. At night the brigade commander again concentrated on the brigade in Khem Karan.

During the night 8/9 September, 4 Armoured Brigade commanded by Brigadier &#39;Tony&#39; Lumb, concentrated in the bridgehead, it had 4 Cavalry commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Nazir, 5 Horse commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Khan and 10 FF, an armoured infantry battalion, while the brigade was in the bridgehead, the IAF appeared and attacked the brigade. The brigade was ordered to capture Chima, the brigade commander planned to capture Mastgarh with 5 Horse, Bhure Karimpur with 10 FF, secure the line Duhal Kuhna-Kalangar Uttar with 5 Horse and then attack Chima.

The 4 Armoured Brigade advance started at about mid-day, 5 Horse moved about 4000 yards in four hours and secured Mastgarh without opposition, then instead of advancing eastwards, moved towards the Pakistan border, went to Sankhatra and reported contact with the enemy. 10 FF advanced and occupied Bhure Karimpur without opposition, half the tank squadron supporting the battalion got bogged down and they made no effort to advance to Kalanger Uttar. At about 1600 hours the brigade commander asked the GOC to call off the operation for the day, the GOC refused and ordered the brigade to replenish at Mastgarh and complete the mission at night. To do this the brigade commander asked for flank protection and a squadron of 12 Cavalry was sent to the area Lakhna-Kalangar Uttar but the brigade made no effort to complete the mission.

On 10 September plans were revised. 4 Armoured Brigade was ordered to outflank the Indian defences by securing Mile 32 on the Khem Karan-Bhikkiwind road and clearing Chima while 5 Armoured Brigade advanced on the road Khem Karan-Bhikkiwind.

4 Armoured Brigade ordered 4 Cavalry to advance to Mastgarh-Mile 32 while 10 FF with a squadron 5 Horse was to capture Chima. The advance started and after sometime the brigade commander discovered that 4 cavalry and 10 FF were on wrong routes and were corrected. 10 FF after being corrected started moving from Sankhatra towards Duhal Kuhna, the 12 Cavalry squadron deployed at Lakhna-Kalangar Uttar had not been informed about the 10 FF movement and when 10 FF tried to pass through 12 Cavalry opened fire. 10 FF panicked, abandoned their armoured personnel carriers, rushed past the brigade headquarters where the company under command 4 Cavalry also joined them, the battalion crossed the BRB and collected in 106 Brigade area. The second in command of the battalion, Major &#39;George&#39; Rabbani, spent the next few days recovering the abandoned APCs.

4 Cavalry advanced and contacted the Indians holding the line Lakhna-Duhal Kuhna, an outflanking attempt towards Bhikkiwind failed with the loss of two tanks, but trying the other flank the regiment reached its objective, Mile 32, with 11 tanks, at about 1600 hours and waited for the brigade to link up. The regiment had no wireless contact with 4 Armoured Brigade because the commanding officer&#39;s tank with the wireless link had bogged down, the second link was in the commanding officer&#39;s rover which the second in command, Major Khalid Kayani, had taken away, the third in the regimental command vehicle had also gone back. The commanding officer did not send back an officer to the brigade to inform that the objective had been taken and the brigade commander made no attempt to establish communications and find out what had happened to the regiment.

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Nothing happened during the night, after sunrise an Indian jeep came along the track which crossed the road at Mile 32, stopped and a very surprised Sikh lieutenant saw a dozen M 47 Patton tanks lined up with no signs of the crew, he drove away and came back an hour later. This time he climbed on a tank, looked inside and drove away, after sometime an Indian Patrol of about ten men arrived, a white flag was waved, Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Nazir and about a squadron strength of 4 Cavalry surrendered.

On 10 September, 6 Lancers was declared unfit for battle and 5 Armoured Brigade was ordered to advance on their old beat, Khem Karan-Bhikkiwind, 1 FF was to contain Assal Uttar while 24 Cavalry with one company of 1 FF and two companies of 5 FF was to advance and attack it. 24 Cavalry attacked with two companies of 5 FF and a squadron of tanks, the attack started well but when one company commander was killed and one wounded, both the companies ran back firing at their own troops, 24 Cavalry, left without infantry, pulled back.

At this juncture the Chief of the General Staff arrived to investigate the difficulties of the 1 Armoured Division. He decided that Chima should be captured by 24 Cavalry and 5 FF, to put this into effect commander 5 Armoured Brigade, the divisional artillery commander and the officer commanding the SP Field Regiment supporting the brigade moved forward on the Khem Kharan-Bhikkiwind Road, they were ambushed and Brigadier Shamsi, the divisional artillery commander was killed. The reserve squadron of 24 Cavalry tried to clear the ambush site but without infantry could not do so.

The news of the ambush spread and the troops started moving back bringing the operations to a standstill. The GOC 1 Armoured Division while moving through Khem Karan ordered 1 FF to clear the town and it was finally done. On this day 3rd Armoured Brigade, which had remained in reserve, was ordered to move to Gujranwala.

On 11 September, the Indians breached the Upper Bari Doab Canal and flooded the area around Khem Karan making further armour operations in the area impossible.

On 11 September, 4 Cavalry and 10 FF were assembled to reorganise them as fighting units. Assessment of losses showed that 1 Armoured Division had lost ninety tanks, 4 Cavalry was dismounted and its remaining twelve tanks were divided between 6 Lancers and 24 Cavalry, 4 Armoured Brigade was reorganised with 5 Horse and 1 FF, 5 Armoured Brigade with 24 Cavalry and 10 FF and 1 Armoured Division less 5 Armoured Brigade was ordered to move to Gujranwala. The GOC 1 Armoured Division, and the commanders of 4 and 5 Armoured Brigades were relieved of their commands while almost all the staff officers were transferred. This ended the ambitious, ill planned and very badly executed plan of defeating the Indians at one stroke.

The Indians now attacked 11 Division but Major General Abdul Hameed Khan skillfully held his front and did not lose any ground. My brother Major Firoz Alam noticed that every morning Major General Abdul Hameed Khan turned out immaculately and visited his front line companies. He enquired from the general where he went every day. The general told him that he had no reserves, that his resources were limited therefore he showed himself to the troops in the front line to assure them that he was confident and all was well. The division withstood nine counter attacks in twelve days.

On 19 September, General Musa and Air Marshal Nur Khan met President Ayub. General Musa reported that the army had run out of armour piercing tank ammunition due to the stocking of HE ammunition instead of &#39;AP&#39; (armour piercing). I had pointed out, when I had had the ammunition of 6 Armoured Division inspected, as the DQ of the division, that our tank crews were not familiar with HEAT ammunition and would not accept it as armour piercing ammunition but familiarisation was overruled to surprise the Indians. The Air Force reported that the Air Force was running out of spares. Both asked for a ceasefire which was arranged and came into effect on 23 September.

The 1965 war with India was started by us to force a favourable settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Operation Gibraltar was badly planned and badly executed, it ended with the loss of over 5,000 Azad Kashmiris forcibly recruited and sent as infiltrators. Operation Grand Slam was very near a success on 6 September but failed due to commanders and staff officers, from the regimental to the divisional level, not being alert to the opportunity that 13 Lancers had presented the army. The incorrect assessment of the situation at the Army level after the Indian attack resulted in the changing of the &#39;aim&#39;, in contravention of the first principle of war, &#39;maintenance of aim&#39;, by changing the effort of the army from cutting off Kashmir by the capture of Akhnur to defeating the Indian army by the capture of Raya with 1 Armoured Division when the required infantry was not available to assist the armoured division. It is obvious that the 1 Armoured Division operation was &#39;pre-conceived&#39;, the warning order to the 1 Armoured Division was issued on the same day that the attack in Chamb was launched. In the post war armchair strategy, the 1 Armoured Division should have been held in reserve till the Indian deployment and intentions were clear. Its best employment after the Indian 1 Armoured Division was located in the Chawinda area, was in the Zafarwal area where, with 6 Armoured Division holding Chawinda, a thrust could have been made to cut the Pathankot-Jammu road and cut off Kashmir from India.

The tactical handling of the 1 Armoured Division was extremely poor, with two Corps reconnaissance regiments available, after the bridgehead was established by 11 Division, Khem Karan should have been cleared and the bridgehead should have been held by the two reconnaissance regiments making the infantry available to clear the built-up areas and to hold the ground won by the tanks. Everyone knew that there was a shortage of infantry but there was no innovation to overcome it.

The command failure in the 1 Armoured Division is a sad reflection on the systems of selection of key commanders. The division commander and two brigade commanders performed unsatisfactorily, there was command failure in 4 Cavalry, 5 Horse, 24 Cavalry, 1 FF, 5 FF and 10 FF and the Engineer battalion.

The tactics of 6 Armoured Division left much to be desired, squadrons were employed to attack areas held by tanks and led to heavy tank losses. The best tactics for tanks is to seize or hold ground which the enemy must attack and destroy his tanks firing from static positions with stable gun platforms and pre-determined ranges. The capturing of ground with tanks and withdrawing to leaguers at night allowed Indians to re-occupy the lost ground and our tanks had to attack again to get it back. It made no sense.

In the Lahore sector the failure of Major General Sarfaraz Khan was not that he failed to occupy his defences before the Indian attack but in not moving his defences to the UBDC after the rout of the Indian 15 Division and consolidating his success.

The discipline and the determination of our troops in adversity requires a deep study. Generally when officers got killed the troops abandoned their mission, which means that fighting arms require more officers to ensure succession of command and continuation of command and control. This was rectified in the Armoured Corps where officer troop leaders replaced JCOs. The employment of superseded officers as second in commands and at the company command level is also questionable. The succession in command in battle should be to an officer who is approved for command and not one whose capability has been found wanting.

 

[Reichsmarschall]

OPINION
THE WAY IT WAS

DJ continues publishing extracts from

Brig (Retd) ZA KHAN’s very readable

forthcoming book

On the 23rd of March at about mid-day I was informed that a C-130 had landed at the Commilla airport with food supplies for the garrison. With a change of uniform and the necessities for an overnight stay at Dacca I was leaving my house when my wife asked me to get her jewelry from the office safe as she would wear it at the party that was to be held in the officers’ club that evening. I had kept my wife’s jewelry in my office safe because we did not have any safe place at my house and there were no lockers in the banks at Commilla, I brought the jewelry and gave it to her. It was very lucky as the events turned out later.
Driving to the airport a small naked boy standing by roadside, saw my jeep and very ferociously shouted ‘joy bangla’. My two and half year old younger daughter also used to run around the house shouting ‘joy bangla’, chased by her older sister who tried to prevent her.

The Commilla airport had been secured with a platoon from Hamza Company of my battalion when the ‘General Strike’ started. The C-130 had brought rations for the Commilla garrison and as soon as it finished unloading tinned milk, sugar etc it took off. The pilot of the aircraft was Squadron Leader Abdul Munim Khan who was my younger brother Squadron Leader Shuaib Alam’s brother-in-law and was well known to me, we flew to Dacca talking about the situation in East Pakistan.

Since it was the 23rd of March, Pakistan Day, buildings were supposed to fly the Pakistan flag, as we flew over Dacca we saw the whole city flying the Bangladesh flag. When I arrived at the 14 Division officers’ mess someone told me that there was only one Pakistan flag flying and that was in Mohammadpur, the Bihari colony in Dacca. I, with some other officers went to a vantage point to see the lone Pakistan flag.

Major Bilal had been informed that I would be coming by the C-130 and he was at the airport to receive me. On the way from the airport to the officers’ mess he told me that he had instructions to take me to Colonel S. D. Ahmad of the Martial Law Headquarters. Since it was late in the afternoon we went to the colonel’s room in the officers mess, there the colonel told me that Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the Awami League leader was to be arrested the next day or the day after and I was to make the necessary plan. He further told me that two cars had been placed at my disposal by the United Bank zonal manager and these were to be used for reconnaissance.

That evening Major Bilal, Captain Humayun and I drove around Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s house in Dhanmondi. In front of the house ran a lane which turned off from the road from Mohammadpur, on one side of the lane there was a lake. There was a large crowd near the house and a guard of the East Pakistan Police. As we drove past a group of Hindus came out of the house. No one challenged us because we had entered Dhanmondi and were driving out .

The next morning we looked at the routes from the cantonment to Dhanmondi, there were two, the main road from the cantonment to a road junction called ‘Farm Gate’, from there a road went to Dhanmondi. The second went from the MNA Hostel, to the National Assembly building and joined the Mohammadpur - Dhanmondi road. At the Dacca airport all the entrances and exits were on the cantonment side but on the far side there was a gate which allowed exit to the MNA Hostel, and National Assembly road. This gate had been built to allow an Air Observer Unit, commanded by my younger brother Squadron Leader Shuaib Alam, entrance and exit to the airfield.

I was instructed to report to Major General Rao Farman at eleven o’clock on 24th March for formal orders to arrest Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. I went to the general’s office and he told me that Mujibur Rehman was to be arrested the following night. I heard him, saluted and started to leave when he stopped me and asked me aren’t you going to hear how it is to be done?. I told him that it was not customary to state how orders were to be carried out, but since he had something in mind he could tell me. He then said that I was to take one officer with me in a civilian car and arrest Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. I said in view of the crowd around the house it could not be done with less than a company. He said that he was giving an order and it should be done the way he had ordered it. I told him I was not taking the order and he could find someone else to do the job, and before he could say anything else I saluted and left his office.

I knew that I was in trouble. For the rest of the day I did not go to any place where I could be contacted. I had been told that Major General A. O. Mitha was coming by a PIA flight which was scheduled to arrive at five in the evening, when the flight arrived I was waiting on the airfield, met the general and told him about the orders I had received and that in view of the crowd around the house it was not possible to drive up to the house and arrest Sheikh Mujib. The general told me to meet him at nine o’clock at the Eastern Command Headquarters.

The next morning just before nine I went to the office of the Colonel GS of Eastern Command, Colonel Akbar, later brigadier. When I entered the office I found Major General Rao Farman sitting there and he asked me why I had come to Colonel Akbar’s office, I told him that I had come to see Major General Mitha. Major General Farman then ordered Colonel Akbar to arrange for a helicopter and fly me out of Dacca in fifteen minutes. Colonel Akbar looked at me and at the general, and telephoned the Army Aviation Base, after finishing his conversation he said that it would take an hour for the helicopter to be ready. After this I asked Colonel Akbar whether Major General Mitha had come or was expected to come and he told me he was with Lieutenant General Tikka. I then positioned myself so that I could see the door opening into Lieutenant General Tikka’s office. After an uncomfortable fifteen minutes the door opened and Major General Mitha came out. In one bound I was out of Colonel Akbar’s office, intercepted the general and explained what had happened. The general’s staff car was standing there, he asked me to get in the car and we drove to where General Abdul Hamid Khan was staying.

At General Hamid’s residence I waited in a waiting room, after about an hour I was called in and Major General Mitha told me to tell General Hamid what I had told him. General Hamid heard me out and then telephoned Major General Rao Farman and told him that he was sending me to him and that he should meet all my requirements. General Hamid then told me that I was to arrest Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and that he was to be taken alive. When I was leaving and had got to the door, General Hamid called my name and when I turned around he again called out remember he is to be taken alive and I will hold you personally responsible if he is killed.

I then drove to Major General Rao Farman’s office, he asked me what my requirement was and I told him that I required three troop carrying vehicles and the layout of the house. He had the plan of the house with him and gave it to me and told me that the vehicles would be available. I then told him that the Japanese Consul’s residence was behind Sheikh Mujib’s house and if Sheikh Mujib crossed into the diplomat’s house what were my instructions, the general told me to use my discretion.

A model of the route and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s house was made, ammunition was issued and after the evening meal I briefed the company. The company was divided into three groups; one group of twenty five men, commanded by Captain Saeed, was to surround Sheikh Mujib’s house by blocking the lane at the turning from the Mohammadpur - Dhanmondi road, a second block was to be at the first turning to the right, a third at the second turning to the right and one back on the Mohammadpur - Dhanmondi road, cutting off the block of houses including the Japanese diplomat’s house. The second group of twenty five, commanded by Captain Humayun, was to follow the first group to the lane in front of Sheikh Mujib’s house, enter the compound of the house adjacent to the Sheikh’s house, jump over the wall, enter Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s house compound and form a perimeter around the house, taking special care to prevent anybody crossing into the Japanese diplomat’s house. The third group of twelve men was commanded by Major Bilal, these were equipped with electric torches, they were to search the house, the ground floor first then the upper floor. The assembly point was the gate on the airfield perimeter opening towards the MNA Hostel, the route was the airfield, National Assembly building, Mohammadpur, Dhanmondi; my jeep with full headlights was to lead. Captain Saeed, Captain Humayun and Major Bilal were to follow with their groups in trucks without any lights, the idea was that anyone looking into the headlights could not gauge how many vehicles were following. I was told that the operation was to begin at mid-night and was given a password that was applicable throughout East Pakistan. Everyone taking part was briefed thoroughly and understood his part, the company moved and assembled on the airfield near the gate from which they were to exit. Captain Humayun, with two men, was sent to circle and observe the Sheikh’s house in a civilian car and in civil dress.

After dark, vehicles loaded with stores that the troops take with them when they move out of their barracks, started moving about in the cantonment and to anyone familiar with the army it would have been obvious that something was happening. Later it was said that Bengali officers had informed Sheikh Mujib that the army was going to act that night.

At about nine o’clock I drove to the airfield and when my jeep entered the airport area I was challenged by a soldier who demanded the password. I gave him the password and he told me that it was not the password, an argument followed, I told him that I was the commanding officer of the Commando Battalion, he said that without the password I could not enter the airfield. I then asked him what his unit was and he told me that he belonged to the Anti-aircraft Regiment, I then told him to take me to his commanding officer and we marched right across the airfield to the Anti-aircraft regiment headquarters with him pointing his rifle at me. The regiment commander apologised but was quite amused by the incident. He said that he had not been given the password that had been given to me and since his unit was guarding the airfield, he had issued his own password.

At about ten o’clock Captain Humayun came back from reconnoitering the area around Sheikh Mujib’s house and reported that road blocks were being constructed on the Mohammadpur - Dhanmondi road. I ordered all the company’s rocket launchers brought and two rounds per launcher, the men with rocket launchers were told to accompany Captain Saeed’s group. This group was instructed that on encountering the road block it was to form a single line with the rocket launchers in the centre, the rocket launchers would fire first, then all the rifles. I explained that the crowd around the road block had never heard the double crack and burst of rocket launchers and would disperse, the other groups were to observe the sides of the road. I also advanced the beginning of the operation from mid-night to eleven o’clock, on my own initiative, to reduce the time for strengthening the road block.

At eleven on the night 25/26 March we drove out from the airfield on the road going from the MNA Hostel to Mohammadpur. Street lights were off and buildings were dark, my jeep led with full headlights and the troop carrying vehicles, which belonged to the Signal Corps, followed without lights. Driving at about twenty miles an hour the column turned left on the Mohammadpur - Dhanmondi road and about a quarter mile from Dhanmondi, the road was blocked with trucks and other vehicles turned on their sides, as instructed, Captain Saeed’s group formed up, fired the rockets and opened fire with their rifles, the groups on the sides of the road also opened fire. After about two or three minutes I ordered a ceasefire but found that the order was ignored and I had to walk from man to man and make him cease firing. Some of the vehicles in the road block, hit by the rockets were burning, a white Volkswagon Combi was blazing, the road block was still there but whoever was defending the block had disappeared. I was wondering how to create a gap in the road block, I had not bothered to examine the troop transports but now when I looked at one I noticed that it was a five-ton vehicle with a winch fitted on it, with two vehicles we soon winched some of the vehicles to make a gap in the road block, mounted the vehicles and moved forward.

We went about two hundred yards and there was another road block, this time a number of pipes about two feet in diameter, the length of which completely blocked the road between two high walls. I tied the winch cable around middle of the pipes and had them winched, the block moved as a whole still blocking the road, then I had the winch cable tied around one end of the pipes and made Captain Saeed’s group sit on the other end, when the cable was winched the pipes pivoted and a gap large enough for the vehicles to pass was created, we again mounted our vehicles and continued.

We went another two hundred yards and there was another road block, this time of bricks stacked about three feet high and about four feet in depth. We tried ramming the block with the troop carriers but could not clear a passage for vehicles. I then ordered Captain Saeed’s group to manually clear a gap wide enough for the vehicles to pass and ordered the rest of the troops to dismount and proceed on foot.

We walked down the Mohammadpur-Dhanmondi road to the street on which Sheikh Mujib’s house was located and turned right on the lane between the house and the lake. Captain Humayun’s group entered the house adjacent to Sheikh Mujib’s house, ran across the compound and jumped over the wall into Sheikh Mujib’s house. Fire was opened, some people in the compound ran out of the gate, one man was killed. The East Pakistan Police guard outside the house got into their 180 pounder tent, lifted the tent by its poles and ran into the lake. Sheikh Mujib’s compound perimeter was secured, it was pitch dark, Mujib’s house and the adjacent houses had no lights.

The house search party now entered the house, a guard of Sheikh Mujib was escorted out with a soldier walking by his side. After going a little distance from the house the guard pulled out a ‘dah’, a long bladed knife and attacked his escort, he did not know that he was being covered from behind and was shot but not killed. The ground floor was searched and no one was found there, the search party went upstairs, there was nobody there in the rooms that were open, one room door was bolted from the inside. When I went upstairs someone said that there was some sound coming from the closed room, I told Major Bilal to have the door of the closed room broken down and went downstairs to check if Captain Saeed had arrived and if there was any sign of a crowd.

When I came out on the lane in front of the house I found that Captain Saeed had arrived with the vehicles but in turning the long five ton vehicles he got them stuck in the narrow lane in front of the house. On the loudspeaker of the wireless set on my jeep I could hear Brigadier Jehanzeb Arbab, later lieutenant general, urging one of his units to use their ‘romeo romeos’.

While I was instructing Captain Saeed on how to sort out the vehicles, there was a shot, then the sound of a grenade exploding followed by a burst from a sub-machine gun, I thought that someone had killed Sheikh Mujib. I ran back to the house and upstairs and there I found a very shaken Sheikh Mujib outside the door of the room that had been closed. I asked Sheikh Mujib to accompany me, he asked me if he could say good bye to his family and I told him to go ahead. He went into the room where the family had enclosed themselves and came out quickly and we walked to where the vehicles were. Captain Saeed had still not managed to turn them around, I sent a radio message to inform the Eastern Command that we had got Sheikh Mujib.

Sheikh Mujib then told me that he had forgotten his pipe, I walked back with him and he collected his pipe. By this time Sheikh Mujib was confident that we would not harm him and he told me that we had only to call him and he would have come on his own, I told him that we wanted to show him that he could be arrested. When we got back, Captain Saeed had the vehicles lined up, Sheikh Mujib was put in the middle troop carrying vehicle and we started back to the cantonment.

I later learnt that after telling Major Bilal to break down the closed door upstairs when I went to check on the vehicles, someone had fired a pistol shot into the room where Major Bilal’s men were collected, luckily no one was hit. Before anyone could stop him a soldier threw a grenade into the veranda from where the pistol shot had come and followed it with a burst from his sub-machine gun. The grenade burst and the sub-machine gun fire made Sheikh Mujib call out from behind the closed room that if an assurance was given that he would not be killed he would come out. He was given an assurance and he came out of the room. When he came out Havaldar Major Khan Wazir, later subedar, gave him a resounding slap on his face.

My instructions were to arrest Sheikh Mujib, I was not told where I was to take him and to whom he was to be handed over. As we drove back I thought over this and decided to take him to the National Assembly building and hold him there while I went to get instructions. I stopped at the National Assembly building, had a jeep seat removed, took Mujib up the stairs of the National Assembly building and made him sit on the landing. While we were doing this, from the direction of ‘Farm Gate’ came the sound of thousands of people running. We thought that these people were running in our direction and prepared to defend ourselves, after a while the sound faded away. Later we learnt that this was the force that the Awami League had collected to storm the cantonment with and it was running away.

From the National Assembly building I went to the Martial Law Headquarters where Lieutenant General Tikka Khan had set up his headquarters. I met Brigadier Ghulam Jilani Khan, who had taken over as Chief of Staff of Eastern Command, and told him that I had arrested Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and left him at the National Assembly building. He took me to the entrance of Lieutenant General Tikka Khan’s office and told me to go in and report to the general. General Tikka must have been already told that Sheikh Mujib had been arrested, he was sitting very composed expecting me to formally inform him that Sheikh Mujib had been arrested. Just for fun I told him that I had arrested a man that looked like Mujib and I thought it was Mujib but was not sure. On hearing this General Tikka shot out of his chair like a jack in the box, he called for Brigadier Jilani who had heard me as he was standing just inside the office entrance. He assured the Corps Commander that he would have the matter seen to immediately, Colonel S. D. Ahmad was sent for and told to go immediately to the National Assembly to see whether I had got the genuine Sheikh Mujib or a fake.

Waiting for Colonel S. D. Ahmad to return, I stepped outside the building to smoke. While I was standing and smoking, a light machine gun, sited at the headquarters perimeter wire, either accidentally or the gunner saw something, fired a short burst. For a while after the burst was fired it was quiet, then every weapon in the cantonment and in the city opened fire. Not to be outdone the anti-craft regiment on the airfield also fired, green and yellow tracer arcs criss-crossed the whole of Dacca, after a few minutes the firing ceased as suddenly as it had started.

After about twenty minutes Colonel S. D. Ahmad returned and confirmed that I had arrested the genuine Sheikh Mujib. When I asked where I was supposed to take him to, there was huddle as no one had given it a thought. Eventually it was decided that he was to be put in the same room where he was kept when he was under arrest for the Agartala Conspiracy case. We took him to the 14 Division officers mess, he was put up in an independent single bedroom annexe and a guard was placed on him. The next day Major General Mitha asked me where Sheikh Mujib was confined, when I told him, he got annoyed and said that there was a complete lack of understanding of the situation and an attempt could be made to rescue him. He later had Sheikh Mujib moved to the third floor of a school building.

Everyone who served in East Pakistan in March 1971 was of the opinion that East Pakistan was lost due to the lack of action immediately following the announcement of the postponement of the meeting of the National Assembly. It was believed that Admiral Ahsan had resigned because he had disagreed with the military action and it was said that Lieutenant General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan had planned the military action but when he was called upon to execute the action he refused and resigned. This refusal of Lieutenant General Yaqub, the delay by General Yahya in finding a replacement and Lieutenant General Tikka Khan not taking any action for eighteen days, allowed the Awami League to demonstrate to the public that it had paralysed the army and the Martial Law authorities and allowed it to prepare for resistance against subsequent action by the Pakistan government.

On the morning of 26 March, at about eight, I received a telephone call from Major General Mitha to report immediately at the helipad, there the general told me that the previous night 53 Brigade Headquarters and 24 FF had been ordered to move to Chittagong, contact with Chittagong had been lost and there was no contact with 53 Brigade. Major General Mitha said that we would take two MI 8 helicopters, go to Commilla, pick up two platoons from my battalion and go to Chittagong. At Commilla when the helicopters landed on the ground adjacent to the 53 Brigade Headquarters, there was no reaction from the brigade headquarters. The first officer to come to the helicopters was a East Pakistani major who was in charge of the Inter-Services Intelligence. In his vehicle we went to the brigade headquarters where the brigade major, Major Sultan, later lieutenant colonel, was sitting in his office, the general gave a bit of his mind for not checking why the helicopters had come. I telephoned my battalion headquarters and told my adjutant to bring sixty men with weapons and ammunition to the brigade headquarters and that they would be going to Chittagong and that Major Mannan, the Bengali company commander was to be included.

I next telephoned my house and spoke to my wife, she told me that everything was fine, she said she had been asked to move to an area where the majority of the West Pakistani officers were living, I told her that was not necessary. While I was telephoning my wife, Lieutenant Colonel Yaqub Malik, commanding officer 53 Field Regiment Artillery came to the brigade headquarters, with Brigadier Iqbal Shafi away, he was the senior officer in Commilla, he had a dazed look on his face. Without any preliminaries he announced that he would use his guns if there was any opposition, he could not clearly explain the situation in Commilla and what he planned to do. Two platoons of Hamza Company with Captain Sajjad Akbar and Major Abdul Mannan arrived and got in the helicopters. One platoon was deployed on the Commilla airfield, this left Lieutenant Haider, the Subedar Major and the few battalion headquarters personnel in Commilla.

53 Brigade and 24 FF had been ordered to make a night move to Chittagong and had lost contact with Commilla and Dacca, our helicopters flew along the road Commilla - Chittagong, there was no sign of the brigade on the main road to Chittagong. On arrival at Chittagong the helicopters circled the Nautonpara cantonment, machine gun fire could be heard and on the hillocks at the edge of the cantonment weapons could be seen firing small arms, as the helicopters came from the hillocks and troops in the barracks away from the hillocks waved at the helicopters. We landed in an open ground between two barracks, the troops dismounted. Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Fatmi, the commanding officer of 20 Baluch, came and reported to Major General Mitha, he said that he had been ordered to take his battalion to the port where the Pakistan National Shipping Corporation ship M.V. Swat had berthed and had brought 105 mm gun ammunition which had to be unloaded by troops because the dock workers were on strike; a company of a Punjab battalion which had just arrived from West Pakistan and was on its way to Sylhet, was already employed on the task, at about three o’clock in the morning 20 Baluch started moving. To go out of the cantonment, the Baluch battalion had to pass through the East Bengal Centre lines and as it approached the hillocks, it came under fire from prepared positions on the hillocks. Lieutenant Colonel Fatmi was in complete control of the situation though he was not in communication with any other army unit or the Navy and did not ask for any help. Colonel Shigri, 1st PMA Course, officiating commandant of the East Bengal Centre, was there, in his night clothes, he had managed to get out of his house and come to the Baluch lines.

After ensuring that everything was under control, Major General Mitha told Lieutenant Colonel Fatmi that he would arrange communications with the Navy and we all got in the helicopters and flew to the Naval Base. We circled the Naval Base but there was no reaction, no one came out of any building. The helicopters landed on a parade ground and after a while a vehicle came and took us to the office of Commodore R. A. Mumtaz, the commander of the Pakistan Navy in East Pakistan. Commodore Mumtaz said that a naval contingent had secured the Chittagong airfield, there was no problem at the Naval Base but he was not aware of what was going on in the port. Major General Mitha ordered one of my platoons to relieve the Naval contingent at the airport.

The Chittagong Airport had been seized by the rebels, a platoon of East Pakistan Rifles, withdrawn from a border post was hurriedly sent on 25 March to seize it. The platoon was not given clear instructions and was apparently not aware of the prevailing situation in Chittagong. In the hurry of the deployment the West Pakistani JCOs and NCOs were not screened out and a West Pakistani took charge of the machine gun covering the road to the terminal building. On the same day about a platoon strength of Navy personnel were sent under Lieutenant Commander Akhtar, later captain, to secure the airport, the West Pakistani did not allow the machine gun to fire. Lieutenant Commander Akhtar drove up to the terminal building, told the East Pakistan Rifles men that he had come to relieve them, to stack their weapons and rest. When the weapons were stacked they were seized and all the men were locked in the basement of the terminal building. Captain Sajjad with a platoon relieved the Navy personnel and took over the airport. The second platoon under Major Mannan remained at the Naval Base. A wireless set was obtained from the Navy and Major General Mitha and I went back to 20 Baluch, gave them the wireless set and established communications with the Naval Base.

In one helicopter, personnel who had to be evacuated from the Nautonpara cantonment, including Mrs Mazumdar, were sent off to Dacca. In the second helicopter Major General Mitha and I flew along the Chittagong - Commilla road looking for Brigadier Shafi and 53 Brigade, instead of following the main road we followed a minor road which made a loop near Feni and found the brigade. We landed and Brigadier Iqbal Shafi told us that after he had gone a few miles from Commilla he found that the wooden bridges on streams burnt and he had difficulty in crossing the numerous streams, which had delayed him the previous night and since the morning 24 FF was in contact with a East Bengal Regiment unit which was resisting his movement to Chittagong and told us that Lieutenant Colonel Shahpur Khan, Commanding Officer 24 FF, had been shot and killed by a sniper. From there we flew back to Dacca arriving just when it was getting dark.

Brigadier Mazumdar, 2nd PMA Course, had been transferred from the Punjab Regiment to the East Bengal Regiment to command the East Bengal Regimental Centre, his wife was in the 20 Baluch lines and was evacuated to Dacca with others. Some days before the military action started a non-Bengali lieutenant colonel went to see Brigadier Mazumdar in his office, the brigadier was not in his office, the officer entered the office, saw a signal message lying on the brigadier’s table and read it. It was a message from Lieutenant Colonel Massoudul Hussain Khan, 4th PMA Course, commanding 2 East Bengal Regiment at Jodeybpur north of Dacca, asking Brigadier Mazumdar for orders in the event of military action. The officer pocketed the signal and sent it to the authorities in Dacca. The story went that Major General Khadim Hussain Raja flew to the East Pakistan Regimental Centre for a visit and there involved Brigadier Mazumdar in a discussion about the state of 2 East Bengal Regiment and ordered Brigadier Mazumdar to accompany him to Dacca to inspect the battalion and make a report. Brigadier Mazumdar accompanied him but disappeared in Dacca. When the helicopter carrying Mrs. Mazumdar landed at Dacca, she went straight to where the brigadier was staying, she was being followed and both were taken into custody. Lieutenant Colonel Massoudul Hussain was also taken into custody.

Brigadier Mazumdar and his wife were flown to West Pakistan and Colonel Agha Javed Iqbal, Colonel Staff 6 Armoured Division, was informed that Brigadier Mazumdar and his wife were being sent to 6 Armoured Division and they were to be kept in custody in Banni Bungalow, a rest house on the Grand Trunk Road, between Kharian and Sarai Alamgir. Being thorough in everything he did, he had the brigadier and his wife searched, Mrs. Mazumdar was carrying a pistol in her handbag. She had the pistol all the time she had been in custody and while flying to West Pakistan, why she or her husband did not hijack the aircraft bringing them to West Pakistan is anybody’s guess.

26 Cavalry, deployed in the Saeedpur, Bogra area had two troops of tanks in Chittagong because the tank ranges were located at the base of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and it was difficult to move tanks to Chittagong and back so gunners were sent to Chittagong to fire. The two troops were under command of Captain Kayani and were housed in the 20 Baluch lines. Brigadier Mazumdar, in his capacity of Station Commander, ordered tanks to be moved to the East Pakistan regimental Centre but Captain Kayani managed to evade the order.

After the East Pakistan Regimental Centre was cleared by 20 Baluch, I went to Brigadier Mazumdar’s house. In one room he had made an ‘operations room’, on one wall there was a quarter inch map of the whole of East Pakistan with the deployment of the East Bengal Battalions, East Pakistan Rifle Wings, police and ad hoc units marked with chinagraph pencils, an obvious command headquarters of all the Bengali troops in East Pakistan and Brigadier Mazumdar was to control them.

When I returned in the evening to Dacca and went to the place where I was staying, I found Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Suleiman, commanding officer 2 Commando Battalion there, he and about a company of 2 Commando Battalion had been air lifted from West Pakistan and later another flight of PIA brought another company.

While having our evening meal we turned on the radio and heard an Indian radio station, probably All India Radio, Calcutta, announce that Sheikh Mujib had safely crossed over to India. We also heard Major Zia ur Rehman, the second in command of 8 East Bengal Regiment, broadcast declaring the independence of Bangladesh and proclaiming himself the commander-in-chief of the Bangladesh army.

The next day, 27 March, I again accompanied Major General Mitha to the Naval Base, Ghazi and Shaheen Companies of 2 Commando Battalion, with Lieutenant Colonel Suleiman and his adjutant Captain Sikandar, flew in C-130s to Chittagong. In the late afternoon Major General A. O. Mitha ordered Lieutenant Colonel Suleiman to take his two companies and link up with 53 Brigade which was still held up on the Commilla - Chittagong road.

Since 2 Commando Battalion had come from West Pakistan, they were not familiar with Chittagong and required a guide to lead them. A Bihari officer, Captain Siddiqui whose parents were living on the outskirts of Chittagong and there was no news of them, had come to Chittagong from Azad Kashmir by getting lifts in the aircraft moving troops from West Pakistan. He had managed a lift in the C-130 bringing the commando battalion and he offered to guide 2 Commando Battalion to the outskirts of the city. Vehicles of the Pakistan Navy were borrowed and 2 Commando Battalion was ready to move at about five in the evening. Captain Sajjad came and told me that Lieutenant Colonel Suleiman had given orders to drive through the city in a convoy. I talked to Lieutenant Colonel Suleiman and told him that the situation was not a ‘aid to civil power’ situation and asked him to take precautions. He laughed and told me that all of us who were serving in East Pakistan had lost our nerves and ordered the convoy to move.

Major General Mitha also ordered reconnaissance of the East Pakistan Rifles headquarters with a view to clearing it and releasing some West Pakistanis that were known to be held prisoners. After giving these orders and telling me to stay back the general flew back to Dacca.

Major Salman Ahmad, Ebrahim Company commander, who with his company had gone to West Pakistan in December after completing two years with 3 Commando Battalion in East Pakistan, had accompanied 2 Commando Battalion because he was the only officer in the battalion who had been in East Pakistan. Major Salman was given charge of the reconnaissance of the East Pakistan Rifles Headquarters because he was familiar with the East Pakistan Rifles Headquarters, Captain Zaidi, later brigadier, from 2 Commando Battalion and Subedar Ramzan of 3 Commando Battalion and some men of Hamza Company made up the party and moved off at about the same time as 2 Commando Battalion.

At the Naval Base, at about seven thirty in the evening, I was called to the telephone and told that there was a call for me from Tiger Pass, a Naval establishment in the city. On the line there was a lance naik from Ghazi Company, he told me that 2 Commando Battalion had been ambushed, everyone had been killed and he was the sole survivor. I told him that it was impossible for the whole battalion to be killed, that he had deserted and asked the authorities at Tiger Pass to place him under arrest.

At about eleven o’clock Major Mohammad Iqbal, later brigadier, Ghazi company commander came and reported to me that 2 Commando Battalion had been ambushed about half a mile from where the Commilla road started, that Lieutenant Colonel Suleiman, Captain Sikandar and Captain Siddiqui had been killed and he had brought the casualties. The Naval Base had a small Medical Inspection Room and a medical officer who was a lieutenant commander. The wounded were first taken out and laid out on the floor of the MI Room, then the dead. The medical officer, when he came and saw the dead and the wounded lying on the floor, fainted and had to be carried away. Then someone from the Navy said that there were some medical college students in the Naval Base, they were called and they with the nursing orderlies gave whatever aid that could be given. There were twenty three dead, Lieutenant Colonel Suleiman, Captain Sikandar and Captain Siddiqui, Subedar Allah Din and nineteen other ranks, and twenty wounded. Major Iqbal took the remainder of the company back to the ambush site to clear it but there was nobody there. We later learnt that the ambush was laid by a subedar major of the East Pakistan Rifles to ambush 53 Brigade when they entered Chittagong.

The place where the ambush of 2 Commando Battalion took place was near the East Pakistan Rifles headquarters. When the firing took place at the ambush site the personnel defending the headquarters took up their firing positions and intercepted the reconnaissance party, wounding Captain Zaidi. Major Salman and Subedar Ramzan carried Captain Zaidi for about four hundred yards, then Subedar Ramzan went and brought a vehicle, Captain Zaidi was put in it and the vehicle started moving towards the Naval Base. A sentry left by the reconnaissance party, signalled the vehicle to stop, the vehicle did not stop and as it went past the sentry he fired two shots in the dark, both bullets hit Subedar Ramzan in the thigh. Later Subedar Ramzan commented on the excellence of the man’s night shooting ability.

The next morning a troop-carrying C-130 came, I had all the dead and the wounded loaded on it and sent to Dacca because the hospital was in Chittagong cantonment in Nautonpara where 20 Baluch and the East Bengal Regimental Centre were still fighting and there were no other hospital facilities. When the C-130 landed in Dacca and about fifty casualties were off loaded it had a stunning effect on the personnel on the airfield and in the cantonment. A few days later I received a message that the wounded would be taken care of locally and the dead will be buried locally as sending them to Dacca had an effect on the morale there.

With Lieutenant Colonel Suleiman killed I assumed command of 2 Commando Battalion also and ordered both the battalions to always wear the commando insignia and the maroon beret to show the people that the commandos had arrived. I placed a platoon from 2 Commando Battalion, commanded by Captain Pervez, later lieutenant colonel, at the airport, the task of the platoon was to protect the terminal building and aircraft while it was on the ground. The East Pakistan Rifles men were still locked up in the basement and were employed for loading and unloading cargo.

On 28 March the situation was grim, 53 Brigade was still on the road between Commilla and Chittagong with 8 East Bengal Regiment, commanded by Major Zia ur Rehman, fighting a rearguard action, 20 Baluch and East Bengal Regimental Centre were still fighting in Nautonpara, 2 Commando Battalion had been ambushed, and the reconnaissance of the East Pakistan Rifles headquarters had failed. Late in the day Major General Khadim Hussain Raja arrived to takeover the control of operations in Chittagong.

From Dacca, Major General Mitha ordered me to mount a raid on Radio Pakistan Chittagong whose transmitter was being used by Major Zia ur Rehman as the Bangladesh Radio. When I inquired from Major Salman, Major Mannan and Captain Sajjad if they knew where in Chittagong the transmitters were located everyone said they had seen the masts but did not remember the location. I tried the Navy, they also did not know. I was wondering what to do when I chanced to see a Chittagong telephone directory, I looked it up and the location of the transmitter was given as Kalurghat. On looking up a map it was found that to get to the transmitter site from the Naval Base you had to pass through the city, get on to the Chittagong - Kaptai road and go about six miles. This was not possible because the city was in the hands of Major Zia ur Rehman who was controlling the 8 East Bengal Regiment, the East Bengal Regimental Centre and East Pakistan Rifle rebels. The map showed that the transmitter was located about a mile from the Karnaphuli River bank downstream from the Kaptai Dam and could be approached by going up river. The Navy was asked to provide a suitable craft to lift about fifty men and they agreed to provide a landing craft tank, two or three of these vessels had been captured from the Indians in the 1965 war. A plan was drawn up on surmises, Major Mannan was given the command because he was the senior officer and could speak Bengali. I reminded him that when he was commissioned he had taken an oath and now was the time to fulfil it. The party was to be landed at high tide but landing craft was late in arriving and the raiding party left at about nine at night.

By the time the landing party reached the disembarkation area, the tide was running out and the party had to wade through mud for a long distance. The signal operator carrying the thirty pound AN/GRC 9 wireless set dropped it in the mud and could not find it as it sank in the loose mud. After the party crossed the high water mark Major Mannan made inquiries about the location of the transmitter from the residents of houses on the river bank and the party moved in the direction indicated. After going for some distance it ran into a rebel patrol, Major Mannan talked to them and then grabbed the sten gun of the man he was talking to, the man fired and the bullet went through Major Mannan’s palm.

When the firing started the raiding party, which had crowded near Major Mannan, went to the ground, one man, who was armed with a rocket launcher, did not have the safety catch on and as he went to ground the rocket launcher fired. The rocket landed in the middle of the raiding force, the Bengali patrol ran away, in the raiding force a number of persons were wounded. The officers conferred and it was decided to find a suitable defensive position which the raiding party would occupy and Major Mannan would return to the cantonment and get help. Major Salman reconnoitered and found that the Chittagong - Kaptai road was a few hundred yards away, the transmitter was about a five or six hundred yards away, and very luckily, just off the metal road he found a concrete building with a long drive from the road. The raiding party moved its wounded to the building and prepared to defend it.

Major Mannan walked and ran along the Kaptai - Chittagong road to the Chittagong cantonment and reported the mishap of the raiding party to Lieutenant Colonel Fatmi who reported it to Major General Khadim Raja on the wireless. I was sent for and spoke to Major Mannan who told me what had happened and told me the exact location of the transmitter.

I told Major General Khadim Raja that now that we had the location of the transmitter I would ask for an air strike and knock it out. I got in touch with Dacca, explained what had happened and asked for an air strike. About two hours later, two F-86 Sabres arrived, carried out a very impressive rocketing and machine gunning of the Radio Pakistan transmitters and the transmitter went off the air.

 

[Signalian]

The difficulties faced against odds, mistakes in decision making and lack of far sight. The situation in different sectors had all these factors contributing in a mix-match of 65 war.