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The might of the Thambis - 1965 War

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The might of the Thambis

Thambis_jpg_2539338f.jpg




Remembering the soldiers at the Ichhogil Bund action in 1965.
The Indian armed forces are celebrating the golden jubilee of their victory in the 1965 war. This is an occasion to remember a memorable battle a battalion of the Madras Regiment fought and won during the closing hours of that war, 50 years ago to this month.

The Ichhogil Canal, or the Bambanwalla Ravi Bedian Link (BRBL) as Pakistan calls it, is a defence obstacle it built in the 1950s along the Indian border linking the Ravi in the north and the Sutlej in the south. Some 45 metres wide and 5 m deep with its western bank built higher, lined with bunkers overlooking the eastern bank, it was primarily designed to block an Indian advance on Lahore, barely 12 miles away.

In early September 1965, once India chose to go on the offensive and open new fronts to counter the Pakistani offensive in Jammu and Kashmir, the thrust of the Indian Army’s XI Corps towards Lahore was under way. By September 10, the troops and tanks had overrun the township of Barki, barely 500 m short of Ichhogil, around which the Pakistani defences of the canal were concentrated. Abandoning their positions, the Pakistanis withdrew into their bunkers on the western bank and blew up the bridge over the canal to check pursuit. However, during the ensuing melee, before the Indian troops could consolidate their hold on the east bank, they managed to reoccupy a part of the bund with a sizeable force. They hadn’t been dislodged till September 22 when the deadline was fixed for ceasefire from the following day.

Advance guard

The 9th Battalion of the Madras Regiment forming part of 65 Infantry Brigade under 7 Infantry Division of the Corps, which had been with the advance guard of the formation before the assault on Barki, was then holding the firm base for attack by the other two battalions of the brigade, 4 Sikh and 16 Punjab. The battalion, which was short of one Rifle Company that had been diverted elsewhere, was ordered at short notice to attack and evict the enemy from the bund.

It was a tricky mission that required the unit to assault in waves of one company at a time from the flank. The enemy, two-company strong, was entrenched along the bund with fire support from their comrades across the canal barely 150 feet away. Nevertheless, the battalion, with an abundance of young Thambis — as southern soldiers are affectionately referred to within the Army — and an equally young leadership, made short work of it with a lightning charge that bordered on the reckless. Guns and tanks backed them with steady covering fire to neutralise the enemy on the far bank. The enemy was virtually routed. A number of them jumped into the canal to escape the assault, while many were lifted and thrown in, if not shot down or bayoneted. It was all over in two hours and 30 minutes from the word go at 12-30 a.m. on September 23. By 3 a.m. the bund had been overrun. The enemy casualties were heavy: 48 dead and an estimated 80 washed away. Eleven, including an officer, were taken prisoner. An enormous amount of arms and ammunition, including two anti-tank guns, was captured. Indian casualties were heavy too; 49 including a JCO killed, and 65, including an officer, wounded.

Night of heroism

It was a night of heroism, layered with glorious acts and poignant scenes. There were two jawans of the lead platoon, Narayanan and Bhaskaran, who volunteered to silence a machine gun and crawled forward in the darkness. The gun was silenced in 20 minutes, but in the heat of the battle no one noticed their absence. They were found later, sprawled dead in front of the pillbox that housed the weapon. Sepoys Mallappan and Ramachandran were found frozen to death in sitting posture manning their machine gun, one on the weapon and the other belt-feeding.

The Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel B.K. Sathyan, was up on the bund, cheering his men. The night air was rent by the battle cry of the Madrassis, adi, kollu, or, strike, kill. The medical truck plied up and down, picking up the casualties, with the popular Medical NCO, ‘Rasam’ Thankappan, at the wheel.

The 9th Madrassis call themselves the ‘Terrors’ — that’s just what the Pakistanis found them to be that night. And for the battalion, which traces its origins to the erstwhile Travancore State Forces, it was quite an Onam, the traditional Malayali festival that the men of the whole Madras Regiment celebrate with zest in August-September.

Exploits over centuries

The history of 9 Madras is as fascinating as its exploits in the battlefield for over three centuries. Raised in 1704 as the Nair Pattaalam — later Nair Brigade — by the sovereign of Venad (later Travancore), it is the oldest unit in the Indian Army. The Nair Brigade under King Marthanda Varma trounced the invading Dutch forces in a decisive battle on August 10, 1741 at Colachel, putting an end to their imperialistic dreams in India; it was the first-ever victory achieved by an Indian native force over the Europeans. A number of Dutch officers were taken prisoner, among them Eustace Benedict de Lannoy, who was later to train the Travancore Army on modern European lines.

This army defeated Tipu Sultan’s forces in the Battle of Nedumkotta in December 1789, a battle which stemmed the Mysorean onslaught on Travancore. It left Tipu permanently lame. Though downsized and relegated to do police work following Travancore’s unsuccessful revolt against British domination in 1809 led by Velu Thampi Dalawa, it was later resurrected. In 1934 the Travancore State Force was formed by merging the Nair Brigade with the Maharaja’s Body Guard.

They saw action in Burma and West Asia during the Second World War under the British and were, after Independence, amalgamated with the Indian Army as the 9th and 16th Battalions of the Madras Regiment respectively. Both these battalions, now composed of troops from all over southern India, have fought with distinction in the wars Independent India fought. While 9 Madras crowned itself with glory at Ichhogil Bund in 1965, 16 Madras gave an equally brilliant account of itself in the Battle of Basantar in 1971.

The might of the Thambis - The Hindu
 
The might of the Thambis

Thambis_jpg_2539338f.jpg




Remembering the soldiers at the Ichhogil Bund action in 1965.
The Indian armed forces are celebrating the golden jubilee of their victory in the 1965 war. This is an occasion to remember a memorable battle a battalion of the Madras Regiment fought and won during the closing hours of that war, 50 years ago to this month.

The Ichhogil Canal, or the Bambanwalla Ravi Bedian Link (BRBL) as Pakistan calls it, is a defence obstacle it built in the 1950s along the Indian border linking the Ravi in the north and the Sutlej in the south. Some 45 metres wide and 5 m deep with its western bank built higher, lined with bunkers overlooking the eastern bank, it was primarily designed to block an Indian advance on Lahore, barely 12 miles away.

In early September 1965, once India chose to go on the offensive and open new fronts to counter the Pakistani offensive in Jammu and Kashmir, the thrust of the Indian Army’s XI Corps towards Lahore was under way. By September 10, the troops and tanks had overrun the township of Barki, barely 500 m short of Ichhogil, around which the Pakistani defences of the canal were concentrated. Abandoning their positions, the Pakistanis withdrew into their bunkers on the western bank and blew up the bridge over the canal to check pursuit. However, during the ensuing melee, before the Indian troops could consolidate their hold on the east bank, they managed to reoccupy a part of the bund with a sizeable force. They hadn’t been dislodged till September 22 when the deadline was fixed for ceasefire from the following day.

Advance guard

The 9th Battalion of the Madras Regiment forming part of 65 Infantry Brigade under 7 Infantry Division of the Corps, which had been with the advance guard of the formation before the assault on Barki, was then holding the firm base for attack by the other two battalions of the brigade, 4 Sikh and 16 Punjab. The battalion, which was short of one Rifle Company that had been diverted elsewhere, was ordered at short notice to attack and evict the enemy from the bund.

It was a tricky mission that required the unit to assault in waves of one company at a time from the flank. The enemy, two-company strong, was entrenched along the bund with fire support from their comrades across the canal barely 150 feet away. Nevertheless, the battalion, with an abundance of young Thambis — as southern soldiers are affectionately referred to within the Army — and an equally young leadership, made short work of it with a lightning charge that bordered on the reckless. Guns and tanks backed them with steady covering fire to neutralise the enemy on the far bank. The enemy was virtually routed. A number of them jumped into the canal to escape the assault, while many were lifted and thrown in, if not shot down or bayoneted. It was all over in two hours and 30 minutes from the word go at 12-30 a.m. on September 23. By 3 a.m. the bund had been overrun. The enemy casualties were heavy: 48 dead and an estimated 80 washed away. Eleven, including an officer, were taken prisoner. An enormous amount of arms and ammunition, including two anti-tank guns, was captured. Indian casualties were heavy too; 49 including a JCO killed, and 65, including an officer, wounded.

Night of heroism

It was a night of heroism, layered with glorious acts and poignant scenes. There were two jawans of the lead platoon, Narayanan and Bhaskaran, who volunteered to silence a machine gun and crawled forward in the darkness. The gun was silenced in 20 minutes, but in the heat of the battle no one noticed their absence. They were found later, sprawled dead in front of the pillbox that housed the weapon. Sepoys Mallappan and Ramachandran were found frozen to death in sitting posture manning their machine gun, one on the weapon and the other belt-feeding.

The Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel B.K. Sathyan, was up on the bund, cheering his men. The night air was rent by the battle cry of the Madrassis, adi, kollu, or, strike, kill. The medical truck plied up and down, picking up the casualties, with the popular Medical NCO, ‘Rasam’ Thankappan, at the wheel.

The 9th Madrassis call themselves the ‘Terrors’ — that’s just what the Pakistanis found them to be that night. And for the battalion, which traces its origins to the erstwhile Travancore State Forces, it was quite an Onam, the traditional Malayali festival that the men of the whole Madras Regiment celebrate with zest in August-September.

Exploits over centuries

The history of 9 Madras is as fascinating as its exploits in the battlefield for over three centuries. Raised in 1704 as the Nair Pattaalam — later Nair Brigade — by the sovereign of Venad (later Travancore), it is the oldest unit in the Indian Army. The Nair Brigade under King Marthanda Varma trounced the invading Dutch forces in a decisive battle on August 10, 1741 at Colachel, putting an end to their imperialistic dreams in India; it was the first-ever victory achieved by an Indian native force over the Europeans. A number of Dutch officers were taken prisoner, among them Eustace Benedict de Lannoy, who was later to train the Travancore Army on modern European lines.

This army defeated Tipu Sultan’s forces in the Battle of Nedumkotta in December 1789, a battle which stemmed the Mysorean onslaught on Travancore. It left Tipu permanently lame. Though downsized and relegated to do police work following Travancore’s unsuccessful revolt against British domination in 1809 led by Velu Thampi Dalawa, it was later resurrected. In 1934 the Travancore State Force was formed by merging the Nair Brigade with the Maharaja’s Body Guard.

They saw action in Burma and West Asia during the Second World War under the British and were, after Independence, amalgamated with the Indian Army as the 9th and 16th Battalions of the Madras Regiment respectively. Both these battalions, now composed of troops from all over southern India, have fought with distinction in the wars Independent India fought. While 9 Madras crowned itself with glory at Ichhogil Bund in 1965, 16 Madras gave an equally brilliant account of itself in the Battle of Basantar in 1971.

The might of the Thambis - The Hindu
What was name of that Pakistani Battalion?
 
Does the Madras Regiment train in mountain warfare?
 
Name the Pakistani Battalion. ?
False pride, boasting victory over Pakistan. Nice story , now tell something which isn't partially fabricated.

You were handed an *** whooping , that our descendants will honor for generations.
 
Those war heroes of the south who fought and won all over

madras_2410358f.jpg


A historic photographers of the Madras Sappers opening the gates of Fort Dufferin in Mandalay, in March 1945. Photo by Special Arrangement.







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Awards and honours South Indians have earned in wars in India and abroad are too many to recount.
Reading of the George Cross that had been awarded posthumously to an Indian soldier in 1946 but that ended up in London after getting stolen, being returned to his widow living in Himachal Pradesh by the British High Commission (The Hindu, May 10, 2015), one was reminded of the gallantry of the first-ever Indian recipient of this medal. He hailed from Tamil Nadu. He too was awarded it posthumously. The George Cross is the highest British award for gallantry while not facing the enemy; roughly the equivalent of India’s own Ashok Chakra.

Subedar K. Subramaniam of the Madras Sappers made the ultimate sacrifice to save his comrades’ lives during the Italian Campaign. His 11 Field Park Company was engaged in mine-clearing operations on February 24, 1944 for an attack on the mountain monastery of Cassino, the focal point of the German Gustav Line 100 miles south of Rome. One of the men stepped on a mine and triggered it. With seconds left for it to explode, Subramaniam hurled himself on top of it, smothering the explosion with his own body. His act saved the lives of the entire group, including that of a young British officer.

The Sangro River Cremation Memorial in Italy erected in memory of the officers and men from India who fell fighting in Italy during the Second World War and were cremated there, and the Memorial Gates on Constitution Hill in London that commemorates the Allied dead of that war, carry Subramaniam’s name. But in his own country and State he remains forgotten. The Madras Engineer Group (MEG) to which Subramaniam belonged, remembers him with a day named after him.

The authorities of Kancheepuram district built a memorial for him in Keelottivakkam village. K.R.A. Narasiah, scholar-historian, in a recent article mentions having met the war hero’s son, Durailingam, who expressed his unhappiness over the Indian Army not making use of his ancestral home that he donated to honour his father’s memory.

Subedar Subramaniam’s was just one of many heroic feats during the Second World War by soldiers from the south. During the Italian Campaign, another hero of the Sappers, Jemadar Perumal, won a Military Cross for capturing three German soldiers single-handedly: it is the third highest award for an act of gallantry while facing the enemy, equivalent to the Vir Chakra. Another JCO, Subedar Thangaraju, was decorated with an American Silver Star for a daring bridging operation conducted under fire in support of a U.S. Infantry Brigade.

The Burma Campaign, in which S.H.F.J. Manekshaw, then-Captain of the 4/12 Frontier Force Regiment and later Chief of the Army Staff and Field Marshal, won a Military Cross, also saw a young officer, Captain R.S. Noronha of the 4th Battalion of the Madras Regiment being decorated with the same award twice – MC with bar – for acts of conspicuous gallantry. With his battalion facing the Japanese onslaught in the Kabaw Valley, the notorious ‘Valley of Death’ on the Indo-Burma border, he held out with his company for 16 days at Sita Ridge. Later during the counter-offensive, he led an attack on an enemy stronghold on the west bank of the Irrawaddy, where he won the bar to his earlier award. During this action, one of his JCOs, Jamedar Thomas, who displayed outstanding tenacity, was awarded the Military Cross. Major C.P.A. Menon of the 1st Battalion of the Madras Regiment, who led his company in an audacious amphibious assault on the Indonesian town of Sourabaya – it left 20 of his men dead and 52 wounded – was awarded the Military Cross. Noronha, who hailed from Thangassery near Kollam, had an illustrious post-War military career till he retired as Lieutenant-General. Menon, from Palakkad, was killed during the Kashmir War of 1947-48 while commanding his battalion as a Lieutenant-Colonel.

The Kashmir War of 1947-48 saw a large complement of troops – both infantry and engineers – from the south in the thick of action. C.P.A. Menon’s battalion was one of the first to take the field. Despite the loss of their commanding officer early on during the operations, the unit put up a sterling performance, earning one of their gritty NCOs, Naik Raju, a Maha Vir Chakra, the second highest gallantry award, and seven others Vir Chakras and 16 Mention in Dispatches. Twenty one of them were killed and 96 wounded. Another battalion of the Madras Regiment that had an eventful stint was the 4th Madras.

The most memorable contribution of the southern Indian troops in the Kashmir War was the role played by the Madras Sappers in the victory of Zojila Pass. A task force commanded by Major M.A. Thangaraju achieved what General Thimmayya was later to describe as ‘a record in any operation’, when they converted a five-mile jeep track between Baltal and the Zojila Pass into a tankable road, climbing to 12,000 feet under the enemy’s nose in a month’s time to beat the snowfall that would have closed the pass. Thanks to this road (named Thangaraju Road) Indian tanks made a dramatic appearance, chasing the enemy out of those heights. They also carved out a 12,000-foot high jeep track all the way to Gurais, toiling through snow and ice as deep as 12 feet. Jemadars R Kanickasami and Thangavelu and Sappers Subhash Thevar and Arunachalam of the Madras Sappers were awarded Vir Chakras for exceptional acts of courage in operations during the Kashmir War.

The contribution of South Indian troops in Kashmir was so outstanding during the fighting as well as rebuilding that Chief Minister Sheikh Abdullah wrote of the ‘Madrassi foot soldier’ in glowing terms to the Madras Government.

The awards and honours the South Indians earned in the wars fought after Independence are far too many to recount. Maybe because of the distance from the theatre of operations, people in the south are often sparsely informed of front line battles. No wonder few would have heard of 9 Madras in action at Ichhogil Bund in 1965 or of 16 Madras at Basantar in 1971, some of the hottest pieces of warfare that saw the southern fighting spirit at its peak.

captdpr@gmail.com
 
Its a shame that the Nair Brigade is now called "Madras Regiment" :tdown:

It gives a completely wrong picture.
 
Name the Pakistani Battalion. ?
False pride, boasting victory over Pakistan. Nice story , now tell something which isn't partially fabricated.

You were handed an *** whooping , that our descendants will honor for generations.
Yes. That is all we do.
 
Name the Pakistani Battalion. ?
False pride, boasting victory over Pakistan. Nice story , now tell something which isn't partially fabricated.

You were handed an *** whooping , that our descendants will honor for generations.

Why not you check your own sources in PA? Better still The first attempt ended in failure. The second attempt, which is what this speaks about resulted in your posts being over run.

itsPakistan - Pakistan - History of Pakistan
On September 6, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II veteran Major General Prasad battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Ichhogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was a de facto border of India and Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to flee his vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross over the Ichhogil Canal was made through the bridge in the village of Barki, just east of Lahore. This brought the Indian Army within the range of Lahore International Airport.

Better still, why not call in @niaz or @fatman17 to clarify your doubt? @Capt.Popeye @Joe Shearer (I wonder where he is, no history lessons nowadays)

By the way, there is a possibility of it being 18th Baloch. Since, these chaps had captured the Jonga of the Div Commander Major Gen Niranjan Prasad in the same sector. Above mentioned chaps please correct me, if I am mistaken.

Edit : Bloody hell! I gave a search for "Defence of Lahore" and all I got were real estate information!
 
Last edited:
Name the Pakistani Battalion. ?
False pride, boasting victory over Pakistan. Nice story , now tell something which isn't partially fabricated.

You were handed an *** whooping , that our descendants will honor for generations.

Sucker, suck it up. Read here, carefully


The Battle for Ravi-Sutlej Corridor 1965

About Defence Journal
(We take pleasure in introducing you to the Defence Journal. Published monthly from Karachi, the Defence Journal benefits from a long and distinguished pedigree. It has been in continuous operation since the past 27 years)


Lot of detail on the link but some excerpts
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Indian attack on Lahore in particular and Ravi-Sutlej Corridor in general has remained the subject of too much propaganda and too little analysis. On Pakistani side the Battle for Lahore was seen as a superhuman effort while on the Indian side it exposed many glaring weaknesses in the Indian Army at unit, brigade, divisional and corps level.

On the other hand the total failure of the main Pakistani attack in Khem Karan was ignored or forgotten in the smoke screen of glory created by official propagandists who successfully shifted the entire public attention on laurels of Aziz Bhatti etc. Thus, many glaring failures like surrender of an entire tank regiment on Pakistani side in Khem Karan were overlooked. If Niranjan Parshad was sacked on the Indian side no one realized that the Pakistani GOC 1st Armoured Division survived unceremonious dismissal simply because he was close to the then army chief.

Unfortunately, instead of dispassionate analysis the Battle for Lahore or Ravi-Sutlej Corridor as one may call it was overclouded by tales of heroism at individual and unit level on the Pakistani side.On the Indian side, it led to various drastic changes in high command and re-thinking about unit employment. After the war, Indian High Command spent a very large fortune on increasing terrain friction by construction of spurs, bunds, drains etc to ensure that something like a tank thrust against their strategic line of communication to Kashmir and Amritsar may never again take place. In 1971, thus little activity took place in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor and the emphasis shifted to area south of Sutlej.

We will analyse the corps level battle in this article in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor in 1965 which involved a total force of some five infantry divisions and one armoured division and an independent armoured brigade.


------------------------------------------------------
Meanwhile, the 7 Indian Division performed better. It crossed the international border at0530 Hours 6th September with 48 Brigade in lead and secured the Hudiara Drain defended by a company size advanced position by an outflanking manoeuvre from the left. 65 Brigade commenced the advance from Hudiara Drain onwards towards Barki and contaced the BRB opposite Barki which was held in strength by elements of a unit of 103 Brigade. Barki defended by a company of 17 Punjab and a company of 12 Punjab was captured by the 7 Division employing one battalion (4 Sikh) supported by Central India Horse less two squadrons on night 10th/11th September. Major Aziz Bhatti who was later awarded the Nishan-I-Haidar was the 17 Punjab Company Commander at Barki and survived this action. He was killed by enemy shelling on 11th September on the west bank of the BRBL the next day.40 The Indian Commanding Officer of Central India Horse Lt Col Joshi who was leading from the front was mortally wounded once his jeep was blown up by an anti-tank mine and died on 12th September.41


-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comparative Differences in the two armies

Many ridiculous myths were propagated in Pakistan about differences in the two armies. Racially by and large both the armies were of the same stock. The Pakistan Army bulk of which some 65% to 75% being Punjabis who were converted to Islam in the period 1000-1600 or Pathans or Ranghars who were of Hindu Rajput origin. On the other hand the bulk of the Indian Army was Punjabi or North Indian again with Sikhs who were converted to Sikhism in the period from 1500-1800. The remaining larger portion of the Indian Army was Dogra (Punjabi Hindu Rajput), Punjabi Hindu Jat, and some Madrasis, Kumaonis and Gurkhas. Racially by and large the armies were alike. Where a unit did not do well had a deeper connection with poor leadership at battalion, brigade or divisional level. Units panicked on both sides, artillery fire had the same effect on both sides and if one side had better guns it definitely gave it an advantage. Thus, there was no major differences in both the armies at soldier to soldier level.

This fact was noted by some officers soon after 1965 but the majority were victims of the psychosis of Islamic Martial Military superiority that overwhelmed the West Pakistani psyche during the period 1966-1971! Brigadier A.R Siddiqi in his book on the Pakistan Army’s press image thus narrated a thought-provoking incident soon after the war. Siddiqi met Brigadier Qayyum Sher who as just discussed had distinguished himself as an infantry brigade commander in the battle opposite Lahore. Qayyum Sher was unhappy about the unrealistic expectations and myths that were being created as a result of the official propaganda. Qayyum Sher told Siddiqi, “Miracles he mused, ‘may indeed have happened, but they happen only once. Let me tell you that your press chaps are doing a lot of harm to the soldier psychologically by publishing all those foolish stories. I wonder what they are really trying to tell the world. That the Pakistani soldier can fight his war only with the help of his celestial allies. That he is facing an enemy inferior to him in all respects. I admit God’s help is of the utmost importance but it’s no substitute for one’s own performance. It would be quite stupid to forget that the Indian soldier is as much of a professional as his Pakistani counterpart. He has been trained in similar military systems and institutions and fights like hell when he has to. The only reason why the Pakistani soldier put up a comparatively better performance in this war was that he fought largely on his own home ground as a defender”. Siddiqi further noted that “The Pakistani image makers, however, had little use for such sterile talk. They had their own mental picture of the war and regarded it as the only correct one. Anybody who dared to speak of the war more realistically simply betrayed a ‘diffident and defeatist mentality’ ...The merest suggestion of the criticism of the military performance became a taboo”.71 Sher was not alone in entertaining these views. Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik who very ably commanded the 3rd Baluch opposite Lahore on the BRB states in his memoirs that the Indian superiority opposite Lahore was not as overwhelming as later portrayed in the Pakistani official propaganda. Tajammul thus stated, “We had Patton Tanks whereas Indians had mostly Sherman Tanks which were comparatively much inferior. Similarly our artillery guns out ranged the Indian artillery guns. They had an overall superiority of infantry, perhaps of about 1 to 2 but most of their divisions were comparatively ill-equipped and untrained and they had to guard a much bigger frontier”. 72

Conclusion

The battles fought in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor are fit to be subject of a Shakespearian comedy of errors. On a more serious note Pakistan Army lost its last chance to force a military solution on the Indians. It failed not because failure was inevitable but because seeds of failure were sown once soldiering was mixed with politics, merit was sidelined and men of limited grey matter were elevated to the highest ranks. After 1965 the current of history started flowing against Pakistan and its full results came into light only in December 1971. There was logic in Bhutto and his hawk’s position that Pakistan had the potential to knock India out in a swift war like the Israelis did in 1956 and 1967. Unfortunately, Pakistan failed not because of material reasons but because of qualitative reasons. The finest steel goes through the hottest fire. This unfortunately was not the case with the Pakistan Army of 1965 in terms of higher leadership.
 
I've read this forged crap before. Give something else.

Sucker, suck it up. Read here, carefully

The Battle for Ravi-Sutlej Corridor 1965

About Defence Journal
(We take pleasure in introducing you to the Defence Journal. Published monthly from Karachi, the Defence Journal benefits from a long and distinguished pedigree. It has been in continuous operation since the past 27 years)


Lot of detail on the link but some excerpts
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Indian attack on Lahore in particular and Ravi-Sutlej Corridor in general has remained the subject of too much propaganda and too little analysis. On Pakistani side the Battle for Lahore was seen as a superhuman effort while on the Indian side it exposed many glaring weaknesses in the Indian Army at unit, brigade, divisional and corps level.

On the other hand the total failure of the main Pakistani attack in Khem Karan was ignored or forgotten in the smoke screen of glory created by official propagandists who successfully shifted the entire public attention on laurels of Aziz Bhatti etc. Thus, many glaring failures like surrender of an entire tank regiment on Pakistani side in Khem Karan were overlooked. If Niranjan Parshad was sacked on the Indian side no one realized that the Pakistani GOC 1st Armoured Division survived unceremonious dismissal simply because he was close to the then army chief.

Unfortunately, instead of dispassionate analysis the Battle for Lahore or Ravi-Sutlej Corridor as one may call it was overclouded by tales of heroism at individual and unit level on the Pakistani side.On the Indian side, it led to various drastic changes in high command and re-thinking about unit employment. After the war, Indian High Command spent a very large fortune on increasing terrain friction by construction of spurs, bunds, drains etc to ensure that something like a tank thrust against their strategic line of communication to Kashmir and Amritsar may never again take place. In 1971, thus little activity took place in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor and the emphasis shifted to area south of Sutlej.

We will analyse the corps level battle in this article in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor in 1965 which involved a total force of some five infantry divisions and one armoured division and an independent armoured brigade.


------------------------------------------------------
Meanwhile, the 7 Indian Division performed better. It crossed the international border at0530 Hours 6th September with 48 Brigade in lead and secured the Hudiara Drain defended by a company size advanced position by an outflanking manoeuvre from the left. 65 Brigade commenced the advance from Hudiara Drain onwards towards Barki and contaced the BRB opposite Barki which was held in strength by elements of a unit of 103 Brigade. Barki defended by a company of 17 Punjab and a company of 12 Punjab was captured by the 7 Division employing one battalion (4 Sikh) supported by Central India Horse less two squadrons on night 10th/11th September. Major Aziz Bhatti who was later awarded the Nishan-I-Haidar was the 17 Punjab Company Commander at Barki and survived this action. He was killed by enemy shelling on 11th September on the west bank of the BRBL the next day.40 The Indian Commanding Officer of Central India Horse Lt Col Joshi who was leading from the front was mortally wounded once his jeep was blown up by an anti-tank mine and died on 12th September.41


-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comparative Differences in the two armies

Many ridiculous myths were propagated in Pakistan about differences in the two armies. Racially by and large both the armies were of the same stock. The Pakistan Army bulk of which some 65% to 75% being Punjabis who were converted to Islam in the period 1000-1600 or Pathans or Ranghars who were of Hindu Rajput origin. On the other hand the bulk of the Indian Army was Punjabi or North Indian again with Sikhs who were converted to Sikhism in the period from 1500-1800. The remaining larger portion of the Indian Army was Dogra (Punjabi Hindu Rajput), Punjabi Hindu Jat, and some Madrasis, Kumaonis and Gurkhas. Racially by and large the armies were alike. Where a unit did not do well had a deeper connection with poor leadership at battalion, brigade or divisional level. Units panicked on both sides, artillery fire had the same effect on both sides and if one side had better guns it definitely gave it an advantage. Thus, there was no major differences in both the armies at soldier to soldier level.

This fact was noted by some officers soon after 1965 but the majority were victims of the psychosis of Islamic Martial Military superiority that overwhelmed the West Pakistani psyche during the period 1966-1971! Brigadier A.R Siddiqi in his book on the Pakistan Army’s press image thus narrated a thought-provoking incident soon after the war. Siddiqi met Brigadier Qayyum Sher who as just discussed had distinguished himself as an infantry brigade commander in the battle opposite Lahore. Qayyum Sher was unhappy about the unrealistic expectations and myths that were being created as a result of the official propaganda. Qayyum Sher told Siddiqi, “Miracles he mused, ‘may indeed have happened, but they happen only once. Let me tell you that your press chaps are doing a lot of harm to the soldier psychologically by publishing all those foolish stories. I wonder what they are really trying to tell the world. That the Pakistani soldier can fight his war only with the help of his celestial allies. That he is facing an enemy inferior to him in all respects. I admit God’s help is of the utmost importance but it’s no substitute for one’s own performance. It would be quite stupid to forget that the Indian soldier is as much of a professional as his Pakistani counterpart. He has been trained in similar military systems and institutions and fights like hell when he has to. The only reason why the Pakistani soldier put up a comparatively better performance in this war was that he fought largely on his own home ground as a defender”. Siddiqi further noted that “The Pakistani image makers, however, had little use for such sterile talk. They had their own mental picture of the war and regarded it as the only correct one. Anybody who dared to speak of the war more realistically simply betrayed a ‘diffident and defeatist mentality’ ...The merest suggestion of the criticism of the military performance became a taboo”.71 Sher was not alone in entertaining these views. Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik who very ably commanded the 3rd Baluch opposite Lahore on the BRB states in his memoirs that the Indian superiority opposite Lahore was not as overwhelming as later portrayed in the Pakistani official propaganda. Tajammul thus stated, “We had Patton Tanks whereas Indians had mostly Sherman Tanks which were comparatively much inferior. Similarly our artillery guns out ranged the Indian artillery guns. They had an overall superiority of infantry, perhaps of about 1 to 2 but most of their divisions were comparatively ill-equipped and untrained and they had to guard a much bigger frontier”. 72

Conclusion

The battles fought in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor are fit to be subject of a Shakespearian comedy of errors. On a more serious note Pakistan Army lost its last chance to force a military solution on the Indians. It failed not because failure was inevitable but because seeds of failure were sown once soldiering was mixed with politics, merit was sidelined and men of limited grey matter were elevated to the highest ranks. After 1965 the current of history started flowing against Pakistan and its full results came into light only in December 1971. There was logic in Bhutto and his hawk’s position that Pakistan had the potential to knock India out in a swift war like the Israelis did in 1956 and 1967. Unfortunately, Pakistan failed not because of material reasons but because of qualitative reasons. The finest steel goes through the hottest fire. This unfortunately was not the case with the Pakistan Army of 1965 in terms of higher leadership.
 
So convenient, right? Go and hide somewhere.

Only thing I have left for you now is pic of my ***. But that is too ugly to share. The Classic BLACK Indian A$%
Oh offcourse. You don't have actual pictures so you are resorting to a picture of your *** out of fustration. Here have this it will sooth your pain.

images
 

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