Analysis by Najmuddin A Shaikh
Peace in Afghanistan remains a distant dream and Pakistan must frame its policies so that it can, to the extent possible, insulate itself from an unstable Afghanistans pernicious influence
Polls taken immediately after the second US presidential debate on Tuesday showed that Barack Obama had consolidated his lead. This was partly attributable to Obamas performance, which was impressive, but largely to the fact that despite the passage of the economic rescue package, it seems that confidence has not been restored, and the economic situation is expected to deteriorate further before it improves.
This legacy of the Bush era works to the advantage of the Democrats not only in the presidential election but also in the congressional elections. A Democratic White House and a Democrat-dominated Congress are likely to emerge after the November elections.
What will this mean for American policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan?
A full thirty minutes of the second Presidential debate were devoted to international affairs, and of this time about twenty minutes were spent on Pakistan and Afghanistan. Obama sounded convincing when, even while reiterating his previous stance that he would take out Osama bin Laden unilaterally if Pakistan was unable or unwilling to do so, he outlined his policy towards Pakistan as being supportive of democracy and with increased non-military assistance so that the Pakistanis would be more willing to cooperate with the US. He promised to make more troops available to the commanders in Afghanistan, tying it to the drawdown of forces in Iraq.
Defence Secretary Robert Gates has termed as defeatist the assessment of the senior British commander in Afghanistan, who believes that the modified objective in Afghanistan should be to reduce the level of fighting to a low level insurgency that Afghan security forces can handle.
Gates, however, agreed that a resolution of the conflict would need talks with the Taliban: Part of the solution is reconciliation with people who are willing to work with the Afghan government. (The State Department says the Afghan governments condition is renunciation of violence and adherence to the constitution.) This is a position that has been endorsed by ISAF spokespersons and by the UN representative, who has said, We all know that we cannot win it militarily. It has to be won through political means. That means political engagement.
There has been a detailed report in the American media about talks under Saudi auspices between representatives of the Karzai administration and the Taliban and Hekmatyar forces. These reports have been denied by the Taliban, with Mullah Zaeef stating that while there were Afghans from these factions present at an Iftar hosted by King Abdullah, there had been no negotiations. Something, however, is happening. Australian press reports suggest former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is using his contacts with the Saudi monarchy and the Afghan Mujahideen to promote such talks.
What has prompted all this renewed talk of reconciliation?
The situation in Afghanistan has of course deteriorated. Unconfirmed press reports suggest that a new intelligence estimate prepared by the Directorate of National Intelligence paints a grim picture. For obvious reasons, the report is not likely to be released until after the US elections, but what it contains can be gleaned from facts on the ground and testimonies of senior military officers.
Admiral Mullen, Chairman US Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a congressional hearing that absent a broader international and interagency approach to the problems there, it is my professional opinion that no amount of troops in no amount of time can ever achieve all the objectives we seek in Afghanistan.
In Helmand province, the British commander maintains that they have taken the sting out of the Taliban for 2008. But Gulab Mangal, the governor of Helmand, says that the Taliban control more than half the province despite increased presence of British forces. In June, this British commander had spoken of having reached the tipping point and of having decapitated the Taliban leadership. Today he says a military victory is not possible.
Roads leading out of Kabul considered safe six months ago are now controlled by the Taliban. Afghan legislators from Ghazni, a province next to Kabul, have told reporters that they no longer dare to visit their homes, while residents of Wardak, the next province, actively discourage visitors from Kabul because of the danger of Taliban attacks on the highway. From interviews, American reporters have come to the conclusion that the Pashtuns see Karzai as a traitor ruling with the assistance of foreign troops and rival ethnic groups.
Casualty figures are rising dramatically. According to a UN report, 1445 civilians had been killed in the first eight months of 2008, a 40 percent increase from the same period in 2007. More than half of those killed died at the hands of the insurgents, but 577 have been killed by coalition forces some two-thirds by air strikes.
The Taliban today are stronger force than ever before. They, according to one knowledgeable American correspondent, are a larger, better armed and more confident militia, capable of mounting sustained military assaults. Their forces operate in virtually every province and control many districts in areas ringing the capital. They have changed tactics and no longer punish people for owning CDs or cassettes. Unlike the past, the new Taliban structure has councils for each area of governance, appoints officials in controlled areas and confers swift justice for crimes and disputes.
Also, their propaganda machine is much more effective than anything that NATO forces have been able to muster. They are well financed, though the amount they receive from opium-related activities is far less than the $100 million that is currently being bruited about. Clearly there is external financing.
On the other hand, the quality of governance provided by the Karzai administration has gone from bad to worse. Karzais brother has been named in a detailed New York Times article as a major drug dealer and his subsequent denials have not been convincing. In Helmand and Kandahar, Karzai appears to remain beholden to warlords who undermine efforts to provide good governance and development.
Overall, it is the corruption of the government and its failure to provide even the most elementary of civic services that has contributed to the Taliban resurgence. Assistance from the Taliban across the Pak-Afghan border has contributed a great deal to the destabilisation of Pakistan, but has been a relatively minor factor in the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan.
Support for this view comes from the new commander of American forces in East Afghanistan who acknowledged that much of the increase in violence in that area was attributable to Taliban fighters who had remained in Kunar last winter and intensified operations without crossing the border.
Grim the situation may be, but there should be no doubt that the Americans will stay. In retreating from Vietnam, they had only to contend with the dubious domino theory. In Afghanistan they perceive a very real and imminent threat. The Pentagon is awarding contracts for mine clearance, for building roads around the perimeter of Bagram air base and for other long-term activities. A contract has already been awarded for the building of a $50 million prison for high security prisoners at Bagram.
The exit strategy now being talked about is the building up of the Afghan army. They appear determined to find the money (estimated at $20 billion) themselves or through their allies over the next five years to bring the Afghan army to a strength of 134,000. There is no way that the Afghan economy can support an army of that size and the Americans would have to continue to finance and maintain that army.
More importantly, there are reports that more than 70 percent of the officer corps is drawn from the Tajiks and that recruitment in the Pashtun areas, possibly because of Taliban intimidation, remains very low. If a Tajik-dominated army comes into being, it will provide fuel for a further ethnic conflict and make even token stability more difficult to achieve.
On a positive note, discerning Taliban may well recognise that they cannot win; the Americans are determined to stay until some measure of peace and stability is achieved; Pakistanis, worried about themselves, are going to do whatever is needed to rid themselves of the Taliban; and much criminal activity is now being disguised as Taliban-directed efforts to rid the country of foreigners. They may well want to talk.
But for the moment, peace in Afghanistan remains a distant dream and Pakistan must frame its policies so that it can, to the extent possible, insulate itself from an unstable Afghanistans pernicious influence.
The writer is a former foreign secretary
Peace in Afghanistan remains a distant dream and Pakistan must frame its policies so that it can, to the extent possible, insulate itself from an unstable Afghanistans pernicious influence
Polls taken immediately after the second US presidential debate on Tuesday showed that Barack Obama had consolidated his lead. This was partly attributable to Obamas performance, which was impressive, but largely to the fact that despite the passage of the economic rescue package, it seems that confidence has not been restored, and the economic situation is expected to deteriorate further before it improves.
This legacy of the Bush era works to the advantage of the Democrats not only in the presidential election but also in the congressional elections. A Democratic White House and a Democrat-dominated Congress are likely to emerge after the November elections.
What will this mean for American policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan?
A full thirty minutes of the second Presidential debate were devoted to international affairs, and of this time about twenty minutes were spent on Pakistan and Afghanistan. Obama sounded convincing when, even while reiterating his previous stance that he would take out Osama bin Laden unilaterally if Pakistan was unable or unwilling to do so, he outlined his policy towards Pakistan as being supportive of democracy and with increased non-military assistance so that the Pakistanis would be more willing to cooperate with the US. He promised to make more troops available to the commanders in Afghanistan, tying it to the drawdown of forces in Iraq.
Defence Secretary Robert Gates has termed as defeatist the assessment of the senior British commander in Afghanistan, who believes that the modified objective in Afghanistan should be to reduce the level of fighting to a low level insurgency that Afghan security forces can handle.
Gates, however, agreed that a resolution of the conflict would need talks with the Taliban: Part of the solution is reconciliation with people who are willing to work with the Afghan government. (The State Department says the Afghan governments condition is renunciation of violence and adherence to the constitution.) This is a position that has been endorsed by ISAF spokespersons and by the UN representative, who has said, We all know that we cannot win it militarily. It has to be won through political means. That means political engagement.
There has been a detailed report in the American media about talks under Saudi auspices between representatives of the Karzai administration and the Taliban and Hekmatyar forces. These reports have been denied by the Taliban, with Mullah Zaeef stating that while there were Afghans from these factions present at an Iftar hosted by King Abdullah, there had been no negotiations. Something, however, is happening. Australian press reports suggest former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is using his contacts with the Saudi monarchy and the Afghan Mujahideen to promote such talks.
What has prompted all this renewed talk of reconciliation?
The situation in Afghanistan has of course deteriorated. Unconfirmed press reports suggest that a new intelligence estimate prepared by the Directorate of National Intelligence paints a grim picture. For obvious reasons, the report is not likely to be released until after the US elections, but what it contains can be gleaned from facts on the ground and testimonies of senior military officers.
Admiral Mullen, Chairman US Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a congressional hearing that absent a broader international and interagency approach to the problems there, it is my professional opinion that no amount of troops in no amount of time can ever achieve all the objectives we seek in Afghanistan.
In Helmand province, the British commander maintains that they have taken the sting out of the Taliban for 2008. But Gulab Mangal, the governor of Helmand, says that the Taliban control more than half the province despite increased presence of British forces. In June, this British commander had spoken of having reached the tipping point and of having decapitated the Taliban leadership. Today he says a military victory is not possible.
Roads leading out of Kabul considered safe six months ago are now controlled by the Taliban. Afghan legislators from Ghazni, a province next to Kabul, have told reporters that they no longer dare to visit their homes, while residents of Wardak, the next province, actively discourage visitors from Kabul because of the danger of Taliban attacks on the highway. From interviews, American reporters have come to the conclusion that the Pashtuns see Karzai as a traitor ruling with the assistance of foreign troops and rival ethnic groups.
Casualty figures are rising dramatically. According to a UN report, 1445 civilians had been killed in the first eight months of 2008, a 40 percent increase from the same period in 2007. More than half of those killed died at the hands of the insurgents, but 577 have been killed by coalition forces some two-thirds by air strikes.
The Taliban today are stronger force than ever before. They, according to one knowledgeable American correspondent, are a larger, better armed and more confident militia, capable of mounting sustained military assaults. Their forces operate in virtually every province and control many districts in areas ringing the capital. They have changed tactics and no longer punish people for owning CDs or cassettes. Unlike the past, the new Taliban structure has councils for each area of governance, appoints officials in controlled areas and confers swift justice for crimes and disputes.
Also, their propaganda machine is much more effective than anything that NATO forces have been able to muster. They are well financed, though the amount they receive from opium-related activities is far less than the $100 million that is currently being bruited about. Clearly there is external financing.
On the other hand, the quality of governance provided by the Karzai administration has gone from bad to worse. Karzais brother has been named in a detailed New York Times article as a major drug dealer and his subsequent denials have not been convincing. In Helmand and Kandahar, Karzai appears to remain beholden to warlords who undermine efforts to provide good governance and development.
Overall, it is the corruption of the government and its failure to provide even the most elementary of civic services that has contributed to the Taliban resurgence. Assistance from the Taliban across the Pak-Afghan border has contributed a great deal to the destabilisation of Pakistan, but has been a relatively minor factor in the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan.
Support for this view comes from the new commander of American forces in East Afghanistan who acknowledged that much of the increase in violence in that area was attributable to Taliban fighters who had remained in Kunar last winter and intensified operations without crossing the border.
Grim the situation may be, but there should be no doubt that the Americans will stay. In retreating from Vietnam, they had only to contend with the dubious domino theory. In Afghanistan they perceive a very real and imminent threat. The Pentagon is awarding contracts for mine clearance, for building roads around the perimeter of Bagram air base and for other long-term activities. A contract has already been awarded for the building of a $50 million prison for high security prisoners at Bagram.
The exit strategy now being talked about is the building up of the Afghan army. They appear determined to find the money (estimated at $20 billion) themselves or through their allies over the next five years to bring the Afghan army to a strength of 134,000. There is no way that the Afghan economy can support an army of that size and the Americans would have to continue to finance and maintain that army.
More importantly, there are reports that more than 70 percent of the officer corps is drawn from the Tajiks and that recruitment in the Pashtun areas, possibly because of Taliban intimidation, remains very low. If a Tajik-dominated army comes into being, it will provide fuel for a further ethnic conflict and make even token stability more difficult to achieve.
On a positive note, discerning Taliban may well recognise that they cannot win; the Americans are determined to stay until some measure of peace and stability is achieved; Pakistanis, worried about themselves, are going to do whatever is needed to rid themselves of the Taliban; and much criminal activity is now being disguised as Taliban-directed efforts to rid the country of foreigners. They may well want to talk.
But for the moment, peace in Afghanistan remains a distant dream and Pakistan must frame its policies so that it can, to the extent possible, insulate itself from an unstable Afghanistans pernicious influence.
The writer is a former foreign secretary
