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DAWN.COM | Editorial | The saviour complex
Eleven years ago yesterday, the country was plunged into its fourth round of direct military rule. The decade of democracy which preceded that fateful day had proved to be a governance disaster, clearing a path for yet another would-be saviour in uniform to rescue Pakistan from the clutches of venal, incompetent and corrupt politicians.
But by the time Gen Musharraf was hounded out of office in August 2008, it seemed at long last Pakistan and Pakistanis had embraced the only form of governance that has never really been given a shot: a democratic form of government built around a succession principle allowing the regular, peaceful transfer of power between political parties. Worryingly, however, this time too the memory of institutions, the media and the people has proved short-lived. If another coup seems unlikely today which it does, notwithstanding all the political rumour and gossip it has little to do with a love for democracy. The three strongest arguments against a coup today are: one, the army has its hands full fighting a fierce internal insurgency; two, the political government has surrendered control of foreign and national security policies, matters the army cares about the most; and three, no acceptable political alternative to the present government is available to the extra-constitutional powers-that-be. Hardly the kind of arguments that make for a resounding defence of the democratic project.
So, unhappily, there is little reason to believe the days of would-be uniformed saviours are a thing of the past. A report in this newspaper yesterday, outlining the story of the short-lived army chief, Ziauddin Butt, who temporarily replaced Gen Musharraf on Oct 12, 1999, suggests how fine the line is between an apolitical chief and a would-be saviour. Ziauddin Butt may have reasons to exaggerate or distort history, but it is telling that to this day rumours persist that the army under Gen Musharraf had in principle decided it was time for the civilians to go and only the details were left to be filled out by circumstance. True, Nawaz Sharif eventually obliged the army by trying to get rid of yet another chief, but Mr Sharif did not create the institutional mindset of the military which made the Musharraf coup possible in the first place.
Equally, however, if a certain kind of military mindset is ever to be defeated, the civilians will have to raise their game. Ceteris paribus, the political governments staggering indifference to issues of governance and policymaking has done much harm to the prospects for democracy. The villain cannot be expected to just bow out gracefully; it will need to be out-thought and outfoxed.
Eleven years ago yesterday, the country was plunged into its fourth round of direct military rule. The decade of democracy which preceded that fateful day had proved to be a governance disaster, clearing a path for yet another would-be saviour in uniform to rescue Pakistan from the clutches of venal, incompetent and corrupt politicians.
But by the time Gen Musharraf was hounded out of office in August 2008, it seemed at long last Pakistan and Pakistanis had embraced the only form of governance that has never really been given a shot: a democratic form of government built around a succession principle allowing the regular, peaceful transfer of power between political parties. Worryingly, however, this time too the memory of institutions, the media and the people has proved short-lived. If another coup seems unlikely today which it does, notwithstanding all the political rumour and gossip it has little to do with a love for democracy. The three strongest arguments against a coup today are: one, the army has its hands full fighting a fierce internal insurgency; two, the political government has surrendered control of foreign and national security policies, matters the army cares about the most; and three, no acceptable political alternative to the present government is available to the extra-constitutional powers-that-be. Hardly the kind of arguments that make for a resounding defence of the democratic project.
So, unhappily, there is little reason to believe the days of would-be uniformed saviours are a thing of the past. A report in this newspaper yesterday, outlining the story of the short-lived army chief, Ziauddin Butt, who temporarily replaced Gen Musharraf on Oct 12, 1999, suggests how fine the line is between an apolitical chief and a would-be saviour. Ziauddin Butt may have reasons to exaggerate or distort history, but it is telling that to this day rumours persist that the army under Gen Musharraf had in principle decided it was time for the civilians to go and only the details were left to be filled out by circumstance. True, Nawaz Sharif eventually obliged the army by trying to get rid of yet another chief, but Mr Sharif did not create the institutional mindset of the military which made the Musharraf coup possible in the first place.
Equally, however, if a certain kind of military mindset is ever to be defeated, the civilians will have to raise their game. Ceteris paribus, the political governments staggering indifference to issues of governance and policymaking has done much harm to the prospects for democracy. The villain cannot be expected to just bow out gracefully; it will need to be out-thought and outfoxed.
