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RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE NEW GREAT GAME
Any attempt to fill the void in Afghanistan after the coalition troop withdrawal will likely result in an unwelcome destabilization of the region. Still, the diminishing Western presence in Afghanistan could lead to greater competition between neighboring powers, which may stage a new “great game” for the so-called heart of Asia.
Russia has no need to enter this contest and vie for influence in Afghanistan against other, more motivated external players, such as Pakistan. Doing so would be a waste of Moscow’s efforts and would risk damaging Russia’s relations with the countries fighting for influence. But understanding the positions these countries hold and taking these stances into account will allow Russia to formulate an approach and policy toward Afghanistan that best serves Moscow’s interests.
Maintaining working relations with all the significant players in Afghanistan and the region will help Russia counter the main threats a destabilized Afghanistan would pose to Russia’s security—terrorism, insurgencies, and drug trafficking. In this light, connections with the political leadership—as well as the intelligence and military structures—inside Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan will be especially valuable.
Pakistan
Pakistan is the most active and interested player on the Afghan stage. Pashtun tribes that live along both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border act as the major link connecting the two countries, and the border that divides these tribes is a source of serious conflict between Islamabad and Kabul.
Pakistan traditionally treats Afghanistan as being within its sphere of influence and regards the situation in that country as both a matter of Pakistani national security and an opportunity to gain strategic advantages over India, Islamabad’s main rival. As such, Pakistan has been actively and consistently involved in Afghanistan’s internal affairs since the second half of the 1970s. This involvement will increase after the international coalition troops depart.
When it comes to other key players in Afghanistan, Pakistan has very uneven relations with the United States, close ties with China, and an alliance with Saudi Arabia. In Central Asia, Islamabad has held some sway over Dushanbe and Tashkent since the 1990s.
Pakistan cannot become Russia’s ally, but Russia should not necessarily treat Pakistan as a rival, let alone an adversary, in Afghanistan. Pragmatic cooperation with Islamabad on the issues of terrorism and drug trafficking may prove helpful to Moscow.
The Central Asian Nations
The Central Asian states are concerned about the regional consequences of instability in Afghanistan. They worry about the survival of their own political regimes, the economic burden associated with the possible influx of refugees, and the geopolitical changes that might result from reduced American presence in the region. In reality, most political problems in Central Asia stem from within individual nations, Afghan refugees would likely only pose a problem for Tajikistan, and Central Asia’s economic prospects depend more on China, Russia, and the Western states than on U.S. presence in Afghanistan. Drug trafficking and production, however, do pose a threat to the population of all Central Asian countries—and to Russia.
In the wake of the troop withdrawal, greater cooperation with Moscow’s allies and partners in Central Asia will be necessary to ensure the country’s security, especially in the south. Russia must play a much more active role here. Economic integration and cooperation are its main policy tools in the region, but it should also seek to build greater security sector cooperation along two axes. Multilaterally, Moscow should operate in the framework of the CSTO; the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; and the proposed Eurasian Economic Union of post-Soviet states. Bilaterally, Russia should strengthen relations with each of its partners.
Enhancing security cooperation with other CSTO members should be a top priority. Russia’s security policy in the region would particularly benefit from improving relations with Kazakhstan, which is a key regional player. There should be a privileged partnership between Moscow and Astana within the CSTO to ensure security in Central Asia.
Two other CSTO members—Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—require Russia’s special attention because they host Russian military bases. With coalition forces leaving Afghanistan and the United States closing its Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan, there is an increased need for Russia’s direct participation in protecting the Tajik-Afghan border as well as for constructing a Russian military base in southern Kyrgyzstan. Joint military exercises involving Russian, Tajik, and Kyrgyz troops should also be conducted regularly. To ensure more effective cooperation in this sphere, Russia should help rearm the Kyrgyz and Tajik armies and upgrade the skills of their military personnel, primarily their officer corps.
A diplomatic component should reinforce the military one at the Russian army bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The commanders of Russian contingents there should have political advisers who are in constant communication with the leadership of the host countries.
Russia should also seek to optimize the CSTO’s functions and tasks. The organization’s political component must be strengthened, and closer ties between member states’ national security councils, intelligence agencies, and law-enforcement communities should be fostered. There should also be attempts to develop closer contacts between the political elites of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Creating a CSTO academy in Kazakhstan to prepare a cadre of regional security specialists would help strengthen the organization, especially if this institution offered courses to top military and law-enforcement commanders, political leaders, and high-ranking officials from member countries.
The CSTO’s Collective Rapid Reaction Force, an armed task force comprised of members from all CSTO states, is intended to be employed in emergency situations. The collective force should be engaged not only in counterterrorism but also in counterinsurgency and counternarcotic operations.
Two of the five Central Asian states—Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan—are not CSTO members. Moscow needs to intensify bilateral contacts with Tashkent and Ashkhabad to alleviate their possible fears regarding Russia’s policy in the region. Moscow should pay particular attention to the development of its contacts with Uzbekistan, the most populated and centrally located country in the region.
To address the problems of drug production and trafficking, Moscow should work with Central Asian countries to increase the efficiency of Russia’s Federal Drug Control Service. With the consent of Russia’s allies and in cooperation with them, this organization should be allowed to operate beyond Russia’s borders in Central Asian countries. This expanded reach will enable it to better stem the flow of drugs and detect and destroy drug-producing facilities.
In addition, enhancing regional migration policy and its instruments will be key to ensuring Russia’s security in a post-withdrawal Afghanistan. Visa-free travel, already in place between the Customs Union members and the members of the future Eurasian Economic Union, ought to continue. At the same time, Russia’s Federal Migration Service must maintain close contacts with its Central Asian counterparts to closely monitor migration flows from other countries in the region in order to prevent drug smuggling and keep extremists and terrorists out.
India and China
Russia would also benefit from consulting and possibly cooperating with great Asian powers namely China and India on the issues involving Afghanistan. New Delhi and especially Beijing are starting to play a substantially greater role in South and Central Asia.
India’s presence in Afghanistan is not merely part of a regional geopolitical strategy vis-à-vis its rivals, Pakistan and China. It is also an important example of New Delhi’s attempts to assert itself as a great Asian power. If the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) emerges victorious in India’s general elections this year—an outcome many see as probable the BJP will likely strengthen India’s resolve to play a greater international role.
New Delhi and Moscow are strategic partners, and India helps maintain a continental global balance of power that Russia considers favorable. Cooperation with India—including on matters related to Afghanistan, such as increasing regional stabilization, combatting terrorism, and curbing the drug trade—is therefore valuable to Russia.
For India, given its traditional rivalries with Pakistan and China as well as the decreasing American activity and presence in Afghanistan, Russia, together with Iran, is one of few serious partners. At the same time, some of New Delhi’s specific interests and aspirations in Afghanistan diverge from Moscow’s interests, largely because of India’s competition with Pakistan and China.
For its part, China looks at Afghanistan through an economic lens as well as in terms of Beijing’s security interests and its broader geopolitical concerns in Central and South Asia. Chinese state-run companies actively invest in tapping Afghanistan’s (and Central Asia’s) natural resources.
Pakistan is China’s long-standing and close partner, and India is its historical rival. From Beijing’s standpoint and in light of its special relations with Islamabad, the Taliban is a political movement that can and must be negotiated with despite its possible ties with Uyghur Islamist separatists in China and the region. As a result, while maintaining economic interests in Afghanistan, China distances itself from active political involvement in the country’s affairs, demonstrating its willingness to cooperate with any regime in Kabul.
For Russia, China is an important global and regional partner. This is true in a number of areas, including on issues related to Afghanistan.
To maximize its consultations and cooperation with India and China, Russia should improve bilateral ties with these countries. At the same time, Moscow should use multilateral platforms to reach out to New Delhi and Beijing. These platforms—such as the SCO; a quadrilateral grouping of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, and Tajikistan referred to as “the Four”; and RIC (Russia-India-China)—could serve as forums for exchanging ideas and preparing for negotiations.
The United States and NATO
In the short and medium term, the degree of U.S. participation in Afghan affairs will depend on whether Washington signs an agreement with Kabul on continued American troop presence in the country. But even if the troop departure from Afghanistan is complete, the United States, as a global power, will remain concerned with everything that happens around the world, including in Afghanistan.
That said, the major motivation behind American presence and interest in Afghanistan—preventing the creation of terrorist bases in the country—is substantially less relevant now than it was when the U.S. invasion began in 2001. Afghanistan has stopped being a central problem for U.S. foreign and military policies and is quickly becoming peripheral. Of course, it will continue to be of some interest to the United States—for instance, as a drone and air force base in the context of Washington’s policies on China, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asian countries, but this interest will be limited.
Due to a radical deterioration of U.S.-Russia relations that has taken place since the start of 2014 and the scheduled withdrawal of U.S. combat troops, there are few prospects for cooperation between Moscow and Washington on issues related to Afghanistan—for instance, on combating drug trafficking. Nevertheless, targeted cooperation in areas of mutual interest should not be excluded.
When it comes to working with other NATO countries, Moscow’s options are similarly limited. Not many areas of possible Russian cooperation with NATO members exist, except for the issue of troop and military cargo transit through Russian territory. And as the coalition removes its forces from Afghanistan and Russia’s relations with the West continue to deteriorate, the number of issues on which Moscow and NATO could collaborate will decrease even further. There are, however, some prospects for Russian cooperation with Turkey, which continues to be interested in Afghanistan.
Iran
For Iran, Afghanistan is a linguistically, culturally, and religiously close country. Tehran is interested in having a stable, independent neighbor whose balance of political powers roughly reflects Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious makeup.
Iran is advancing its interests in Afghanistan primarily through trade and investments. It relies on the help of residents of the Afghan province of Herat, who have traditionally had ties with Iran, as well as ethnic Tajiks and Hazaras. Tehran also has a strong interest in stopping Afghan drug trafficking because many smuggling routes pass through Iran.
Tehran has complex ties to other major players in Afghanistan. It welcomes the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan and is developing a partnership with India. It has complicated relations with Pakistan, which, like Iran, aspires to a leadership role in the region and is attempting to be a predominant influence in Afghanistan. And Tehran’s relations with Saudi Arabia are hostile.
Iran and Russia, however, have common interests on a number of important issues, ranging from stabilizing Afghanistan to combatting drug trafficking. Both countries also exert influence on Dushanbe and the Afghan Tajiks, which they demonstrated in 1997 by joining forces to help end the civil war in Tajikistan. Moscow and Tehran can use this influence to play a significant role in the post-American Afghanistan, provided they coordinate their actions.
CONCLUSIONS
Russia should not treat the post-2014 situation in Afghanistan as a potential disaster for its security in the south. An extremist takeover of Afghanistan—and the country’s subsequent turn into a hotbed of international terrorism is not a certainty. Nevertheless, the coalition withdrawal from Afghanistan will force Russia to take more responsibility for regional security.
This heightened responsibility does not mean Russia should be directly involved in Afghan events. Russia should never intervene in infighting in Afghanistan, especially militarily. Its goal should be protecting Russian interests by using diplomatic and other nonviolent means in Afghanistan and in the region.
Moscow should also pursue an active and comprehensive policy in Central Asia the territory where the first Russian line of defense against security threats emanating from Afghanistan lies. Having effective working relations with all significant Afghan elites and with all regional powers is an important condition for the success of Russian policy in Afghanistan. This approach is consistent with a well-known great game principle that advises states not to strive for victory but rather to avoid defeat in Russia’s case, to stay out of any new contest over the “heart of Asia” and focus instead on Moscow’s interests.
Any attempt to fill the void in Afghanistan after the coalition troop withdrawal will likely result in an unwelcome destabilization of the region. Still, the diminishing Western presence in Afghanistan could lead to greater competition between neighboring powers, which may stage a new “great game” for the so-called heart of Asia.
Russia has no need to enter this contest and vie for influence in Afghanistan against other, more motivated external players, such as Pakistan. Doing so would be a waste of Moscow’s efforts and would risk damaging Russia’s relations with the countries fighting for influence. But understanding the positions these countries hold and taking these stances into account will allow Russia to formulate an approach and policy toward Afghanistan that best serves Moscow’s interests.
Maintaining working relations with all the significant players in Afghanistan and the region will help Russia counter the main threats a destabilized Afghanistan would pose to Russia’s security—terrorism, insurgencies, and drug trafficking. In this light, connections with the political leadership—as well as the intelligence and military structures—inside Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan will be especially valuable.
Pakistan
Pakistan is the most active and interested player on the Afghan stage. Pashtun tribes that live along both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border act as the major link connecting the two countries, and the border that divides these tribes is a source of serious conflict between Islamabad and Kabul.
Pakistan traditionally treats Afghanistan as being within its sphere of influence and regards the situation in that country as both a matter of Pakistani national security and an opportunity to gain strategic advantages over India, Islamabad’s main rival. As such, Pakistan has been actively and consistently involved in Afghanistan’s internal affairs since the second half of the 1970s. This involvement will increase after the international coalition troops depart.
When it comes to other key players in Afghanistan, Pakistan has very uneven relations with the United States, close ties with China, and an alliance with Saudi Arabia. In Central Asia, Islamabad has held some sway over Dushanbe and Tashkent since the 1990s.
Pakistan cannot become Russia’s ally, but Russia should not necessarily treat Pakistan as a rival, let alone an adversary, in Afghanistan. Pragmatic cooperation with Islamabad on the issues of terrorism and drug trafficking may prove helpful to Moscow.
The Central Asian Nations
The Central Asian states are concerned about the regional consequences of instability in Afghanistan. They worry about the survival of their own political regimes, the economic burden associated with the possible influx of refugees, and the geopolitical changes that might result from reduced American presence in the region. In reality, most political problems in Central Asia stem from within individual nations, Afghan refugees would likely only pose a problem for Tajikistan, and Central Asia’s economic prospects depend more on China, Russia, and the Western states than on U.S. presence in Afghanistan. Drug trafficking and production, however, do pose a threat to the population of all Central Asian countries—and to Russia.
In the wake of the troop withdrawal, greater cooperation with Moscow’s allies and partners in Central Asia will be necessary to ensure the country’s security, especially in the south. Russia must play a much more active role here. Economic integration and cooperation are its main policy tools in the region, but it should also seek to build greater security sector cooperation along two axes. Multilaterally, Moscow should operate in the framework of the CSTO; the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; and the proposed Eurasian Economic Union of post-Soviet states. Bilaterally, Russia should strengthen relations with each of its partners.
Enhancing security cooperation with other CSTO members should be a top priority. Russia’s security policy in the region would particularly benefit from improving relations with Kazakhstan, which is a key regional player. There should be a privileged partnership between Moscow and Astana within the CSTO to ensure security in Central Asia.
Two other CSTO members—Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—require Russia’s special attention because they host Russian military bases. With coalition forces leaving Afghanistan and the United States closing its Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan, there is an increased need for Russia’s direct participation in protecting the Tajik-Afghan border as well as for constructing a Russian military base in southern Kyrgyzstan. Joint military exercises involving Russian, Tajik, and Kyrgyz troops should also be conducted regularly. To ensure more effective cooperation in this sphere, Russia should help rearm the Kyrgyz and Tajik armies and upgrade the skills of their military personnel, primarily their officer corps.
A diplomatic component should reinforce the military one at the Russian army bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The commanders of Russian contingents there should have political advisers who are in constant communication with the leadership of the host countries.
Russia should also seek to optimize the CSTO’s functions and tasks. The organization’s political component must be strengthened, and closer ties between member states’ national security councils, intelligence agencies, and law-enforcement communities should be fostered. There should also be attempts to develop closer contacts between the political elites of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Creating a CSTO academy in Kazakhstan to prepare a cadre of regional security specialists would help strengthen the organization, especially if this institution offered courses to top military and law-enforcement commanders, political leaders, and high-ranking officials from member countries.
The CSTO’s Collective Rapid Reaction Force, an armed task force comprised of members from all CSTO states, is intended to be employed in emergency situations. The collective force should be engaged not only in counterterrorism but also in counterinsurgency and counternarcotic operations.
Two of the five Central Asian states—Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan—are not CSTO members. Moscow needs to intensify bilateral contacts with Tashkent and Ashkhabad to alleviate their possible fears regarding Russia’s policy in the region. Moscow should pay particular attention to the development of its contacts with Uzbekistan, the most populated and centrally located country in the region.
To address the problems of drug production and trafficking, Moscow should work with Central Asian countries to increase the efficiency of Russia’s Federal Drug Control Service. With the consent of Russia’s allies and in cooperation with them, this organization should be allowed to operate beyond Russia’s borders in Central Asian countries. This expanded reach will enable it to better stem the flow of drugs and detect and destroy drug-producing facilities.
In addition, enhancing regional migration policy and its instruments will be key to ensuring Russia’s security in a post-withdrawal Afghanistan. Visa-free travel, already in place between the Customs Union members and the members of the future Eurasian Economic Union, ought to continue. At the same time, Russia’s Federal Migration Service must maintain close contacts with its Central Asian counterparts to closely monitor migration flows from other countries in the region in order to prevent drug smuggling and keep extremists and terrorists out.
India and China
Russia would also benefit from consulting and possibly cooperating with great Asian powers namely China and India on the issues involving Afghanistan. New Delhi and especially Beijing are starting to play a substantially greater role in South and Central Asia.
India’s presence in Afghanistan is not merely part of a regional geopolitical strategy vis-à-vis its rivals, Pakistan and China. It is also an important example of New Delhi’s attempts to assert itself as a great Asian power. If the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) emerges victorious in India’s general elections this year—an outcome many see as probable the BJP will likely strengthen India’s resolve to play a greater international role.
New Delhi and Moscow are strategic partners, and India helps maintain a continental global balance of power that Russia considers favorable. Cooperation with India—including on matters related to Afghanistan, such as increasing regional stabilization, combatting terrorism, and curbing the drug trade—is therefore valuable to Russia.
For India, given its traditional rivalries with Pakistan and China as well as the decreasing American activity and presence in Afghanistan, Russia, together with Iran, is one of few serious partners. At the same time, some of New Delhi’s specific interests and aspirations in Afghanistan diverge from Moscow’s interests, largely because of India’s competition with Pakistan and China.
For its part, China looks at Afghanistan through an economic lens as well as in terms of Beijing’s security interests and its broader geopolitical concerns in Central and South Asia. Chinese state-run companies actively invest in tapping Afghanistan’s (and Central Asia’s) natural resources.
Pakistan is China’s long-standing and close partner, and India is its historical rival. From Beijing’s standpoint and in light of its special relations with Islamabad, the Taliban is a political movement that can and must be negotiated with despite its possible ties with Uyghur Islamist separatists in China and the region. As a result, while maintaining economic interests in Afghanistan, China distances itself from active political involvement in the country’s affairs, demonstrating its willingness to cooperate with any regime in Kabul.
For Russia, China is an important global and regional partner. This is true in a number of areas, including on issues related to Afghanistan.
To maximize its consultations and cooperation with India and China, Russia should improve bilateral ties with these countries. At the same time, Moscow should use multilateral platforms to reach out to New Delhi and Beijing. These platforms—such as the SCO; a quadrilateral grouping of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, and Tajikistan referred to as “the Four”; and RIC (Russia-India-China)—could serve as forums for exchanging ideas and preparing for negotiations.
The United States and NATO
In the short and medium term, the degree of U.S. participation in Afghan affairs will depend on whether Washington signs an agreement with Kabul on continued American troop presence in the country. But even if the troop departure from Afghanistan is complete, the United States, as a global power, will remain concerned with everything that happens around the world, including in Afghanistan.
That said, the major motivation behind American presence and interest in Afghanistan—preventing the creation of terrorist bases in the country—is substantially less relevant now than it was when the U.S. invasion began in 2001. Afghanistan has stopped being a central problem for U.S. foreign and military policies and is quickly becoming peripheral. Of course, it will continue to be of some interest to the United States—for instance, as a drone and air force base in the context of Washington’s policies on China, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asian countries, but this interest will be limited.
Due to a radical deterioration of U.S.-Russia relations that has taken place since the start of 2014 and the scheduled withdrawal of U.S. combat troops, there are few prospects for cooperation between Moscow and Washington on issues related to Afghanistan—for instance, on combating drug trafficking. Nevertheless, targeted cooperation in areas of mutual interest should not be excluded.
When it comes to working with other NATO countries, Moscow’s options are similarly limited. Not many areas of possible Russian cooperation with NATO members exist, except for the issue of troop and military cargo transit through Russian territory. And as the coalition removes its forces from Afghanistan and Russia’s relations with the West continue to deteriorate, the number of issues on which Moscow and NATO could collaborate will decrease even further. There are, however, some prospects for Russian cooperation with Turkey, which continues to be interested in Afghanistan.
Iran
For Iran, Afghanistan is a linguistically, culturally, and religiously close country. Tehran is interested in having a stable, independent neighbor whose balance of political powers roughly reflects Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious makeup.
Iran is advancing its interests in Afghanistan primarily through trade and investments. It relies on the help of residents of the Afghan province of Herat, who have traditionally had ties with Iran, as well as ethnic Tajiks and Hazaras. Tehran also has a strong interest in stopping Afghan drug trafficking because many smuggling routes pass through Iran.
Tehran has complex ties to other major players in Afghanistan. It welcomes the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan and is developing a partnership with India. It has complicated relations with Pakistan, which, like Iran, aspires to a leadership role in the region and is attempting to be a predominant influence in Afghanistan. And Tehran’s relations with Saudi Arabia are hostile.
Iran and Russia, however, have common interests on a number of important issues, ranging from stabilizing Afghanistan to combatting drug trafficking. Both countries also exert influence on Dushanbe and the Afghan Tajiks, which they demonstrated in 1997 by joining forces to help end the civil war in Tajikistan. Moscow and Tehran can use this influence to play a significant role in the post-American Afghanistan, provided they coordinate their actions.
CONCLUSIONS
Russia should not treat the post-2014 situation in Afghanistan as a potential disaster for its security in the south. An extremist takeover of Afghanistan—and the country’s subsequent turn into a hotbed of international terrorism is not a certainty. Nevertheless, the coalition withdrawal from Afghanistan will force Russia to take more responsibility for regional security.
This heightened responsibility does not mean Russia should be directly involved in Afghan events. Russia should never intervene in infighting in Afghanistan, especially militarily. Its goal should be protecting Russian interests by using diplomatic and other nonviolent means in Afghanistan and in the region.
Moscow should also pursue an active and comprehensive policy in Central Asia the territory where the first Russian line of defense against security threats emanating from Afghanistan lies. Having effective working relations with all significant Afghan elites and with all regional powers is an important condition for the success of Russian policy in Afghanistan. This approach is consistent with a well-known great game principle that advises states not to strive for victory but rather to avoid defeat in Russia’s case, to stay out of any new contest over the “heart of Asia” and focus instead on Moscow’s interests.
