Aslan
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Sep 15, 2009
- Messages
- 4,551
- Reaction score
- 3
- Country
- Location
Sitting on the tarmac at Zhukovsky flight test center, Sukhoi's latest and greatest fighter, the stunning Su-35, gives every impression of a coiled snake. Cocked and prepared to strike at the slightest warning, it hunkers down: poised on its rough-field landing gear, nose low, peering forward through the single offset eye of its infrared search-and-track ball.
Article by Jay Miller. Photos by Katsuhiko Tokunaga
The Su-35 is viewed as the most potent threat facing Western military air forces today. It is a superb combat aircraft, mixing modern technique and technology with a strong dose of Russian mechanical pragmatism.
Sukhoi and the Russian government promote the Su-35 as the chosen champion of non-westernized air forces. They explore export sales opportunities around every international corner. To date, however, no foreign air force has bought the airplane, primarily because it is too expensive and is backed by only the goodwill of a slowly disintegrating government. Without significant financial and trade offsets, the aircraft has little chance of realizing any legitimate international military sales.
Sukhoi has built seven Su-35s; six have flown. None represent fully operational or production configurations. Each has served as a system, structural, or a performance testbed. The airplanes have been continuously modified since the first aircraft (initially referred to as the Su-27M) arrived at Zhukovsky in 1985.
Cockpit configurations have varied from aircraft to aircraft. Multifunction display screens, for instance, virtually standardized in arrangement and presentation symbology in the United States, have been installed in what appears to be random order to accommodate ever-changing combat requirements and ill-defined ergonomic specifications. Even more surprising, the screens are mostly monochromatic. Russia lags the West in color screen technology.
The Su-35 has a digital quadruplex fly-by-wire flight control system comparable to the latest Western aircraft. The airplane, otherwise, is an amalgam of other components and materials that can trace their origins back thirty years. Incorporating older, proven technology and materials, however, is no flaw. Rather, it is an exercise in utilitarianism. For Russian designers, usefulness outweighs the Western propensity for sophistication and complexity.
Aerodynamically, the Su-35 represents little in the way of advanced thinking. It is, however, highly maneuverable and surprisingly agile for its size. Roll, pitch, and instantaneous turn rates throughout most of its sustained 9g envelope are comparable to Western fighters, though it reportedly requires exceptional physical exertion to maneuver through extensive aerobatics.
Designers made little attempt to lower the Su-35's radar cross-section, which is considerable. Composites have been used sparingly in its construction. The airplanes have no indication of internal structural or external surface materials to reduce radar return. Attempts to blend surfaces have been made only to accommodate aerodynamic requirements.
The aircraft can carry an electronic countermeasures suite in wingtip-mounted pods (a relatively new development). The pods have been seen on only a few occasions. Russian pilots who have used the system have commented on its limited dependability.
The Su-35's air-to-air radar (it also has an air-to-ground capability) is sophisticated for a Russian unit. Sukhoi claims the radar can track up to fifteen targets simultaneously while engaging any six at ranges of up to 225 miles. Few observers of Russian aircraft truly believe these last figures. But the numbers remain a concern for military strategists.
Sukhoi Design Bureau chief Mikhail Simonov has alluded to a small aft-facing radar mounted in the extreme rear end of the fuselage sting, but no such system has been seen on any of the flight-worthy Su-35s currently undergoing test. Aft-facing radar could serve any of several purposes, including early warning of rear attack or active guidance for aft-facing air-to-air weapons.
The Su-35's external finish is substandard. To Western eyes, it appears very rough. Panels are ill-fitting and often dented. Many parts, such as the massive glass-fiber radome, appear to be poorly manufactured. But they work. And they are easier and less expensive to manufacture than more refined Western hardware. Production processes are simplified whenever and wherever possible in Russia to accommodate the skills of the personnel assembling the aircraft. While the finish on the Su-35 is not comparable to that of Western aircraft, such refinement makes very little difference operationally. This construction latitude simplifies the production process and lessens the burden of field repairs during battle.
Russian designs for military hardware have always been influenced by the lessons learned during World War II. Equipment must be able to function in extraordinarily harsh climactic and field conditions. The Su-35 is no exception. It is designed to operate from virtually any imaginable unprepared surface-hard dirt, mud, snow, or ice. High-flotation tires, extremely rugged gear struts, mud guards on the nose wheels, independent self-contained main gear disk brake cooling fans, and nose wheel brakes all represent weight and system complexity concessions that would never be acceptable to any other country.
The Su-35 has an extraordinary complement of weapons, including a conventional cannon, air-to-air missiles, air-to-surface missiles, anti-ship missiles, air-to-surface rockets, conventional iron bombs, laser-guided bombs, and, most likely, tactical nuclear weapons. The airplane has at least twelve different stores stations.
This diversity, though impressive, is complex. Each weapon requires a different set of aiming equations (and, sometimes, systems), a different set of launch parameters, special mounting considerations, and calculations that affect aircraft performance. Each weapon also requires separate and totally independent production lines and logistical support systems. As a crowning touch to complexity, the Su-35 can carry a UPAZ inflight refueling "buddy" pod and probably a centerline reconnaissance pod.
The Su-35 is powered by two NPO Saturn powerplants, each rated at over 29,000 pounds thrust in afterburner. These exceptionally powerful turbofans appear to be miserly fuel consumers. They permit the Su-35 to accomplish all its missions with internal fuel only. The aircraft, in fact, is not known to be capable of mounting or using external fuel tanks. Internal fuel capacity has been stretched to the limit by installing tanks in the aircraft's vertical fins. Ferry range of the Su-35 is in excess of 2,500 miles without auxiliary fuel of any kind. The airplane is inflight refuelable.
Few observers question the impressive performance of the Su-35. Whether it will ever become a threat to Western combat aircraft is another question. Sukhoi and its director, Simonov, will rarely argue to the contrary.
Code One Magazine: Su-35: The Latest From Sukhoi — October 1994
Article by Jay Miller. Photos by Katsuhiko Tokunaga
The Su-35 is viewed as the most potent threat facing Western military air forces today. It is a superb combat aircraft, mixing modern technique and technology with a strong dose of Russian mechanical pragmatism.
Sukhoi and the Russian government promote the Su-35 as the chosen champion of non-westernized air forces. They explore export sales opportunities around every international corner. To date, however, no foreign air force has bought the airplane, primarily because it is too expensive and is backed by only the goodwill of a slowly disintegrating government. Without significant financial and trade offsets, the aircraft has little chance of realizing any legitimate international military sales.
Sukhoi has built seven Su-35s; six have flown. None represent fully operational or production configurations. Each has served as a system, structural, or a performance testbed. The airplanes have been continuously modified since the first aircraft (initially referred to as the Su-27M) arrived at Zhukovsky in 1985.
Cockpit configurations have varied from aircraft to aircraft. Multifunction display screens, for instance, virtually standardized in arrangement and presentation symbology in the United States, have been installed in what appears to be random order to accommodate ever-changing combat requirements and ill-defined ergonomic specifications. Even more surprising, the screens are mostly monochromatic. Russia lags the West in color screen technology.
The Su-35 has a digital quadruplex fly-by-wire flight control system comparable to the latest Western aircraft. The airplane, otherwise, is an amalgam of other components and materials that can trace their origins back thirty years. Incorporating older, proven technology and materials, however, is no flaw. Rather, it is an exercise in utilitarianism. For Russian designers, usefulness outweighs the Western propensity for sophistication and complexity.
Aerodynamically, the Su-35 represents little in the way of advanced thinking. It is, however, highly maneuverable and surprisingly agile for its size. Roll, pitch, and instantaneous turn rates throughout most of its sustained 9g envelope are comparable to Western fighters, though it reportedly requires exceptional physical exertion to maneuver through extensive aerobatics.
Designers made little attempt to lower the Su-35's radar cross-section, which is considerable. Composites have been used sparingly in its construction. The airplanes have no indication of internal structural or external surface materials to reduce radar return. Attempts to blend surfaces have been made only to accommodate aerodynamic requirements.
The aircraft can carry an electronic countermeasures suite in wingtip-mounted pods (a relatively new development). The pods have been seen on only a few occasions. Russian pilots who have used the system have commented on its limited dependability.
The Su-35's air-to-air radar (it also has an air-to-ground capability) is sophisticated for a Russian unit. Sukhoi claims the radar can track up to fifteen targets simultaneously while engaging any six at ranges of up to 225 miles. Few observers of Russian aircraft truly believe these last figures. But the numbers remain a concern for military strategists.
Sukhoi Design Bureau chief Mikhail Simonov has alluded to a small aft-facing radar mounted in the extreme rear end of the fuselage sting, but no such system has been seen on any of the flight-worthy Su-35s currently undergoing test. Aft-facing radar could serve any of several purposes, including early warning of rear attack or active guidance for aft-facing air-to-air weapons.
The Su-35's external finish is substandard. To Western eyes, it appears very rough. Panels are ill-fitting and often dented. Many parts, such as the massive glass-fiber radome, appear to be poorly manufactured. But they work. And they are easier and less expensive to manufacture than more refined Western hardware. Production processes are simplified whenever and wherever possible in Russia to accommodate the skills of the personnel assembling the aircraft. While the finish on the Su-35 is not comparable to that of Western aircraft, such refinement makes very little difference operationally. This construction latitude simplifies the production process and lessens the burden of field repairs during battle.
Russian designs for military hardware have always been influenced by the lessons learned during World War II. Equipment must be able to function in extraordinarily harsh climactic and field conditions. The Su-35 is no exception. It is designed to operate from virtually any imaginable unprepared surface-hard dirt, mud, snow, or ice. High-flotation tires, extremely rugged gear struts, mud guards on the nose wheels, independent self-contained main gear disk brake cooling fans, and nose wheel brakes all represent weight and system complexity concessions that would never be acceptable to any other country.
The Su-35 has an extraordinary complement of weapons, including a conventional cannon, air-to-air missiles, air-to-surface missiles, anti-ship missiles, air-to-surface rockets, conventional iron bombs, laser-guided bombs, and, most likely, tactical nuclear weapons. The airplane has at least twelve different stores stations.
This diversity, though impressive, is complex. Each weapon requires a different set of aiming equations (and, sometimes, systems), a different set of launch parameters, special mounting considerations, and calculations that affect aircraft performance. Each weapon also requires separate and totally independent production lines and logistical support systems. As a crowning touch to complexity, the Su-35 can carry a UPAZ inflight refueling "buddy" pod and probably a centerline reconnaissance pod.
The Su-35 is powered by two NPO Saturn powerplants, each rated at over 29,000 pounds thrust in afterburner. These exceptionally powerful turbofans appear to be miserly fuel consumers. They permit the Su-35 to accomplish all its missions with internal fuel only. The aircraft, in fact, is not known to be capable of mounting or using external fuel tanks. Internal fuel capacity has been stretched to the limit by installing tanks in the aircraft's vertical fins. Ferry range of the Su-35 is in excess of 2,500 miles without auxiliary fuel of any kind. The airplane is inflight refuelable.
Few observers question the impressive performance of the Su-35. Whether it will ever become a threat to Western combat aircraft is another question. Sukhoi and its director, Simonov, will rarely argue to the contrary.
Code One Magazine: Su-35: The Latest From Sukhoi — October 1994
