Cheetah786
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DOES Pakistan still have a prominent position in the eyes of the Afghan Taliban? If not, then who does? Another related question is: who holds the key to peace and security in Pakistan and Afghanistan after the foreign forces exit the latter by 2014? At present, Pakistan and Afghanistan are suffering from extreme levels of insecurity and militant violence. However, the post-2014 scenario appears no better as there is an increased risk of insecurity and violence in both countries.
No doubt the Afghan Taliban hold the key to peace in the region. This is their perceived strength in addition to the terror they have generated across Afghanistan over the years. They have also managed to gradually reduce the space for Pakistan to use them as a tool of strategic manoeuvring.
Much of the debate on security and stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan is dominated by the strategic choices and priorities of the stakeholders, who use these to shape and direct their policy discourse. But Pakistans position is not yet clear. It does not appear to be prepared for the post-2014 scenario.
One reason behind this lack of clear policy on Pakistans part could be the ambiguity and confusion among its policymakers on the use of the Taliban as a balancing factor in Afghanistan. Though Pakistan denies this impression it has failed to convince the international community.
The Afghan Taliban have taken advantage of this impression and camouflaged themselves in Pakistans doctrine of strategic depth, thus making Pakistans policy responses even more confused. That is why while global policy circles are aware of the positions of stakeholders inside Afghanistan, they have a tough time spotting the Taliban accurately in these.
Let us see how the Taliban could behave post-2014. It is relevant to first look at the militant landscape in the region with a view to understanding the points of convergence and divergence among different groups and, most importantly, the sources through which they seek political and ideological legitimacy.
A cause has a central place in almost all aspects and affairs of any militant movement. Without an attractive cause, a militant movement is little more than a crime syndicate. The presence in Afghanistan of the US-led International Security Assistance Force, seen as the enemy by the Taliban, provides political legitimacy to them within their country and in Pakistan where they have taken refuge along with their foreign affiliates.
Of course, after 2014 political legitimacy will no longer be a strong source of inspiration and can provide some space to states to counter them on that front. It depends on both Kabul and Islamabad to seize this opportunity.
Though there are few chances of the militants source of ideological inspiration weakening, their ideological tendencies mainly breed on political and social causes.
Though all the Taliban and their foreign allies are part of one militant discourse, the groups operating from Pakistan have strong ideological credentials with deep-rooted sectarian tendencies. On the other hand, a nationalistic trait dominates the resistance within Afghanistan.
Nationalistic credentials allow the Afghan Taliban and other Afghan militant groups to craft better political strategies. So far the Taliban in Afghanistan have been successful in this regard, and have used their partners sheltering in Pakistan not only for operational purposes but also as proxies to counter Pakistani pressure or influence.
The Taliban have indeed put Pakistan in an awkward position Pakistan cannot work its influence over them due to perceived strategic compulsions, nor can it persuade the Afghan Taliban to use their influence to get Pakistani militants to stop the violence inside Pakistan.
At the same time, the Afghan Taliban have successfully managed a separate channel for reconciliation without Pakistans consent or acquiescence. The Taliban not only brought the US from the battleground to the negotiating table, they also made Washington compromise its position on the issue of Taliban prisoners being held in Guantanamo Bay.
The US continues to insist on reconciliation contingent on the Taliban renouncing violence, parting ways with Al Qaeda and embracing the Afghan constitution. Though it will not be easy for the Afghan Taliban to renounce the militant network because of the latters influence over many Taliban factions and commanders including the Haqqanis, it would be interesting to see how the Taliban manage their relationship with Al Qaeda. The latter, together with foreign groups, can play the role of spoiler in case of any successful reconciliation attempt, but the Taliban know that it is largely because of Al Qaeda that the US engaged them.
It will be the responsibility of Mullah Omar to bring all the militant stakeholders on board on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border. That will not be a small challenge for Mullah Omar and one where failure would substantially weaken his position in the talks. This is about their internal dynamics, but they have proved themselves the movers and shakers in the whole withdrawal and reconciliation game. Violence is their real tool to keep shifting the balance in their favour.
Regional and international stakeholders are trying to adjust their strategic interests to a changing environment, and Pakistan is still struggling to find a way of incorporating its strategic interests in the region and outside.
A reduced role in the regional strategic equation would obviously be a headache for Islamabad. The dynamics of international engagement with Pakistan are changing as the international communitys concerns grow about Pakistans internal security and the presence of transnational terrorist networks on its soil.
The new political government will inherit this strategic burden. However it still remains to be seen whether it will try to find a new solution or continue with the last governments approach. One hopes, however, that it is Pakistans internal security that forms the basis of the countrys emerging regional outlook.
The writer is editor of the quarterly research journal Conflict and Peace Studies.
mamirrana@yahoo.com
No doubt the Afghan Taliban hold the key to peace in the region. This is their perceived strength in addition to the terror they have generated across Afghanistan over the years. They have also managed to gradually reduce the space for Pakistan to use them as a tool of strategic manoeuvring.
Much of the debate on security and stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan is dominated by the strategic choices and priorities of the stakeholders, who use these to shape and direct their policy discourse. But Pakistans position is not yet clear. It does not appear to be prepared for the post-2014 scenario.
One reason behind this lack of clear policy on Pakistans part could be the ambiguity and confusion among its policymakers on the use of the Taliban as a balancing factor in Afghanistan. Though Pakistan denies this impression it has failed to convince the international community.
The Afghan Taliban have taken advantage of this impression and camouflaged themselves in Pakistans doctrine of strategic depth, thus making Pakistans policy responses even more confused. That is why while global policy circles are aware of the positions of stakeholders inside Afghanistan, they have a tough time spotting the Taliban accurately in these.
Let us see how the Taliban could behave post-2014. It is relevant to first look at the militant landscape in the region with a view to understanding the points of convergence and divergence among different groups and, most importantly, the sources through which they seek political and ideological legitimacy.
A cause has a central place in almost all aspects and affairs of any militant movement. Without an attractive cause, a militant movement is little more than a crime syndicate. The presence in Afghanistan of the US-led International Security Assistance Force, seen as the enemy by the Taliban, provides political legitimacy to them within their country and in Pakistan where they have taken refuge along with their foreign affiliates.
Of course, after 2014 political legitimacy will no longer be a strong source of inspiration and can provide some space to states to counter them on that front. It depends on both Kabul and Islamabad to seize this opportunity.
Though there are few chances of the militants source of ideological inspiration weakening, their ideological tendencies mainly breed on political and social causes.
Though all the Taliban and their foreign allies are part of one militant discourse, the groups operating from Pakistan have strong ideological credentials with deep-rooted sectarian tendencies. On the other hand, a nationalistic trait dominates the resistance within Afghanistan.
Nationalistic credentials allow the Afghan Taliban and other Afghan militant groups to craft better political strategies. So far the Taliban in Afghanistan have been successful in this regard, and have used their partners sheltering in Pakistan not only for operational purposes but also as proxies to counter Pakistani pressure or influence.
The Taliban have indeed put Pakistan in an awkward position Pakistan cannot work its influence over them due to perceived strategic compulsions, nor can it persuade the Afghan Taliban to use their influence to get Pakistani militants to stop the violence inside Pakistan.
At the same time, the Afghan Taliban have successfully managed a separate channel for reconciliation without Pakistans consent or acquiescence. The Taliban not only brought the US from the battleground to the negotiating table, they also made Washington compromise its position on the issue of Taliban prisoners being held in Guantanamo Bay.
The US continues to insist on reconciliation contingent on the Taliban renouncing violence, parting ways with Al Qaeda and embracing the Afghan constitution. Though it will not be easy for the Afghan Taliban to renounce the militant network because of the latters influence over many Taliban factions and commanders including the Haqqanis, it would be interesting to see how the Taliban manage their relationship with Al Qaeda. The latter, together with foreign groups, can play the role of spoiler in case of any successful reconciliation attempt, but the Taliban know that it is largely because of Al Qaeda that the US engaged them.
It will be the responsibility of Mullah Omar to bring all the militant stakeholders on board on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border. That will not be a small challenge for Mullah Omar and one where failure would substantially weaken his position in the talks. This is about their internal dynamics, but they have proved themselves the movers and shakers in the whole withdrawal and reconciliation game. Violence is their real tool to keep shifting the balance in their favour.
Regional and international stakeholders are trying to adjust their strategic interests to a changing environment, and Pakistan is still struggling to find a way of incorporating its strategic interests in the region and outside.
A reduced role in the regional strategic equation would obviously be a headache for Islamabad. The dynamics of international engagement with Pakistan are changing as the international communitys concerns grow about Pakistans internal security and the presence of transnational terrorist networks on its soil.
The new political government will inherit this strategic burden. However it still remains to be seen whether it will try to find a new solution or continue with the last governments approach. One hopes, however, that it is Pakistans internal security that forms the basis of the countrys emerging regional outlook.
The writer is editor of the quarterly research journal Conflict and Peace Studies.
mamirrana@yahoo.com
