The India-US Defence Partnership is Not Out of the Political Woods Yet

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The India-US Defence Partnership is Not Out of the Political Woods Yet
By Arun Mohan Sukumar on 14/04/2016 • Leave a comment


Without India clearly articulating its own blueprint to enhance indigenous capacity, agreements like the LSA and CISMOA will be susceptible to political undulation.

Union Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar and the US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter address a joint Press Conference at South Block in New Delhi on April 12. Credit: PTI

The India-United States Joint Statement on the visit of Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter reflects the Indian government’s continued reluctance to sign the “foundational” defence agreements on the table. Virtually no sticking points remain on the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) or the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Understanding (CISMOA) – even the most contentious clauses that could draw India into major US-led combat operations are conditioned on sovereign consent – suggesting that India is yet to muster the political appetite to sign them. Indeed, this task could now be left to the Prime Minister himself during his visit to the US later this summer.

The LSA and CISMOA are barebones agreements and hardly a negotiator’s nightmare. Both these agreements offer sufficient room for India to protect its strategic autonomy, argue Indian officials, but their political masters appear to have developed cold feet, shelving the LSA for now. Given that the National Democratic Alliance took these agreements out of deep freeze and placed it at the centre of the India-US strategic partnership, it cannot be exculpated of its responsibility to sell them to the Indian public. The LSA and CISMOA have not been debated on their merit, and if closer strategic engagement animated these agreements, the Indian establishment has not offered a convincing defence to sign them.

The Indian negotiating line on the Logistics Support Agreement is simple: in the coming years, New Delhi expects to step up its engagement with “low intensity” scenarios such as maritime piracy, WMD proliferation and humanitarian emergencies in the Indian Ocean region. This expectation stems from an understanding that the US will gradually recede from its “smaller” commitments, as it turns its undivided attention towards the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. India sees the LSA as a backbone to support its imminent and expanded role as the “net security provider” in the region, hoping to access not just US military bases in the Indian Ocean Rim and Horn of Africa but also in the South China (Philippines) and East China (Japan) seas.

If this is an ambitious and forward looking objective, it must be clearly articulated. From a transactional perspective, the United States arguably is not dependent on the LSA, just as India’s current operations limit the need for American bases in the Asia-Pacific. As others have noted, India has in the past offered overflight rights to the United States during Operation Enduring Freedom, and refuelled US aircraft during the 1991 Gulf War, all in the absence of the LSA. Joint military exercises, where both parties may use the other’s military bases for refuelling or servicing, are possible without a framework agreement.

Indian negotiators also see the LSA as a small but significant step in the evolution of the 2015 India-US Defence Framework. Its predecessor, the 2005 Framework, may have been foreshadowed by the India-US nuclear deal but its trigger was the December 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. The Indian Navy’s relief and assistance efforts – which were faster and more effective in reaching US assets – “changed the US mindset” about Delhi’s regional role. India’s decision to negotiate the LSA is therefore based on an overtly strategic premise.

The CISMOA requires careful treatment on its own merits, given that it may have the unintended consequence of locking India into the US defence technology market. India would have three main concerns with an interoperability agreement for advanced communications equipment with the United States:

1. Who can install, and more importantly, “patch” communications systems in platforms sold to India? Will this be done exclusively by US officials, and if so, what will be their level of clearance to enter Indian installations?
2. Will India be able to jointly develop “keying materials” – or algorithms to encrypt sensitive communication – with the US for platforms sold to New Delhi? Where will these be stored?
3. Can the CISMOA, by setting the terms for interoperability, lead to US-India cooperation in the sale and development of more advanced technologies in electronic warfare?

The first two questions are important but they raise concerns that can be addressed (if not already) in the negotiating text of the Memorandum. For instance, the Indian Army is well-positioned to conform to or absorb platforms that use advanced encryption standards set by the US National Institute of Science and Technology or the National Security Agency. It is really the promise of future cooperation in advanced technologies that appeals to Indian negotiators. By itself, CISMOA cannot lead to the transfer or development of electronic warfare equipment but India hopes that the agreement will set the stage for India’s entry into export control regimes. The growing capabilities of both Pakistan and China in asymmetric, electronic warfare motivates this objective. Much has been made of the sale of P-8is (maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine aircraft) to India without secure communications equipment in the absence of a CISMOA, but it’s really the co-development of technologies that India hopes will be the eventual outcome of this agreement. Like the LSA, then, the CISMOA serves a strategic purpose.

The third agreement, BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for geospatial information), adds another layer of concerns regarding the mapping and collection of data by private companies that provide support to US forces. But as similar agreements — the US-Norway BECA is one example — illustrate, adequate safeguards can be built into the text to address any misgivings. Geospatial intelligence offers US forces unparalleled advantages in Afghanistan and Iraq, but for India it can play a crucial role in assessing and responding to humanitarian emergencies in South Asia. More importantly, the expectation is that the Indian public and private sectors are finally able to co-develop their capacities in this field.

All three agreements clearly serve long-term goals for India, making it incumbent on the government to explain why it wants to hedge its faith in the United States. This is where the National Democratic Alliance has come a cropper, because it has not convincingly explained how the agreements facilitate India’s interests, rather than responding to criticism that New Delhi is moving closer to a “US alliance”. Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar recently suggested that India needs a “bolder” foreign policy that will invariably “unsettle status quo”. There is certainly a case to be made for sharper strategic manoeuvring, but it has not been made in the context of the defence agreements. The United States may be seeking a greater convergence of interests but India has its own reasons to negotiate these agreements.

Privately, Indian officials believe that Russia’s dwindling economy will eventually reduce the state’s capacity to produce cutting edge defence equipment. With China, Beijing’s strategic embrace of Pakistan and India’s own territorial disputes make it a less attractive supplier of advanced equipment. But above all, India’s defence relationship with the United States appears to be premised on the hope that the organic linkages that both countries share on civilian technology will be carried over to the military on the shoulders of agreements like the CISMOA. The eventual goal of co-producing sophisticated technologies is not far-fetched because US-based Indian scientists and engineers have played an important role in the development of American defence platforms as well.

This ambiguity and lack of political direction is presumably the reason why a key chapter on “strategic partnerships” was held back from the new Defence Procurement Policy released last month. The Indian government’s vision for engaging its domestic private sector will also determine the course of international partnerships. India needs to agree on a model that incorporates the best of all defence production models: private sector-led (US), state supported (France/Israel) and state-led (Russia). Without a clear articulation of its own blueprint to enhance indigenous capacity, agreements like the LSA and CISMOA will be susceptible to political undulation, which explains their non-signing during Sec. Carter’s visit. The delay may well be a blessing in disguise, because India’s interests will hardly be served if it has not clinically assessed the costs and benefits of signing these agreements.

Arun Mohan Sukumar heads the Cyber Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

http://thewire.in/2016/04/14/the-in...-is-not-out-of-the-political-woods-yet-29632/

 

[dadeechi]

India-US pact behind, Manohar Parrikar heads to China

Deevakar Anand | Fri, 15 Apr 2016-07:30am , New Delhi , dna
Manohar Parrikar's four-day visit to China starting April 17 will not just be the first by an Indian defence minister after 2013 when UPA minister AK Antony went there, but also comes close on the heels of India-US announcing an in-principle agreement on sharing military logistics.

One of the gains for India on account of the new arrangement with the US can be that it will balance out the growing maritime assertiveness by China in the Indian Ocean.


Analysts point that they won't be surprised if Parrikar's visit leads to some definitive outcome due to India-US agreement. "Now that India and US have announced in-principle agreement on sharing military logistics, one may expect this to influence a definitive impact during Parrikar's visit," said Pravin Sawhney, editor of defence and security magazine, Force.

US has been pestering India to join a joint maritime patrol along with its own and the navies of Japan and Australia in the Asia-Pacific region. India, however, has not approved the idea as yet. Notably, trade worth $ 5.3 trillion is carried out through the South China sea and the Indian Ocean.China asserts itself, especially in the South China sea.

In Beijing, following the announcement of the new India-US engagement, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang was quoted by PTI as telling reporters on Wednesday, "We have noted relevant reports on US defence secretary Ash Carter's visit to India". Lu further said that "India is also an influential country in the world, and India has been upholding independent diplomatic policy. India will make up its diplomatic policies based on its own interests."

Parrikar will be accompanied to Beijing by the defence secretary, director general of military operations, western Naval commander, and air force vice chief, and is likely to raise the issue of China blocking India's bid in the United Nations to get Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar declared as terrorist following the organisation's role on the January attack on the Pathankot air base, said a senior functionary at the Indian ministry of defence (MoD).

The functionary also pointed that "last year Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) vice chairman General Fan Changlong came to India and the two sides' representatives are holding dialogues continuously over the long-pending border dispute between the two countries".

http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-india-us-pact-behind-manohar-parrikar-heads-to-china-2202227

Shyam Saran: A lopsided strategic partnership
We should be honest enough to acknowledge our strategic partnership with the US may be valuable, but has clearly defined limits
Shyam Saran

April 14, 2016 Last Updated at 21:50 IST

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US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter has concluded his visit to India on a high note. Most importantly the two sides have agreed to sign a Logistics Exchange Memorandum Agreement that would enable reciprocal support to each other's armed forces in specific situations such as joint military exercises, interventions in natural disasters and any other situation that may be mutually agreed upon. This does not add up to an alliance relationship but certainly upgrades the defence relationship between the two countries.



This may open the way for concluding the two other politically more difficult "foundational agreements", viz, the Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement(BECA), which together add up to a level of inter-operability in defence that presupposes a very high level of trust and strategic alignment. While one should welcome the opportunity to access sophisticated defence technologies from the US, such as modern aircraft carrier technology and virtual reality applications, there is need for caution in proceeding with expanded defence cooperation while there continue to be significant differences in perceptions concerning key strategic issues, which impact directly on India's security.

It is in the maritime domain that India and the US appear to have the most significant alignment of interests. This is mainly with respect to the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific, including the South China Sea, a region now better known collectively as the Indo-Pacific. The China factor is clearly a shared concern. During Mr Carter's visit, the two sides instituted a regular dialogue on maritime security. This is likely to focus again on the Indo-Pacific. There is no similar alignment of interests with respect to the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf, which would include our concerns over Gwadar and Chinese ingress into our western flank through Pakistan.



China is a security challenge to India not just in the Indo-Pacific but also on the western flank. In fact, China is a greater and more immediate threat to Indian interests on this flank precisely because it is allied with and supports a hostile Pakistan. It is now becoming active in Afghanistan and the US believes its interests are better served by working together with China and Pakistan to broker peace with the Taliban. Here, India's interests are not aligned with the US. In this regard, the US should not cherry-pick where it wants to work together with India and where it is willing to sideline Indian interests. If that is the case, then we, too, need to be selective in our approach.

We have also seen that the US continues to bracket India and Pakistan together as far as nuclear issues are concerned, ignoring the fact that it is Pakistan which has a first-use doctrine, is deliberately lowering the nuclear threshold by developing and deploying theatre nuclear weapons and rapidly building up its nuclear arsenal. India, by contrast, has a no first-use and retaliation-only doctrine and has been remarkably restrained in developing and upgrading its nuclear deterrent. For President Barack Obama to have suggested recently at the Nuclear Security Summit that both India and Pakistan have nuclear doctrines that are headed in the wrong direction, reflects continued India-Pakistan hyphenation. We should acknowledge that the US has only partially adjusted its posture in this respect.

There is another dimension which works against the forging of a strategic partnership and that pertains to the economic and trade relationship. In this important domain, the two countries are adversaries. The US move to establish the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) without any dialogue or consultation with India is illustrative of how the US Trade Representative looks upon India as a spoiler and a constant irritant, without considering whether there are genuine Indian concerns behind the positions we take. Even on India's membership of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which is not a negotiating body but a forum for sharing best practices, it is the US which is busy warning APEC members that bringing India in would retard progress in the forum. How can India be a strategic and, in particular, maritime security partner in the Indo-Pacific if it is seen as a rank adversary, and treated as such, in the economic and commercial domain in the same region? You cannot be a partner in one domain and a target in another. If that is the case then we should be honest enough to acknowledge that our strategic partnership, which may be of considerable value, nevertheless has clearly defined limits. If the US wishes to keep several options open to pursue its interests, India may need to do the same.

One should acknowledge that India-US relations today are more broad ranging and much deeper than at any time in the past. In the areas of defence and counter-terrorism, the level of cooperation and mutual understanding is unprecedented. But, we should also recognise that there is a constant threat of commercial issues overwhelming the relationship as was the case in 2014-15, when the US pharma industry launched a virtual "beat up on India" campaign on the issue of intellectual property. While India made a major contribution to the success of the Paris Climate Change agreement, at considerable sacrifice of its own long-term energy security interests, the US has dealt a blow to India's renewable energy plans by lodging a complaint at the World Trade Organization (WTO) against India for promoting its domestic solar industry.

Mr Obama recently gave a long interview to The National Interest magazine on the evolving global situation and the US's role in the Asia-Pacific region. India did not figure in the interview. So much for the "defining partnership of the 21st century", which is how he had described Indo-US relations during his first visit to India.

The US presidential elections are round the corner and it is anybody's guess what the new administration will look like and what its foreign policy agenda will be. While there will always be issues on which India and the US will adopt different postures, a strategic partnership should entail that on issues of key interest to each other there will at least be a "no surprises" and a "do no harm" understanding. Spelling out these interests may be a good starting point for dialogue with the incoming administration in Washington.
The writer is a former Foreign Secretary
He is currently Chairman of RIS and Senior Fellow at CPR.

http://www.business-standard.com/ar...ded-strategic-partnership-116041400917_1.html

Does the Logistics Exchange Agreement help the US more than India?
Sadiq Naqvi | 14 April 2016

Sajad Malik/Catch News
TWEET THIS
India and US are likely to sign a key logistics exchange agreement. China is watching
Indo-US logistics exchange agreement will be ready in a month, if not weeks, says @manoharparrikar Indo-US logistics exchange agreement will be ready in a month, if not weeks, says @manoharparrikar

QUICK PILL
The deal

• Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar & US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter announced that India & US have decided to share military logisitics

• The 2 countries may sign a Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement by June

• Both countries will be able to use military bases to facilitate, repair, re-fuelling and other contingencies

More in the story

• Is the agreement in India's interests?

• What is the Opposition's take?

• What do foreign policy experts say?

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Ten years after former US president George W Bush and former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed on signing it, the Logistics Support Agreement may finally become reality. Albeit in a different avatar. Visiting US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter and Union Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar announced that the two government have finally agreed in-principle to share military logistics. The broad framework has been worked out, however, it is not ready for signing.

Also read - Obama hyphenates India & Pakistan. Why this is bad news for India

"Secretary Carter and I agreed in principle to conclude a Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in the coming months," Parrikar said. "The draft of LEMOA will be ready in a month, if not weeks." It is understood that the agreement may be ready by June this year for signing.




"Parrikar and Carter clarified that it does not entail presence of US armed forces on Indian bases "
The agreement which aims to bolster military ties, will pave way for both countries to use military bases to facilitate, repair, re-fuelling and other contingencies. Both Parrikar and Carter clarified that the agreement does not entail the presence of US armed forces on Indian bases.

According to Parrikar, the pact will be helpful in situations of humanitarian crises like the recent one in Nepal. The talks also hinted that the Indian government can decide such an assistance on a case to case basis. The pact will have provisions of support, supplies and services on a reimbursable basis. However, some operation details are yet to be agreed upon.

"This agreement makes it more routine for us to operate logistically. There are issues to be resolved. We will have to see how the agreement works," Carter, who was on a three-day visit to India, said.

Opposition raises concerns
The agreement was put in deep-freeze during the days of the UPA government owing to stiff opposition from Left parties. The latter had said that this would pave way for the presence of American troops on Indian basis.

Even after the recent announcement, the CPI(M) has reportedly called it a dangerous step and said that it will entail the presence of US military personnel on Indian bases.

A similar concern was shared by the Congress, which too has criticised the development. "Though, America is India's strategic partner and there is an on-going defence co-operation but we have strong reservations and concerns over this development," senior spokesperson Anand Sharma told the media. Sharma says that the party has strong reservations and concerns on both the Logistic Support Agreement - LSA as well as CISMOA, another pending bilateral issue which the US has been pressing for.

"The CISMOA would take into its embrace the complete communication network of the Indian Armed Forces, its Radar, its Signals including that of the Air Force and the Indian Navy which can jeopardise our operational preparedness and strategies," he said.

Sharma also hinted that the government is not revealing the important ramifications this agreement may have and that it will automatically entail the presence of US personnel on Indian bases.

"When you have such an agreement put in place, it will also require, though the government may deny, the presence of support personnel for maintenance and repair in your military bases i.e. in India's military bases and that will further be taking a step towards a formal military alliance," the Congress spokesperson pointed out while adding that it may invite opposition and serious concerns of India's strategic partners that is Russia and even China.

Concerned about increasing Chinese aggression especially in the India Ocean, the Narendra Modi government sees this agreement as an important step to consolidate the Indian presence.

What does it mean for India?
"I am certainly not very excited about it," former National Security Advisor MK Narayanan said while adding he is yet to see the details. Others like former Deputy National Security Advisor Leela Ponappa welcomed the move, albeit with caution.

"We have been talking about it for over 10 years now. Some degree of mutual support is good but we have to make sure our interests are taken care of, " she told Catch.

Former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal says the LEMOA is less sensitive of the three agreements that the US has been pressing India for long, which are necessary for transfer of high-end military technology and strengthening of military ties.

He also stressed that it should have adequate safeguards in terms of the US military operations which India doesn't support like the ones currently in West Asia. India has steered clear of the mess in West Asia where a large number of Western security forces are deployed in.

"It is a logical step in the growing relationship between both the countries and it has enormous benefits for both sides," says Vice Admiral KK Nayyar, who served as the Vice Chief of Navy and currently heads the National Maritime Foundation. He says the move will have important benefits for the Indian vessels where the country doesn't have a presence.




"It will be mostly the US that uses Indian facilities, not the other way around: Mohan Guruswamy"
Former Diplomat and JD(U) leader Pavan Varma says that one has to really see what the 'logistics' indicate since those details are yet to be seen. "In the past also India and the US has had joint military exercises. We have to see how further have we gone and what are the finer details," he told Catch.

"Since a number of US ships and aircraft operate in the Indian Ocean and very little of the Indian military operates away from our coasts, it will be mostly the US that uses Indian facilities," commentator Mohan Guruswamy pointed out in a post.

"This will not be a bad thing for Indian commercial interests and we could develop a profitable industrial base catering to US military needs like Coca Cola, toilet rolls to servicing and repairing of marine and aircraft engines," he wrote.

China's guarded reaction
Meanwhile, the Chinese have been guarded in that reaction. "We have noted relevant reports on US Defence Secretary Ash Carter's visit to India," the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang told media.

"India is also an influential country in the world, and India has been upholding independent diplomatic policy. India will make up its diplomatic policies based on its own interests," he said while adding that Indian defence minister will be visiting China soon. While the dates of Parrikar's visit have not been finalised yet, the Chinese may take up this issue during his visit.

"It is not right for a country of our size to worry about what the Chinese think of our bilateral relationship with another country," Nayyar says. "The Chinese have a much closer ties with the US," he adds.

"Why should we bother about the Chinese? Do they bother about us like when they blocked India's request at the UN for action against terrorist Masood Azhar," Sibal asks. "The bigger issue with this development is not China but US military operations in West Asia," he says.

http://www.catchnews.com/india-news...t-help-the-us-more-than-india-1460644574.html