fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
Taliban sitrep
Contents
Structure and strategy
Tactics and composition
Conclusion
ASYMMETRIC TACTICS: IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
Last posted:2014-02-06
Images:6 images
While attempts to negotiate a peace deal between Afghan officials and Taliban leaders continued in 2013, rising civilian casualties, ongoing internal power struggles and fractured lines of control on the ground call into question how much any peace talks can deliver. Joanna Wright reports
From the opening in June of a Taliban office in Qatar to a meeting between Afghan officials and former Taliban No 2 commander Mullah Baradar in Pakistan in November, 2013 was dotted with attempts to initiate peace talks between the two sides fighting to control Afghanistan.
The situation on the ground, however, does not suggest an insurgency moving towards reconciliation. In the southern provinces - the traditional Taliban heartland - residents remain fearful, civilian casualties caused by anti-government elements are increasing, and interviews with the Taliban indicate power struggles and fractured lines of control.
Afghan policemen inspect a house near the site of an attack by Taliban militants on a construction company in Herat province, Afghanistan, on 17 August 2013. (PA)
Together, these may limit how much any peace talks can deliver. A November 2013 report on the Taliban and other associated individuals by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team indicated that independent fronts are emerging and that the Taliban leadership may be unable to control some of the activities carried out by anti-government networks operating in Afghanistan.
Structure and strategy
"Questions remain about how much direct control the Taliban leadership can exercise," the UNSC report said. "The Taliban combine centralised authority with significant scope for decentralised action.... Despite what passes for a zonal command structure across Afghanistan, the Taliban have shown themselves unwilling or unable to monopolise anti-state violence."
Citing examples of non-Taliban groups operating in Afghanistan, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and the relative autonomy of the Haqqani Network, the report also noted the significance of personal relationships and informal networks.
"The Taliban combine hierarchy and a structured leadership with considerable autonomy for individual commanders," it stated. "The senior leadership does not necessarily enjoy absolute control over all commanders in the field."
Several named groups, such as the Tora Bora Front, have regenerated, with incidents increasing in their areas. The report stated: "During its most recent visit to Afghanistan, the Monitoring Team was briefed on the emergence of other person-centric networks or 'fronts' that act in a manner similar to the Haqqani Network, autonomously from the senior leadership, handling money and logistics for their respective groups." In addition to the Tora Bora Front, the report identified the Mawlawi Nazir Group and the Fidayi Mahaz, which was previously known as the Mullah Dadullah Front. 'Fidayi', or 'fedayeen', translates as 'sacrifice' and is taken by many Afghans to mean 'suicide'.
These groups are nominally subordinate to the Taliban leadership, but may not be under their control. If some of the current commanders bypass traditional lines of control then this will limit how much negotiators can deliver, international observers with experience on the ground warned.
The observers stated that the attack on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) office in Jalalabad at the end of May 2013 - described by the ICRC as the first incident of this type in the country - underlined a breakdown of Taliban leadership control over the choice of targets. The ICRC has historically been able to work across Afghanistan, including accessing detainees at the Detention Facility in Parwan, and there has been a noticeable lack of complex attacks against its offices, although ICRC members have been killed or held in Afghanistan.
The Taliban issued a statement denying the 29 May attack, which had killed a guard and injured others. Nevertheless, the UN Monitoring Team reported in November: "Local security officials and other Afghan interlocutors identified a Taliban 'front' (the 'Fidayi Mahaz') as the perpetrator of the attack."
commandos assigned to the 8th Special Operations Kandak conduct a training exercise in Logar province on 30 January. (PA)
There is awareness of another account of the attack that identifies the involvement of a different group, while Taliban sources have also stated that the attack was carried out by the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has a presence in Nangarhar and has made prior agreements with the Taliban to support operations. Dr Antonio Giustozzi, who has written a number of books on the war in Afghanistan, told that the Taliban sources claimed the TTP carried out the attack to try to discredit the Peshawar Shura as it sent emissaries to the Qatar office and manoeuvred to negotiate. Regardless of which group was ultimately responsible, however, the attack highlighted a limit of influence exerted by the Taliban leadership.
Meanwhile, an increasing number of new fronts (mahaz) have been created in southern Afghanistan.
Giustozzi stated that 2013 saw the creation of the highest number of new fronts, with eight identified as of the end of October. Six are in the south, under the Quetta Shura (two of these operate more in Western Afghanistan and have a level of co-operation with Iran), and two are in the east, under the Peshawar Shura.
The creation of new fronts is "in part due to the fact that there is no clear leadership in the Taliban ... there is no agreement of the political leadership among the Taliban now," said Giustozzi. Commanders seeking influence at the political level will try to increase the number of fronts they control, as each front is represented by a seat at the shura. "It is a competition for influence among different players which drives the recruitment expansion," Giustozzi explained. "If you have money to spend, the best strategy to maximise your influence is to have a lot of aligned mahaz [fronts]."
He added that the commanders creating the fronts were existing players but are establishing the new structures to recruit more people.
An ANA soldier fires a D-30 howitzer during a live fire exercise at Camp Eagle, Afghanistan, on 22 January. (PA)
Changes in funding lines for shuras have also encouraged the proliferation of fronts. The arrest of Taliban military commander and Quetta Shura member Mullah Baradar in Karachi in February 2010 led to conflict between some of the shura leaders and their Pakistani sponsors. Funding was re-directed to Mullah Zakir, then head of the military commission in Quetta and now the military leader for all Taliban.
The Peshawar Shura also received some of the money previously channelled to Quetta, which has led to an increase in the number of fronts in eastern Afghanistan, said Giustozzi.
The promotion of Mullah Zakir led to further friction among Taliban commanders in southern Afghanistan. Some Taliban describe him as unable to manage commanders sufficiently to keep them militarily supplied and in the field to hold territory. There is a considerable age difference between the current Taliban commanders in southern Afghanistan, with Zakir in his mid-thirties and Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, the former deputy of Mullah Baradar who briefly took over after Baradar's arrest, nearly two decades older and a mujahideen-era commander. Mullah Baradar, meanwhile, is in his mid-forties.
Observers in Kandahar also highlight tribal tension, with Baradar from the Popolzai tribe, Zakir from the Alizai and Mansour from the Ishaqzai tribe.
All three seek funding from opiates, with production in Afghanistan reaching record levels. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime reported in November that cultivation had risen from 154,000 hectares in 2012 to 209,000 hectares in 2013.
Giustozzi also claims there are outside players seeking influence, with the Iranians and a number of Arab sympathisers sending money directly to some Taliban groups. National Directorate of Security (NDS) and central government officials in Kandahar have complained that the 'Iranians' are providing money, training and sophisticated weaponry to the Taliban, while Giustozzi has noted increasing collaboration between the Iranians and the Taliban since 2012.
"The Iranians are worried about Western intervention in Syria, so they kind of retaliate in Afghanistan," he said. "They are training more, giving more money, sending more [materiel] to the Taliban." Taliban fighters involved in the September 2012 assault on Camp Bastion received training in Iran for a month and also in Waziristan, said Giustozzi.
Tactics and composition
Sources have reported that a considerable number of Taliban commanders have been killed in recent years, with officials in Helmand saying 2011 was the deadliest year for Taliban field commanders.
Officials in Kandahar and Helmand also said that fewer established commanders were spending time on the battlefield, instead relying on younger commanders who lack both military training and familiarity with the area.
An Afghan commando provides security during an operation targeting Taliban militants in Ghorband district, Parwan province, in early January. (PA)
There is no accurate external assessment of Taliban numbers, but many sources have reported a major drive to expand the ranks, with an associated need for more commanders to train the new recruits.
The increasing presence of younger leaders has had two knock-on effects. One is increased brutality in operations, something that has concerned residents and some Taliban. Another has been a change in tactics. "In a sense, losing the old style commanders was beneficial to move forward with innovation as there are [commanders] now who are happy to use asymmetric tactics," Giustozzi said. "So you can see it both ways - the skills and charisma [of old commanders] is not so important when you plant IEDs [improvised explosive devises]".
A Taliban fighter from Kajaki told that unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strikes had killed numerous Taliban commanders and that their young replacements were "totally relying on IEDs".
The Taliban fighter acknowledged civilian casualties but did not take the stance typically seen in past interviews when Taliban fighters have defended their use of IEDs. Instead, he stated: "Nobody is paying attention to [these] casualties and they keep planting IEDs on civilian routes."
Asymmetric tactics that threaten the population will be harder for the Taliban to justify as foreign troops withdraw. They are also likely to be less necessary as the overwhelming firepower of Western forces becomes less of a battlefield factor.
An ANA special forces soldier searches for IEDs in Ab Band district, Ghazni province, on 14 December 2013. (PA)
"The transition to more conventional warfare is going to be problematic because the new generation of [Taliban commanders] has been essentially trained into this new kind of war," Giustozzi said. "They put a lot of pressure on the commanders to shift to asymmetric tactics; it took a couple of years, then they succeeded. Now they have totally acquired asymmetric tactics, and now is the time to go back again.
That will take time, in part because these [commanders] got used to fighting in a way that spares casualties, but also because you require new skills and these have to be learnt - either someone trains them or they learn by doing, which takes a while."
Some of the old tactics used, including larger groups of Taliban, were seen in 2013 during attempts to take over Sangin district centre. Officials in Helmand noted that the Afghan Local Police were particularly vulnerable to the use of IEDs combined with small arms fire, as following an explosion they would rush into the line of fire as they sought help or attempted to pursue the Taliban.
Underlining the lack of an overall shift in Taliban tactics - and a lack of command and control - is an escalation in civilian casualties from IEDs, even as the footprint of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is reduced. Additionally, the Taliban is increasingly using remote-controlled IEDs (RCIEDs) that should enable more discriminate targeting.
One would expect the importance of civilian welfare to increase to an insurgency as international forces leave theatre, but Giustozzi claims this is not happening. "The leadership might issue orders, but the [Taliban fighters] in the field don't seem to be very concerned at all," he said.
Conclusion
Despite causing more civilian casualties, the Taliban are also investing in more non-military activities; they have expanded the Taliban court system, opened more madrassahs, and appointed civilian officers in districts.
ANA commandos secure the ridgeline above the Zamtu Valley to provide security while other team members clear the building and the surrounding area in the valley below on 13 November 2013. (PA)
A further major investment was made outside Afghanistan with the establishment of the Taliban office in Qatar in June 2013, which, the UNSC's November report noted, "was meant to provide the Taliban with an address for engaging with the High Peace Council". There was, however, controversy when the office closed shortly after opening and funding for the address and personnel is not clear.
Along with the evidence that younger commanders were calling the shots from the ground, the unclear status of the Qatar office suggests a divided movement - or at least one that is undergoing an internal debate on the best way forward.
"Although the Qatar initiative appears to have stalled, the potential for dialogue persists," the UNSC's November 2013 report noted. "The challenge lies within the Taliban movement, as those interested in dialogue still appear subordinate to those committed to further fighting."
ASYMMETRIC TACTICS: IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
Civilian casualties increased by nearly a quarter to 3,852 during the first half of 2013, with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) the most deadly factor. IEDs killed 443 civilians and injured 917 (35% of all civilian casualties) during the first six months of 2013: a rise of more than a third compared with 2012,
according to the mid-year report on civilian casualties by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).
Most Afghan National Security Forces casualties were also caused by IEDs, the US Department of Defense reported in its November 2013 'Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan'. This stated that there was a 79% increase in ANSF casualties from the beginning of April to the end of September compared with the same period in 2012. In comparison, ISAF casualties decreased by 59%.
The rise in casualties sustained by the ANSF is explained by their increased size and more extensive engagement in theatre. According to the DoD report, their manpower totalled 344,603 in August 2013 (98% of the ANSF's authorised end strength of 352,000 and nearly twice their size in 2009). The number of ANSF is further boosted by more than 24,000 Afghan Local Police (ALP).
ISAF troops now total less than a fifth of the declared ANSF number and numbers fell from 86,888 at the beginning of April 2013 to 65,222 by the end of September. Furthermore, in August around two-thirds of security incidents in Afghanistan involved ANSF forces only, with just a quarter involving ISAF troops. In comparison, a DoD graphic shows that in August 2011 fewer than 10% of incidents involved ANSF only, while nearly 90% involved ISAF.
The majority of IED strikes continue to take place in the traditional Taliban regions of Kandahar and Helmand, which have also been a focus of ISAF and now ANSF operations. The insurgents have moved away from victim-operated IEDs, such as pressure plates, to radio-controlled IEDs (two-way radios and phones have been used in Afghanistan), UNAMA has reported.
When ISAF had a heavy footprint in theatre, making its troops the main target, widespread use of electronic countermeasures (ECM) rendered RC-IEDs less effective. "The reduction in patrolling by ISAF may have been viewed as an opportunity by anti-government elements to increase the use of RC-IEDs and reduce the use of victim-operated devices. The ANSF have been using electronic countermeasures since June 2013," reported UNAMA, noting that Afghan personnel were also using bomb suits, robots for route clearance and radio frequency jammers. ANSF protection through the use of ECM will depend on how widely units have been equipped with such equipment and the extent to which it is used and maintained effectively.
RC-IEDs should theoretically enable attackers to discriminate between targets and so have the potential to reduce civilian casualties. The figures in Afghanistan, however, show that civilian casualties from RC-IEDs have increased by 130%. UNAMA recorded 160 RCIED attacks resulting in 136 civilian deaths and 426 injuries during the first half of 2013.
One reason for this increase is the targeting of government officials operating in urban areas, such as Afghan National Police "performing civilian law enforcement functions such as traffic policing", UNAMA reported, or "against ANP checkposts in areas with high concentrations of civilians".
Extremely basic arming devices have been built for some IED initiators in Afghanistan, including the use of non-conductive material such as plastic to block the initiation circuit, which is then pulled out to arm the device. This allows a bomb-setter to bury a device in a road so that traffic can pass over it, allowing the operator to arm it when a target, such as a military convoy, approaches and thus allowing the IED to function in a manner similar to one activated by a pressure plate.
Taliban use of actual pressure plates has evolved from the use of crude devices with a high metal content, which were thus susceptible to discovery by ISAF and ANSF metal detectors, to initiators designed with minimal metal content. In 2010 documented PMN-type anti-personnel mines being smuggled in bulk across the Pakistani border to Kandahar. These mines, which had moulded plastic cases and lacked a safety arming mechanism (meaning they were transported live), contained around 0.5 kg of potassium chlorate-based explosive. The pressure required to activate these devices was only around 1.8 kg, according to an ISAF weapons safety officer, meaning they could be easily triggered.
Home-made initiators that can be produced in Afghanistan also feature on the battlefield. A device recovered by the ANA in the summer of 2012 used a wooden frame containing carbon rods from a battery as the contact points.
Kandahar residents interviewed in late 2013 claimed pressure plates continued to be the main type of initiator used, noting that the devices detonate as vehicles pass over them.
JDW
Contents
Structure and strategy
Tactics and composition
Conclusion
ASYMMETRIC TACTICS: IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
Last posted:2014-02-06
Images:6 images
While attempts to negotiate a peace deal between Afghan officials and Taliban leaders continued in 2013, rising civilian casualties, ongoing internal power struggles and fractured lines of control on the ground call into question how much any peace talks can deliver. Joanna Wright reports
From the opening in June of a Taliban office in Qatar to a meeting between Afghan officials and former Taliban No 2 commander Mullah Baradar in Pakistan in November, 2013 was dotted with attempts to initiate peace talks between the two sides fighting to control Afghanistan.
The situation on the ground, however, does not suggest an insurgency moving towards reconciliation. In the southern provinces - the traditional Taliban heartland - residents remain fearful, civilian casualties caused by anti-government elements are increasing, and interviews with the Taliban indicate power struggles and fractured lines of control.
Afghan policemen inspect a house near the site of an attack by Taliban militants on a construction company in Herat province, Afghanistan, on 17 August 2013. (PA)
Together, these may limit how much any peace talks can deliver. A November 2013 report on the Taliban and other associated individuals by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team indicated that independent fronts are emerging and that the Taliban leadership may be unable to control some of the activities carried out by anti-government networks operating in Afghanistan.
Structure and strategy
"Questions remain about how much direct control the Taliban leadership can exercise," the UNSC report said. "The Taliban combine centralised authority with significant scope for decentralised action.... Despite what passes for a zonal command structure across Afghanistan, the Taliban have shown themselves unwilling or unable to monopolise anti-state violence."
Citing examples of non-Taliban groups operating in Afghanistan, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and the relative autonomy of the Haqqani Network, the report also noted the significance of personal relationships and informal networks.
"The Taliban combine hierarchy and a structured leadership with considerable autonomy for individual commanders," it stated. "The senior leadership does not necessarily enjoy absolute control over all commanders in the field."
Several named groups, such as the Tora Bora Front, have regenerated, with incidents increasing in their areas. The report stated: "During its most recent visit to Afghanistan, the Monitoring Team was briefed on the emergence of other person-centric networks or 'fronts' that act in a manner similar to the Haqqani Network, autonomously from the senior leadership, handling money and logistics for their respective groups." In addition to the Tora Bora Front, the report identified the Mawlawi Nazir Group and the Fidayi Mahaz, which was previously known as the Mullah Dadullah Front. 'Fidayi', or 'fedayeen', translates as 'sacrifice' and is taken by many Afghans to mean 'suicide'.
These groups are nominally subordinate to the Taliban leadership, but may not be under their control. If some of the current commanders bypass traditional lines of control then this will limit how much negotiators can deliver, international observers with experience on the ground warned.
The observers stated that the attack on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) office in Jalalabad at the end of May 2013 - described by the ICRC as the first incident of this type in the country - underlined a breakdown of Taliban leadership control over the choice of targets. The ICRC has historically been able to work across Afghanistan, including accessing detainees at the Detention Facility in Parwan, and there has been a noticeable lack of complex attacks against its offices, although ICRC members have been killed or held in Afghanistan.
The Taliban issued a statement denying the 29 May attack, which had killed a guard and injured others. Nevertheless, the UN Monitoring Team reported in November: "Local security officials and other Afghan interlocutors identified a Taliban 'front' (the 'Fidayi Mahaz') as the perpetrator of the attack."
commandos assigned to the 8th Special Operations Kandak conduct a training exercise in Logar province on 30 January. (PA)
There is awareness of another account of the attack that identifies the involvement of a different group, while Taliban sources have also stated that the attack was carried out by the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has a presence in Nangarhar and has made prior agreements with the Taliban to support operations. Dr Antonio Giustozzi, who has written a number of books on the war in Afghanistan, told that the Taliban sources claimed the TTP carried out the attack to try to discredit the Peshawar Shura as it sent emissaries to the Qatar office and manoeuvred to negotiate. Regardless of which group was ultimately responsible, however, the attack highlighted a limit of influence exerted by the Taliban leadership.
Meanwhile, an increasing number of new fronts (mahaz) have been created in southern Afghanistan.
Giustozzi stated that 2013 saw the creation of the highest number of new fronts, with eight identified as of the end of October. Six are in the south, under the Quetta Shura (two of these operate more in Western Afghanistan and have a level of co-operation with Iran), and two are in the east, under the Peshawar Shura.
The creation of new fronts is "in part due to the fact that there is no clear leadership in the Taliban ... there is no agreement of the political leadership among the Taliban now," said Giustozzi. Commanders seeking influence at the political level will try to increase the number of fronts they control, as each front is represented by a seat at the shura. "It is a competition for influence among different players which drives the recruitment expansion," Giustozzi explained. "If you have money to spend, the best strategy to maximise your influence is to have a lot of aligned mahaz [fronts]."
He added that the commanders creating the fronts were existing players but are establishing the new structures to recruit more people.
An ANA soldier fires a D-30 howitzer during a live fire exercise at Camp Eagle, Afghanistan, on 22 January. (PA)
Changes in funding lines for shuras have also encouraged the proliferation of fronts. The arrest of Taliban military commander and Quetta Shura member Mullah Baradar in Karachi in February 2010 led to conflict between some of the shura leaders and their Pakistani sponsors. Funding was re-directed to Mullah Zakir, then head of the military commission in Quetta and now the military leader for all Taliban.
The Peshawar Shura also received some of the money previously channelled to Quetta, which has led to an increase in the number of fronts in eastern Afghanistan, said Giustozzi.
The promotion of Mullah Zakir led to further friction among Taliban commanders in southern Afghanistan. Some Taliban describe him as unable to manage commanders sufficiently to keep them militarily supplied and in the field to hold territory. There is a considerable age difference between the current Taliban commanders in southern Afghanistan, with Zakir in his mid-thirties and Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, the former deputy of Mullah Baradar who briefly took over after Baradar's arrest, nearly two decades older and a mujahideen-era commander. Mullah Baradar, meanwhile, is in his mid-forties.
Observers in Kandahar also highlight tribal tension, with Baradar from the Popolzai tribe, Zakir from the Alizai and Mansour from the Ishaqzai tribe.
All three seek funding from opiates, with production in Afghanistan reaching record levels. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime reported in November that cultivation had risen from 154,000 hectares in 2012 to 209,000 hectares in 2013.
Giustozzi also claims there are outside players seeking influence, with the Iranians and a number of Arab sympathisers sending money directly to some Taliban groups. National Directorate of Security (NDS) and central government officials in Kandahar have complained that the 'Iranians' are providing money, training and sophisticated weaponry to the Taliban, while Giustozzi has noted increasing collaboration between the Iranians and the Taliban since 2012.
"The Iranians are worried about Western intervention in Syria, so they kind of retaliate in Afghanistan," he said. "They are training more, giving more money, sending more [materiel] to the Taliban." Taliban fighters involved in the September 2012 assault on Camp Bastion received training in Iran for a month and also in Waziristan, said Giustozzi.
Tactics and composition
Sources have reported that a considerable number of Taliban commanders have been killed in recent years, with officials in Helmand saying 2011 was the deadliest year for Taliban field commanders.
Officials in Kandahar and Helmand also said that fewer established commanders were spending time on the battlefield, instead relying on younger commanders who lack both military training and familiarity with the area.
An Afghan commando provides security during an operation targeting Taliban militants in Ghorband district, Parwan province, in early January. (PA)
There is no accurate external assessment of Taliban numbers, but many sources have reported a major drive to expand the ranks, with an associated need for more commanders to train the new recruits.
The increasing presence of younger leaders has had two knock-on effects. One is increased brutality in operations, something that has concerned residents and some Taliban. Another has been a change in tactics. "In a sense, losing the old style commanders was beneficial to move forward with innovation as there are [commanders] now who are happy to use asymmetric tactics," Giustozzi said. "So you can see it both ways - the skills and charisma [of old commanders] is not so important when you plant IEDs [improvised explosive devises]".
A Taliban fighter from Kajaki told that unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strikes had killed numerous Taliban commanders and that their young replacements were "totally relying on IEDs".
The Taliban fighter acknowledged civilian casualties but did not take the stance typically seen in past interviews when Taliban fighters have defended their use of IEDs. Instead, he stated: "Nobody is paying attention to [these] casualties and they keep planting IEDs on civilian routes."
Asymmetric tactics that threaten the population will be harder for the Taliban to justify as foreign troops withdraw. They are also likely to be less necessary as the overwhelming firepower of Western forces becomes less of a battlefield factor.
An ANA special forces soldier searches for IEDs in Ab Band district, Ghazni province, on 14 December 2013. (PA)
"The transition to more conventional warfare is going to be problematic because the new generation of [Taliban commanders] has been essentially trained into this new kind of war," Giustozzi said. "They put a lot of pressure on the commanders to shift to asymmetric tactics; it took a couple of years, then they succeeded. Now they have totally acquired asymmetric tactics, and now is the time to go back again.
That will take time, in part because these [commanders] got used to fighting in a way that spares casualties, but also because you require new skills and these have to be learnt - either someone trains them or they learn by doing, which takes a while."
Some of the old tactics used, including larger groups of Taliban, were seen in 2013 during attempts to take over Sangin district centre. Officials in Helmand noted that the Afghan Local Police were particularly vulnerable to the use of IEDs combined with small arms fire, as following an explosion they would rush into the line of fire as they sought help or attempted to pursue the Taliban.
Underlining the lack of an overall shift in Taliban tactics - and a lack of command and control - is an escalation in civilian casualties from IEDs, even as the footprint of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is reduced. Additionally, the Taliban is increasingly using remote-controlled IEDs (RCIEDs) that should enable more discriminate targeting.
One would expect the importance of civilian welfare to increase to an insurgency as international forces leave theatre, but Giustozzi claims this is not happening. "The leadership might issue orders, but the [Taliban fighters] in the field don't seem to be very concerned at all," he said.
Conclusion
Despite causing more civilian casualties, the Taliban are also investing in more non-military activities; they have expanded the Taliban court system, opened more madrassahs, and appointed civilian officers in districts.
ANA commandos secure the ridgeline above the Zamtu Valley to provide security while other team members clear the building and the surrounding area in the valley below on 13 November 2013. (PA)
A further major investment was made outside Afghanistan with the establishment of the Taliban office in Qatar in June 2013, which, the UNSC's November report noted, "was meant to provide the Taliban with an address for engaging with the High Peace Council". There was, however, controversy when the office closed shortly after opening and funding for the address and personnel is not clear.
Along with the evidence that younger commanders were calling the shots from the ground, the unclear status of the Qatar office suggests a divided movement - or at least one that is undergoing an internal debate on the best way forward.
"Although the Qatar initiative appears to have stalled, the potential for dialogue persists," the UNSC's November 2013 report noted. "The challenge lies within the Taliban movement, as those interested in dialogue still appear subordinate to those committed to further fighting."
ASYMMETRIC TACTICS: IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
Civilian casualties increased by nearly a quarter to 3,852 during the first half of 2013, with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) the most deadly factor. IEDs killed 443 civilians and injured 917 (35% of all civilian casualties) during the first six months of 2013: a rise of more than a third compared with 2012,
according to the mid-year report on civilian casualties by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).
Most Afghan National Security Forces casualties were also caused by IEDs, the US Department of Defense reported in its November 2013 'Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan'. This stated that there was a 79% increase in ANSF casualties from the beginning of April to the end of September compared with the same period in 2012. In comparison, ISAF casualties decreased by 59%.
The rise in casualties sustained by the ANSF is explained by their increased size and more extensive engagement in theatre. According to the DoD report, their manpower totalled 344,603 in August 2013 (98% of the ANSF's authorised end strength of 352,000 and nearly twice their size in 2009). The number of ANSF is further boosted by more than 24,000 Afghan Local Police (ALP).
ISAF troops now total less than a fifth of the declared ANSF number and numbers fell from 86,888 at the beginning of April 2013 to 65,222 by the end of September. Furthermore, in August around two-thirds of security incidents in Afghanistan involved ANSF forces only, with just a quarter involving ISAF troops. In comparison, a DoD graphic shows that in August 2011 fewer than 10% of incidents involved ANSF only, while nearly 90% involved ISAF.
The majority of IED strikes continue to take place in the traditional Taliban regions of Kandahar and Helmand, which have also been a focus of ISAF and now ANSF operations. The insurgents have moved away from victim-operated IEDs, such as pressure plates, to radio-controlled IEDs (two-way radios and phones have been used in Afghanistan), UNAMA has reported.
When ISAF had a heavy footprint in theatre, making its troops the main target, widespread use of electronic countermeasures (ECM) rendered RC-IEDs less effective. "The reduction in patrolling by ISAF may have been viewed as an opportunity by anti-government elements to increase the use of RC-IEDs and reduce the use of victim-operated devices. The ANSF have been using electronic countermeasures since June 2013," reported UNAMA, noting that Afghan personnel were also using bomb suits, robots for route clearance and radio frequency jammers. ANSF protection through the use of ECM will depend on how widely units have been equipped with such equipment and the extent to which it is used and maintained effectively.
RC-IEDs should theoretically enable attackers to discriminate between targets and so have the potential to reduce civilian casualties. The figures in Afghanistan, however, show that civilian casualties from RC-IEDs have increased by 130%. UNAMA recorded 160 RCIED attacks resulting in 136 civilian deaths and 426 injuries during the first half of 2013.
One reason for this increase is the targeting of government officials operating in urban areas, such as Afghan National Police "performing civilian law enforcement functions such as traffic policing", UNAMA reported, or "against ANP checkposts in areas with high concentrations of civilians".
Extremely basic arming devices have been built for some IED initiators in Afghanistan, including the use of non-conductive material such as plastic to block the initiation circuit, which is then pulled out to arm the device. This allows a bomb-setter to bury a device in a road so that traffic can pass over it, allowing the operator to arm it when a target, such as a military convoy, approaches and thus allowing the IED to function in a manner similar to one activated by a pressure plate.
Taliban use of actual pressure plates has evolved from the use of crude devices with a high metal content, which were thus susceptible to discovery by ISAF and ANSF metal detectors, to initiators designed with minimal metal content. In 2010 documented PMN-type anti-personnel mines being smuggled in bulk across the Pakistani border to Kandahar. These mines, which had moulded plastic cases and lacked a safety arming mechanism (meaning they were transported live), contained around 0.5 kg of potassium chlorate-based explosive. The pressure required to activate these devices was only around 1.8 kg, according to an ISAF weapons safety officer, meaning they could be easily triggered.
Home-made initiators that can be produced in Afghanistan also feature on the battlefield. A device recovered by the ANA in the summer of 2012 used a wooden frame containing carbon rods from a battery as the contact points.
Kandahar residents interviewed in late 2013 claimed pressure plates continued to be the main type of initiator used, noting that the devices detonate as vehicles pass over them.
JDW
