Lankan Ranger
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Russias Middle East Policy: All Tactics, No Strategy
Since the turn of the century, Russia has been ever more active in the Greater Middle East (an area stretching from North Africa to the Indian subcontinent).
Its policy here, however, is radically different from what it was in Soviet times, when Moscow was a key player in the region. That policy is now completely devoid of ideology. The new goals are, in the descending order of priority: commercial gain, stability in the former Soviet republics, and influence on the international arena.
The commercial considerations are quite obvious. Intense international competition means that in many markets Russia is losing out to other nations due to its lack of technological prowess or political clout.
Russian manufacturers (the defense contractors or the atomic industry) find warmer welcome in those countries which, for one reason or another, are at odds with the West.
In the Middle East than means primarily Iran and Syria. Libya used to be in the same group until about five years ago.
The approach has obvious limitations: if a nation falls out with the West, it either becomes victim of political or economic pressure, including sanctions or sells out its loyalties, as was the case with Tripoli.
Moscow has always walked a fine line here, trying to protect its trade without straying beyond the boundaries of international law (i.e. not breaking any sanctions), or allowing its Middle Eastern dealings to sour relations with the West too much. Of course, Russia is trying to expand its presence in the region beyond the problem nations.
It is also working to break into new markets either traditional Western turf (the Gulf monarchies) or the former Soviet sphere of influence (the North Africa).
The Russian energy giants, especially Gazprom, are showing great interest in the Middle East. Relations with Turkey, which aspires to become the main energy crossroads in the western part of Central Eurasia, are at an all-time high. Russian officials have aired a number of ideas on supplying gas to Israel, Syria and Lebanon.
Another proposal mooted several years ago was to team up with Nigeria and build a pipeline to the Mediterranean coast. So far, however, all these plans remain firmly in the realm of the hypothetical, and look more like an attempt to put some pressure on Russias European clients and remind them of the role of Gazprom.
Stability in the former Soviet republics remains another priority of Russias foreign policy and events in the Greater Middle East impinge on that stability very directly.
First, this part of the world (which includes Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) is a source of the radical Islamist threat. Russia has already confronted that threat in the Caucasus, and could well be dragged into a new clash with radical Islam in Central Asia, where Moscows allies will count on its support in the event of a crisis.
It would hardly be realistic to expect full cooperation from the Middle Eastern governments on this issue. Each of those governments is itself walking on thin ice, constrained by numerous political and religious factors. But pragmatic cooperation is necessary, to try at least to minimize the risks, if not avert them altogether.
Second, nations such as Turkey and Iran have a role to play in at least two regions of the former Soviet Union the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Both territories are part of Russias sphere of vital interests. The way in which Ankara and Tehran will choose to exercise their influence in those territories greatly depends on the nature of their relations with Moscow.
Both are potentially capable of wreaking havoc on Russias plans in the region, which is why Moscow must try to keep rivalry with the two capitals to a minimum. Relations with Turkey are now on the ascendant. Not so with Iran, for reasons whose origins lie outside the region.
But recent history does hold some positive examples of Moscows cooperation with Tehran in the former Soviet territories, including the settlement of the Tajik conflict and Irans decision to desist from supporting separatism in the Caucasus.
Third, Russias policy towards many of its neighbors is largely informed by Moscows strategy of maintaining Gazproms hold on its Eurasia markets. Turkey and Iran have a key role to play here Turkey as a leading transit nation and Iran as a potential competitor on the European market.
That is why Moscow is interested in Tehrans continued isolation and if said isolation is eventually broken, Russia can always fall back on the old idea of a Gas OPEC, which includes, apart from Iran, large gas producers such as Algeria and Qatar. Alas, there has been much political talk here, but precious little action.
Finally, as part of its efforts to bolster its international standing, Russia is trying to step up its relations with all the key international players. Moscow is the only capital of the G8 that can sit down at talks with almost every single player in the Middle East with the possible exception of the Taliban, but including Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel, HAMAS, Hezbollah and Iran.
Russia has repeatedly tried to cash in on its unique position to secure a greater say in world affairs but with little success so far, it has to be said. In itself, the ability to engage various players in dialogue does not confer greater sway. From time to time, this ability actually causes some tensions: the other players begin to suspect Russia of double or triple dealing, while expectations of real progress remain unfulfilled.
Russias problem in the Greater Middle East is fairly unique. Moscow has too many interests there and too much leverage to be simply one of several players. And yet this leverage isnt strong enough to shift the course of events or achieve equal standing with America. Moscow continues to play a complex game in the region, with all three of its key priorities in mind - but there priorities can often clash.
Commercial interest sometimes stands in the way of political gains, and vice versa. The need to participate in the global game (on the Iran issue, for example) jeopardizes constructive relations with Tehran on the regional level (in the Caspian and the Caucasus). Nevertheless, for the time being Russia is likely to stick to its tactical course of keeping all its options option, without committing to any definitive strategy.
Moscow Defense Brief
Since the turn of the century, Russia has been ever more active in the Greater Middle East (an area stretching from North Africa to the Indian subcontinent).
Its policy here, however, is radically different from what it was in Soviet times, when Moscow was a key player in the region. That policy is now completely devoid of ideology. The new goals are, in the descending order of priority: commercial gain, stability in the former Soviet republics, and influence on the international arena.
The commercial considerations are quite obvious. Intense international competition means that in many markets Russia is losing out to other nations due to its lack of technological prowess or political clout.
Russian manufacturers (the defense contractors or the atomic industry) find warmer welcome in those countries which, for one reason or another, are at odds with the West.
In the Middle East than means primarily Iran and Syria. Libya used to be in the same group until about five years ago.
The approach has obvious limitations: if a nation falls out with the West, it either becomes victim of political or economic pressure, including sanctions or sells out its loyalties, as was the case with Tripoli.
Moscow has always walked a fine line here, trying to protect its trade without straying beyond the boundaries of international law (i.e. not breaking any sanctions), or allowing its Middle Eastern dealings to sour relations with the West too much. Of course, Russia is trying to expand its presence in the region beyond the problem nations.
It is also working to break into new markets either traditional Western turf (the Gulf monarchies) or the former Soviet sphere of influence (the North Africa).
The Russian energy giants, especially Gazprom, are showing great interest in the Middle East. Relations with Turkey, which aspires to become the main energy crossroads in the western part of Central Eurasia, are at an all-time high. Russian officials have aired a number of ideas on supplying gas to Israel, Syria and Lebanon.
Another proposal mooted several years ago was to team up with Nigeria and build a pipeline to the Mediterranean coast. So far, however, all these plans remain firmly in the realm of the hypothetical, and look more like an attempt to put some pressure on Russias European clients and remind them of the role of Gazprom.
Stability in the former Soviet republics remains another priority of Russias foreign policy and events in the Greater Middle East impinge on that stability very directly.
First, this part of the world (which includes Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) is a source of the radical Islamist threat. Russia has already confronted that threat in the Caucasus, and could well be dragged into a new clash with radical Islam in Central Asia, where Moscows allies will count on its support in the event of a crisis.
It would hardly be realistic to expect full cooperation from the Middle Eastern governments on this issue. Each of those governments is itself walking on thin ice, constrained by numerous political and religious factors. But pragmatic cooperation is necessary, to try at least to minimize the risks, if not avert them altogether.
Second, nations such as Turkey and Iran have a role to play in at least two regions of the former Soviet Union the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Both territories are part of Russias sphere of vital interests. The way in which Ankara and Tehran will choose to exercise their influence in those territories greatly depends on the nature of their relations with Moscow.
Both are potentially capable of wreaking havoc on Russias plans in the region, which is why Moscow must try to keep rivalry with the two capitals to a minimum. Relations with Turkey are now on the ascendant. Not so with Iran, for reasons whose origins lie outside the region.
But recent history does hold some positive examples of Moscows cooperation with Tehran in the former Soviet territories, including the settlement of the Tajik conflict and Irans decision to desist from supporting separatism in the Caucasus.
Third, Russias policy towards many of its neighbors is largely informed by Moscows strategy of maintaining Gazproms hold on its Eurasia markets. Turkey and Iran have a key role to play here Turkey as a leading transit nation and Iran as a potential competitor on the European market.
That is why Moscow is interested in Tehrans continued isolation and if said isolation is eventually broken, Russia can always fall back on the old idea of a Gas OPEC, which includes, apart from Iran, large gas producers such as Algeria and Qatar. Alas, there has been much political talk here, but precious little action.
Finally, as part of its efforts to bolster its international standing, Russia is trying to step up its relations with all the key international players. Moscow is the only capital of the G8 that can sit down at talks with almost every single player in the Middle East with the possible exception of the Taliban, but including Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel, HAMAS, Hezbollah and Iran.
Russia has repeatedly tried to cash in on its unique position to secure a greater say in world affairs but with little success so far, it has to be said. In itself, the ability to engage various players in dialogue does not confer greater sway. From time to time, this ability actually causes some tensions: the other players begin to suspect Russia of double or triple dealing, while expectations of real progress remain unfulfilled.
Russias problem in the Greater Middle East is fairly unique. Moscow has too many interests there and too much leverage to be simply one of several players. And yet this leverage isnt strong enough to shift the course of events or achieve equal standing with America. Moscow continues to play a complex game in the region, with all three of its key priorities in mind - but there priorities can often clash.
Commercial interest sometimes stands in the way of political gains, and vice versa. The need to participate in the global game (on the Iran issue, for example) jeopardizes constructive relations with Tehran on the regional level (in the Caspian and the Caucasus). Nevertheless, for the time being Russia is likely to stick to its tactical course of keeping all its options option, without committing to any definitive strategy.
Moscow Defense Brief
