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The end of the road?... ... maybe for some
DARREN LAKE JDW Staff Reporter - London
and KIM BURGER JDW Staff Reporter - Washington DC
Critics argue that the days of the main battle tank as we know it are numbered in light of new technologies and air assets
Is the life of the main battle tank (MBT) coming to an end? After bringing back manoeuvre to the static warfare of the trenches and dominating the battlefield for the last century, some in military circles question whether the traditional MBT will survive beyond the current generation of vehicles.
Among western armies and in industry there is almost no talk of developing a next-generation MBT, despite the relative age of several platforms. Instead, armies are investing in the development of lightweight future combat systems that would employ technologies and network capabilities to match the effectiveness of systems like the US M1 Abrams and UK Challenger 2 MBTs.
That said, no-one questions that the threat that cultivated the development of heavier, more lethal tracked combat vehicles has diminished. Yet, there is still widespread support for the MBT having much more life left, especially from within the tank establishment. However, these life extensions will probably manifest themselves as upgrades rather than through the development of brand-new platforms.
To ensure the new systems evolve in the right way, the MBT, and its current battlefield role, needs a clear definition.
Experience of blitzkrieg, or lightning warfare, and the huge tank battles during the Second World War in North Africa and Russia showed that the tank is mainly useful as a tank killer and in the cavalry role; as the principal ground manoeuvre and shock units.
The Cold War and the years afterwards saw the retention of light tanks for reconnaissance, but the distinction between medium and heavy tanks was dropped in favour of the MBT concept - a heavily armoured tracked fighting vehicle with a large gun as its main armament - whose principal role remained to engage and destroy opposing heavy forces.
In western military thinking, the MBT's raison d'être remained throughout the 50 years of the Cold War. As long as Soviet or other forces could mass large MBT forces on the central plains of Europe or elsewhere, NATO and its allies would need a similar force to defeat the threat.
This assumption is now being increasingly challenged, not least as the style of western force deployments and likely conflict scenarios evolves from set-piece battles in Europe to a more expeditionary style of deployments and recognition dawns that traditional MBTs have a number of potential disadvantages in this role.
The Cold War reaction to potential threats was to stockpile equipment in the most likely theatres of conflict - such as central Europe and the Korean peninsula. Nowadays it is not possible or practical - politically, economically or strategically - to cover the globe sufficiently to pre-empt conflicts or react to threats in a timely manner.
Post-Cold War, the major threats have been less clearly defined and with the reduction in the number of bases in Europe and elsewhere, western armies have more and more had to operate and deploy from home bases far from the conflict. Only the USA, with its at-sea deployments, has been able to continue maintaining some pre-positioned forces in theatre. The US Army maintains armoured force packages - that equip armoured battalions and mechanised infantry battalions - throughout Europe, South Korea, Japan, Doha, Qatar and Kuwait and also afloat off Diego Garcia. In times of need, soldiers would be airlifted in to meet up with their equipment on the ground in the region, allowing for far speedier deployments.
MBTs have consistently grown to become monstrously large and heavy and consequently lack theatre or strategic mobility and can't easily self-deploy over long distances, relying instead on road or rail tank transporters. Furthermore, their size and weight means no more than a token force could be deployed by air - only one Challenger 2-sized MBT can be deployed in a C-17, of which the UK RAF has only four. This means that movement between theatres or long-range deployment demands a large and concerted sealift capability and all the constraints on speed that this entails.
During the 1990-91 Gulf War, western military planners received an object lesson in the difficulties of rapidly deploying heavy forces from one theatre to another. According to the US official history, The Whirlwind War, the first 88 M1 MBTs that formed part of Operation 'Desert Shield', protecting Saudi Arabia against an Iraqi attack, arrived at a Saudi port of entry on 31 August, over two weeks after the lead elements of the US force arrived, and there was no sizeable MBT force until mid-October. The force levels deemed necessary to effect entry into Kuwait took several more months to arrive in the region.
US Army leadership often cites the experience of this deployment as a reason behind its decision to provide more capability to its early-response forces and increase its major warfighting units' ability to deploy more quickly. A key piece of this effort is the development of the Future Combat Systems (FCS) - envisioned as a network of lightweight platforms, sensors, robotics and weapons - that would together be as effective as an MBT in terms of battlefield dominance, but much more easily deployed (JDW 13 June).
The army hopes to begin producing early versions of FCS by 2010, but acknowledges it will be some time before many of the desired capabilities and advanced technologies become available. It therefore emphasises that the M1 Abrams will form a large part of the force for at least the next 30 years.
A number of US military officials privately deride the US Army's plans for a 20-ton FCS, however. One serving army officer predicts that short of a major technological breakthrough, the "raw physics" of survivability will require a vehicle to weigh between 30 and 40 tons to fight on a similar level to an MBT. If this is true, the army would end up with a heavier FCS, or one that cannot match even the current MBT capability.
The US Marine Corps (USMC) is also sceptical that a lightweight vehicle will ever replace its M1 Abrams tanks and envisions a future 30-ton assault vehicle. The army and USMC may share technologies and components of their systems. But while the army is pursuing a network of lightweight systems, the USMC is clinging to conventional concept of a powerful platform that can dominate the fight on its own. The approaches may lead to very different systems.
The Russians are also looking to the future of MBTs. Although nothing specific has been openly discussed it is thought the country is developing a new generation of MBTs "with possibly an unconventional design", one industry source said. Among other developments, this may include the replacement of the turret with an external gun, reducing the MBT's profile. However, Russian industry has a notable weakness in providing the electro-optics and other advanced technology on which such a design would rely. That said, there are a host of upgrades and add-ons for existing Russian hardware, from self-defence systems and armour packages to advanced sensors that will ensure their utility for a long time, even in the more advanced forces deploying Russian MBTs.
Indeed, according to Jerry Sollick, technical manager Direct Fire System, at QinetiQ in the UK, western thinking on the MBT has been informed by Russian tank design and development. "Looking at the late T-72s, T-90s and T-80s, they are very well protected, have good battlefield mobility, a big gun, and good strategic mobility. Here is a tank 75% of the weight and volume of a western tank performing much the same job. They may not have the latest technology, but they do have some advantages." There are also advantages beyond weight and mobility; cost is becoming more important as defence budgets are tightened across the world. Sollick adds that although the Russian solution is not right for western armies - "[because of its size] a T-72 is not a tank you would want to campaign in" - there are definitely areas where they can learn to do things differently.
He goes on to assert his belief that a suitable replacement for the current generation of MBT depends heavily on threat development. "It depends what happens in the next 20 years. If a country with an expansionist policy emerges and starts investing heavily in land forces, we may want heavy forces. On the flipside, advances in missile and aircraft design might mean MBTs are useless. Or a hard-kill DAS [Defensive Aids Suite] may mean that the MBT has the upper hand. I don't think it is black and white."
Technology development will also dictate whether future platforms are indeed tank-like. Significant strides in active protection and gun technology could allow lightweight platforms to operate like tanks. But the current status of such development programmes is said to be insufficiently advanced for such a leap at the moment.
The incessant march of technology has not just benefited armoured vehicles. The number of viable threats and variety of methods of attacking MBTs have increased immeasurably. Missile and warhead advances have ensured that infantry and air forces have become more effective in dealing with the MBT.
As armour has built up across the traditional threat arcs of armoured fighting vehicles - the front and sides - so anti-armour missiles have been developed to fly over the targets and attack them from above. Similarly, developments such as tandem warheads have nullified advanced armour packages like appliqué explosive reactive armour (JDW 6 June).
Equally, Lt Col Shaun Wilson, working for the Director Equipment Capability (Direct Battlefield Engagement - DBE) at the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD), said armed forces will have to become more aware of changes in the "conventional threat" to MBTs. "If that threat changes, so it's not so much from CE [chemical energy] or KE [kinetic energy] attack, but maybe a surge of power knocking out the tank's essential systems, we must be aware of that vulnerability".
According to Sollick, the "days of heavier and heavier MBTs are diminishing". He says that in the UK, for example, there are "two main thrusts" on the development of the army's armoured vehicle fleet, one a further evolution of the current Challenger 2 fleet, the other the development of the medium force through the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES).
He says it is unclear whether the MoD perceives the need for "a direct-fire role within the FRES family", but says that if a requirement was issued "all sorts of questions" would need to be asked about the type of system, "especially if it is going to come up against a T-80-type threat".
Assuming that FRES would have a tank-killer in its family of vehicles and taking the T-80 as a benchmark, Sollick says a light platform, like FRES, would need to be able to fire a large-calibre KE shot to defeat it. "The US is saying quite openly that it is going to go to a 105mm gun for its medium force, but we haven't even started the debate yet. If you look at the L30 [the Challenger 2's main gun] it would be very difficult to package into a FRES-sized system. If you are going to go lighter and smaller you get into technical difficulties."
Col Wilson says that even with the move towards a strategic medium force, the British Army would retain its heavy force until the same capabilities could be delivered from a lighter platform. "In the future, the 2020-25 timeframe, we anticipate we can replace [the Challenger 2] with one lighter, more lethal, and with greater survivability."
Until then the Challenger 2 will continue to provide one of the British Army's main means of destroying enemy armour. Col Wilson says that over the next 25 years or so, the main focus will be on enhancing that capability through a number of incremental Technical Insertion Groups (TIGs). He says the MoD is pursuing the TIG concept rather than going for one Mid-Life Upgrade because it offers a more cost-effective, progressive improvement of the platform allowing upgrades to capitalise on new developments in technology. These TIGs will look at several areas of enhancement from digitisation, through various firepower enhancements, to improved mobility.
Beyond Challenger 2, the MoD is looking at a concept called the Future Land Combat System (FLCS), sweeping together the Mobile Direct Fire Equipment Requirement and Future Infantry Fighting Vehicle concepts. Under the concept, the MoD is looking to field a system with improved tactical mobility, range, lethality and survivability. According to Col Wilson, the system will do "everything the tank does today" and all within the constraint of being airportable in an A400M transport, adding that "it may be possible to drive that down to C-130 levels".
MoD sources said Brig Ian Rodley, Director of Equipment Capability (DBE), favours using the as-yet unfunded FRES programme as a basis for meeting the FLCS requirement. However, this would entail building a large potential for growth into FRES, "which may not be compatible with a purely off-the-shelf solution to meet the FRES requirement", one source said.
The introduction and steady improvement of increasingly capable attack helicopters over the past few decades is also beginning to challenge the MBT's battlefield supremacy and tank-killing role.
Although there will be a continuing battle between MBT armour and helicopter-deployed weapons, the attack helicopter has a number of advantages. They can often deploy to a theatre more quickly than an MBT, and once there they can self-deploy more easily into operations and are more mobile on the battlefield. However, their logistics tail can be considerable.
During the build-up to the Gulf War, 15 AH-64D Apaches accompanied the first US forces into Saudi Arabia, providing an immediate, albeit limited, capability to defend against Iraq's heavy ground forces. However, despite the bizarre situation of Iraqi troops surrendering to US Apaches - an attack helicopter's major drawback is an inability to take and hold objectives.
MBTs are also increasingly able to engage helicopters, especially if hovering - which is necessary for the launch and guidance of many air-to-surface missiles, such as the widely deployed Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided type - and indeed Israeli MBTs have a proven success at downing helicopters in the past. There are also various studies into giving MBTs a greater anti-helicopter capability with guided rounds, but "the main difficulty is in seeing the target and having a sensor that will alert you to the presence of a helicopter", said one industry source.
From now to 2025, Col Wilson believes the British Army will maintain a complementary suite of weapons to deal with enemy armour. These will include a force of Challenger 2s, Longbow Apaches, and battlegroup anti-armour weapons.
He goes on to envisage that the Apache will provide a close air support akin to the Harrier, although he does not see it superseding the MBT. "It is a question of providing a capability and achieving it in the most cost-effective way." Tanks and helicopters are capable platforms, but attack helicopters have limitations in difficult weather and "physically holding the ground", they are are more expensive and in some ways more vulnerable than MBTs. Despite quite a large deployment of Apaches to the Balkans, the US avoided sending them on combat missions for fear of losses.
Col Phillip Mangin of the French Army's Combat Developments Office (Armour) maintains that MBTs will also continue having a role in low-intensity peacekeeping operations. Col Mangin, Commander of the 6th Regiment de Cuirassiers between 1998 and 2000, served with the Kosovo Force (KFOR) from March to July 2000. He argues that "tanks will retain a role on the battlefield in coercion operations and as a deterrent".
Col Mangin believes that MBTs, such as the French Leclerc, will continue to play an important part in operations, but that they may be fewer in number - the French Army's initial requirement for 1,400 Leclercs is now under 400. Fifteen Leclercs are currently deployed with the French contingent of the Kosovo Force.
The Danish experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina supports Col Mangin's analysis. In late 1993 six Leopard 1A5s were deployed with the Danish contingent based in Tuzla. During the journey to Tuzla and on later operations the Danish force showed a willingness to use the coercive options made available to them by the presence of their imposing MBTs. As a result the Danish force received grudging respect from the opposing forces in the conflict that they used to their advantage for peacekeeping.
The sheer bulk and seemingly impregnable armour of an MBT can prove a powerful coercive force, especially when facing a lightly armed opposition. The Israel Defence Force (IDF) has regularly deployed its M60/Magach MBTs into trouble spots to provide mobile fire support and effectively protected command bunkers. Likewise simply driving a Challenger or Abrams tank into a small Balkan village can potentially dominate an unstable situation and force capitulation.
That said, there are distinct advantages in having lighter vehicles performing peacekeeping duties after a conflict as the heavy tracks of MBTs churn up roads and even smaller armoured personnel carriers have a habit of damaging civilian buildings while clumsily manoeuvring in built-up areas. A British Army officer serving in Kosovo told Jane's Defence Weekly that large Czech BMP infantry fighting vehicles, though much smaller and lighter than MBTs, have damaged walls and buildings and "don't win us any friends when we damage the environment with their vehicles".
It is also argued that MBTs can be inflammatory in certain situations. Some examples can be seen when the Soviet tanks rolled into Prague in 1969 and more recently when the British Army faced complaints from the combatants that even their Warrior armoured personnel carriers were too offensive and tank-like during peace-enforcement operations in Bosnia.
John Boughton, marketing and sales director of Vickers Defence Systems, which builds the Challenger 2, forecasts that the MBT market will remain steady over the next 10 years. He also believes that over the next 25-30 years there will be a continuing market for upgrading existing MBT fleets, adding that the "idea of the death of the battle tank is a misnomer", arguing instead that different technologies will steadily be introduced into direct-fire platforms.
Boughton comments that many countries will continue to operate MBT fleets because they have regional interests rather than, or as well as, a need for a force that can operate at long range from home bases.
Peter Keating, spokesman for General Dynamic Land Systems, manufacturer of the M1 Abrams tank, agrees. He believes that armies will never completely lay their heavy forces to rest because some nations will always be threatening their neighbours. Those countries in that circumstance would have no need to worry about the challenges of transporting heavy systems to the conflict area and could therefore rely on MBTs for the same capability the west is striving for through massive spending on research and development.
In particular, Israel is one country that continues to see a need to maintain its MBT fleet for this very reason. IDF doctrine does not envisage a requirement for a force deployable over long distances. Instead the major threat is conflict with neighbouring states and so at most, the IDF needs to be able to deploy from one front to another over relatively secure and short lines of communication. Also the main armoured threat to the IDF will continue to be Arab heavy forces, consisting of former Soviet-manufactured and, in the case of Egypt, increasingly modern western MBTs with their licensed and locally-built M1 Abrams.
As a result, Israel has begun development work on a fourth generation of Merkava, which is expected to enter service in the next few years (JDW 8 December 99). Although no detailed information about the programme is available there is speculation that the tank will have an integrated vehicle protection system and a new weapon system, which may consist of a larger-calibre gun or an electro-thermal weapon.
The IDF has recently been experiencing problems with MBTs' employment, however. During the current conflict with Palestinians in the occupied territories, the IDF has faced international criticism for using MBTs, with critics saying it is a disproportionate response to Palestinian attacks.
Internally there has also been a debate as to whether MBTs are an effective tool to use against the Palestinians (JDW 22 August). Critics argue that tanks are ill-suited to urban close-quarter operations. They also say that if a tank loiters in a position for too long it becomes an easy target, and that militant groups in the Gaza Strip have made the destruction of an IDF tank a priority. Informed sources believe that that goal may now have been achieved, following an incident earlier this year where a shoulder-launched anti-tank weapon reportedly disabled an IDF tank.
Keating, of GDLS, further adds that while "medium-weight" forces have attracted military investment in many countries over recent years, many forces plan also to continually modernise their MBTs, trying to bring what is left of their tank fleets up to the highest standard they can afford.
He went on to say that following the M1A2 System Enhancement Program, the Abrams platform could bear another one or two block improvements, including transition from the current 120mm to a 140mm gun - although recent developments in 120mm guns and ammunition make it harder to justify transition to a larger gun. But it could incorporate an unlimited number of sensor and electronic improvements, particularly as smaller microchips are becoming cheaper and more capable.
Robert Scales, a retired US Army major general who headed the Army After Next wargames at the US Army War College, said those modifications are more significant to the future of the systems than constructing a new chassis.
"The technological expansion of the future is not in the platforms. There's a limit on speed and range and so forth, limited by fossil-fuel types of propulsion," Scales said. "The great leap forward for these platforms is what you put inside them to enhance their capabilities.
"If you put modern precision and information systems aboard these platforms, the platform speed may not increase terribly but the relative effectiveness of these platforms will increase by a significant degree. So don't diminish the fact that you're not making another box here."
Scales said those upgrades will be particularly important for the US Army, precisely because it is developing a lightweight FCS. While FCS could respond when a crisis first erupts, when quick speeds on the battlefield will be most important, the service will want to keep it out of a "slugging match" and potentially use it to hold the fort until the sea-lifted MBT cavalry arrives. The potential for a close-in engagement later in the campaign will still exist, and that is when the mass and explosive power of MBTs would be most useful.
"When you get to the phase of the battle where the breakthrough has occurred, you still have to do the mopping up and the hard nasty work of digging an enemy out of his positions," Scales said. This is where the MBT really comes into its own, providing its main and still relevant, strengths of protection, mobility and firepower.
An active-duty US Army officer and sceptic of the enchantment with lightweight combat vehicles says the focus should not be on the platform at all, but on the mission of providing mobile protected firepower in all types of terrain. Although unmanned air vehicles and smart munitions have reduced the requirement and will enable armies to make do with fewer tanks, the mission type will persist at some level into the future.
Col Wilson also believes the MBT must be looked at in the context of a battlegroup's capabilities. "A battlegroup needs complementary systems" but in the foreseeable future that will continue to include a direct-fire system, with the capability to extend ranges beyond line-of-sight (over 4km).
Sollick said there may be adjustments to extend the life of the current generation of MBTs by a few years, but buying a next-generation MBT would commit the UK to having a heavy force to at least 2050. "Because of the increasing pace of technology innovation it would be very brave to say tanks would run on that long".
It is safe to say, though, that the main roles of current MBTs - from peacekeeping duties to full-scale open warfare and their inherent strengths and benefits - are unlikely to be diminished anytime soon. Whatever system is chosen to replace the likes of the Challenger, the Leclerc, the M1 and the Leopard will have to be able to carry out all current missions if a drop in capability is to be avoided. Col Wilson says "whether in the 2025 timeframe we call the new system a tank or not remains to be seen" but is, he believes, largely a question of semantics.
DARREN LAKE JDW Staff Reporter - London
and KIM BURGER JDW Staff Reporter - Washington DC
Critics argue that the days of the main battle tank as we know it are numbered in light of new technologies and air assets
Is the life of the main battle tank (MBT) coming to an end? After bringing back manoeuvre to the static warfare of the trenches and dominating the battlefield for the last century, some in military circles question whether the traditional MBT will survive beyond the current generation of vehicles.
Among western armies and in industry there is almost no talk of developing a next-generation MBT, despite the relative age of several platforms. Instead, armies are investing in the development of lightweight future combat systems that would employ technologies and network capabilities to match the effectiveness of systems like the US M1 Abrams and UK Challenger 2 MBTs.
That said, no-one questions that the threat that cultivated the development of heavier, more lethal tracked combat vehicles has diminished. Yet, there is still widespread support for the MBT having much more life left, especially from within the tank establishment. However, these life extensions will probably manifest themselves as upgrades rather than through the development of brand-new platforms.
To ensure the new systems evolve in the right way, the MBT, and its current battlefield role, needs a clear definition.
Experience of blitzkrieg, or lightning warfare, and the huge tank battles during the Second World War in North Africa and Russia showed that the tank is mainly useful as a tank killer and in the cavalry role; as the principal ground manoeuvre and shock units.
The Cold War and the years afterwards saw the retention of light tanks for reconnaissance, but the distinction between medium and heavy tanks was dropped in favour of the MBT concept - a heavily armoured tracked fighting vehicle with a large gun as its main armament - whose principal role remained to engage and destroy opposing heavy forces.
In western military thinking, the MBT's raison d'être remained throughout the 50 years of the Cold War. As long as Soviet or other forces could mass large MBT forces on the central plains of Europe or elsewhere, NATO and its allies would need a similar force to defeat the threat.
This assumption is now being increasingly challenged, not least as the style of western force deployments and likely conflict scenarios evolves from set-piece battles in Europe to a more expeditionary style of deployments and recognition dawns that traditional MBTs have a number of potential disadvantages in this role.
The Cold War reaction to potential threats was to stockpile equipment in the most likely theatres of conflict - such as central Europe and the Korean peninsula. Nowadays it is not possible or practical - politically, economically or strategically - to cover the globe sufficiently to pre-empt conflicts or react to threats in a timely manner.
Post-Cold War, the major threats have been less clearly defined and with the reduction in the number of bases in Europe and elsewhere, western armies have more and more had to operate and deploy from home bases far from the conflict. Only the USA, with its at-sea deployments, has been able to continue maintaining some pre-positioned forces in theatre. The US Army maintains armoured force packages - that equip armoured battalions and mechanised infantry battalions - throughout Europe, South Korea, Japan, Doha, Qatar and Kuwait and also afloat off Diego Garcia. In times of need, soldiers would be airlifted in to meet up with their equipment on the ground in the region, allowing for far speedier deployments.
MBTs have consistently grown to become monstrously large and heavy and consequently lack theatre or strategic mobility and can't easily self-deploy over long distances, relying instead on road or rail tank transporters. Furthermore, their size and weight means no more than a token force could be deployed by air - only one Challenger 2-sized MBT can be deployed in a C-17, of which the UK RAF has only four. This means that movement between theatres or long-range deployment demands a large and concerted sealift capability and all the constraints on speed that this entails.
During the 1990-91 Gulf War, western military planners received an object lesson in the difficulties of rapidly deploying heavy forces from one theatre to another. According to the US official history, The Whirlwind War, the first 88 M1 MBTs that formed part of Operation 'Desert Shield', protecting Saudi Arabia against an Iraqi attack, arrived at a Saudi port of entry on 31 August, over two weeks after the lead elements of the US force arrived, and there was no sizeable MBT force until mid-October. The force levels deemed necessary to effect entry into Kuwait took several more months to arrive in the region.
US Army leadership often cites the experience of this deployment as a reason behind its decision to provide more capability to its early-response forces and increase its major warfighting units' ability to deploy more quickly. A key piece of this effort is the development of the Future Combat Systems (FCS) - envisioned as a network of lightweight platforms, sensors, robotics and weapons - that would together be as effective as an MBT in terms of battlefield dominance, but much more easily deployed (JDW 13 June).
The army hopes to begin producing early versions of FCS by 2010, but acknowledges it will be some time before many of the desired capabilities and advanced technologies become available. It therefore emphasises that the M1 Abrams will form a large part of the force for at least the next 30 years.
A number of US military officials privately deride the US Army's plans for a 20-ton FCS, however. One serving army officer predicts that short of a major technological breakthrough, the "raw physics" of survivability will require a vehicle to weigh between 30 and 40 tons to fight on a similar level to an MBT. If this is true, the army would end up with a heavier FCS, or one that cannot match even the current MBT capability.
The US Marine Corps (USMC) is also sceptical that a lightweight vehicle will ever replace its M1 Abrams tanks and envisions a future 30-ton assault vehicle. The army and USMC may share technologies and components of their systems. But while the army is pursuing a network of lightweight systems, the USMC is clinging to conventional concept of a powerful platform that can dominate the fight on its own. The approaches may lead to very different systems.
The Russians are also looking to the future of MBTs. Although nothing specific has been openly discussed it is thought the country is developing a new generation of MBTs "with possibly an unconventional design", one industry source said. Among other developments, this may include the replacement of the turret with an external gun, reducing the MBT's profile. However, Russian industry has a notable weakness in providing the electro-optics and other advanced technology on which such a design would rely. That said, there are a host of upgrades and add-ons for existing Russian hardware, from self-defence systems and armour packages to advanced sensors that will ensure their utility for a long time, even in the more advanced forces deploying Russian MBTs.
Indeed, according to Jerry Sollick, technical manager Direct Fire System, at QinetiQ in the UK, western thinking on the MBT has been informed by Russian tank design and development. "Looking at the late T-72s, T-90s and T-80s, they are very well protected, have good battlefield mobility, a big gun, and good strategic mobility. Here is a tank 75% of the weight and volume of a western tank performing much the same job. They may not have the latest technology, but they do have some advantages." There are also advantages beyond weight and mobility; cost is becoming more important as defence budgets are tightened across the world. Sollick adds that although the Russian solution is not right for western armies - "[because of its size] a T-72 is not a tank you would want to campaign in" - there are definitely areas where they can learn to do things differently.
He goes on to assert his belief that a suitable replacement for the current generation of MBT depends heavily on threat development. "It depends what happens in the next 20 years. If a country with an expansionist policy emerges and starts investing heavily in land forces, we may want heavy forces. On the flipside, advances in missile and aircraft design might mean MBTs are useless. Or a hard-kill DAS [Defensive Aids Suite] may mean that the MBT has the upper hand. I don't think it is black and white."
Technology development will also dictate whether future platforms are indeed tank-like. Significant strides in active protection and gun technology could allow lightweight platforms to operate like tanks. But the current status of such development programmes is said to be insufficiently advanced for such a leap at the moment.
The incessant march of technology has not just benefited armoured vehicles. The number of viable threats and variety of methods of attacking MBTs have increased immeasurably. Missile and warhead advances have ensured that infantry and air forces have become more effective in dealing with the MBT.
As armour has built up across the traditional threat arcs of armoured fighting vehicles - the front and sides - so anti-armour missiles have been developed to fly over the targets and attack them from above. Similarly, developments such as tandem warheads have nullified advanced armour packages like appliqué explosive reactive armour (JDW 6 June).
Equally, Lt Col Shaun Wilson, working for the Director Equipment Capability (Direct Battlefield Engagement - DBE) at the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD), said armed forces will have to become more aware of changes in the "conventional threat" to MBTs. "If that threat changes, so it's not so much from CE [chemical energy] or KE [kinetic energy] attack, but maybe a surge of power knocking out the tank's essential systems, we must be aware of that vulnerability".
According to Sollick, the "days of heavier and heavier MBTs are diminishing". He says that in the UK, for example, there are "two main thrusts" on the development of the army's armoured vehicle fleet, one a further evolution of the current Challenger 2 fleet, the other the development of the medium force through the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES).
He says it is unclear whether the MoD perceives the need for "a direct-fire role within the FRES family", but says that if a requirement was issued "all sorts of questions" would need to be asked about the type of system, "especially if it is going to come up against a T-80-type threat".
Assuming that FRES would have a tank-killer in its family of vehicles and taking the T-80 as a benchmark, Sollick says a light platform, like FRES, would need to be able to fire a large-calibre KE shot to defeat it. "The US is saying quite openly that it is going to go to a 105mm gun for its medium force, but we haven't even started the debate yet. If you look at the L30 [the Challenger 2's main gun] it would be very difficult to package into a FRES-sized system. If you are going to go lighter and smaller you get into technical difficulties."
Col Wilson says that even with the move towards a strategic medium force, the British Army would retain its heavy force until the same capabilities could be delivered from a lighter platform. "In the future, the 2020-25 timeframe, we anticipate we can replace [the Challenger 2] with one lighter, more lethal, and with greater survivability."
Until then the Challenger 2 will continue to provide one of the British Army's main means of destroying enemy armour. Col Wilson says that over the next 25 years or so, the main focus will be on enhancing that capability through a number of incremental Technical Insertion Groups (TIGs). He says the MoD is pursuing the TIG concept rather than going for one Mid-Life Upgrade because it offers a more cost-effective, progressive improvement of the platform allowing upgrades to capitalise on new developments in technology. These TIGs will look at several areas of enhancement from digitisation, through various firepower enhancements, to improved mobility.
Beyond Challenger 2, the MoD is looking at a concept called the Future Land Combat System (FLCS), sweeping together the Mobile Direct Fire Equipment Requirement and Future Infantry Fighting Vehicle concepts. Under the concept, the MoD is looking to field a system with improved tactical mobility, range, lethality and survivability. According to Col Wilson, the system will do "everything the tank does today" and all within the constraint of being airportable in an A400M transport, adding that "it may be possible to drive that down to C-130 levels".
MoD sources said Brig Ian Rodley, Director of Equipment Capability (DBE), favours using the as-yet unfunded FRES programme as a basis for meeting the FLCS requirement. However, this would entail building a large potential for growth into FRES, "which may not be compatible with a purely off-the-shelf solution to meet the FRES requirement", one source said.
The introduction and steady improvement of increasingly capable attack helicopters over the past few decades is also beginning to challenge the MBT's battlefield supremacy and tank-killing role.
Although there will be a continuing battle between MBT armour and helicopter-deployed weapons, the attack helicopter has a number of advantages. They can often deploy to a theatre more quickly than an MBT, and once there they can self-deploy more easily into operations and are more mobile on the battlefield. However, their logistics tail can be considerable.
During the build-up to the Gulf War, 15 AH-64D Apaches accompanied the first US forces into Saudi Arabia, providing an immediate, albeit limited, capability to defend against Iraq's heavy ground forces. However, despite the bizarre situation of Iraqi troops surrendering to US Apaches - an attack helicopter's major drawback is an inability to take and hold objectives.
MBTs are also increasingly able to engage helicopters, especially if hovering - which is necessary for the launch and guidance of many air-to-surface missiles, such as the widely deployed Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided type - and indeed Israeli MBTs have a proven success at downing helicopters in the past. There are also various studies into giving MBTs a greater anti-helicopter capability with guided rounds, but "the main difficulty is in seeing the target and having a sensor that will alert you to the presence of a helicopter", said one industry source.
From now to 2025, Col Wilson believes the British Army will maintain a complementary suite of weapons to deal with enemy armour. These will include a force of Challenger 2s, Longbow Apaches, and battlegroup anti-armour weapons.
He goes on to envisage that the Apache will provide a close air support akin to the Harrier, although he does not see it superseding the MBT. "It is a question of providing a capability and achieving it in the most cost-effective way." Tanks and helicopters are capable platforms, but attack helicopters have limitations in difficult weather and "physically holding the ground", they are are more expensive and in some ways more vulnerable than MBTs. Despite quite a large deployment of Apaches to the Balkans, the US avoided sending them on combat missions for fear of losses.
Col Phillip Mangin of the French Army's Combat Developments Office (Armour) maintains that MBTs will also continue having a role in low-intensity peacekeeping operations. Col Mangin, Commander of the 6th Regiment de Cuirassiers between 1998 and 2000, served with the Kosovo Force (KFOR) from March to July 2000. He argues that "tanks will retain a role on the battlefield in coercion operations and as a deterrent".
Col Mangin believes that MBTs, such as the French Leclerc, will continue to play an important part in operations, but that they may be fewer in number - the French Army's initial requirement for 1,400 Leclercs is now under 400. Fifteen Leclercs are currently deployed with the French contingent of the Kosovo Force.
The Danish experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina supports Col Mangin's analysis. In late 1993 six Leopard 1A5s were deployed with the Danish contingent based in Tuzla. During the journey to Tuzla and on later operations the Danish force showed a willingness to use the coercive options made available to them by the presence of their imposing MBTs. As a result the Danish force received grudging respect from the opposing forces in the conflict that they used to their advantage for peacekeeping.
The sheer bulk and seemingly impregnable armour of an MBT can prove a powerful coercive force, especially when facing a lightly armed opposition. The Israel Defence Force (IDF) has regularly deployed its M60/Magach MBTs into trouble spots to provide mobile fire support and effectively protected command bunkers. Likewise simply driving a Challenger or Abrams tank into a small Balkan village can potentially dominate an unstable situation and force capitulation.
That said, there are distinct advantages in having lighter vehicles performing peacekeeping duties after a conflict as the heavy tracks of MBTs churn up roads and even smaller armoured personnel carriers have a habit of damaging civilian buildings while clumsily manoeuvring in built-up areas. A British Army officer serving in Kosovo told Jane's Defence Weekly that large Czech BMP infantry fighting vehicles, though much smaller and lighter than MBTs, have damaged walls and buildings and "don't win us any friends when we damage the environment with their vehicles".
It is also argued that MBTs can be inflammatory in certain situations. Some examples can be seen when the Soviet tanks rolled into Prague in 1969 and more recently when the British Army faced complaints from the combatants that even their Warrior armoured personnel carriers were too offensive and tank-like during peace-enforcement operations in Bosnia.
John Boughton, marketing and sales director of Vickers Defence Systems, which builds the Challenger 2, forecasts that the MBT market will remain steady over the next 10 years. He also believes that over the next 25-30 years there will be a continuing market for upgrading existing MBT fleets, adding that the "idea of the death of the battle tank is a misnomer", arguing instead that different technologies will steadily be introduced into direct-fire platforms.
Boughton comments that many countries will continue to operate MBT fleets because they have regional interests rather than, or as well as, a need for a force that can operate at long range from home bases.
Peter Keating, spokesman for General Dynamic Land Systems, manufacturer of the M1 Abrams tank, agrees. He believes that armies will never completely lay their heavy forces to rest because some nations will always be threatening their neighbours. Those countries in that circumstance would have no need to worry about the challenges of transporting heavy systems to the conflict area and could therefore rely on MBTs for the same capability the west is striving for through massive spending on research and development.
In particular, Israel is one country that continues to see a need to maintain its MBT fleet for this very reason. IDF doctrine does not envisage a requirement for a force deployable over long distances. Instead the major threat is conflict with neighbouring states and so at most, the IDF needs to be able to deploy from one front to another over relatively secure and short lines of communication. Also the main armoured threat to the IDF will continue to be Arab heavy forces, consisting of former Soviet-manufactured and, in the case of Egypt, increasingly modern western MBTs with their licensed and locally-built M1 Abrams.
As a result, Israel has begun development work on a fourth generation of Merkava, which is expected to enter service in the next few years (JDW 8 December 99). Although no detailed information about the programme is available there is speculation that the tank will have an integrated vehicle protection system and a new weapon system, which may consist of a larger-calibre gun or an electro-thermal weapon.
The IDF has recently been experiencing problems with MBTs' employment, however. During the current conflict with Palestinians in the occupied territories, the IDF has faced international criticism for using MBTs, with critics saying it is a disproportionate response to Palestinian attacks.
Internally there has also been a debate as to whether MBTs are an effective tool to use against the Palestinians (JDW 22 August). Critics argue that tanks are ill-suited to urban close-quarter operations. They also say that if a tank loiters in a position for too long it becomes an easy target, and that militant groups in the Gaza Strip have made the destruction of an IDF tank a priority. Informed sources believe that that goal may now have been achieved, following an incident earlier this year where a shoulder-launched anti-tank weapon reportedly disabled an IDF tank.
Keating, of GDLS, further adds that while "medium-weight" forces have attracted military investment in many countries over recent years, many forces plan also to continually modernise their MBTs, trying to bring what is left of their tank fleets up to the highest standard they can afford.
He went on to say that following the M1A2 System Enhancement Program, the Abrams platform could bear another one or two block improvements, including transition from the current 120mm to a 140mm gun - although recent developments in 120mm guns and ammunition make it harder to justify transition to a larger gun. But it could incorporate an unlimited number of sensor and electronic improvements, particularly as smaller microchips are becoming cheaper and more capable.
Robert Scales, a retired US Army major general who headed the Army After Next wargames at the US Army War College, said those modifications are more significant to the future of the systems than constructing a new chassis.
"The technological expansion of the future is not in the platforms. There's a limit on speed and range and so forth, limited by fossil-fuel types of propulsion," Scales said. "The great leap forward for these platforms is what you put inside them to enhance their capabilities.
"If you put modern precision and information systems aboard these platforms, the platform speed may not increase terribly but the relative effectiveness of these platforms will increase by a significant degree. So don't diminish the fact that you're not making another box here."
Scales said those upgrades will be particularly important for the US Army, precisely because it is developing a lightweight FCS. While FCS could respond when a crisis first erupts, when quick speeds on the battlefield will be most important, the service will want to keep it out of a "slugging match" and potentially use it to hold the fort until the sea-lifted MBT cavalry arrives. The potential for a close-in engagement later in the campaign will still exist, and that is when the mass and explosive power of MBTs would be most useful.
"When you get to the phase of the battle where the breakthrough has occurred, you still have to do the mopping up and the hard nasty work of digging an enemy out of his positions," Scales said. This is where the MBT really comes into its own, providing its main and still relevant, strengths of protection, mobility and firepower.
An active-duty US Army officer and sceptic of the enchantment with lightweight combat vehicles says the focus should not be on the platform at all, but on the mission of providing mobile protected firepower in all types of terrain. Although unmanned air vehicles and smart munitions have reduced the requirement and will enable armies to make do with fewer tanks, the mission type will persist at some level into the future.
Col Wilson also believes the MBT must be looked at in the context of a battlegroup's capabilities. "A battlegroup needs complementary systems" but in the foreseeable future that will continue to include a direct-fire system, with the capability to extend ranges beyond line-of-sight (over 4km).
Sollick said there may be adjustments to extend the life of the current generation of MBTs by a few years, but buying a next-generation MBT would commit the UK to having a heavy force to at least 2050. "Because of the increasing pace of technology innovation it would be very brave to say tanks would run on that long".
It is safe to say, though, that the main roles of current MBTs - from peacekeeping duties to full-scale open warfare and their inherent strengths and benefits - are unlikely to be diminished anytime soon. Whatever system is chosen to replace the likes of the Challenger, the Leclerc, the M1 and the Leopard will have to be able to carry out all current missions if a drop in capability is to be avoided. Col Wilson says "whether in the 2025 timeframe we call the new system a tank or not remains to be seen" but is, he believes, largely a question of semantics.
