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The People's Republic at 60 — China's place in the world

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The People's Republic at 60


China's place in the world

Oct 1st 2009

From The Economist print edition


The world has accepted that China is emerging as a great power; it is a pity that it still does not always act as one




FOR a country that prides itself on its “peaceful rise”, it was an odd way to celebrate a birthday. The People’s Republic of China marked its diamond jubilee on October 1st with a staggering display of military muscle-flexing (see article). Goose-stepping soldiers, tanks and intercontinental ballistic missiles filed through Tiananmen Square, past the eponymous Gate of Heavenly Peace, where, 60 years ago, as every Chinese schoolchild is taught (wrongly, it now seems), Mao Zedong declared that the Chinese people had “stood up”.

For many Chinese, daily life remains a grim struggle, and their government rapacious, arbitrary and corrupt (see article). But on the world stage, they have never stood taller than today. China’s growing military, political and economic clout has given the country an influence of which Mao could only have dreamed. Yet Chinese officials still habitually complain that the world has not accepted China’s emergence, and wants to thwart its ambitions and “contain” it. America and others are trapped, lament these ascendant peaceniks, in a “cold-war mentality”. Sometimes, they have a point. But a bigger problem is that China’s own world view has failed to keep pace with its growing weight. It is a big power with a medium-power mindset, and a small-power chip on its shoulder.

Seventy-six trombones and better nukes

Take that spectacular parade. What message was it meant to convey to an awestruck world? China is a huge, newly emerging force on the world scene. And it is unapologetically authoritarian, as were Japan and Prussia, whose rises in the late 19th century were hardly trouble-free. Nor is China a status quo power. There is the unfinished business of Taiwan, eventual “reunification” with which remains an article of faith for China, and towards which it has pointed some 1,000 missiles. There is the big, lolling tongue of its maritime claim in the South China Sea, which unnerves its South-East Asian neighbours. And China keeps giving reminders of its unresolved wrangle with India over what is now the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which it briefly overran in 1962. Nor has it reached agreement with Japan over disputed islands.

China’s intentions may be entirely peaceful, but its plans to build aircraft-carriers are shrouded in secrecy and it is modernising its nuclear arsenal. A modicum of anxiety about its ambitions is more than just cold-war paranoia. And those prey to it will have been reassured neither by the October 1st parade nor by the massive military build-up and the increasingly sophisticated home-grown weapons technology it flaunted.

None of this is to deny that China is playing a constructive—and vital—role on a number of international fronts. A year ago there was much scepticism about whether the huge fiscal boost it announced for its economy was genuine. Its insistence that its main role in responding to the crisis would be to keep China’s economy growing smacked of an excuse for inaction. The stimulus, however, did prove real and effective (though it was imposed without debate). Also, China has been a helpful part of the global recovery effort. At last month’s G20 summit in Pittsburgh it even signed a communiqué committing itself to a process of economic co-operation and IMF-assisted mutual assessment. How far China’s decision-making, opaque even to its own officials, will be submitted to outside scrutiny is questionable. But for a government so fiercely insistent on the inviolability of its own sovereignty, this was a big step.

It has also softened this same principle as applied to some of its nastier diplomatic friends, such as Myanmar and Sudan. Flouting its hallowed doctrine of “non-interference”, it has nudged them into slightly less hostile stances towards the West. North Korea would probably not be a nuclear power today if China had been prepared to exert more pressure on it in the past. But at least China now plays host to the six-party process aimed at getting it to ditch its nukes, and is trying to bring it back to the negotiating table. Wen Jiabao, the prime minister, is off to Pyongyang on October 4th. Elsewhere, China has forsaken belligerence for courtship. Despite those missiles, it at present seems more intent on winning Taiwan by sending tourists to buy it than soldiers to conquer it. And it has agreed with Japan on the joint exploration of some disputed gasfields.

Yet as a constructive international partner in multilateral diplomacy, China still seems to dabble—to pick and choose the issues where it is willing to help. It will find expectations running ahead of it: the more it proves it can contribute, the more will be demanded of it. There is no shortage of issues, from climate change to virus-containment, where its role is crucial. But the image that it would like to cultivate, as a responsible, unthreatening, emergent superpower, is constantly being undercut by two of its leaders’ habits.

One is the knee-jerk resort to hysterical propaganda and reprisals when a foreign country displeases it by criticising its appalling treatment of political dissidents, or accepts a visit from the Dalai Lama or other objects of the Communist Party’s venom. The other is its readiness to put its perceived economic self-interest ahead of strategic common sense. That is the message from its reluctance to contemplate sanctions against Iran. Much as it would abhor a nuclear-armed Iran, China does not want to jeopardise important supplies of oil and gas. And this is merely one among many countries, especially in Africa, where China may be suppressing its global political influence for the mirage of energy security.

Were you watching, Mrs Wang?

China’s leaders rightly point out that theirs is still a poor country which will naturally give priority to lifting its economic development. And this in one sense answers the question about the message conveyed by the National Day parade: its main audience was not the outside world, but China’s own people.[/B] With no popular mandate, the government’s legitimacy relies on its record in making China richer and stronger. The display of strength, showing how well it has done in this, hints at its own lack of confidence. For those worried about where China’s rise might lead, that the government is so insecure is not a comforting thought.


Economist.com
 
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Watchout for arrogance....'Happy Birthday to China'. Showing off their new found prosperity and power is natural and its display is okay.

Problems will stem when this power will fuel chinese ambition to settle disputes with force. Further power will breed pride.

Unchecked Pride breeds Arrogance. Arrogance is one is the achilles heel of success (the other being complacency).
 
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Watchout for arrogance....'Happy Birthday to China'. Showing off their new found prosperity and power is natural and its display is okay.

Problems will stem when this power will fuel chinese ambition to settle disputes with force. Further power will breed pride.

Unchecked Pride breeds Arrogance. Arrogance is one is the achilles heel of success (the other being complacency).


We concur with you. Some "laws" are immutable and universal.
 
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Watchout for arrogance....'Happy Birthday to China'. Showing off their new found prosperity and power is natural and its display is okay.

Problems will stem when this power will fuel chinese ambition to settle disputes with force. Further power will breed pride.

Unchecked Pride breeds Arrogance. Arrogance is one is the achilles heel of success (the other being complacency).

Yeah exactly, last time when I saw an Indian, I was told NY city is the worlds' most advanced city and Bombay ranks the second, and in 1962 India troops totally kicked Chinese's ***...oh.and also he ask me if Chinese ppl know what is cell phone...
 
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Yeah exactly, last time when I saw an Indian, I was told NY city is the worlds' most advanced city and Bombay ranks the second, and in 1962 India troops totally kicked Chinese's ***...oh.and also he ask me if Chinese ppl know what is cell phone...

interesting...
the first time i met an indian guy, he was a international student, only been in the us for about 2 month and you know what he said?
he said the indian airforce is the largest and most modern in the world. and that they also have the best navy.
i laughed then proceeded to show him the fact that the us navy alone has some 3700 aircraft. i didnt need to go further on about technology and others, he was quiet after that.
thank god not all of them are like that, the next indian dude i met(whom i room with right now) is much more realistic(and hence much less annoying)
 
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From where did India bashing became a favourite past time of chinese folks? This is a thread glorifying China's prosperity, so enjoy it and stop stooping to low level of trolling.

ANALYSIS - As modern China turns 60, can we foresee its future?
Thu, Oct 1 08:24 PM

Enlarge Photo Fireworks explode over Tiananmen Square during an evening performance to mark the 60th anniversary of... Slideshow: World in pictures: October 1
"Things develop ceaselessly," said Chairman Mao Zedong in 1956, noting how much China had changed in 45 years. "In another 45 years... the beginning of the 21st century, China will have undergone an even greater change. She will have become a powerful socialist industrial country."

As forecasts go, it was pretty prescient.

Yet while China's rise may seem inevitable in retrospect as it marks 60 years of Communist rule, the path it has taken was anything but predictable. China weathered the upheavals of the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution and the traumatic Tiananmen Square crackdown and emerged remarkably stable and pragmatically governed.

The surprises of the last six decades have not deterred an army of pundits from trying to peer into China's future, making forecasts not just a few years ahead, but decades.

In economics, the most influential attempt to chart China's prospects has been Goldman Sachs' research on the "BRICs": Brazil, Russia, India and China. Goldman predicts China will overtake the United States as the world's biggest economy by 2027.

Some say the BRICs concept actually underplays China's growing importance. "Among the BRICs, China is the 800-pound panda in the room," said Markus Jaeger of Deutsche Bank Research.

"If China maintains near double-digit growth rates, its contribution to global growth will continue to vastly outweigh that of the other BRICs," he wrote in a research note this week.

Efforts to forecast China's political, geopolitical and military future are just as feverish.

"China is poised to have more impact on the world over the next 20 years than any other country," the U.S. National Intelligence Council's "Global Trends 2025" report said.

"By 2025, China will have the world's second-largest economy and will be a leading military power. It also could be the largest importer of natural resources and the biggest polluter."

While most forecasts regard China's ascent as almost inevitable, not everybody is so sanguine. George Friedman, founder and chief executive of geopolitical analysis firm STRATFOR, believes China will fragment by 2020.

"I don't share the view that China is going to be a major world power," Friedman wrote in "The Next 100 Years", which ambitiously attempts to predict the entire upcoming century. "I don't even believe it will hold together as a unified country."



PREDICTION IS DIFFICULT, ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE FUTURE

The evidence suggests forecasts of China's long-term future should be treated with caution. Studies of political forecasting have found most pundits do no better in predicting the future than if their forecasts had been based on the toss of a coin.

"When I have staged competitions, many forecasters fail to outperform the proverbial dart-throwing chimpanzee," psychologist Philip Tetlock said in the latest issue of The National Interest.

Even short-run forecasts often prove unreliable. Forecasting what may happen decades ahead is fraught with problems.

"The BRIC story has one fundamental flaw," wrote Ian Bremmer and Preston Keat of Eurasia Group in their book on risk analysis, "The Fat Tail", pointing out how different the world was 50 years ago, and how different it is likely to be five decades from now.

"The fundamental problem with 50-year political predictions is that virtually no-one gets them right. We simply cannot know how leaders in Brazil, Russia, India and China will define their political and economic interests half a century from now."

So are efforts to peer into China's future a waste of time?

Not necessarily. Goldman Sachs notes that its BRICs research is setting out one scenario, rather than making fixed forecasts.

"Our projections are optimistic," wrote Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman in their 2003 paper "Dreaming with BRICs".

"There is a good chance that the right conditions... will not fall into place and the projections will not be realised. If the BRICs pursue sound policies, however, the world we envisage here might turn out to be a reality, not just a dream."

Goldman's research focuses on the conditions for growth -- in terms of human capital, political stability, control of corruption, and environmental and demographic factors. This allows alternative scenarios of the future to be mapped.

In geopolitical forecasting too, while the future may be fundamentally unpredictable, key trends can be analysed.

Friedman concedes that long-range political forecasting is frequently overturned by the unexpected: "If you argued in 1970 that by 2007 China would have been the world's fourth-largest power, the laughter would have been ... intense," he said.

But while many of his detailed forecasts will turn out to be wrong, Friedman said, "the goal is to identify the major tendencies -- geopolitical, technological, demographic, cultural, military -- in their broadest sense".

We have no idea what China will look like in 60 years. It might be celebrating 120 years of Communist Party rule. It may not exist at all. But by analysing the forces that shape its long-term future, investors can gain a better understanding of the probable paths -- and be better prepared for the unexpected.

(Editing by Nick Macfie)

Andrew Marshall, Asia Political Risk Correspondent
 
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