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Power and Principle
By Eva Prag
Published: Jan 13, 2011 12:35 PM Updated: Jan 13, 2011 12:35 PM
Following Barack Obamas proclaimed backing of an Indian Security Council seat, various reform proposals are being contemplated. However, it is questionable how far Security Council reform is really the solution to the UNs problems.
Barack Obamas recent declaration that he would back Indias claim to a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations has, once again, fuelled calls for a reform of the international body, widely seen as failing in its attempts to represent the world as it is. A significant amount of influential voices including The Economist, argue that the only alternative to reforming the UN is accepting its decline. Such bold statements, however, show a disregard for the history of the organization and its place in international politics.
The most recent efforts towards reform started in 2003, after the US invasion of Iraq, when Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for a radical overhaul of intergovernmental machinery, beginning with the Security Council (SC). Annan established a High Level Panel (HLP) to undertake a fundamental review of the United Nations role in the field of peace and security, the primary responsibility of the SC. Recommendations included expanding the SC to 24 members through reforms that included increasing the number of permanent seats, creating a new category of four-year seats and/or expanding the number of two-year seats among others. The panels criteria for seat holders would be based on the geographic representation of states, as well as their financial, military and diplomatic contribution to the UN.
While these criteria sound logical, it is incredibly difficult to implement. An emphasis on financial contribution would earn Germany and Japan seats, the latter of which would be unacceptable to China. Meanwhile, one of the greatest military contributors is Pakistan, whose membership to the Council would be incompatible with Indias. Norway is a strong diplomatic power, but another seat to a European country seems unfeasible, and France and the UK cannot be expected to give up their seats, although a single seat for the EU would indeed be more representative of the international distribution of power.
What comes to the surface with this quick analysis of a supposedly more representative Security Council is that firstly, representation is very difficult to define, and secondly, the justness of such a council is likely to be undermined by state interest. As Erik Luck, current adviser to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has stated, the sense of urgency in Kofi Annans call for reform reflected a puzzling disregard for the history and politics of the UN.
The past six decades have seen dozens of reform efforts. Although broad packages, such as those of the HLP are sometimes proposed, they are never adopted, as member states like to pick and choose reforms that correspond to their political interests.
This should serve as a reminder that the UN is nothing more and nothing less than what states make itit is not an independent body. Legitimacy is the only tool at the UNs disposal with which it can counter the national interest of states, and must therefore be taken seriously. However, legitimacy is a constant challenge, as the concept changes with the dynamics of international politics and depends on the perspective of particular states.
The evolution of the UN in international politics and the tensions it continually faces were particularly evident towards the end of the Cold War. Although the 90s were just as difficult; there were many appeals for the UN to help countries like Somalia and Haiti, and too few resources to implement Security Council Mandates. While many questioned the future of the UN at the time, and its actions were certainly flawed, states have continuously turned to it in the new millennium.
The UN has survived because it is highly adaptable and capable of making midcourse corrections, of championing new agendas, and of learning to employ new tools as the needs and values of its member states change. However, these transitions do not imply a smooth process. The UN adopts formal reforms with great reluctance and glacier-like speed. The founders wanted it that way, and so they placed high hurdles to charter amendment.
Hence, what should be learned from six decades of reform proposals is that modest expectations are in order. Rather than an excessive focus on expanding the Security Council, which will have unpredictable and potentially damaging consequences for regional and global relations, greater attention should be paid to ensuring the transparency and accountability of the UNs day-to-day activities. Furthermore, the UNs working methods should be improved, for example though a strengthening of UN field operations, and enhancement of the capacities of the Secretary-General should be implemented. Progress has already been made through the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission and a smaller, more accountable Human Rights Council.
These modifications are unlikely to fundamentally influence national interest decision-making by states in the Council, but neither would changes in the UN Charter. In the end, it is its practical achievements that will lend legitimacy to the UN, not which states are on the SC.
The UN proclaims in Article 1 of the Charter that its purpose is achieving international cooperation for promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all, and reform should contribute towards fulfilling this goal. There are more promising ways to improve Security Council accountability and effectiveness than overly optimistic notions about amending the Charter. We should thus be cautious in suggesting that the organization can be saved from irrelevance only by radical structural reform, as this is simply not true.
As the Kofi Annan expressed it in his first reform report in 1997, [r]eform is not an event; it is a process. The tension between power and principle in the UN has always been present and it should be treated as a creative tension rather than a problem, easily overcome by a simple act of will. Progressive calls for reform should be encouraged, as rhetorical fireworks may contribute to an environment that facilitates pragmatic modifications in working methods and democratic accountability. However, as with all explosives, they should be approached with caution and awareness of their potentially destructive effects.
Eva Prag - A London based freelance journalist
© Copyright 2010 Al Majalla
Power and Principle
By Eva Prag
Published: Jan 13, 2011 12:35 PM Updated: Jan 13, 2011 12:35 PM
Following Barack Obamas proclaimed backing of an Indian Security Council seat, various reform proposals are being contemplated. However, it is questionable how far Security Council reform is really the solution to the UNs problems.
Barack Obamas recent declaration that he would back Indias claim to a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations has, once again, fuelled calls for a reform of the international body, widely seen as failing in its attempts to represent the world as it is. A significant amount of influential voices including The Economist, argue that the only alternative to reforming the UN is accepting its decline. Such bold statements, however, show a disregard for the history of the organization and its place in international politics.
The most recent efforts towards reform started in 2003, after the US invasion of Iraq, when Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for a radical overhaul of intergovernmental machinery, beginning with the Security Council (SC). Annan established a High Level Panel (HLP) to undertake a fundamental review of the United Nations role in the field of peace and security, the primary responsibility of the SC. Recommendations included expanding the SC to 24 members through reforms that included increasing the number of permanent seats, creating a new category of four-year seats and/or expanding the number of two-year seats among others. The panels criteria for seat holders would be based on the geographic representation of states, as well as their financial, military and diplomatic contribution to the UN.
While these criteria sound logical, it is incredibly difficult to implement. An emphasis on financial contribution would earn Germany and Japan seats, the latter of which would be unacceptable to China. Meanwhile, one of the greatest military contributors is Pakistan, whose membership to the Council would be incompatible with Indias. Norway is a strong diplomatic power, but another seat to a European country seems unfeasible, and France and the UK cannot be expected to give up their seats, although a single seat for the EU would indeed be more representative of the international distribution of power.
What comes to the surface with this quick analysis of a supposedly more representative Security Council is that firstly, representation is very difficult to define, and secondly, the justness of such a council is likely to be undermined by state interest. As Erik Luck, current adviser to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has stated, the sense of urgency in Kofi Annans call for reform reflected a puzzling disregard for the history and politics of the UN.
The past six decades have seen dozens of reform efforts. Although broad packages, such as those of the HLP are sometimes proposed, they are never adopted, as member states like to pick and choose reforms that correspond to their political interests.
This should serve as a reminder that the UN is nothing more and nothing less than what states make itit is not an independent body. Legitimacy is the only tool at the UNs disposal with which it can counter the national interest of states, and must therefore be taken seriously. However, legitimacy is a constant challenge, as the concept changes with the dynamics of international politics and depends on the perspective of particular states.
The evolution of the UN in international politics and the tensions it continually faces were particularly evident towards the end of the Cold War. Although the 90s were just as difficult; there were many appeals for the UN to help countries like Somalia and Haiti, and too few resources to implement Security Council Mandates. While many questioned the future of the UN at the time, and its actions were certainly flawed, states have continuously turned to it in the new millennium.
The UN has survived because it is highly adaptable and capable of making midcourse corrections, of championing new agendas, and of learning to employ new tools as the needs and values of its member states change. However, these transitions do not imply a smooth process. The UN adopts formal reforms with great reluctance and glacier-like speed. The founders wanted it that way, and so they placed high hurdles to charter amendment.
Hence, what should be learned from six decades of reform proposals is that modest expectations are in order. Rather than an excessive focus on expanding the Security Council, which will have unpredictable and potentially damaging consequences for regional and global relations, greater attention should be paid to ensuring the transparency and accountability of the UNs day-to-day activities. Furthermore, the UNs working methods should be improved, for example though a strengthening of UN field operations, and enhancement of the capacities of the Secretary-General should be implemented. Progress has already been made through the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission and a smaller, more accountable Human Rights Council.
These modifications are unlikely to fundamentally influence national interest decision-making by states in the Council, but neither would changes in the UN Charter. In the end, it is its practical achievements that will lend legitimacy to the UN, not which states are on the SC.
The UN proclaims in Article 1 of the Charter that its purpose is achieving international cooperation for promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all, and reform should contribute towards fulfilling this goal. There are more promising ways to improve Security Council accountability and effectiveness than overly optimistic notions about amending the Charter. We should thus be cautious in suggesting that the organization can be saved from irrelevance only by radical structural reform, as this is simply not true.
As the Kofi Annan expressed it in his first reform report in 1997, [r]eform is not an event; it is a process. The tension between power and principle in the UN has always been present and it should be treated as a creative tension rather than a problem, easily overcome by a simple act of will. Progressive calls for reform should be encouraged, as rhetorical fireworks may contribute to an environment that facilitates pragmatic modifications in working methods and democratic accountability. However, as with all explosives, they should be approached with caution and awareness of their potentially destructive effects.
Eva Prag - A London based freelance journalist
© Copyright 2010 Al Majalla
