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The war of books
By A.G. Noorani
Saturday, 24 Oct, 2009
A BATTLE of books has been waged in Washington D.C. as ferociously as the clash of arms in Afghanistan. Both draw lessons from the Vietnam War but reach conflicting conclusions. Both graced President Barack Obamas night stand and the shelves of military pundits.
Lessons in Disaster by Gordon M. Goldstein describes how in 1965 President Lyndon B. Johnson was marched into an escalating war in Vietnam by his military advisers who viewed the conflict in purely military terms and ignored the perils ahead.
Lewis Sorleys book A Better War takes a look at the unexamined victories in Vietnam, implying that the war could have been won.
Opinion is divided not only on the military but also the political situation in Afghanistan. Defence Secretary Robert Gates holds that the Taliban and the Al Qaeda are closely linked. Vice President Joe Biden disagrees. Peter Spiegel and Jonathan Weisman of The Wall Street Journal report: Administration officials in the Biden camp fear they too could close off the path to a more peaceful resolution of the conflict if 40,000 more troops are sent. They believe most of the Taliban fighters, and some of their leaders, are neither hard-core, violent Islamists not sympathetic to Al Qaeda. Some are nationalists trying to rid their country of foreigners.
Surprisingly few care to draw lessons from an analogy of direct relevance to Afghanistan, whose people have always resisted the foreign soldier.
Prof Robert A. Pape of the University of Chicago wrote a book of stupendous research Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism drawing on case studies from various places. His thesis is that it is foreign occupation, in the main, which motivates the suicide bomber. Doubtless religious bigotry and the ambitious bid to grab power by armed force are not to be overlooked or even minimised. The violent Naxalites in India have a simple aim grab power through terrorist attacks. The United States, however, has consistently ignored the peoples resentment at foreign domination.
Prof Papes article on Afghanistan in The New York Times recently is therefore of particular importance. He recalls the importance of the record. After the US attack on Afghanistan in 2001, itself a reaction of doubtful wisdom to 9/11, the Taliban were dispersed. The US and Nato forces had a modest strength of 20,000. Till 2004 there was little terrorism there.
In 2005, the US and Nato began to systematically extend their military presence across Afghanistan. The goals were to defeat the tiny insurgency that did exist at the time, eradicate poppy crops and encourage local support for the central government. Western forces were deployed in all major regions and today have ballooned to more than 100,000 troops.
As the western occupation grew, the use of the two most worrisome forms of terrorism in Afghanistan suicide attacks and homemade bombs escalated in parallel. There were no recorded suicide attacks in Afghanistan before 2001. But in 2006, suicide attacks began to increase with 97 in 2006, 142 in 2007, 148 in 2008 and more than 60 in the first half of 2009. Moreover, the overwhelming percentage (80 per cent) of the suicide attacks has been against the US and allied troops or their bases. The pattern for other terrorist attacks is almost the same.
The picture is clear: the more western troops America has sent to Afghanistan, the more the local residents have viewed themselves as under foreign occupation, leading to a rise in suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks. Unless this popular resentment is allayed the Taliban will continue to draw strength from the people.
Meanwhile public opinion in both the US and Britain has veered largely against the war. A BBC poll found that 56 per cent of those polled were against it. Rigged elections and rampant corruption have not helped the Karzai regime to garner support at home or abroad.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carters national security adviser, has always held that 9/11 was for all its monstrous proportions an act of terrorism, not an act of aggression. In a recent speech, on Sept 14, he noted that it took about 300 US special forces with the troops of the Northern Alliance to overthrow the Taliban in 2001. Now some 100,000 US and allied forces are caught in a situation where they are regarded as foreign invaders like the Soviet troops. He pointedly mentioned Gen Stanley McChrystals demand for 40,000 more to add to the existing 68,000 troops. President Obama is in a cruel dilemma.
It may be just a ploy for aught we know but two overtures by the Taliban, in rapid succession, surely merit note. First came on Oct 7 the eight anniversary of the US attack. A statement posted on its website said: We did not have any agenda to harm other countries, including Europe, nor do we have such agenda today. A week later came its letter in Pashto to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Beijing asking it to adopt a strong stance against the occupation of Afghanistan and promising good relations with the neighbours after the foreign troops had quit.
None of the neighbours can accept Al Qaedas return. But there is an opportunity to explore precisely what the Taliban are prepared to concede once they are assured of a guaranteed withdrawal of foreign troops.
Times are grim. Dexter Filkins reported from Kabul on Oct 17: [Gen] McChrystals plan is a blueprint for an extensive American commitment to build a modern state in Afghanistan, where one has never existed, and to bring order to a place famous for the empires it has exhausted. Even under the best of circumstances, this effort would most likely last many more years, cost hundreds of billions of dollars and entail the deaths of many more troops. And thats if it succeeds.
The writer is an author and a lawyer.
By A.G. Noorani
Saturday, 24 Oct, 2009
A BATTLE of books has been waged in Washington D.C. as ferociously as the clash of arms in Afghanistan. Both draw lessons from the Vietnam War but reach conflicting conclusions. Both graced President Barack Obamas night stand and the shelves of military pundits.
Lessons in Disaster by Gordon M. Goldstein describes how in 1965 President Lyndon B. Johnson was marched into an escalating war in Vietnam by his military advisers who viewed the conflict in purely military terms and ignored the perils ahead.
Lewis Sorleys book A Better War takes a look at the unexamined victories in Vietnam, implying that the war could have been won.
Opinion is divided not only on the military but also the political situation in Afghanistan. Defence Secretary Robert Gates holds that the Taliban and the Al Qaeda are closely linked. Vice President Joe Biden disagrees. Peter Spiegel and Jonathan Weisman of The Wall Street Journal report: Administration officials in the Biden camp fear they too could close off the path to a more peaceful resolution of the conflict if 40,000 more troops are sent. They believe most of the Taliban fighters, and some of their leaders, are neither hard-core, violent Islamists not sympathetic to Al Qaeda. Some are nationalists trying to rid their country of foreigners.
Surprisingly few care to draw lessons from an analogy of direct relevance to Afghanistan, whose people have always resisted the foreign soldier.
Prof Robert A. Pape of the University of Chicago wrote a book of stupendous research Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism drawing on case studies from various places. His thesis is that it is foreign occupation, in the main, which motivates the suicide bomber. Doubtless religious bigotry and the ambitious bid to grab power by armed force are not to be overlooked or even minimised. The violent Naxalites in India have a simple aim grab power through terrorist attacks. The United States, however, has consistently ignored the peoples resentment at foreign domination.
Prof Papes article on Afghanistan in The New York Times recently is therefore of particular importance. He recalls the importance of the record. After the US attack on Afghanistan in 2001, itself a reaction of doubtful wisdom to 9/11, the Taliban were dispersed. The US and Nato forces had a modest strength of 20,000. Till 2004 there was little terrorism there.
In 2005, the US and Nato began to systematically extend their military presence across Afghanistan. The goals were to defeat the tiny insurgency that did exist at the time, eradicate poppy crops and encourage local support for the central government. Western forces were deployed in all major regions and today have ballooned to more than 100,000 troops.
As the western occupation grew, the use of the two most worrisome forms of terrorism in Afghanistan suicide attacks and homemade bombs escalated in parallel. There were no recorded suicide attacks in Afghanistan before 2001. But in 2006, suicide attacks began to increase with 97 in 2006, 142 in 2007, 148 in 2008 and more than 60 in the first half of 2009. Moreover, the overwhelming percentage (80 per cent) of the suicide attacks has been against the US and allied troops or their bases. The pattern for other terrorist attacks is almost the same.
The picture is clear: the more western troops America has sent to Afghanistan, the more the local residents have viewed themselves as under foreign occupation, leading to a rise in suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks. Unless this popular resentment is allayed the Taliban will continue to draw strength from the people.
Meanwhile public opinion in both the US and Britain has veered largely against the war. A BBC poll found that 56 per cent of those polled were against it. Rigged elections and rampant corruption have not helped the Karzai regime to garner support at home or abroad.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carters national security adviser, has always held that 9/11 was for all its monstrous proportions an act of terrorism, not an act of aggression. In a recent speech, on Sept 14, he noted that it took about 300 US special forces with the troops of the Northern Alliance to overthrow the Taliban in 2001. Now some 100,000 US and allied forces are caught in a situation where they are regarded as foreign invaders like the Soviet troops. He pointedly mentioned Gen Stanley McChrystals demand for 40,000 more to add to the existing 68,000 troops. President Obama is in a cruel dilemma.
It may be just a ploy for aught we know but two overtures by the Taliban, in rapid succession, surely merit note. First came on Oct 7 the eight anniversary of the US attack. A statement posted on its website said: We did not have any agenda to harm other countries, including Europe, nor do we have such agenda today. A week later came its letter in Pashto to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Beijing asking it to adopt a strong stance against the occupation of Afghanistan and promising good relations with the neighbours after the foreign troops had quit.
None of the neighbours can accept Al Qaedas return. But there is an opportunity to explore precisely what the Taliban are prepared to concede once they are assured of a guaranteed withdrawal of foreign troops.
Times are grim. Dexter Filkins reported from Kabul on Oct 17: [Gen] McChrystals plan is a blueprint for an extensive American commitment to build a modern state in Afghanistan, where one has never existed, and to bring order to a place famous for the empires it has exhausted. Even under the best of circumstances, this effort would most likely last many more years, cost hundreds of billions of dollars and entail the deaths of many more troops. And thats if it succeeds.
The writer is an author and a lawyer.
