Replay in Afghanistan

[zimmick]

Do not be fooled by the thaw in relations between the United States and Pakistan. The breach is deep and, unlike past troughs in the bilateral relationship, this time it extends to mutual antipathy at a popular level. Also, an entire generation of military officers from both countries now sees the other as the enemy. It will take a lot of time, statesmanship and luck to restore ties to what they were even on September 10, 2001. If Washington has yielded to Pakistan’s demands for an apology for US troops killing Pakistani soldiers at Salala last year, it is only to ease the conditions for the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan.

Barack Obama has executed a very smart policy change — he has effectively dehyphenated ******* by extricating the US from the long-running Afghan civil war and focusing Washington’s attention on Pakistan. The US will put in a genuine effort to mitigate the risk of a Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, but will essentially leave Afghans to fight out their own affairs. It will, instead, maintain a security presence in the region, tasked with keeping military pressure on jihadi militants who pose a threat to its own security.

What does that imply?
First, as far as Washington is concerned, not just Hamid Karzai but even the post-2002 Afghan state is dispensable. If the Afghan state cannot secure itself against Taliban revolutionaries or other factions that seek to destroy it, Washington will not be concerned beyond a point. This message, as we will see, has (predictable) consequences.

Second, although the US will withdraw its troops in 2014, it is not in a form that the Pakistani military-jihadi complex expected. Pakistani generals had long assumed that US withdrawal from Afghanistan automatically implied that they could take over the place the next day through a combination of Mullah Omar, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Haqqanis. They had also assumed that they held the cards because international forces depended on their goodwill to make a face-saving exit. President Obama has delivered the Pakistani generals a nasty surprise — the residual US presence on the Afghan side of the Durand Line and drone strikes on Pakistani soil will calibrate how much Pakistan can influence the security and stability of Afghanistan.

Third, as a consequence of Washington extricating itself from Afghanistan, we are bound to see political factions emerge around tribal and ethnic lines, fighting and allying among themselves and seeking external support. This process will strengthen if the Taliban were to either take or share power.

Let’s not forget that the mujahideen separated into factions after the Soviets left in 1989 and fought each other. Let’s also not forget that there was no “Northern Alliance” before the Taliban became a dominant political force. So just because there isn’t visible opposition to the Taliban today, it doesn’t follow that there won’t be one if they came to power. Just because Messrs Omar, Hekmatyar and Haqqani are Pakistan’s proxies today, it doesn’t follow that they won’t reach for each other’s throats tomorrow. Of course this means “civil war”, if only because the Afghan civil war has been ongoing for a couple of decades now.

Fourth, if and when the “civil war” does take place, the US will become the swing power between the China-Pakistan-Saudi and the India-Russia-Iran alignments. It has so far been engaged in the self-weakening business of preventing India, Russia and Iran from cooperating over Afghanistan. Washington will have to decide which side it intends to back.

The smart thing for it to do would be to back regional powers selectively, while retaining for itself the power and influence that come from its role as the balancer. For this, though, it will need to have better relations with each of these alignments than they have with each other. Therefore, its ability to swing will depend on whether it can get over its Iran dogma and work out a modus vivendi, at least in Afghanistan.

Fifth, if Pakistan need not keep appearances of being an ally in the war on terror, the military establishment might well prefer to install a regime that is to its liking. To the extent that the Pakistani army’s needs for an “acceptable civilian face” to extract money from the US are diminished, Imran Khan’s – and Hafiz Saeed’s – political fortunes are set to improve.

Finally, India will need to remain open to support political factions in Afghanistan that might seek New Delhi’s assistance, even while robustly backing the legitimate leadership of the Afghan state.

The most important risk to India’s national security comes from the spillover of veteran Afghan militants. In the early 1990s, Pakistan solved two problems at one go by diverting the surplus militant manpower to Jammu & Kashmir. Given that it has been unable to even begin addressing the problem of de-radicalising its militant manpower base, its leaders – both military and civilian – will be tempted to do the same now. The longer these militants have reason to fight in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, the better it is for India. This should be one of New Delhi’s policy goals.

It’s time to dust off histories of Afghanistan in the 1990s.

Nitin Pai: Replay in Afghanistan

 

[Fracker]

Most of this article is based on self assumptions not the truth. i.e. Pakistan want presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan is supporting Mullah Omar and Haqqanis, Afghani people are tribes and if Taliban will not share the power then they will go against taliban. All of these are far from the truth.

What you can expect from a biased article where the author didn't even car to mention TTP factor, and support for TTP. Which is right now Pakistan's main concern. and a threat to Pakistan's security rather then caring to deploy dummy government in Afghanistan and care more mess on their head.

Pakistani presence will only be cared when Pakistan will start feeling threaten from Indian Presence in Afghanistan

 

[RazorMC]

This genius thinks he's the only one who knows that the US wants to maintain some sort of presence even after 2014.

And what was he thinking putting six countries into 2 self-made groups?
Each has its own interests and priorities.

 

[Loy Afghanistan]

Most of this article is based on self assumptions not the truth. i.e. Pakistan want presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan is supporting Mullah Omar and Haqqanis, Afghani people are tribes and if Taliban will not share the power then they will go against taliban. All of these are far from the truth.

Precisely where do you think you are going with this and whom do you think you are fooling here? I for one knew that Jallaludin Haqqani was a down and out ISI agent well before Mike Mullen openly described him as the "veritable arm of the ISI". There's no way in hell that either he or his son will have a place in Afghanistan, rest assured. These puppets will end up in the same pages of Afghan history as the likes of Babrak Karmal, Nur Mohammad Taraki, and Shah Shuja Ul Mulk.

What you can expect from a biased article where the author didn't even car to mention TTP factor, and support for TTP. Which is right now Pakistan's main concern. and a threat to Pakistan's security rather then caring to deploy dummy government in Afghanistan and care more mess on their head.

Why don't you people ever engage in a serious dialogue about those who've benefited the most from the TTP? Have you ever considered the possibility that you might be living in denial?

Pakistani presence will only be cared when Pakistan will start feeling threaten from Indian Presence in Afghanistan

I guess you'll just have to learn to live with the consequences of feeling "threatened" by an Indian ally that like the Americans have been helping Afghanistan re-assert herself. They have their interests and we've our own interests, although there's no denying that our shared interests have been converging as one in the region. We are no less cognizant of this as are our sworn enemies.

 

[Developereo]

Why don't you people ever engage in a serious dialogue about those who've benefited the most from the TTP?

The pro-India, anti-Pakistan, crowd in Afghanistan.

I guess you'll just have to learn to live with the consequences of feeling "threatened" by an Indian ally that like the Americans have been helping Afghanistan re-assert herself. They have their interests and we've our own interests, although there's no denying that our shared interests have been converging as one in the region. We are no less cognizant of this as are our sworn enemies.

We know full well that there is a segment of Afghan population that is pro-India and anti-Pakistan. That has always been the case. However, you guys are not representative of Afghanistan and will NOT dictate that country's policies. The simple fact is that, after you guys lost to the Taliban, you needed the US to invade and help prop up your faction into government. And, without continued US military presence, your influence and agenda will wither away from the Afghan landscape.

You are the unpatriotic fifth column in Afghanistan that works with, and supports, foreign invaders in your country.

 

[Loy Afghanistan]

The pro-India, anti-Pakistan, crowd in Afghanistan.

We know full well that there is a segment of Afghan population that is pro-India and anti-Pakistan.

Sure...and that "segment" would have to be just about every Afghan under the sun, besides Pakistan's murderous proxies that is. How about you try and be real men for once and rather than rely on assassins and terrorists, enter Afghanistan in full military regalia to find out for sure....go on....come on in and find out about the length and breadth of this "segment" you are referring to, I dare you.

 

[Fracker]

Precisely where do you think you are going with this and whom do you think you are fooling here? I for one knew that Jallaludin Haqqani was a down and out ISI agent well before Mike Mullen openly described him as the "veritable arm of the ISI". There's no way in hell that either he or his son will have a place in Afghanistan, rest assured. These puppets will end up in the same pages of Afghan history as the likes of Babrak Karmal, Nur Mohammad Taraki, and Shah Shuja Ul Mulk.

Afghanistan history is like that, So may be you are right about the fate of Jallaludin Haqqani. But there is still no proof other then words alone on these types of things. And what you expect from dual mentality players like Mullan. Who sometimes get scared that Pakistani Nuclear mission can go into the hands of Taliban a.k.a extremists and on the other hand they describe Jallaludin, Mullah Umar being guests of ISI. And you still believe the loosers who has left complete provinces for the extremists? Yunkies will say what ever suites them whether true or not true...

Why don't you people ever engage in a serious dialogue about those who've benefited the most from the TTP? Have you ever considered the possibility that you might be living in denial?

I don't see any confusion who are gaining from TTP. And this is showing who is in denial.

I guess you'll just have to learn to live with the consequences of feeling "threatened" by an Indian ally that like the Americans have been helping Afghanistan re-assert herself. They have their interests and we've our own interests, although there's no denying that our shared interests have been converging as one in the region. We are no less cognizant of this as are our sworn enemies.

It is natural when your biggest enemy start helping your other side of the boarder and you started get attacks from sophisticated weapons. Suddenly form no where a FM Mullah appears and take over complete region and when He has been kicked out of Pakistan he gets save heaven in Afghanistan.

btw i don't know who you are fooling? Yourself Alone!! Here the only benefiting country is India & US. Afghanistan was loosing and is loosing here alone.

 

[clmeta]

If everything is true then why did you resume the NATO supply line?
Don't blame civilians alone. It had the approval stamp of the army.

Afghanistan history is like that, So may be you are right about the fate of Jallaludin Haqqani. But there is still no proof other then words alone on these types of things. And what you expect from dual mentality players like Mullan. Who sometimes get scared that Pakistani Nuclear mission can go into the hands of Taliban a.k.a extremists and on the other hand they describe Jallaludin, Mullah Umar being guests of ISI. And you still believe the loosers who has left complete provinces for the extremists? Yunkies will say what ever suites them whether true or not true...





I don't see any confusion who are gaining from TTP. And this is showing who is in denial.





It is natural when your biggest enemy start helping your other side of the boarder and you started get attacks from sophisticated weapons. Suddenly form no where a FM Mullah appears and take over complete region and when He has been kicked out of Pakistan he gets save heaven in Afghanistan.

btw i don't know who you are fooling? Yourself Alone!! Here the only benefiting country is India & US. Afghanistan was loosing and is loosing here alone.

 

[Fracker]

If everything is true then why did you resume the NATO supply line?
Don't blame civilians alone. It had the approval stamp of the army.

Approval stamp? Really where? Yes our Establishment also care more for dollars but here The only stamps I have seen was from civilian side only.. Check whole episode, rather then only the highlights ...

 

[niaz]

Do not be fooled by the thaw in relations between the United States and Pakistan. The breach is deep and, unlike past troughs in the bilateral relationship, this time it extends to mutual antipathy at a popular level. Also, an entire generation of military officers from both countries now sees the other as the enemy. It will take a lot of time, statesmanship and luck to restore ties to what they were even on September 10, 2001. If Washington has yielded to Pakistan’s demands for an apology for US troops killing Pakistani soldiers at Salala last year, it is only to ease the conditions for the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan.

Barack Obama has executed a very smart policy change — he has effectively dehyphenated ******* by extricating the US from the long-running Afghan civil war and focusing Washington’s attention on Pakistan. The US will put in a genuine effort to mitigate the risk of a Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, but will essentially leave Afghans to fight out their own affairs. It will, instead, maintain a security presence in the region, tasked with keeping military pressure on jihadi militants who pose a threat to its own security.

What does that imply?
First, as far as Washington is concerned, not just Hamid Karzai but even the post-2002 Afghan state is dispensable. If the Afghan state cannot secure itself against Taliban revolutionaries or other factions that seek to destroy it, Washington will not be concerned beyond a point. This message, as we will see, has (predictable) consequences.

Second, although the US will withdraw its troops in 2014, it is not in a form that the Pakistani military-jihadi complex expected. Pakistani generals had long assumed that US withdrawal from Afghanistan automatically implied that they could take over the place the next day through a combination of Mullah Omar, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Haqqanis. They had also assumed that they held the cards because international forces depended on their goodwill to make a face-saving exit. President Obama has delivered the Pakistani generals a nasty surprise — the residual US presence on the Afghan side of the Durand Line and drone strikes on Pakistani soil will calibrate how much Pakistan can influence the security and stability of Afghanistan.

Third, as a consequence of Washington extricating itself from Afghanistan, we are bound to see political factions emerge around tribal and ethnic lines, fighting and allying among themselves and seeking external support. This process will strengthen if the Taliban were to either take or share power.

Let’s not forget that the mujahideen separated into factions after the Soviets left in 1989 and fought each other. Let’s also not forget that there was no “Northern Alliance” before the Taliban became a dominant political force. So just because there isn’t visible opposition to the Taliban today, it doesn’t follow that there won’t be one if they came to power. Just because Messrs Omar, Hekmatyar and Haqqani are Pakistan’s proxies today, it doesn’t follow that they won’t reach for each other’s throats tomorrow. Of course this means “civil war”, if only because the Afghan civil war has been ongoing for a couple of decades now.

Fourth, if and when the “civil war” does take place, the US will become the swing power between the China-Pakistan-Saudi and the India-Russia-Iran alignments. It has so far been engaged in the self-weakening business of preventing India, Russia and Iran from cooperating over Afghanistan. Washington will have to decide which side it intends to back.

The smart thing for it to do would be to back regional powers selectively, while retaining for itself the power and influence that come from its role as the balancer. For this, though, it will need to have better relations with each of these alignments than they have with each other. Therefore, its ability to swing will depend on whether it can get over its Iran dogma and work out a modus vivendi, at least in Afghanistan.

Fifth, if Pakistan need not keep appearances of being an ally in the war on terror, the military establishment might well prefer to install a regime that is to its liking. To the extent that the Pakistani army’s needs for an “acceptable civilian face” to extract money from the US are diminished, Imran Khan’s – and Hafiz Saeed’s – political fortunes are set to improve.

Finally, India will need to remain open to support political factions in Afghanistan that might seek New Delhi’s assistance, even while robustly backing the legitimate leadership of the Afghan state.

The most important risk to India’s national security comes from the spillover of veteran Afghan militants. In the early 1990s, Pakistan solved two problems at one go by diverting the surplus militant manpower to Jammu & Kashmir. Given that it has been unable to even begin addressing the problem of de-radicalising its militant manpower base, its leaders – both military and civilian – will be tempted to do the same now. The longer these militants have reason to fight in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, the better it is for India. This should be one of New Delhi’s policy goals.

It’s time to dust off histories of Afghanistan in the 1990s.

Nitin Pai: Replay in Afghanistan

The article in question is without doubt written with serious thought and well-chosen semantics.

However there are a lot of assumptions based on of wishful thinking on the writer’s part. Obama assuring Hamid Karzai that US will not totally abandon Afghanistan has a ring of ‘Deja vu’ about it. When thousands of US forces failed to ensure security in Afghanistan, what can be achieved by maintaining security presence?

Pakistan was granted the non NATO ally status, what good did it do? Let us face it; partnership, alliance etc. are just words. In realpolitik, pacts and alliances only have a meaning if these are among equals or near equals. This certainly is not the case between USA & Afghanistan.

If Hamid Karzai & Indians read something into it and start jumping with joy, let them have their dreams. As a Pakistani, I wouldn’t lose much sleep over it.

 

[Developereo]

Sure...and that "segment" would have to be just about every Afghan under the sun, besides Pakistan's murderous proxies that is. How about you try and be real men for once and rather than rely on assassins and terrorists, enter Afghanistan in full military regalia to find out for sure....go on....come on in and find out about the length and breadth of this "segment" you are referring to, I dare you.

We KNOW how much of the real Afghanistan you represent. That's why you desperately depend on American troops to impose your agenda onto the rest of Afghanistan. In return for their "protection", you offer them bases in a geostrategic location. The silent majority in Afghanistan knows exactly what you are selling.

Pakistanis don't need to come into Afghanistan. Patriotic Afghans will eagerly take care of you once your foreign invader protectors leave.

 

[Pakistanisage]

Do not be fooled by the thaw in relations between the United States and Pakistan. The breach is deep and, unlike past troughs in the bilateral relationship, this time it extends to mutual antipathy at a popular level. Also, an entire generation of military officers from both countries now sees the other as the enemy. It will take a lot of time, statesmanship and luck to restore ties to what they were even on September 10, 2001. If Washington has yielded to Pakistan’s demands for an apology for US troops killing Pakistani soldiers at Salala last year, it is only to ease the conditions for the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan.

Barack Obama has executed a very smart policy change — he has effectively dehyphenated ******* by extricating the US from the long-running Afghan civil war and focusing Washington’s attention on Pakistan. The US will put in a genuine effort to mitigate the risk of a Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, but will essentially leave Afghans to fight out their own affairs. It will, instead, maintain a security presence in the region, tasked with keeping military pressure on jihadi militants who pose a threat to its own security.

What does that imply?
First, as far as Washington is concerned, not just Hamid Karzai but even the post-2002 Afghan state is dispensable. If the Afghan state cannot secure itself against Taliban revolutionaries or other factions that seek to destroy it, Washington will not be concerned beyond a point. This message, as we will see, has (predictable) consequences.

Second, although the US will withdraw its troops in 2014, it is not in a form that the Pakistani military-jihadi complex expected. Pakistani generals had long assumed that US withdrawal from Afghanistan automatically implied that they could take over the place the next day through a combination of Mullah Omar, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Haqqanis. They had also assumed that they held the cards because international forces depended on their goodwill to make a face-saving exit. President Obama has delivered the Pakistani generals a nasty surprise — the residual US presence on the Afghan side of the Durand Line and drone strikes on Pakistani soil will calibrate how much Pakistan can influence the security and stability of Afghanistan.

Third, as a consequence of Washington extricating itself from Afghanistan, we are bound to see political factions emerge around tribal and ethnic lines, fighting and allying among themselves and seeking external support. This process will strengthen if the Taliban were to either take or share power.

Let’s not forget that the mujahideen separated into factions after the Soviets left in 1989 and fought each other. Let’s also not forget that there was no “Northern Alliance” before the Taliban became a dominant political force. So just because there isn’t visible opposition to the Taliban today, it doesn’t follow that there won’t be one if they came to power. Just because Messrs Omar, Hekmatyar and Haqqani are Pakistan’s proxies today, it doesn’t follow that they won’t reach for each other’s throats tomorrow. Of course this means “civil war”, if only because the Afghan civil war has been ongoing for a couple of decades now.

Fourth, if and when the “civil war” does take place, the US will become the swing power between the China-Pakistan-Saudi and the India-Russia-Iran alignments. It has so far been engaged in the self-weakening business of preventing India, Russia and Iran from cooperating over Afghanistan. Washington will have to decide which side it intends to back.

The smart thing for it to do would be to back regional powers selectively, while retaining for itself the power and influence that come from its role as the balancer. For this, though, it will need to have better relations with each of these alignments than they have with each other. Therefore, its ability to swing will depend on whether it can get over its Iran dogma and work out a modus vivendi, at least in Afghanistan.

Fifth, if Pakistan need not keep appearances of being an ally in the war on terror, the military establishment might well prefer to install a regime that is to its liking. To the extent that the Pakistani army’s needs for an “acceptable civilian face” to extract money from the US are diminished, Imran Khan’s – and Hafiz Saeed’s – political fortunes are set to improve.Finally, India will need to remain open to support political factions in Afghanistan that might seek New Delhi’s assistance, even while robustly backing the legitimate leadership of the Afghan state.

The most important risk to India’s national security comes from the spillover of veteran Afghan militants. In the early 1990s, Pakistan solved two problems at one go by diverting the surplus militant manpower to Jammu & Kashmir. Given that it has been unable to even begin addressing the problem of de-radicalising its militant manpower base, its leaders – both military and civilian – will be tempted to do the same now. The longer these militants have reason to fight in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, the better it is for India. This should be one of New Delhi’s policy goals.

It’s time to dust off histories of Afghanistan in the 1990s.

Nitin Pai: Replay in Afghanistan

Hafiz Saeed's Political fortunes ?

Whatever this author is smoking is making him crazy.

No one in Pakistan considers Hafiz Saeed a Politician.

 

[MilSpec]

We KNOW how much of the real Afghanistan you represent. That's why you desperately depend on American troops to impose your agenda onto the rest of Afghanistan. In return for their "protection", you offer them bases in a geostrategic location. The silent majority in Afghanistan knows exactly what you are selling.

Pakistanis don't need to come into Afghanistan. Patriotic Afghans will eagerly take care of you once your foreign invader protectors leave.

for heavens sake leave your taliban fascination

 

[Saleem]

waste of badnwidth just bharati propaganda (bug ganda here] nonsense.....

 

[Developereo]

for heavens sake leave your taliban fascination

It's about Pakhtun majority, not Taliban. The current set up does NOT reflect the majority of Afghans.