ptltejas
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As recently hue and cry is made on the report by comptroller and auditor general India, on LCA fighter plane, I go through the report http://www.saiindia.gov.in/english/...rformance/2015/Defence/Report_17/17of2015.pdf and my conclusion as well as the key points of the reports and the other information are as as under:
Background
Indian Air Force (IAF) was operating MIG-21 series of aircraft manufactured during 1966 to 1987 and majority of these aircraft were expected to be phased out in the 1990s, thereby resulting in significant fall in combat level of IAF. Thus, IAF mooted the proposal (early 1980s) for a replacement aircraft for MIG-21 fleet. It was against this backdrop that the indigenous design and development of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) was sanctioned (1983). Government of India constituted (June 1984) Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA),Bangalore, a society registered (June 1984) under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 under the Ministry of Defence, as a dedicated institution for the management of LCA project. IAF had issued Air Staff Requirement (ASR) in Oct 1985 with a projected requirement of 220 Light Combat Aircraft (200 Fighters + 20 Trainers) to be inducted by 1994. As per the ASR Light Combat Aircraft is required to be built as a light weight multi-mission fighter aircraft, having contemporary air combat and offensive air support capabilities with excellent maneuverability for close air combat at low and medium altitudes. The aircraft should be able to provide extended Air Defence cover over the forward bases and tactical battle area.
So the Air Staff Requirement was Issued in 1985 and since then Now there are many changes are made in fighter and are required, Hence Even IAF many time ask for change and so the fighter time line increased. The ASR copy of 1985 is not available, and I could not search it out (Plz some one may give it or give link for it) At that time the Mig-21 was their and we need some fighter compare to it, and till than till today their are No. of changes are required, so according to me, there is no need any strict following ness, or adherence on ASR 1985. any Evaluation of Fighter on base of that ASR is obsolete.
Key findings
LCA programme was initially sanctioned in 1983 with a development schedule of eight to ten years against AF’s requirement of induction by 1994. Our analysis revealed that the project schedules had slipped, mainly on account of design changes necessitated due to change in weapon requirements, non-availability of Kaveri 1 engine, delay in completion of work packages by the work centres, etc. LCA achieved IOC in December 2013 with 53 concessions/permanent waivers considerably reducing its operational employability, is yet to be inducted in IAF squadrons, as discussed below:
53 concessions/permanent waivers
The 20 permanent waivers
were granted for ASR parameters which the current configuration of LCA Mk-I with GE-F-404-IN20 engine cannot achieve. Also, the performance shortfalls applicable to 20 IOC aircraft under production at HAL will also be applicable 20 FOC aircraft as these waivers were granted for LCA Mk-I in its current configuration.
33 temporary time bound concessions
were granted for ASR parameters which are still under design/development and testing and would adversely affect LCA's combat potential. Kgs (1235 Kgs as against 1100 Kgs) and also engine thrust achieved was 70 The 20 permanent waivers are due to the Engines, that could be speed and other things, its said in the report that many things would be clear in Mk-2 but not possible in Mk-1 as the Jammer, which size is more and can not be fitted and no space in Mk-1 without which the defence of Mk-1 could be weak, now for more system we need some big size platform with moditication, than why not to do as earliest Mk-2 so the problems can solve, the Mk-1 is lacks. AS happen in case of Sukhoi-27 which is change its design and than be useful,(plz refer my thread the video on making su-27 from youtube) So, why we can not do that. The Mk-1 if not give right strength, we have to press for Mk-2 as early as possible, with night and day duty. The 33 Temporary concessions are not that they are denied, they will be their after some time, so not need to worry that they will be not their.
LCA Mark-I, which achieved Initial Operational Clearance (December 2013)has significant shortfalls (53 permanent waivers/concessions) in meeting the ASR as a result of which, it will have reduced operational capabilities and reduced survivability, thereby limiting its operational employability when inducted into IAF squadrons. Shortcomings in LCA Mark-I (increased weight, reduced internal fuel capacity, non-compliance of fuel system protection, pilot protection from front, reduced speed) were expected to be overcome by development of LCA Mark-II, an aircraft with lower weight and a higher thrust engine which is expected to meet the ASR, had been taken up by ADA in November 2009 and is scheduled for completion by December 2018.
(Para 2.3)
So need to go for MK-2 and proud the Mk-1 for its basic help in creating Mk-2
Addition of new weapons by Air HQ for operational edge of LCA (March 1997, December 2009) necessitating design changes on the aircraft, coupled with delayed specifying (December 2009) of integrating R-73E
missile with Multi-Mode Radar/Helmet Mounted Display and Sight and delayed identification (December 2009) of Beyond Visual Range Missiles also contributed to the delays in achieving IOC/FOC by LCA.
(Para 2.3.2, 2.3.3)
These new weapons adding and the HMD and MMR is make the delay in programme.
LCA Mark-I is deficient in Electronic Warfare capabilities as specified by IAF, as the Self Protection Jammer could not be fitted on the aircraft due to space constraints and the Radar Warning Receiver/Counter Measure
Dispensing System fitted on the aircraft are having performance issues, which are yet to be overcome (January 2015). (Para 2.3.4)
If Mk-1 lacks weight lifting we need to go for Mk-2 rather to be more stick on the Mk-1 and to hammer the Less fighter on Pilots and IAF
Repair and Overhaul (ROH) facility for LCA, as specified in the ASR has not been created fully at HAL. Out of the 344 Line Replaceable Units 4 of LCA, 90 LRUs were considered non-repairable. Of the remaining 254 LRUs, while ROH facilities in respect of 185 LRUs were available, ROH facilities were yet to be established for 69 LRUs (January 2015).
(Para 4.4)
There is need LINE REPLACEMENT UNITS, so the system can be repaired as early, and need to identify the delay too.
4. Conclusion
While we appreciate the efforts made by ADA and its work centres in the indigenous development of LCA which is comparable to many contemporary aircraft in the world, considerable time taken in the development of LCA has delayed the productionisation and subsequent induction of the aircraft into IAF thereby impacting the operational preparedness of IAF with reduced squadron level. Moreover, the LCA Mark-I despite achieving the Initial Operational Clearance does not meet the ASR, which reduces its operational employability. Final Operational Clearance of LCA is yet to be achieved. This PA, therefore, points out the need for a more efficient management of planning and execution of aircraft development programmes, closer interaction and coordinated efforts among all the stake holders involved, ensuring effective indigenisation efforts, creation of adequate manufacturing facilities in a timely manner and supply of aircraft to IAF in line with their induction planning.
Recommendations
Realistic timelines should be projected by MoD while seeking approval for such projects from the GoI and the same be adhered to during their execution with coordinated planning and effective in-built monitoring mechanism to produce desired results in time.
In view of the complexity of the technology involved, while deviating from the approved plan of development, ADA should consult the user (Air HQ) and obtain prior approval of sanctioning authority/Ministry for such deviations, so as to minimize waivers and concessions at the time of acceptance by the user (IAF).
The agencies viz. DRDO, ADA and HAL, should undertake the projects strictly in conformity with the specifications projected by the IAF, who should be involved right from the planning stage, so as to ensure timely achievement of their requirements.
Indigenisation efforts should be made in coordination with all the agencies involved, with a well-defined indigenisation plan and a clear roadmap, so as to develop quality product as per the requirement, in order to avoid import substitution.
MoD should award contract to production agency at an appropriate stage of development of a system/equipment in order to avoid the necessity of extending delivery schedule consequent to delay in development of the system, apart from the resultant blocking of funds/inventory and to overcome obsolescence of the components procured by the production agency.
2.3 Shortfall in accomplishment of Air Staff Requirement(ASR)
Air Staff Requirement (1985) prescribes the physical parameters of LCA such as aircraft weight, fuel capacity, load carrying capacity of weapons, missiles, survivability, navigation, etc and features like single point defueling, pilot protection system, all weather operations, fuel system protection etc. to make
the aircraft capable of performing its role of multi mission fighter aircraft and have increased survivability against battle damage. The ASR also envisages timeline for induction of LCA, quantity of LCA fighter and trainer required. There were no revisions to the ASR by IAF, except in respect of weapon requirements, as discussed in Para 2.3.2.
So its Clear that many things are not followed as per the ASR of 1985, due to the No Change is ASR or Revise it. the IAF has make changes to use new weapons but not change, the other configuration, hence, the Picture seems worst. The Change and rivise ASR is required to see that the things are followed or not.
IN 1985 their were only need the fighter in compare to the Mig-21, But now the fighter IAF is asked for is considering the New chanllenges, so Report of CAG that ASR Not followed strictly, not make or show more horror picture shown by our Neighbour Members
Audit observed (May 2014) that IAF had revised 17 the weapons requirement from time to time such as replacing R-60 missile with R-73E missile 18 , adding M-62 Russian Bombs, Counter Measures Dispensing System 19 , etc for integration on LCA. When impact of these changes on the LCA programme were enquired in audit, ADA stated (June 2014) that these changes had delayed the programme schedules as follows:
(1) Change of Close Combat Missile from R-60 to R-73E had resulted in redesign of integral wing and associated manufacturing and testing efforts involving delay of 14 months.
(2) Addition of Russian 500 Kg (M-62) bombs necessitated design and fabrication of adopter and software development which delayed the programme by 16 months.
(3) Addition of CMDS led to design modifications and software development with an additional time of 18 months.
When the above delays caused due to changes in the weapons by IAF as reported by ADA was pointed out (September 2014) in audit, Air HQ stated (December 2014) that the extended schedule of design and development of LCA had resulted in several weapons and systems becoming obsolete/out of stock/operationally irrelevant and to retain operational edge, newer weapons had to be included. It was also stated that ADA being the programme manager could have inducted additional resources to realize the integration of the changed weapons in time.
Thus, due to design and development of LCA programme getting extended from time to time, IAF had to opt for newer weapons to retain operational edge of LCA. This consequently had a further impact on the timelines of the LCA programme.
2.3.3 Status of integration of weapons on LCA
Audit observed that delayed identification/procurement of weapons/integration also contributed to delays in LCA programme as discussed below:
(1) i. Integration of R-73E Missiles - delay of 88 month
(2) ii. Integration of Derby & Python-5 Missile - (months not available)
(ASR of 1985 broadly indicated the requirement of BVR configuration missiles on LCA without specifying any particular BVR missile. It was only in December 2009 the Air HQ communicated the requirement of specific BVR (missiles viz. Derby and Python-5 Missiles on LCA as part of the FOC)
(3) iii. Manufacture of Drop tanks and pylons - Delayed
These above system delayed the project, AS per the CAG the IAF not involved in project, as needed, and HAL and NAL do their work as per their own and later the IAF give its needs, This is hight of Stupidity at this Level, this can not be tolerated, i think both the departments and Gov.s are responsible for this.
2.3.4 Electronic Warfare capabilities for LCA
Combat aircraft are equipped with Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities to degrade the effectiveness of enemy radar and radio systems. ASR specified that LCA should be capable of carrying an Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) Pod. In addition, provision was to be made for an internally mounted
Self Protection Jammer (SPJ) in the LCA with provision for future updates. Air HQ revised (March 1997) the EW capability on LCA to include SPJ, Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) and Counter Measures Dispensing System(CMDS).
Details of development of these EW systems for LCA Mk-I by Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE), Bangalore – SPJ and RWR – and Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL), Hyderabad – CMDS – are indicated in the below:
(1) Self-Protection Jammer - It radiatesinterfering signals toward an enemy's radar, blocking the receiver with highly concentrated energy signals. - System developed by DARE will not be fitted on LCA Mk-I due to
space constraints - LCA Mk-I is deficient in a self-protection jammer
(2) Radar Warning Receiver -It alerts pilots of the various types of hostile emitters employed by other countries and enables pilots to initiate suitable action, which is crucial for the success of missions and
survival of aircraft deployed for such missions.- RWR fitted on LCA Mk-I is having issues such as degradation of direction finding accuracy, reset in air, etc and DARE is in the process of resolving these
issues. -LCA Mk-I is deficient of a fully functional RWR
(3) Counter Measure Dispensing System - It is a mission critical system to protect the aircraft
against radar and heat seeking missiles and Radar Guided Anti-Aircraft Missiles- CMDS fitted on LCA Mk-I
exhibited deficiency in misguiding enemy missiles and ADA/BDL are in the process of modifying the design
to overcome the flaw.- LCA Mk-I is deficient of a fully functional CMDS
2.4 Work-packages for LCA programme
As per the Memorandum of Association (1984), ADA was to execute the LCA development by utilising the capabilities of national agencies/ institutions (referred as work centers) working in Aerospace technology. There were/are 152 work centres in all, viz. DRDO labs (38), Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) (22), Government organizations (36), educational institutes (14) and other private agencies (42). Audit examination of the work packages awarded to work centres by ADA and results thereof are discussed below:
2.4.2 Work-packages for FSED Phase-II
There are Total 503 Work Packages for different institutions, out of which 110 are Critical, and 393 are
Non-Critical, out of which, In Critical Packages 19 are remain, where as Non-critical, 43 are remain to complete, So Total 62 Packages are remain to complete built Out of 503.
Other Main Points in the Report:
(1) There is a Lack of User Involvement in the Project.
(2) Lack in indigenisation as, The Kaveri Jet engine was not as per requirement, the engine weight exceeded by 135 kilo Newton (Kn) against the requirement of 81 KN despite extentions of the project schedule.
Development of Radome The Radome is a primary structure on an aircraft, which houses the antenna. It needed to possess electro-magnetic (EM) transparency to get the best performance of the Antenna as well asstructural integrity. HAL showed (June 2012) high loss of signal power resulting in significant reduction in radar range thereby affecting its performance. ADA had to conclude (September 2013) a contract with M/s
Cobham, England for development and supply of six Radomes 4 with quartz material at a cost of GBP 2.5 million (22.75 crore) by January 2015 for testing on LCA.
Development of Multi-Mode Radar (MMR) Multi-Mode Radar (MMR) is used in LCA for tracking targets from Air to Air, Air to Surface including sea. It facilitates all weather launching of weapons. It should operate under different modes viz., single target tracking (STT) 5 mode, close combat mode and air-to-ground ranging
modes. Thus, indigenous development of MMR for LCA could not be accomplished even after 22 years. Further, pending testing of MMR with the newly developed Radome, the performance testing and integration of MMR would remain incomplete, which would impact the combat employability of LCA.
Multi-Functional Display System (MFDS) Fact remains that HAL was unable to manufacture MFDs either in-house or through the JV Company formed for the specific purpose of developing MFDs and had to resort to procurement from foreign source.
Jet Fuel Starter (JFS)
JFS is used to start the engine. Its performance becomes very critical particularly while operating in the Himalayan Terrain, where the temperature goes below (–) 16 degrees centigrade. As per the ASR, the LCA power plant and intake should permit at least two consecutive starts. We observed from the records of ADA that IAF expressed the need for three consecutive starts capability of JFS against its own approved ASR. This was necessitated to cater for two main engine starts and dry rollover in-between. Modified JFS (GTSU 110 M1) could not be proved for the mandatory three consecutive starts in the high altitude trials
and in cold weather trials held in January 2013 and January 2014 respectively at Leh. During the trials held (January 2014) at Bangalore, excessive oil consumption by JFS beyond permitted levels was noticed.
Flight Control System Actuators
LCA is equipped with quadruplex digital Fly-By-Wire Flight Control System. The maneuverability of the LCA is controlled by 13 Flight Control System Actuators Audit observed (September 2014) from the records of HAL that it continued to procure the Actuators from foreign source due to the delay in indigenous development of the actuators. HAL replied (September 2014) that the development work and the qualification tests were completed in January 2014 and the first stage of supply of actuators would be completed by December 2014.
AS a Result, indigenous content of LCA estimated by ADA as 70 per cent actually amounted to about 35 per cent (January 2015), with the aircraft dependent on foreign sources forimportant components such as aero engine, Multi-Mode Radar, Radome, Flight control System Actuators and Multi-Functional Display System.
(3) Absence of Fatigue Test Specimen (FTS) A Fatigue Test Specimen (FTS) was required to be built for testing the endurance of LCA for determining the total technical life. Audit observed that (February 2014) building of FTS was not taken up by HAL.from Air HQ which limited the life of airframe to 1000 hours as against the ASR specification of more than 3000 hours.
(4) Low availability of LCA for flight testing towards achieving IOC/FOC
(5) Deficiencies in the HAL manufactured LSP aircraft
Audit observed (October 2014) from the Empowered Committee (EC) meetings (September 2012 to July 2014) that the LSP aircraft manufactured by HAL had the following deficiencies:
(a) Design deficiencies in fuel system, brake management system, brake parachute, undercarriage system;
(b) Quality problems (September 2012) on the MMR with HALmanufactured Radome (also discussed in Chapter III Para 3.1);
(c) Water seepage observed during the flight testing to prove all weather clearance, in critical areas of aircraft including cockpit, radar, DFCC,avionics bay, etc. which required design solutions;
(d) Structural problems like fuel leak, cracking of turkey feathers, de-lamination, and contour deviation;
(e) The performance of aircraft was affected by low reliability of critical LRUs like Jet Fuel Starter (JFS), Cockpit Pressure Transducer (CPTCV) on the aircraft.
HAL’s contention to have resolved the deficiencies in fuel system and brake management system is not tenable as permanent waiver for deficiencies in fuel system and concession for deficiencies in the brake parachute system were obtained from Air HQ at the time of achieving IOC of LCA (December 2013).
Thus, all the LCA Mk-I would have deficiencies in Fuel System, being a permanent waiver. As regards deficiencies in Brake Parachute System (under concession), LCA Mk-I will fly with this deficiency till the issue is resolved.
(6) There is delay in creation of production facility
(7) There is dalay in procurement of plant and machinary
(8) There is delay in completion of LCA Hangers
(9) There is dalay in procuring tools and jigs
(10) There is delay in creation of facility of Repair and Overhauling (ROH)
LCA comprises 344 Line Replaceable Units (LRUs). Of these, 90 LRUs were considered non-repairable. While Repair and Overhaul (ROH) facility in respect of 185 was available with HAL. For the remaining 69 LRUs, ROH facilities were required to be established in HAL. Audit observed (October 2014) that proposals received (between May 2008 and May 2009) from Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) for creating ROH facilities in respect of 40 LRUs were under evaluation (October 2014 ) and proposals for ROH facilities for the remaining 29 LRUs were awaited (October 2014).
The fact remains that HAL delayed finalising the proposals received in May2009 from vendors. As a result, establishment of the ROH facilities for the repairable LRU’s was yet to be fully accomplished by HAL
(January 2015).
(11) There is delay in supply of the LSP aircrafts, There are changes in All LSP aircrafts after relese of standard of preparation.
(12) The stipulated weight is not Achived in all aircrafts, The stipulated weight of all aircrafts are 5365 Kg. where as the Emply weight is Excess to 1300 to 1400 kg. ; Similarly the Basic weight is 8485, the excess is same 1300 to 1400 Kg.
(13) Envisaged speed not achieved
ASR specified that the LCA should have maximum speed in excess of 1300 kmph and minimum touch down speed of 240 kmph. The MoU (June 2002) specified the maximum speed at sea level as 1325 kmph and touchdown speed of 240 kmph. However, the maximum speed achieved was 1204 kmph and touchdown speed of 308 kmph (December 2013). Thus, there was shortfall in achievement of maximum speed as well as in touchdown speed with reference to MoU specifications.
(14) There is shortfall in creation of production facility of fighter LCA
Background
Indian Air Force (IAF) was operating MIG-21 series of aircraft manufactured during 1966 to 1987 and majority of these aircraft were expected to be phased out in the 1990s, thereby resulting in significant fall in combat level of IAF. Thus, IAF mooted the proposal (early 1980s) for a replacement aircraft for MIG-21 fleet. It was against this backdrop that the indigenous design and development of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) was sanctioned (1983). Government of India constituted (June 1984) Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA),Bangalore, a society registered (June 1984) under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 under the Ministry of Defence, as a dedicated institution for the management of LCA project. IAF had issued Air Staff Requirement (ASR) in Oct 1985 with a projected requirement of 220 Light Combat Aircraft (200 Fighters + 20 Trainers) to be inducted by 1994. As per the ASR Light Combat Aircraft is required to be built as a light weight multi-mission fighter aircraft, having contemporary air combat and offensive air support capabilities with excellent maneuverability for close air combat at low and medium altitudes. The aircraft should be able to provide extended Air Defence cover over the forward bases and tactical battle area.
So the Air Staff Requirement was Issued in 1985 and since then Now there are many changes are made in fighter and are required, Hence Even IAF many time ask for change and so the fighter time line increased. The ASR copy of 1985 is not available, and I could not search it out (Plz some one may give it or give link for it) At that time the Mig-21 was their and we need some fighter compare to it, and till than till today their are No. of changes are required, so according to me, there is no need any strict following ness, or adherence on ASR 1985. any Evaluation of Fighter on base of that ASR is obsolete.
Key findings
LCA programme was initially sanctioned in 1983 with a development schedule of eight to ten years against AF’s requirement of induction by 1994. Our analysis revealed that the project schedules had slipped, mainly on account of design changes necessitated due to change in weapon requirements, non-availability of Kaveri 1 engine, delay in completion of work packages by the work centres, etc. LCA achieved IOC in December 2013 with 53 concessions/permanent waivers considerably reducing its operational employability, is yet to be inducted in IAF squadrons, as discussed below:
53 concessions/permanent waivers
The 20 permanent waivers
were granted for ASR parameters which the current configuration of LCA Mk-I with GE-F-404-IN20 engine cannot achieve. Also, the performance shortfalls applicable to 20 IOC aircraft under production at HAL will also be applicable 20 FOC aircraft as these waivers were granted for LCA Mk-I in its current configuration.
33 temporary time bound concessions
were granted for ASR parameters which are still under design/development and testing and would adversely affect LCA's combat potential. Kgs (1235 Kgs as against 1100 Kgs) and also engine thrust achieved was 70 The 20 permanent waivers are due to the Engines, that could be speed and other things, its said in the report that many things would be clear in Mk-2 but not possible in Mk-1 as the Jammer, which size is more and can not be fitted and no space in Mk-1 without which the defence of Mk-1 could be weak, now for more system we need some big size platform with moditication, than why not to do as earliest Mk-2 so the problems can solve, the Mk-1 is lacks. AS happen in case of Sukhoi-27 which is change its design and than be useful,(plz refer my thread the video on making su-27 from youtube) So, why we can not do that. The Mk-1 if not give right strength, we have to press for Mk-2 as early as possible, with night and day duty. The 33 Temporary concessions are not that they are denied, they will be their after some time, so not need to worry that they will be not their.
LCA Mark-I, which achieved Initial Operational Clearance (December 2013)has significant shortfalls (53 permanent waivers/concessions) in meeting the ASR as a result of which, it will have reduced operational capabilities and reduced survivability, thereby limiting its operational employability when inducted into IAF squadrons. Shortcomings in LCA Mark-I (increased weight, reduced internal fuel capacity, non-compliance of fuel system protection, pilot protection from front, reduced speed) were expected to be overcome by development of LCA Mark-II, an aircraft with lower weight and a higher thrust engine which is expected to meet the ASR, had been taken up by ADA in November 2009 and is scheduled for completion by December 2018.
(Para 2.3)
So need to go for MK-2 and proud the Mk-1 for its basic help in creating Mk-2
Addition of new weapons by Air HQ for operational edge of LCA (March 1997, December 2009) necessitating design changes on the aircraft, coupled with delayed specifying (December 2009) of integrating R-73E
missile with Multi-Mode Radar/Helmet Mounted Display and Sight and delayed identification (December 2009) of Beyond Visual Range Missiles also contributed to the delays in achieving IOC/FOC by LCA.
(Para 2.3.2, 2.3.3)
These new weapons adding and the HMD and MMR is make the delay in programme.
LCA Mark-I is deficient in Electronic Warfare capabilities as specified by IAF, as the Self Protection Jammer could not be fitted on the aircraft due to space constraints and the Radar Warning Receiver/Counter Measure
Dispensing System fitted on the aircraft are having performance issues, which are yet to be overcome (January 2015). (Para 2.3.4)
If Mk-1 lacks weight lifting we need to go for Mk-2 rather to be more stick on the Mk-1 and to hammer the Less fighter on Pilots and IAF
Repair and Overhaul (ROH) facility for LCA, as specified in the ASR has not been created fully at HAL. Out of the 344 Line Replaceable Units 4 of LCA, 90 LRUs were considered non-repairable. Of the remaining 254 LRUs, while ROH facilities in respect of 185 LRUs were available, ROH facilities were yet to be established for 69 LRUs (January 2015).
(Para 4.4)
There is need LINE REPLACEMENT UNITS, so the system can be repaired as early, and need to identify the delay too.
4. Conclusion
While we appreciate the efforts made by ADA and its work centres in the indigenous development of LCA which is comparable to many contemporary aircraft in the world, considerable time taken in the development of LCA has delayed the productionisation and subsequent induction of the aircraft into IAF thereby impacting the operational preparedness of IAF with reduced squadron level. Moreover, the LCA Mark-I despite achieving the Initial Operational Clearance does not meet the ASR, which reduces its operational employability. Final Operational Clearance of LCA is yet to be achieved. This PA, therefore, points out the need for a more efficient management of planning and execution of aircraft development programmes, closer interaction and coordinated efforts among all the stake holders involved, ensuring effective indigenisation efforts, creation of adequate manufacturing facilities in a timely manner and supply of aircraft to IAF in line with their induction planning.
Recommendations
Realistic timelines should be projected by MoD while seeking approval for such projects from the GoI and the same be adhered to during their execution with coordinated planning and effective in-built monitoring mechanism to produce desired results in time.
In view of the complexity of the technology involved, while deviating from the approved plan of development, ADA should consult the user (Air HQ) and obtain prior approval of sanctioning authority/Ministry for such deviations, so as to minimize waivers and concessions at the time of acceptance by the user (IAF).
The agencies viz. DRDO, ADA and HAL, should undertake the projects strictly in conformity with the specifications projected by the IAF, who should be involved right from the planning stage, so as to ensure timely achievement of their requirements.
Indigenisation efforts should be made in coordination with all the agencies involved, with a well-defined indigenisation plan and a clear roadmap, so as to develop quality product as per the requirement, in order to avoid import substitution.
MoD should award contract to production agency at an appropriate stage of development of a system/equipment in order to avoid the necessity of extending delivery schedule consequent to delay in development of the system, apart from the resultant blocking of funds/inventory and to overcome obsolescence of the components procured by the production agency.
2.3 Shortfall in accomplishment of Air Staff Requirement(ASR)
Air Staff Requirement (1985) prescribes the physical parameters of LCA such as aircraft weight, fuel capacity, load carrying capacity of weapons, missiles, survivability, navigation, etc and features like single point defueling, pilot protection system, all weather operations, fuel system protection etc. to make
the aircraft capable of performing its role of multi mission fighter aircraft and have increased survivability against battle damage. The ASR also envisages timeline for induction of LCA, quantity of LCA fighter and trainer required. There were no revisions to the ASR by IAF, except in respect of weapon requirements, as discussed in Para 2.3.2.
So its Clear that many things are not followed as per the ASR of 1985, due to the No Change is ASR or Revise it. the IAF has make changes to use new weapons but not change, the other configuration, hence, the Picture seems worst. The Change and rivise ASR is required to see that the things are followed or not.
IN 1985 their were only need the fighter in compare to the Mig-21, But now the fighter IAF is asked for is considering the New chanllenges, so Report of CAG that ASR Not followed strictly, not make or show more horror picture shown by our Neighbour Members
Audit observed (May 2014) that IAF had revised 17 the weapons requirement from time to time such as replacing R-60 missile with R-73E missile 18 , adding M-62 Russian Bombs, Counter Measures Dispensing System 19 , etc for integration on LCA. When impact of these changes on the LCA programme were enquired in audit, ADA stated (June 2014) that these changes had delayed the programme schedules as follows:
(1) Change of Close Combat Missile from R-60 to R-73E had resulted in redesign of integral wing and associated manufacturing and testing efforts involving delay of 14 months.
(2) Addition of Russian 500 Kg (M-62) bombs necessitated design and fabrication of adopter and software development which delayed the programme by 16 months.
(3) Addition of CMDS led to design modifications and software development with an additional time of 18 months.
When the above delays caused due to changes in the weapons by IAF as reported by ADA was pointed out (September 2014) in audit, Air HQ stated (December 2014) that the extended schedule of design and development of LCA had resulted in several weapons and systems becoming obsolete/out of stock/operationally irrelevant and to retain operational edge, newer weapons had to be included. It was also stated that ADA being the programme manager could have inducted additional resources to realize the integration of the changed weapons in time.
Thus, due to design and development of LCA programme getting extended from time to time, IAF had to opt for newer weapons to retain operational edge of LCA. This consequently had a further impact on the timelines of the LCA programme.
2.3.3 Status of integration of weapons on LCA
Audit observed that delayed identification/procurement of weapons/integration also contributed to delays in LCA programme as discussed below:
(1) i. Integration of R-73E Missiles - delay of 88 month
(2) ii. Integration of Derby & Python-5 Missile - (months not available)
(ASR of 1985 broadly indicated the requirement of BVR configuration missiles on LCA without specifying any particular BVR missile. It was only in December 2009 the Air HQ communicated the requirement of specific BVR (missiles viz. Derby and Python-5 Missiles on LCA as part of the FOC)
(3) iii. Manufacture of Drop tanks and pylons - Delayed
These above system delayed the project, AS per the CAG the IAF not involved in project, as needed, and HAL and NAL do their work as per their own and later the IAF give its needs, This is hight of Stupidity at this Level, this can not be tolerated, i think both the departments and Gov.s are responsible for this.
2.3.4 Electronic Warfare capabilities for LCA
Combat aircraft are equipped with Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities to degrade the effectiveness of enemy radar and radio systems. ASR specified that LCA should be capable of carrying an Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) Pod. In addition, provision was to be made for an internally mounted
Self Protection Jammer (SPJ) in the LCA with provision for future updates. Air HQ revised (March 1997) the EW capability on LCA to include SPJ, Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) and Counter Measures Dispensing System(CMDS).
Details of development of these EW systems for LCA Mk-I by Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE), Bangalore – SPJ and RWR – and Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL), Hyderabad – CMDS – are indicated in the below:
(1) Self-Protection Jammer - It radiatesinterfering signals toward an enemy's radar, blocking the receiver with highly concentrated energy signals. - System developed by DARE will not be fitted on LCA Mk-I due to
space constraints - LCA Mk-I is deficient in a self-protection jammer
(2) Radar Warning Receiver -It alerts pilots of the various types of hostile emitters employed by other countries and enables pilots to initiate suitable action, which is crucial for the success of missions and
survival of aircraft deployed for such missions.- RWR fitted on LCA Mk-I is having issues such as degradation of direction finding accuracy, reset in air, etc and DARE is in the process of resolving these
issues. -LCA Mk-I is deficient of a fully functional RWR
(3) Counter Measure Dispensing System - It is a mission critical system to protect the aircraft
against radar and heat seeking missiles and Radar Guided Anti-Aircraft Missiles- CMDS fitted on LCA Mk-I
exhibited deficiency in misguiding enemy missiles and ADA/BDL are in the process of modifying the design
to overcome the flaw.- LCA Mk-I is deficient of a fully functional CMDS
2.4 Work-packages for LCA programme
As per the Memorandum of Association (1984), ADA was to execute the LCA development by utilising the capabilities of national agencies/ institutions (referred as work centers) working in Aerospace technology. There were/are 152 work centres in all, viz. DRDO labs (38), Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) (22), Government organizations (36), educational institutes (14) and other private agencies (42). Audit examination of the work packages awarded to work centres by ADA and results thereof are discussed below:
2.4.2 Work-packages for FSED Phase-II
There are Total 503 Work Packages for different institutions, out of which 110 are Critical, and 393 are
Non-Critical, out of which, In Critical Packages 19 are remain, where as Non-critical, 43 are remain to complete, So Total 62 Packages are remain to complete built Out of 503.
Other Main Points in the Report:
(1) There is a Lack of User Involvement in the Project.
(2) Lack in indigenisation as, The Kaveri Jet engine was not as per requirement, the engine weight exceeded by 135 kilo Newton (Kn) against the requirement of 81 KN despite extentions of the project schedule.
Development of Radome The Radome is a primary structure on an aircraft, which houses the antenna. It needed to possess electro-magnetic (EM) transparency to get the best performance of the Antenna as well asstructural integrity. HAL showed (June 2012) high loss of signal power resulting in significant reduction in radar range thereby affecting its performance. ADA had to conclude (September 2013) a contract with M/s
Cobham, England for development and supply of six Radomes 4 with quartz material at a cost of GBP 2.5 million (22.75 crore) by January 2015 for testing on LCA.
Development of Multi-Mode Radar (MMR) Multi-Mode Radar (MMR) is used in LCA for tracking targets from Air to Air, Air to Surface including sea. It facilitates all weather launching of weapons. It should operate under different modes viz., single target tracking (STT) 5 mode, close combat mode and air-to-ground ranging
modes. Thus, indigenous development of MMR for LCA could not be accomplished even after 22 years. Further, pending testing of MMR with the newly developed Radome, the performance testing and integration of MMR would remain incomplete, which would impact the combat employability of LCA.
Multi-Functional Display System (MFDS) Fact remains that HAL was unable to manufacture MFDs either in-house or through the JV Company formed for the specific purpose of developing MFDs and had to resort to procurement from foreign source.
Jet Fuel Starter (JFS)
JFS is used to start the engine. Its performance becomes very critical particularly while operating in the Himalayan Terrain, where the temperature goes below (–) 16 degrees centigrade. As per the ASR, the LCA power plant and intake should permit at least two consecutive starts. We observed from the records of ADA that IAF expressed the need for three consecutive starts capability of JFS against its own approved ASR. This was necessitated to cater for two main engine starts and dry rollover in-between. Modified JFS (GTSU 110 M1) could not be proved for the mandatory three consecutive starts in the high altitude trials
and in cold weather trials held in January 2013 and January 2014 respectively at Leh. During the trials held (January 2014) at Bangalore, excessive oil consumption by JFS beyond permitted levels was noticed.
Flight Control System Actuators
LCA is equipped with quadruplex digital Fly-By-Wire Flight Control System. The maneuverability of the LCA is controlled by 13 Flight Control System Actuators Audit observed (September 2014) from the records of HAL that it continued to procure the Actuators from foreign source due to the delay in indigenous development of the actuators. HAL replied (September 2014) that the development work and the qualification tests were completed in January 2014 and the first stage of supply of actuators would be completed by December 2014.
AS a Result, indigenous content of LCA estimated by ADA as 70 per cent actually amounted to about 35 per cent (January 2015), with the aircraft dependent on foreign sources forimportant components such as aero engine, Multi-Mode Radar, Radome, Flight control System Actuators and Multi-Functional Display System.
(3) Absence of Fatigue Test Specimen (FTS) A Fatigue Test Specimen (FTS) was required to be built for testing the endurance of LCA for determining the total technical life. Audit observed that (February 2014) building of FTS was not taken up by HAL.from Air HQ which limited the life of airframe to 1000 hours as against the ASR specification of more than 3000 hours.
(4) Low availability of LCA for flight testing towards achieving IOC/FOC
(5) Deficiencies in the HAL manufactured LSP aircraft
Audit observed (October 2014) from the Empowered Committee (EC) meetings (September 2012 to July 2014) that the LSP aircraft manufactured by HAL had the following deficiencies:
(a) Design deficiencies in fuel system, brake management system, brake parachute, undercarriage system;
(b) Quality problems (September 2012) on the MMR with HALmanufactured Radome (also discussed in Chapter III Para 3.1);
(c) Water seepage observed during the flight testing to prove all weather clearance, in critical areas of aircraft including cockpit, radar, DFCC,avionics bay, etc. which required design solutions;
(d) Structural problems like fuel leak, cracking of turkey feathers, de-lamination, and contour deviation;
(e) The performance of aircraft was affected by low reliability of critical LRUs like Jet Fuel Starter (JFS), Cockpit Pressure Transducer (CPTCV) on the aircraft.
HAL’s contention to have resolved the deficiencies in fuel system and brake management system is not tenable as permanent waiver for deficiencies in fuel system and concession for deficiencies in the brake parachute system were obtained from Air HQ at the time of achieving IOC of LCA (December 2013).
Thus, all the LCA Mk-I would have deficiencies in Fuel System, being a permanent waiver. As regards deficiencies in Brake Parachute System (under concession), LCA Mk-I will fly with this deficiency till the issue is resolved.
(6) There is delay in creation of production facility
(7) There is dalay in procurement of plant and machinary
(8) There is delay in completion of LCA Hangers
(9) There is dalay in procuring tools and jigs
(10) There is delay in creation of facility of Repair and Overhauling (ROH)
LCA comprises 344 Line Replaceable Units (LRUs). Of these, 90 LRUs were considered non-repairable. While Repair and Overhaul (ROH) facility in respect of 185 was available with HAL. For the remaining 69 LRUs, ROH facilities were required to be established in HAL. Audit observed (October 2014) that proposals received (between May 2008 and May 2009) from Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) for creating ROH facilities in respect of 40 LRUs were under evaluation (October 2014 ) and proposals for ROH facilities for the remaining 29 LRUs were awaited (October 2014).
The fact remains that HAL delayed finalising the proposals received in May2009 from vendors. As a result, establishment of the ROH facilities for the repairable LRU’s was yet to be fully accomplished by HAL
(January 2015).
(11) There is delay in supply of the LSP aircrafts, There are changes in All LSP aircrafts after relese of standard of preparation.
(12) The stipulated weight is not Achived in all aircrafts, The stipulated weight of all aircrafts are 5365 Kg. where as the Emply weight is Excess to 1300 to 1400 kg. ; Similarly the Basic weight is 8485, the excess is same 1300 to 1400 Kg.
(13) Envisaged speed not achieved
ASR specified that the LCA should have maximum speed in excess of 1300 kmph and minimum touch down speed of 240 kmph. The MoU (June 2002) specified the maximum speed at sea level as 1325 kmph and touchdown speed of 240 kmph. However, the maximum speed achieved was 1204 kmph and touchdown speed of 308 kmph (December 2013). Thus, there was shortfall in achievement of maximum speed as well as in touchdown speed with reference to MoU specifications.
(14) There is shortfall in creation of production facility of fighter LCA
