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Pakistan’s Assertion – India Can Produce 2000 Nuclear Warheads
PublishedSeptember 28, 2015 | Byadmin
SOURCE: CLAWS.IN
A recent media report in Pakistan1 brought out that, as per the assessment of Pakistan, India has enough fissile material, both reactor and weapon-grade plutonium, for more than 2000 warheads.The National Command Authority (NCA), Pakistan’s apex policy-making body for its strategic programme, concluded that India’s growing nuclear programme and absence of a conflict resolution mechanism were upsetting strategic stability in the region and the situation was forcing Pakistan to maintain ‘full-spectrum deterrence capability’.
Meeting of NCA
On 9 September 2015, a meeting of Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) was held under the Chairmanship of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and attended by Defence Minister Khawaja Asif, Finance Minister Ishaq Dar, Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar, Adviser on National Security and Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Chairman General Rashad Mehmood, the three services chiefs and the Director General Strategic Plans Division (DG SPD).
As perInter-Services Public Relations (ISPR)2the NCA, reviewed in its meeting the regional security environment and was briefed on fast-paced strategic and conventional capability developments taking place in the neighbourhood. The NCA acknowledged the sacrifices and appreciated successes of the Armed Forces in the ongoing Operation Zarb-e-Azb. As being done in the earlier meetings, it reaffirmed the centrality of Pakistan’s nuclear programme for the defence of the country and reposed full confidence in Pakistan’s robust nuclear command and control structure and security arrangements related to country’s strategic assets.The NCA re-affirmed Pakistan’s cognisance of the evolving security dynamics of South Asia and measures to be taken to safeguard its national security. In view of the growing conventional asymmetry with India, the NCA reiterated the national resolve to maintain ‘Full Spectrum Deterrence Capability’ in line with the dictates of ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’ to deter all forms of aggression, adhering to the policy of avoiding an arms race. In its appraisal of the non-proliferation debate since the last meeting, the NCA expressed satisfaction on Pakistan’s enhanced outreach with the multilateral export control regimes on non-discriminatory basis; including the membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Pakistan emphasised that it “sought peace and strategic stability in South Asia as corner stone of its policy and considers conflict resolution, as the mean to achieve this end.”
Pakistan’s NCA
The NCA oversees the employment, policy formulation, exercises, deployment, research and development, and operational command and control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals. It was established in 2000 as a successor of the Air Force Strategic Command which was established by then- Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Anwar Shamim in 1983.
The NCA is responsible for joint-space operations (military satellites), information operations (information warfare), missile defence, internal and external Command and Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). It also looks into the aspects of strategic deterrence and combating weapons of mass destruction. The NCA oversees the operations of the Pakistan Army, Air Force and Navy’s Strategic Commands, along with their functional basis. The unified military strategic command structure is intended to give the Prime Minister and Cabinet of Pakistan a unified resource for greater understanding of specific threats (military, nuclear, chemical, biological, radiological, conventional and non-conventional and intelligence) and the means to respond to these threats as quickly as possible to prevent collateral damage. The Prime Minister is the Chairman with all military assets, components of NCA and strategic commands directly reporting to Chairman of their course of development and deployment.
Pakistan’s Assertion of Indian Nuclear Warheads
Pakistan has been consistently raising the bogey of India’s nuclear stockpiling since 2008 when the NSGwaiver was provided to India. In the 16th meeting of NCAin Jan 20103, it noted that “the India-specific exemption made by theNSG and subsequent nuclear fuel supply agreements with several countries would enable India to produce substantial quantities of fissile material for nuclear weapons by freeing up its domestic resources.”
Pakistan has not been able to come to terms that the USA, an old ally,was instrumental in India’sclinching of the NSG waiver, while Pakistan was ignored in spite of being a strategic partner of the US in fighting the Global War on Terror (GWOT). What Pakistan is probably not able to fathom is that India received the NSG waiver after some tough and protracted negotiations. Exemption was given to India on the basis of certain non-proliferation commitments to which it agreed under the Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Agreement. These commitments included separating its civilian and military nuclear facilities in a phased manner, placing civil nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, signing and adhering to the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, continuing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, working with the US for the conclusion of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), refraining from the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology to states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread, introducing comprehensive export control legislation to secure nuclear material, and adhering to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and NSG guidelines.
It was reported that NSG members were divided into three groups, according to their national policies, towards the waiver. The first group of countries, motivated by mercantile interests, strongly supported the exemption. This group included Russia, France and the United Kingdom. The second group was “like-minded” countries, small states with a strong non-proliferation stance, (consisted of Austria, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland) and wanted to include strong non-proliferation conditions in the draft. The third group of countries, which came out in favour of the exemption but were not enthusiastic, included Canada, Germany, Japan and Australia.The like-minded countries wanted to include conditions in the waiver such as a clause that would restate the desire of the Group for universal membership in the NPT, a legally binding nuclear testing moratorium, a “review” provision in case of India’s non-compliance with the nonproliferation commitments, and a provision denying the transfer of Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR) technology. However,they failed to get these conditions, as they were unacceptable to India. After rigorous US diplomacy, and two informal assurances, the like-minded states eventually agreed to the waiver. These assurances were that no member state had a policy to transfer sensitive nuclear technology to India and that the trade would terminate if India resumed nuclear testing.4
An Islamabad based think tank, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (ISSI)5, noted in a paper – “New Delhi’s plutonium stocks also continue to pile up; according to one Pakistani assessment, by the end of 2013 India had produced enough weapons and reactor-grade plutonium (0.8-1ton and 15ton respectively) for 2,000 warheads.”
Is it a coincidence that the issue of India having enough fissile material to produce 2000 nuclear warheads was raised, discussed and highlighted in the NCA meeting of 9thSep 2015 when only a week earlier, on 27thAugust 2015, reportsof US think tanks,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Stimson Centre suggested that Pakistan had the fastest growing nuclear programme and could have the third largest nuclear stockpile (350 warheads) within the next decade? The report, A Normal Nuclear Pakistan6, says: “in the next five to 10 years Pakistan could have a nuclear arsenal not only twice the size of India’s but also larger than those of the United Kingdom, China and France, giving it the third-largest arsenal behind the US and Russia.” It further adds that Islamabad’s nuclear ambitions could see it go the way of the Soviet Union in the closing stages of the Cold War. In a manner similar to the way the erstwhile USSR’s nuclear stockpile did nothing to address its socio-economic woes, Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal does not ‘address its internal issues’.
In 2013, estimates of the size of Pakistan’s current nuclear arsenal ranged from about 90 to 120 warheads. The report says that “Islamabad could step up production to about 20 nuclear warheads a year.Many observers have concluded that Pakistan’s rate of fissile material production (and assumed construction of nuclear weapons) gives it the fastest-growing nuclear weapons stockpile. The growth path of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, enabled by existing infrastructure, goes well beyond the assurances of credible minimal deterrence provided by Pakistani officials and analysts after testing nuclear devices.” Given that Pakistan has gone from playing catch-up to now out-producing India in terms of nuclear weapons by a factor of four- at present rates, Pakistan has the ability to construct ‘between 14 and 27’ per year, whereas India can build ‘between two and five’ annually – the report suggests that within the next five to 10 years, Pakistan could have the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal. After the US and Russia, of course, which own around 1,600 weapons each.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Initiative (SIPRI)Year Book 20157, as on date, Cold War rivals Russia and the US possess an estimated 7,500 and 7,260 nuclear warheads respectively. France, China and the United Kingdom possess 300, 260 and 215 warheads respectively, while India is currently thought to have about 90-110. Pakistan is likely to have 100-120 warheads.
The Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), New Delhi8, in 2013, had pointed out four distinct possibilities of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities:-
Pakistan’s Ambiguous and Irrational Posture
Whatever be the world view on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and suggestions put forth to rein in its nuclear ambitions and focus on its sagging economy, malnutrition, electricity shortages, declining education standards, internal terrorism etc, Pakistan will continue to tread on its nuclear path. This is primarily because its nuclear policy is “India-centric”.Given its own lack of strategic depth, Pakistan views its nuclear weapons as a means to counter India’s conventional military superiority and a device to equalise the power asymmetry with India.Pakistan regards its nuclear weapons as its most precious strategic asset which constitutes the ultimate guarantor of the nation’s existence vis-a-vis India.
Pakistan has refrained from publishing a nuclear doctrine primarily because the element of ambiguity and irrationality works to its advantage and has become a hallmark of Pakistan’s nuclear policy. Pakistani military and political leaders have repeatedly indicated that they do not intend to articulate their nuclear doctrine as the ambiguous posture best serves national interests on nuclear matters and strengthens its nuclear deterrence by not allowing the enemy to know its threshold level. The haziness in nuclear strategy has prevented its enemies (implying India) from actions that would provoke a nuclear attack and has also contributed to the avoidance of a major war since nuclearisation. Pakistan believes that it has neutralised the possibility of an Indian conventional attack by holding out the threat of nuclear weapons as the nukes provide it immunity against aggressive proxy war.
PublishedSeptember 28, 2015 | Byadmin
SOURCE: CLAWS.IN
A recent media report in Pakistan1 brought out that, as per the assessment of Pakistan, India has enough fissile material, both reactor and weapon-grade plutonium, for more than 2000 warheads.The National Command Authority (NCA), Pakistan’s apex policy-making body for its strategic programme, concluded that India’s growing nuclear programme and absence of a conflict resolution mechanism were upsetting strategic stability in the region and the situation was forcing Pakistan to maintain ‘full-spectrum deterrence capability’.
Meeting of NCA
On 9 September 2015, a meeting of Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) was held under the Chairmanship of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and attended by Defence Minister Khawaja Asif, Finance Minister Ishaq Dar, Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar, Adviser on National Security and Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Chairman General Rashad Mehmood, the three services chiefs and the Director General Strategic Plans Division (DG SPD).
As perInter-Services Public Relations (ISPR)2the NCA, reviewed in its meeting the regional security environment and was briefed on fast-paced strategic and conventional capability developments taking place in the neighbourhood. The NCA acknowledged the sacrifices and appreciated successes of the Armed Forces in the ongoing Operation Zarb-e-Azb. As being done in the earlier meetings, it reaffirmed the centrality of Pakistan’s nuclear programme for the defence of the country and reposed full confidence in Pakistan’s robust nuclear command and control structure and security arrangements related to country’s strategic assets.The NCA re-affirmed Pakistan’s cognisance of the evolving security dynamics of South Asia and measures to be taken to safeguard its national security. In view of the growing conventional asymmetry with India, the NCA reiterated the national resolve to maintain ‘Full Spectrum Deterrence Capability’ in line with the dictates of ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’ to deter all forms of aggression, adhering to the policy of avoiding an arms race. In its appraisal of the non-proliferation debate since the last meeting, the NCA expressed satisfaction on Pakistan’s enhanced outreach with the multilateral export control regimes on non-discriminatory basis; including the membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Pakistan emphasised that it “sought peace and strategic stability in South Asia as corner stone of its policy and considers conflict resolution, as the mean to achieve this end.”
Pakistan’s NCA
The NCA oversees the employment, policy formulation, exercises, deployment, research and development, and operational command and control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals. It was established in 2000 as a successor of the Air Force Strategic Command which was established by then- Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Anwar Shamim in 1983.
The NCA is responsible for joint-space operations (military satellites), information operations (information warfare), missile defence, internal and external Command and Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). It also looks into the aspects of strategic deterrence and combating weapons of mass destruction. The NCA oversees the operations of the Pakistan Army, Air Force and Navy’s Strategic Commands, along with their functional basis. The unified military strategic command structure is intended to give the Prime Minister and Cabinet of Pakistan a unified resource for greater understanding of specific threats (military, nuclear, chemical, biological, radiological, conventional and non-conventional and intelligence) and the means to respond to these threats as quickly as possible to prevent collateral damage. The Prime Minister is the Chairman with all military assets, components of NCA and strategic commands directly reporting to Chairman of their course of development and deployment.
Pakistan’s Assertion of Indian Nuclear Warheads
Pakistan has been consistently raising the bogey of India’s nuclear stockpiling since 2008 when the NSGwaiver was provided to India. In the 16th meeting of NCAin Jan 20103, it noted that “the India-specific exemption made by theNSG and subsequent nuclear fuel supply agreements with several countries would enable India to produce substantial quantities of fissile material for nuclear weapons by freeing up its domestic resources.”
Pakistan has not been able to come to terms that the USA, an old ally,was instrumental in India’sclinching of the NSG waiver, while Pakistan was ignored in spite of being a strategic partner of the US in fighting the Global War on Terror (GWOT). What Pakistan is probably not able to fathom is that India received the NSG waiver after some tough and protracted negotiations. Exemption was given to India on the basis of certain non-proliferation commitments to which it agreed under the Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Agreement. These commitments included separating its civilian and military nuclear facilities in a phased manner, placing civil nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, signing and adhering to the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, continuing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, working with the US for the conclusion of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), refraining from the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology to states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread, introducing comprehensive export control legislation to secure nuclear material, and adhering to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and NSG guidelines.
It was reported that NSG members were divided into three groups, according to their national policies, towards the waiver. The first group of countries, motivated by mercantile interests, strongly supported the exemption. This group included Russia, France and the United Kingdom. The second group was “like-minded” countries, small states with a strong non-proliferation stance, (consisted of Austria, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland) and wanted to include strong non-proliferation conditions in the draft. The third group of countries, which came out in favour of the exemption but were not enthusiastic, included Canada, Germany, Japan and Australia.The like-minded countries wanted to include conditions in the waiver such as a clause that would restate the desire of the Group for universal membership in the NPT, a legally binding nuclear testing moratorium, a “review” provision in case of India’s non-compliance with the nonproliferation commitments, and a provision denying the transfer of Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR) technology. However,they failed to get these conditions, as they were unacceptable to India. After rigorous US diplomacy, and two informal assurances, the like-minded states eventually agreed to the waiver. These assurances were that no member state had a policy to transfer sensitive nuclear technology to India and that the trade would terminate if India resumed nuclear testing.4
An Islamabad based think tank, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (ISSI)5, noted in a paper – “New Delhi’s plutonium stocks also continue to pile up; according to one Pakistani assessment, by the end of 2013 India had produced enough weapons and reactor-grade plutonium (0.8-1ton and 15ton respectively) for 2,000 warheads.”
Is it a coincidence that the issue of India having enough fissile material to produce 2000 nuclear warheads was raised, discussed and highlighted in the NCA meeting of 9thSep 2015 when only a week earlier, on 27thAugust 2015, reportsof US think tanks,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Stimson Centre suggested that Pakistan had the fastest growing nuclear programme and could have the third largest nuclear stockpile (350 warheads) within the next decade? The report, A Normal Nuclear Pakistan6, says: “in the next five to 10 years Pakistan could have a nuclear arsenal not only twice the size of India’s but also larger than those of the United Kingdom, China and France, giving it the third-largest arsenal behind the US and Russia.” It further adds that Islamabad’s nuclear ambitions could see it go the way of the Soviet Union in the closing stages of the Cold War. In a manner similar to the way the erstwhile USSR’s nuclear stockpile did nothing to address its socio-economic woes, Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal does not ‘address its internal issues’.
In 2013, estimates of the size of Pakistan’s current nuclear arsenal ranged from about 90 to 120 warheads. The report says that “Islamabad could step up production to about 20 nuclear warheads a year.Many observers have concluded that Pakistan’s rate of fissile material production (and assumed construction of nuclear weapons) gives it the fastest-growing nuclear weapons stockpile. The growth path of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, enabled by existing infrastructure, goes well beyond the assurances of credible minimal deterrence provided by Pakistani officials and analysts after testing nuclear devices.” Given that Pakistan has gone from playing catch-up to now out-producing India in terms of nuclear weapons by a factor of four- at present rates, Pakistan has the ability to construct ‘between 14 and 27’ per year, whereas India can build ‘between two and five’ annually – the report suggests that within the next five to 10 years, Pakistan could have the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal. After the US and Russia, of course, which own around 1,600 weapons each.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Initiative (SIPRI)Year Book 20157, as on date, Cold War rivals Russia and the US possess an estimated 7,500 and 7,260 nuclear warheads respectively. France, China and the United Kingdom possess 300, 260 and 215 warheads respectively, while India is currently thought to have about 90-110. Pakistan is likely to have 100-120 warheads.
The Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), New Delhi8, in 2013, had pointed out four distinct possibilities of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities:-
- A small but real possibility of the next India-Pakistan crisis escalating to nuclear levels.
- Pakistan may decide, as a matter of state policy, to extend a nuclear umbrella to a West Asian state (particularly in the aftermath of Iran’s nuclear deal with the UNSC P5 and Germany).
- A ‘hard-to-quantify’ risk of nuclear theft from within the country.
- A small chance that, should Pakistan unravel, its nuclear assets would be ‘seized by the army for political, strategic or personal purposes’.
- Shift declaratory policy from “full spectrum” to “strategic” deterrence.
- Commit to a recessed deterrence posture and limit production of short-range delivery vehicles and tactical nuclear weapons.
- Lift Pakistan’s veto on Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations and reduce or stop fissile material production.
- Separate civilian and military nuclear facilities.
- Sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without waiting for India.
Pakistan’s Ambiguous and Irrational Posture
Whatever be the world view on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and suggestions put forth to rein in its nuclear ambitions and focus on its sagging economy, malnutrition, electricity shortages, declining education standards, internal terrorism etc, Pakistan will continue to tread on its nuclear path. This is primarily because its nuclear policy is “India-centric”.Given its own lack of strategic depth, Pakistan views its nuclear weapons as a means to counter India’s conventional military superiority and a device to equalise the power asymmetry with India.Pakistan regards its nuclear weapons as its most precious strategic asset which constitutes the ultimate guarantor of the nation’s existence vis-a-vis India.
Pakistan has refrained from publishing a nuclear doctrine primarily because the element of ambiguity and irrationality works to its advantage and has become a hallmark of Pakistan’s nuclear policy. Pakistani military and political leaders have repeatedly indicated that they do not intend to articulate their nuclear doctrine as the ambiguous posture best serves national interests on nuclear matters and strengthens its nuclear deterrence by not allowing the enemy to know its threshold level. The haziness in nuclear strategy has prevented its enemies (implying India) from actions that would provoke a nuclear attack and has also contributed to the avoidance of a major war since nuclearisation. Pakistan believes that it has neutralised the possibility of an Indian conventional attack by holding out the threat of nuclear weapons as the nukes provide it immunity against aggressive proxy war.
