Seeking ‘dubious’ peace with the Taliban.

[Perceptron]

Seeking ‘dubious’ peace with the Taliban
By Khaled Ahmed
Published: October 22, 2011

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The writer is Director at the South Asian Media School in Lahore
khaled.ahmed@tribune.com.pk

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Talking peace with the Taliban is a tough undertaking. The Americans who want to talk to the Afghan Taliban should take a close look at how Pakistan fared when it talked to its own Taliban. One can also make a guess at what will happen in the wake of the September 2011 APC in Islamabad as Pakistan gets ready to talk to the Taliban once again.

In 2003, Musharraf nearly got killed when three attacks on him — by al Qaeda through Abu Faraj alLibi, Jaish-e-Muhammad and Pakistan Air Force personnel — on him were foiled. He wanted a counter-attack in South Waziristan but was thwarted by his corps commander in Peshawar, General Ali Muhammad Jan Aurakzai, who preferred retirement to an operation.

The succeeding corps commander Peshawar, General Safdar Hussain, was from the ISI — its second-most important member, DG Analysis. He made peace with the Taliban commander Nek Muhammad at Shakai in 2004, binding him to not attacking in Afghanistan and getting rid of the ‘foreigners’ in return for amnesty. Nek Muhammad did not abide by the peace accord.

General Safdar Hussain told Zahid Hussain (Scorpion’s Tail page 71) he wanted the Americans trapped in Afghanistan. He was seen on TV dubbing Nek Muhammad a soldier of Islam. After Nek Muhammad was killed by a drone in June 2004, General Safdar Hussain signed another peace accord with Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud at Sararogha after giving him half a million dollars to pay back the bribe he and his commanders had got from al Qaeda before shifting loyalty for money. He, too, did not abide by the terms of the accord.

The ‘peace accord’ allowed Baitullah to kill the tribal elders and fill the vacuum thus created in Fata with his warriors. Musharraf then sent in the troops. Lal Masjid in Islamabad issued a fatwa to the Pakistan Army saying their funerals will be desacralised if they fought the Taliban. In 2005, the Pakistan Army lost 230 soldiers in South Waziristan.

There were other such ‘dubious’ peace deals with Sufi Muhammad in Malakand and Mullah Nazir in South Waziristan that helped the terrorists damage Pakistan instead of giving it the breathing space it needed.

Strangely, Musharraf reacted to all this by colluding rather than correcting. In hindsight, his conduct might look like a ‘double game’. He brought General Aurakzai back from retirement and made him governor NWFP.

Carey Schofield who was for a time attached to the combat formations of the Pakistan Army as a military historian, in her book Inside the Pakistan Army: A woman’s Experience on the Frontline of the War on Terror (Biteback Publishing, London 2011) gives us the following account on the authority of then corps commander Peshawar, General Hamid Khan: “In May 2006, the retired General Aurakzai was appointed Governor of the North West Frontier Province. In September he struck a deal, at a Grand Jirga in Miramshah, with the Utmanzai Wazirs. Maulana Gul Bahadur Khan and Maulana Sadiq Noor, key Taliban commanders in North Waziristan, were party to this deal. Jalaluddin Haqqani and Tahir Yuldashev were also present when it was signed. Under this agreement, known as the Waziristan Accord, the Taliban pledged to eject foreign fighters, prevent cross-border attacks into Afghanistan, stop running camps in the Fata and return seized weapons and pay reparation.

“In fact the deal only helped the militants. After South Waziristan, the militants shifted to North Waziristan and then on to Bajaur and Swat.

“In July-August 2007 there were attacks virtually every day, especially around Miramshah and Mir Ali. The Pakistan Army was losing control of territory, but Governor Aurakzai was determined to try to preserve the Waziristan Accord. In August in South Waziristan, the army was faced with the worst episode yet in its struggle against the militants” (p.175).

General Masood Aslam, who succeeded General Hamid Khan as corps commander, described the fiasco of Pakistan Army’s surrender to the Taliban on the road to Laddha Fort: “General Aurakzai began negotiating with the tribes, and the tribes began moving the goalposts. Finally, they produced a list of prisoners held by the government, saying until they were released, our soldiers would be held prisoner. Aurakzai took the list, and would not share it with the rest of us (p.176).

Aurakzai bent to the Taliban’s demands but finally failed to give Baitullah what he wanted: “In mid-December he resigned as governor. This was his way of telling Baitullah that he had played it straight, to persuade the tribes that he had behaved honourably. Otherwise, Baitullah would have gone after Aurakzai. He would have been a marked man. Aurakzai never wanted to discuss what he was doing with the army, with the bureaucrats or with politicians. Nobody could control him” (p.177).
In Orakzai, the Taliban can kill anyone at will. In her book, Taliban and anti-Taliban (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), Farhat Taj tells us that Orakzai Agency is the second agency after Kurram where there is Shia-Sunni tension. The Taliban decided to kill the Shia. Because of the ‘peace treaty’, Pakistan stood aside if not lent a hand, as the Shia were massacred. She writes: “The Ali Khels of Orakzai — the biggest tribe there — were forced into taking on the Taliban and were successful in getting the upper hand, but when the Political Agent told them they had been too harsh, they knew what was coming. The Ali Khel jirga was blown up with a suicide-bomber in October 2008, killing 50 Ali Khel tribal elders, and forcing the survivors to become IDPs. The Sikhs and the Shia, those still left behind, now pay jazia” (p.137).

A Pakistani ambassador who served in Kabul during the Taliban regime says Mullah Omar never agreed to anything Pakistan proposed. A Canadian journalist Kathy Gannon in her book ‘I’ is for Infidel: from Holy War to Holy Terror, 18 Years inside Afghanistan (Public Affairs, New York 2005) says ISI boss General Mehmood Ahmed actually told Mullah Omar to do just the opposite of what Pakistan was officially advising him (p.93).

Published in The Express Tribune, October 23rd, 2011.

 

[Irfan Baloch]

Seeking ‘dubious’ peace with the Taliban A Canadian journalist Kathy Gannon in her book ‘I’ is for Infidel: from Holy War to Holy Terror, 18 Years inside Afghanistan (Public Affairs, New York 2005) says ISI boss General Mehmood Ahmed actually told Mullah Omar to do just the opposite of what Pakistan was officially advising him (p.93).

Published in The Express Tribune, October 23rd, 2011.

This article is based on what a journalist said in her book about ISI's advice to Mullah Omar without providing any backup.

the author seems to be living in an alternate world assuming that the talks with the adversaries should result in successful conclusion in first round as if they are friendly & cordial trade talks between countries although those also take many rounds to reach an agreement.

Talking to the rivals is a delicate task and takes a mix of force and leniency to get your massage across. It starts with verbal warnings, sanctions, limited operations, talks, sanctions, full scale war, talks and when the opposing party sees that there is no way out then finally the talks resume resulting in peace. If the hostilities return then the cycle is repeated until the final solution.

There is nothing duplicitous about a governments stance to take a different approach when it has to deal with groups within its own territory compared to someone who comes from thousands of miles and cant care less about the consequences in the long run. A country dealing with militancy and insurgency has the interest of the state and its people under consideration which prevents it from being ruthless in use of its force as it is working on loss minimisation and has to tread carefully to avoid the backlash and unpopularity among its citizen.

All countries do that, the British had to deal with the IRA in good Friday agreement and the same goes with Spanish Goverment and ETA and the ultra violent white supremsit groups in USA vs. the FBI. They used force where it was necessary but talks were never off the table, even today ETA and IRA activists are caught perpetrating new terrorist acts but that doesn’t affect the overall peace agreement because the safety and security of the people is at stake and its own territory that has to be looked after. But dealing with militancies in far off lands that are under occupation, the things can be different hence the British empire had no such limitation when it dealt with the 1857 mutiny, whole villages were raised and millions of people executed including those even on the suspicion of harbouring the mutineers.

The drug cartel and Sicilian mafia families are allowed to exist both in USA and Italy. There is no suggestion of collusion by the state police and its agencies but such people are approached and told to keep themselves under check and not to cross the line. The police thinks many times and any all out war against the mafia is hotly debated within the government and its agencies before taking a decision because the perceived looses can outweigh the benefits. The resources and engagements of the Police don’t allow it to go after every criminal organisation but the ones that are the most problematic and account for the majority of the crime figures, an 80-20 rule is adopted by taking on the few high profile criminals that account for the 80% of the crime. It doesn’t mean that if the rest of the 20% are seen then the police will look the other way but they are actually given an indirect message that they mend their ways or they will be pursued and brought to justice like their high profile comrades

Coming back to Pakistan‘s so called “peace” deals with the Taliban in its territory. These were a mix of force and diplomacy and a message from a point of a gun or on table to tell the Taliban to realise the fact that they cant beat the state and should stop all anti state activities and also not to fiddle in Afghanistan as the USA is not only looking for blood but will shoot first and ask questions later. It will not hold back while unleashing its firepower. The resignation of the GOC and alleged opposition from other senior commanders is pure speculation and lacks any evidence.

A name that is missing for the reason to misguide the readers is General Tariq Khan former IGFC who had earned the reputation of a feared, ruthless and successful commander that turned the frontier Corps from a dysfunctional, demoralised and dated organisation into an effective fighting force with modern COIN tactics, he not only lead his forces to break the backbone of the Taliban but also established the writ of the state in the places in FATA where no regular army of the state had set food since the time of the British Raj. He broke the Taliban stronghold on the local tribes and helped in establishing Lashkers and motivated the Elders due to the familiarity with the Pashtun customs and being a proud Pashtun son himself.


The author criticises the Pakistani dialog with the Taliban and supports his argument with the attacks on Gen Musharraf and other senior military and civilian leadership done by Al Qaeda. Pakistan at no point, since joining the war on terror to this day, has EVER sought dialog, dealing & leniency towards the Al Qaeda and has been unrelenting and ruthless in their pursuit, elimination and capture with the names of big heavies like Khalid Sheikh Mehmood, Abu Zubaidah, Ahmed Omar Saeed and Al Libbi to name a few. Same goes with the organisations like Lashker e Jhagvi & Sipah Sahabah that projected themselves as the Al Qaeda representatives of Pakistan. Had there been any collusion then Khalid Khawaja and Col. Imam would never had been kidnapped, forced to make “video confession” and then executed by Lashker e Jhagvi.

The author ends his article with what a Canadian reporter claims in her book about ISI chief & Mullah Omar’s meeting. One shouldn’t be surprised if that same Canadian journalist now quotes this article to substantiate her other claims. Such is the nature and value of reporting these days where a research article of a student is used as an evidence for WMDs and accusations and forced confessions as a proof and basis give weight to the argument and case against other states.

There is a consistency in such articles that they decide to select segments of events that suit them to strengthen their theory and ignore the complete picture. This article is no different where the author does mention the meeting of the former ISI chief with Mullah Omar but fails to mention the Saudi diplomat Prince Turki Al Faisal who was there too. The author the makes a ludicrous claim that ISI chief went all the way to Mullah Omar telling him to oppose Pakistani official advice. The way the event happened in reality was that Pakistani spymaster Gen Naseem and his Saudi counterpart Prince Turki (who later became Saudi Ambassador to USA) went together to meet Mullah Omar in Kandahar and requested him to handover Osama Bin Laden for his terrorist crimes in Saudi Soil along with terrorism against he United states, they both reminded him of their support to the Afghans during Afghan Jihad and their support and recognition of the Taliban regime.

They reminded him that Osama had promised Mullah Omar that while being the guest of Taliban, he wont plan any terrorist attacks against other countries specially Saudi Kingdom. Then they both gave him the details of Osama‘s attacks on US Embassies, Naval Vassals & Saudi cities and his support of the groups engaged in sectarian killings in Pakistan. They said that doing so Osama had not only broken his promise (with Taliban) but also harmed the countries that had been the biggest supporters of Afghans during Soviet occupation & the only ones supporting the Taliban regime.

Mullah Omar refused to listen & made a scene out of it (for his Taliban audience present in the meeting) by leaving the room and coming back with a wet head saying that he had to drench himself with water to cool down his temper & if the Pakistani & Saudi spymasters were not his guests then they would have had suffered dire consequences to which the Saudi prince got up full of anger saying that he will be the first person to fight anyone who helps Osama in planning and attacking the Saudi royal family and Saudi Kingdom, Gen Naseem chided Mullah Omar by telling him that his act has just lost him the sympathy and support of the only 2 countries in the world and his regime will suffer the consequences. This was the last ever high-level meeting between the ISI chief and Mullah Omar that ended in a sour note as both chiefs left Kandahar for Pakistan.


I will urge readers to be careful while drawing conclusions from such articles that lack authenticity and rely on quotes of other analysts, political pundits and journalists as a bases of their argument and present them as a proof to make their judgements. I wont be surprised if any reader who is not aware of the whole story can be misguided and accept this as authentic just because there are hundred other such articles like it quoting each other and thus making a case against Pakistan and as if making a case against the peace. Sadly they don’t show any alternative or a solution which is practical and can replace a failed 10 year war campaign in the Afghanistan. Their argument is not to talk peace just because Pakistan is advocating it.

One can only hope that peace can return to this region and the people can live a peaceful life without fear regardless what these nameless horde of analysts have to say and make a case against the dialog to achieve peace.