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State of the state - Ikram Sehgal
Gen Pervez Musharrafs personal ambitions neatly coincided with the state of the State in October 1999; despite Mian Nawaz Sharifs heavy mandate, Musharrafs military takeover was widely welcomed by all sections of society. Expected to correct the system of governance turned by a decade of democracy into a complete farce, the premise was that if Musharraf succeeded in correcting the anomalies disfiguring democracy, Pakistan would succeed. His A team of technocrats ranged from below average to brilliant individuals. Muting any criticism of the Chief Executive, as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) styled himself, many applauded his achievements the establishment of the National Accountability Bureau (Nab) to target endemic corruption was particularly stupendous.
For a dictator to be successful he has to be sincere and be served by honest and efficient colleagues to articulate his policies and initiatives. His Principal Staff Officer (PSO) Lt Gen Ghulam Ahmad who ensured Musharrafs first years had far more pros than cons, was unfortunately killed in a car crash. Surrounded by sycophants and courtiers, it was all downhill thereafter. From an international pariah, 9/11 made Musharraf the darling of the West, only delaying the inevitable.
Ziaur Rahmans Martial Law in Bangladesh from 1975 to 1978 was reasonably successful, mainly because his own honesty and integrity combined well with the brilliance of his PSO, Maj Gen Nurul Islam. Rahman won generally free and fair direct presidential elections post-martial law by a wide margin. However when it came to transitioning to civilian life, he and his military colleagues failed. The ultimate and ironic tragedy is that this honest leaders wife, Khaleda Zia, along with her two sons broke all records for corruption.
In the effort to prolong his rule Musharraf bartered away Nabs integrity by being selective about accountability. Musharraf lost his credibility totally when in a last ditch effort to cling to presidential office by hook or by crook, he sold the countrys soul by enacting the NRO.
To quote from my article of June 29, 1995, Why do Martial Laws fail? Martial Laws fail because the initiators of all extra-constitutional rule ride into town on tanks with the lofty Aim of saving the country, relying on that platonic national purpose to make themselves credible. They soon adjust the Aim to more material (and less patriotic) reasons of self-perpetuation. The original Aim remains publically the same but becomes an exercise in self-delusion. This diversion of the Aim means that one individual or group is simply replaced by another (or others), instead of being a transition mechanism that provides for and facilitates the process of the democratic system being repaired and renovated to reflect the real genius and aspirations of the people (Incidentally these were the words of president Iskandar Mirza who declared Pakistans first countrywide martial law on Oct 7, 1958), Gen Ayub Khan deposed him 20 days later. His Martial Law was tough, complete with Martial Law courts and punishment thereof.
While both Yahya Khan and Ziaul Haq emulated Ayub, Musharrafs discarded the usual trappings of military courts, intelligently camouflaging Martial Law under a civilian façade. In my article A Refined Pakistani Model on July 17, 2008, I added In both the models, the Army went wrong in (1) instead of using the civilian bureaucracy for governance, they targeted them and opted for technocrats (2) replaced bureaucrats wholesale with Army officers and above all (3) the Army Chiefs put their personal ambition over the national interest. The Musharraf model was refined by Gen Moeen in Bangladesh in early 2006 by keeping Army officers away from civilian governance. Unfortunately the Bangladesh model was only partially successful. Instead of leaving it to the Supreme Court (SC), the Army got involved in the accountability process. This tended to become selective and was compounded by allowing the military intelligence services to manipulate the political system. One major success was a clean and honest Election Commission making credible electoral rolls and cleansing the electoral system of bogus votes. In contrast, the recent elections in Azad Kashmir have shown that our electoral exercise will always be fraudulent the bedrock of bogus votes makes democracy a farce.
Before Musharraf was ceremoniously shown the door, my article A Failed Civilian Coup on July 31, 2008 said, Pervez Musharraf may be vilified for any number of reasons, no one can question his patriotism. For the sake of Pakistan, one appeals to the President to correct two major blunders immediately viz (1) repeal the NRO and (2) withdraw the Nov 3 PCO action. Whenever nations are in crisis, leaders are expected to rise above their individual agendas to secure the countrys sovereignty and integrity, unquote. Despite a lot of rhetoric emanating from the SC, the NRO judgement has not been acted upon; Nab has not only become non-functional, it is a standing example that crime does pay in Pakistan.
Notwithstanding Asif Zardari claiming to have educated our military hierarchy to enjoy their material benefits rather than attempting treason. Martial Law has been imposed before, in whatever form it will be imposed in the future. Those who believe that the 18th Amendment is the ultimate deterrence are living in a fools world, subverting the Constitution was always treason but it did not deter earlier bouts of military rule. The intelligentsia has the naïve perception that Western democracies will never accept military rule; if this is really true, why is everyone and their uncle comfortable with the Egyptian and Tunisian Armies overturning the Constitution?
Crass materialism weakens the courage of conviction and moral obligation to ones conscience to act above and beyond the call of responsibility. One can send others to their deaths for a higher cause but how many of us can gamble losing the comforts of living around (and even in) golf courses?
The country is not yet in a state of anarchy that the federal government seems to be. Damage control and recovery of stable governance will be that much harder if the situation rapidly deteriorates. One can only pick up the pieces if there are any pieces left to pick. To safeguard the nascent democratic system would require the president to change the present mode of governance from one of nepotism and corruption to that of honesty and integrity. But with the military hierarchy seemingly compromised, Zardari is not in any tearing hurry to do so.
The ultimate option, a refined Pakistan model, is the route of last resort but lessons need to be learnt from the 1999 Pakistan and 2007 Bangladesh military interventions. Uniformed personnel must support honest and capable bureaucrats in running the affairs of governance as only they can, with a few specialist technocrats thrown in. Only a swift return to democratic rule with accountability extending to the bureaucracy, the judiciary and the military holds hope for Pakistan.
We still do not qualify for the list of failed States, but we are trekking a fail-safe line of sorts. Unless the present democracy opts for course correction, the state of the State is such that intervention will again become a viable option, Article 6 and the 18th Amendment notwithstanding.
If we act too late, we are indeed doomed.
Gen Pervez Musharrafs personal ambitions neatly coincided with the state of the State in October 1999; despite Mian Nawaz Sharifs heavy mandate, Musharrafs military takeover was widely welcomed by all sections of society. Expected to correct the system of governance turned by a decade of democracy into a complete farce, the premise was that if Musharraf succeeded in correcting the anomalies disfiguring democracy, Pakistan would succeed. His A team of technocrats ranged from below average to brilliant individuals. Muting any criticism of the Chief Executive, as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) styled himself, many applauded his achievements the establishment of the National Accountability Bureau (Nab) to target endemic corruption was particularly stupendous.
For a dictator to be successful he has to be sincere and be served by honest and efficient colleagues to articulate his policies and initiatives. His Principal Staff Officer (PSO) Lt Gen Ghulam Ahmad who ensured Musharrafs first years had far more pros than cons, was unfortunately killed in a car crash. Surrounded by sycophants and courtiers, it was all downhill thereafter. From an international pariah, 9/11 made Musharraf the darling of the West, only delaying the inevitable.
Ziaur Rahmans Martial Law in Bangladesh from 1975 to 1978 was reasonably successful, mainly because his own honesty and integrity combined well with the brilliance of his PSO, Maj Gen Nurul Islam. Rahman won generally free and fair direct presidential elections post-martial law by a wide margin. However when it came to transitioning to civilian life, he and his military colleagues failed. The ultimate and ironic tragedy is that this honest leaders wife, Khaleda Zia, along with her two sons broke all records for corruption.
In the effort to prolong his rule Musharraf bartered away Nabs integrity by being selective about accountability. Musharraf lost his credibility totally when in a last ditch effort to cling to presidential office by hook or by crook, he sold the countrys soul by enacting the NRO.
To quote from my article of June 29, 1995, Why do Martial Laws fail? Martial Laws fail because the initiators of all extra-constitutional rule ride into town on tanks with the lofty Aim of saving the country, relying on that platonic national purpose to make themselves credible. They soon adjust the Aim to more material (and less patriotic) reasons of self-perpetuation. The original Aim remains publically the same but becomes an exercise in self-delusion. This diversion of the Aim means that one individual or group is simply replaced by another (or others), instead of being a transition mechanism that provides for and facilitates the process of the democratic system being repaired and renovated to reflect the real genius and aspirations of the people (Incidentally these were the words of president Iskandar Mirza who declared Pakistans first countrywide martial law on Oct 7, 1958), Gen Ayub Khan deposed him 20 days later. His Martial Law was tough, complete with Martial Law courts and punishment thereof.
While both Yahya Khan and Ziaul Haq emulated Ayub, Musharrafs discarded the usual trappings of military courts, intelligently camouflaging Martial Law under a civilian façade. In my article A Refined Pakistani Model on July 17, 2008, I added In both the models, the Army went wrong in (1) instead of using the civilian bureaucracy for governance, they targeted them and opted for technocrats (2) replaced bureaucrats wholesale with Army officers and above all (3) the Army Chiefs put their personal ambition over the national interest. The Musharraf model was refined by Gen Moeen in Bangladesh in early 2006 by keeping Army officers away from civilian governance. Unfortunately the Bangladesh model was only partially successful. Instead of leaving it to the Supreme Court (SC), the Army got involved in the accountability process. This tended to become selective and was compounded by allowing the military intelligence services to manipulate the political system. One major success was a clean and honest Election Commission making credible electoral rolls and cleansing the electoral system of bogus votes. In contrast, the recent elections in Azad Kashmir have shown that our electoral exercise will always be fraudulent the bedrock of bogus votes makes democracy a farce.
Before Musharraf was ceremoniously shown the door, my article A Failed Civilian Coup on July 31, 2008 said, Pervez Musharraf may be vilified for any number of reasons, no one can question his patriotism. For the sake of Pakistan, one appeals to the President to correct two major blunders immediately viz (1) repeal the NRO and (2) withdraw the Nov 3 PCO action. Whenever nations are in crisis, leaders are expected to rise above their individual agendas to secure the countrys sovereignty and integrity, unquote. Despite a lot of rhetoric emanating from the SC, the NRO judgement has not been acted upon; Nab has not only become non-functional, it is a standing example that crime does pay in Pakistan.
Notwithstanding Asif Zardari claiming to have educated our military hierarchy to enjoy their material benefits rather than attempting treason. Martial Law has been imposed before, in whatever form it will be imposed in the future. Those who believe that the 18th Amendment is the ultimate deterrence are living in a fools world, subverting the Constitution was always treason but it did not deter earlier bouts of military rule. The intelligentsia has the naïve perception that Western democracies will never accept military rule; if this is really true, why is everyone and their uncle comfortable with the Egyptian and Tunisian Armies overturning the Constitution?
Crass materialism weakens the courage of conviction and moral obligation to ones conscience to act above and beyond the call of responsibility. One can send others to their deaths for a higher cause but how many of us can gamble losing the comforts of living around (and even in) golf courses?
The country is not yet in a state of anarchy that the federal government seems to be. Damage control and recovery of stable governance will be that much harder if the situation rapidly deteriorates. One can only pick up the pieces if there are any pieces left to pick. To safeguard the nascent democratic system would require the president to change the present mode of governance from one of nepotism and corruption to that of honesty and integrity. But with the military hierarchy seemingly compromised, Zardari is not in any tearing hurry to do so.
The ultimate option, a refined Pakistan model, is the route of last resort but lessons need to be learnt from the 1999 Pakistan and 2007 Bangladesh military interventions. Uniformed personnel must support honest and capable bureaucrats in running the affairs of governance as only they can, with a few specialist technocrats thrown in. Only a swift return to democratic rule with accountability extending to the bureaucracy, the judiciary and the military holds hope for Pakistan.
We still do not qualify for the list of failed States, but we are trekking a fail-safe line of sorts. Unless the present democracy opts for course correction, the state of the State is such that intervention will again become a viable option, Article 6 and the 18th Amendment notwithstanding.
If we act too late, we are indeed doomed.
