Military
Defeating Insurgency On The Border CSC 1985 SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy Executive Summary TITLE: DEFEATING INSURGENCY ON THE BORDER I. Purpose: To establish the validity of border barriers as a counterinsurgency strategy for United States military forces. II. Problem: Although border barriers have been used successfully by other armies, United States forces have developed little doctrine on the subject. This oversight should be a matter of concern because United States forces are likely to be involved in counterinsurgency warfare for much of the future. III. Data: Much of United States counterinsurgency doctrine has been taken from the French who perfected the use of border barriers in Algerian United States forces, however, did not use border barriers well in Vietnam, and as a result current doctrine is rudimentary. Border barriers are needed, however, because they are one of only three methods of eliminating the benefits of sanctuary to the guerrilla. The other two methods, diplomacy and direct military intervention, provide more timely solutions to the sanctuary problem, but often can not be used because of political constraints. Border barriers can best be used when the insurgency is still in unconventional phases, adequate manpower and material resources are available, and the nation is committed to a lengthy war. The technology, mobility, and firepower available to United States forces make them particularly well suited to use border barriers. IV. Conclusions: Border barriers must be a primary consideration in developing strategies for countering guerrilla sanctuaries, especially for United States forces who are well equipped to efficiently use them. V. Recommendations: The various military Services should develop appropriate doctrine for establishng and controlling border barriers during counterinsurgency operations.
Defeating Insurgencies On the Border Outline Thesis The use of border barriers should be a primary consideration in the development of any United States counterinsurgency strategy because many insurgencies can not be defeated without barriers and United States military forces are well equipped to use them. I. Evolution of Border Barrier Doctrine A. Morice Line in Algeria B. McNamara Line in Vietnam C. Doctrine for United States forces II. Importance of Sanctuary to Guerrillas A. Base to establish and supply army B. Haven for guerrilla operations III. Methods of eliminating sanctuaries or their benefits A. Diplomacy B. Direct military intervention C. Border barriers IV. Requirements for effective border barrier operations A. Insurgency in unconventional war phases B. Resources and manpower to control all border routes C. National commitment to a lengthy war V. Special capabilities of United States forces A. Infiltration detection devices B. Firepower and mobility VI. United States' need for border barrier doctrine A. Likely commitment to counterinsurgency operations B. Effectiveness of border barriers as a strategy C. Special capabilities of United States forces DEFEATING INSURGENCY ON THE BORDER In I957 the French Army, fresh from defeat at the hands of guerrillas in Indo-China, found itself losing to them again in Algeria. Despite five years of fighting and the commitment of nearly one half million men, France's continued role in the colonization of Algeria appeared clearly in doubt. A guerrilla army of independence-seeking Algerians, protected and supplied by sanctuaries in Tunisia, had grown from an initial strength of less than 400 to nearly 70,000 men.1 As a result, guerrilla operations against the French Army and its surrogate forces had become more threatening and decisive. As casual ties increased to more than 900 per month and the situation grew more desperate, it became evident to the French leadership that a change in strategy was needed. The tactic of using French troops primarily to garrison and secure the major towns and settlements of Algeria was not working. If France hoped to prevail, the battle would have to be taken to the enemy, first along the Tunisian border and then in the Algerian countryside. In the spring of 1957 the French began construction of an elaborate barrier--the Morice Line--along 200 miles of the frontier with Tunisia. Anchored by the Mediterranean Sea in the north and the Sahara Desert in the south, it was a miracle of modern technology. Its main feature was an eight foot high electric fence through which a charge of 5000 volts was passed. There was a 45 meter minefield on either side of it, and on the Algerian side there was a barbed wire entanglement, and then a footpath, patrol led day and night. If the fence was penetrated, an alarm was automatically activated which brought instant fire from 105mm howitzers and attack from mobile strike farces consisting of helicopters, tanks, and airborne infantry. Some 80,000 French soldiers defended the line.3 During the remainder of 1957 and 1958, Tunisian-based guerrillas tried every conceivable means of breaching the wire using high tension cutters, bangalore torpedoes, tunnels, ramps, and even assaults by entire infantry battalions. French countermeasures, however, in every case proved to be decisive. By the end of 1958 the guerrillas had lost over 6,000 men and 4,300 weapons to the deadly combination of the barrier and mobile strike forces.4 In addition nearly 30,000 insurgents in Tunisia were left cut off from the war in Algeria. Guerrillas left in Algeria, stripped of reinforcement and resupply, proved to be easy prey for the French offensives in the countryside which quickly followed. By the end of 1959 less than 10,000 guerrillas remained in Algeria, most without weapons or ammunition. In less then two years the French Army had accomplished with the Morice Line what it had failed to achieve in the five previous years using conventional counterinsurgency tactics.5 Although political unrest in Paris caused the French to later abandon Algeria, the military aspects of their "successful" countersurgency were studied widely by the major powers of the world, particularly the United States. French counterinsurgency methods such as resettlement, pacification, combined action programs, and cordon and search techniques were later adopted and used by United States forces in Vietnam. The concept of border barriers, however, received little attention.
Army Field Manual 31-16, Counterquerrilla Operations -- the bible for military operations in Vietnam--discussed border operations only briefly, noting that: While certain definite portions of an international land border or shoreline may be placed under effective surveillance and control led by use of static security posts, reserve forces, ground and aerial observers, electronic listening posts, and patrols, the continuous surveillance and control of an extensive land border or shoreline is extremely difficult.6 The United States, nevertheless decided in 1967 to employ a "fence" or "iron shield" along the DMZ between North and South Vietnam.7 This line, erected at the direction of Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, was primarily an electronic barrier rather than a physical one. Although it included a barbed wire fence, its main feature was a field of secret, electronic detection devices hidden along its length which were used to alert air and ground forces of enemy infiltration. Political and practical considerations prevented the extension of the McNamara line along the lengthy Laotian border, the main infiltration route for the North Vietnamese guerrillas.8 As a result, the line presented only a minor obstacle to infiltrating guerrillas who easily avoided it by traveling through Laos rather than across the DMZ. Construction of the final phase of the line was subsequently terminated when its ineffectiveness became obvious. Since the failure of the McNamara Line in 1971, the United States doctrine on the use of border barriers has remained rudimentary. Border operations of all types have, in general, been neglected by military planners, probably because of the political repercussions that have often accompanied their use in the past. Instead, it has been emphasized that control of the borders during counterinsurgency operations is primarily a responsibility of the government of the host nation; and that border police, customs personnel, local police, and other government agencies should be used before military forces. Military forces are committed to border denial operations only, "after careful consideration of the threat, the environment, and the location of the infiltrators probable targets and method of operation."9 The absence of any definitive U.S. doctrine on the use of border barriers strongly suggests that most military planners have concluded that border barriers are not needed, are ineffective when used, and make poor use of military capabilities. Such a conclusion, however, ignores the shortcomings of other border denial methods and fails to recognize the technological capabilities of U.S. forces. In fact, the use of border barriers should be a primary consideration in the development of any United States counterinsurgency strategy because many insurgencies can not be defeated without barriers, and United States military forces are well equipped to use them. The importance of border barriers in counterinsurgency operations can best be appreciated by understanding the importance of sanctuary to guerillas. According to the late Dr. Bernard Fall in his book "Street Without Joy", a sanctuary is "a territory contiguous to a rebellious area which though ostensibly not involved in the conflict, provides the rebel side with shelter, training facilities, equipment, and--if they can get away with it--troops."10 Sanctuaries are an essential requirement for the conduct of any successful insurgency. The availability of sanctuaries allows relatively small groups of guerrillas to establish and equip entire armies within the safety of neighboring borders. These guerrilla armies are then able to attack counterinsurgency forces at a time of their own choosing, returning to the safety of their sanctuaries between combat operations. The guerrilla without sanctuary is, on the other hand, vulnerable to attack at any time and therefore has little opportunity to train and equip his forces. The value of sanctuaries to guerrillas was never more apparent than during the Algerian war.
During that war Tunisian sanctuaries provided both a supply base and a safe haven for Algerian guerrillas. The guerrillas were able to transport arms from Arab and communist-bloc nations directly to their Tunisian camps while the French looked on helplessly. In just three months during 1957 the guerrillas received 17,000 rifles, 380 machineguns, 296 automatic rifles, 190 bazookas, 30 mortars, and over 100 million rounds of ammunition by this means. Within Tunisia, they established five command posts, two replacement depots, eight hospitals, nine arsenals and three training camps all of which were free from French attack. Without such sanctuaries the guerrillas would never have been able to support their 70,000-man Army.
Sanctuaries proved to be equally essential to guerrilla forces some ten years later when Vietnamese Communist (VC) and North Vietnam Army (NVA) forces, operating from protected sanctuaries in Cambodia and Loas, challenged the armies of South Vietnam and the United States. Many historians credit the success of the VC and NVA to their ability to use their sanctuaries effectively against an enemy with vastly greater manpower, firepower and maneuverability. In this regard, some writers suggest that the outcome of every insurgency since WWII has depended upon how well the sanctuary performed its expected role. Others such as Walter Lippman claim that "it is for all practical purposes impossible to win a guerrilla war if there is a privileged sanctuary behind the guerrilla fighters."14 How then can sanctuaries be defeated? There are three widely recognized methods for eliminating or denying guerrillas the use of sanctuaries. Of these, diplomacy is almost always the first attempted, followed by direct military intervention, and finally border barriers depending upon the situation. The diplomacy method depends upon persuasion to force the country "hosting" the sanctuary to eliminate it. Because it does not require the commitment of troops, diplomacy is normally the most desirable approach. For it to be successful, however, substantial world opinion must be marshalled against the host country, the host country must be swayed by that opinion, and it must have the power to force the guerrilla to surrender his sanctuary. Seldom are all three of these essential conditions met. Most countries hosting sanctuaries share common goals with the insurgent and along with him enjoy substantial economic and military support from one or more world powers or power blocks. Thus, it is to their advantage to continue the sanctuary condition. Such was the case during the Algerian War in France's former colony, Tunisia. With powerful support from the Arab and communist worlds, the Tunisians had few incentives to help its former master, France, eliminate the Algerian guerrilla sanctuaries. Even had the Tunisians been persuaded, it is unlikely that they could have eliminated 30,000 armed insurgents from their borders. In this regard, the potential consequencies facing a host country which agrees to militarily oppose sanctuaries within its borders are particularly severe.
For example, during the Southeast Asian conflict of the 60's and 70's, Cambodia, a declared neutral, had 40,000 North Vietnamese Army(NVA) regulars and Vietnamese Communist (VC) guerrillas occupying sanctuaries within its borders. In 1970, after years of United States diplomatic pressure, Cambodia reluctantly agreed to resist communist use of these sanctuaries. In March of that year Cambodia's small, poorly lead army was ordered to move against selected sanctuaries in coordinated attacks with elements of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam(ARVN). The results were disastrous for both Cambodia and the United States. Within a matter of weeks the communist forces drove the ARVN back into South Vietnam and destroyed the Cambodian Army. The Cambodian government, no longer considered a neutral by the communist forces, became subject to attack both from its oun constituents and the communist forces. In its weakened condition it fell to the communist forces shortly after their victory in South Vietnam.15 Thus, what the United States had hoped would be the least costly method of eliminating the communist sanctuaries, instead became the catalyst for the eventual communist takeover of one of the few neutral countries in the area. When dipomatic pressures fail to eliminate sanctuaries direct military intervention against them must be considered. Such intervention may include aerial bombing, artillery and rocket attacks, raids, or even assaults against the sanctuaries by entire mechanized divisions. Military intervention offers the swiftest and most direct method of eliminating the sanctuary. On the other hand, it is frought with risks. The crossing of soverign borders by allied forces is likely to turn public and world opinion against their cause, and may expand the war in totally unpredictable and undesirable directions. In this regard, the United States and its allies have enjoyed few successes in using this method against sanctuaries. For example, as has been previously noted, the intervention of ARVN and U.S. forces against communist sanctuaries in Cambodia eventually led to the downfall of that country. Furthermore it expanded the war, forcing the long term commitment of U.S. firepower and logistical support, and of ARVN troop support to the Cambodian forces at a time when these resources were badly needed in South Vietnam.16 Although the operation was successful from a military point of view-communist operations were reportedly set back six months-it did little to contribute to the long term, strategic plan for this area. Reported one observer The Cambodian decision has set in motion a secondary chain reaction in the U.S.. For Richard Nixon, that reaction must seem a negative and not fully foreseen outcome. It has cost him credibility with the people, aroused and angered the Congress and surely limited his future choices for Indochina. [The Cambodian decision]... may be working out in ways that he did not expect and would not have chosen.17 No example more graphically illustrates the risks of direct military intervention against sanctuaries than the recent Israeli operations in Lebanon in June 1982. What was planned as a shallow penetration to drive Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) guerrillas from sanctuaries along the Israeli border, quickly became an all out war. Israeli forces, initially enjoying overwhelming success, drove deeper into Lebanon than originally planned. Syrian forces were drawn into the fighting, and the balance of power among guerrilla forces, previously a stabalizing element in Lebanon, was destroyed. As a result, Israel has been forced to stay in Lebanon for nearly three years at a tremendous cost to its army and economy. In return Israel has achieved little in terms of securing its borders, but instead has seen the PLO replaced by even more radical guerrilla organizations. Thus, while direct military intervention often appears to offer the quickest and least complicated method of eliminating sanctuaries, it seldom does. Instead, it more often creates new problems which can not be forseen. When diplomatic methods fail and nations are unwilling to risk direct military intervention against sanctuaries, border barriers must be employed. Border barriers require costly manpower and material resources to erect, and more time than other methods to eliminate the sanctuary.
On the other hand, border barriers are defensive in nature, and therefore avoid the political pitfalls associated with other border crossing operations. Furthermore, they generally provide a more lasting and effective solution to the sanctuary problem. For example, in addition to the Morice Line in Algeria, border barriers have been used successfully by both the Soviets and Israelis. In this regard, it has been reported that barriers erected by Soviet forces within the mountain passes of the Afganistan-Pakistan border have limited Afgan rebel resupply across that border to less than twenty percent of the total supplies received. As a result, the rebels have been denied most of the United States aid that originates in Pakistan, and have instead had to rely heavily upon internal support. The Israelis, have been even more successful with their "Security Belt" along the border with Lebanon. This line, consisting of a wire fence, minefields, watch towers, and a variety of sensor and alarm devices is supported by helicopter-borne pursuit forces and artillery.19 To reduce the manpower cost of patrolling the 60 mile border the Israel is have established outposts and settlements in frontier areas which provide bases for patrols by both military units and local personnel. Upon establishment of the security belt and a "dead zone" six miles deep along the border in 1970, Israeli casualties due to infiltrators dropped from 14.5 per month to 3.2 in less than a year.20 The Security Belt has thus proven to be an effective combat power multiplier for this small nation of relatively limited military means. The success of the Israeli Security Belt and of the Morice Line suggests that certain requirements must be met before the use of border barriers can be used successfully. First, the insurgency must still be in the unconventional war phases. Guerrillas, especially in the early stages of an insurgency, are too poorly trained and equipped to overcome a well established barrier. In the later stages of an insurgency, however, as the guerrilla transitions into conventional warfare, his ability to overcome such barriers is greatly increased. In this regard, border barriers are seldom effective against conventional weapons such as tanks, armored vehicles, heavy artillery, and helicopters. Secondly, the counterinsurgency force must have the rescources and manpower to effectively control all primary border routes for guerrilla ingress and egress. In this regard, border barrier operations require a large commitment of troops, both to patrol the border and to provide reaction forces and fire support when the barrier is penetrated. In Algeria for example, more than 200 troops were required along each mile of the Morice Line.21 This is not to say, however, that border barriers could not be used in almost any country in the world. Almost all countries have natural barriers such as mountains, seas, and deserts along much of their border.
These barriers make infiltration difficult if not impossible for guerrillas. For example, the Mediterranean Sea and Sahara Desert on Algeria's northern and southern borders proved to be insurmountable obstacles to the guerrillas who had neither the mobility for sea nor desert operations. Attempts by the guerrillas to bypass the Morice Line by crossing these natural barriers were easily defeated by the highly mobile French. Likewise, the rugged mountains along the Afganistan-Pakistan border have hindered guerrilla operations and allowed the Soviets to use border barriers with a minimum of manpower along a border of almost 1200 miles in length. In this regard, many areas where U.S. forces are likely to be committed to counterinsurgency operations, such as Central America, have natural barriers which are particularly supportive of border barrier operations. Why then are United States forces not prepared to use border barriers today? The commitment of a government and nation to a lengthy counterinsurgency operation is the third, and probably the most difficult requirement for effective use of border barriers. In most situations, months or even years are required before border barrier operations eventually strangle the external support of an insurgency. Unless therefore, a nation is committed to a long term counterinsurgency operation, border barriers will not be effective. Few nations, particularly the United States, have demonstrated such patience. In this regard, the United States approach in Vietnam was plagued by strategies to achieve a quick victory. Yet when one considers the time and resources ultimately expended by the United States in Vietnam, the failure to use border barriers early in that conflict appears to have been a tragic oversight. This is unfortunate because United States forces are particularly well suited for conducting border barrier operations, even under conditions that other larger, and more experienced armies would find unacceptable. Efficient border barrier operations require the utilization of modern technology and light, mobile forces inlieu of costly fortifications and large numbers of troops. In this regard, the United States armed forces, which for several decades have depended upon technology and mobility to meet a broad range of global commitments are well equipped and organized for conducting border barrier operations. For example, United States forces have a broad range of devices to assist them in detecting enemy movements including seismic and acoustical ground sensors, thermal vision devices, ground and airborne radar, and even infrared cameras mounted or satellites. Information received from these devices can be relayed to high speed computers which develop real time targeting information for artillery, gunships, airborne attack aircraft, or heliborne reaction forces. In addition, the computers can identify patterns of enemy infiltration and select likely areas to be seeded with pressure activated anti-personnel mines or other types of area denial weapons. The massive firepower immediately available to US forces from heavy artillery, aircraft-mounted cannons, and laser guided munitions, when tied into the sensor network, makes the use of troops unnecessary along the remote, rugged strips of many borders. The speed with which helicopters, short take-off and landing aircraft, and armored vehicles can deploy U.S. reaction forces from inland bases to trouble spots along the border further reduces the need for large numbers of defenders.
The effectiveness of U.S. technology against guerrilla sanctuaries was clearly demonstrated during Operation Dewey Canyon in Southeast Asia. This air interdiction operation against the Ho Chi Minh Trail , the main guerrilla supply route and sanctuary in Loas, made superb use of United States technology. To locate the enemy, ground sensors were emplaced along the Ho Chi Minh Trail by helicopters and transport aircraft while reconnaissance aircraft, using highly sensitive thermal detectors, monitored the trail day and night. Information from these sources was fed into computers which developed patterns of guerrilla convoy movement and identified supply depots. Based upon this information jet aircraft and helicopters were able to seed guerrilla supply routes, truck parks, and depots with anti-material and anti-personnel mines. Additionally, convoys were brought under attack from bombs, rockets, and laser-guided munitions the minute they started to move. The operation was so successful that in one year it was estimated that NVA supplies entering Vietnam were reduced by eighty percent. According to one observer, for every 320 tons of supplies along the trail only 10 tons survived to reach South Vietnam. Some military experts who were close to this secret and highly successful electronic war have concluded that "the presistent and patient application of superior technology can be decisive in guerrilla war situations."24 Certainly U.S. capabilities are even more impressive today and, if properly applied, could be just as decisive in defeating a guerrilla along almost any border in she world. Guerrilla warfare has become the predominant method of waging war in the twentieth century.
As the military capabilities of the major powers of the world have rapidly outpaced those of their adversaries, they have found themselves increasingly involved in counterinsurgency operations. France, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union have all, in the last twenty years alone, found themselves involved in lengthy, bloody counterinsurgency operations, often with disappointing results. The United States, more than any other major power, faces the prospect today of having to fight guerrillas again. The task at hand then for the military leadership of our country is to determine how counterinsurgencies can be fought and won. The strategic use of border barriers has been one successful technique employed by other counterinsurgency forces in the past. It has provided these forces with the capability to deny the guerrilla the benefits of sanctuary so critical to his survival. Border barriers have worked to defeat sanctuaries when diplomacy failed, and direct military intervention was not possible or was unwise. Along with other counterinsurgency techniques, it has allowed the counterinsurgency forces to divide the guerrilla and defeat him piecemeal United States forces are well equipped to use border barriers and grow more capable in this respect every day. They possess both the technology, firepower and mobility required to make border barrier operations both efficient and effective. What the United States military needs now is a better appreciation of the benefits of border barriers and an understanding of how they are best employed. In this regard, doctrine is needed which defines the conditions which favor the use of border barriers, describes how they are constructed, and provides the concepts for tactical barrier operations. Then and only then can America forces be expected to employ such barriers effectively. More than 10,000 Frenchmen lost their lives before the strategy of the Morice Line was perfected. We in the miltary today can ensure that this sacrifice was not for naught.
FOOTNOTES 1"Tunisia," TIME, 3 March,1985,p.25. 2"Algeria-Reluctant Rebel," TIME, 13 October, 1958, p. 25. 3Alistar Horne, A Savage War of Peace (New York: Viking Press, 1978), pp.263-264. 4Ibid, p.266. 5Harold D. Nelson,ed. Algeria, A Country Study. (Washington: The American University, 1979), p.58. 6Headquarters, Department of the Army, Couterguerrilla Operations, FM31-16 (Washington, 1967), pp. 98-100. 7"Why Saigon's Neighbors Fear Was Expansion," Armed Forces, 14 (February,1968), p.83. 8Ibid. 9Headquarters, Department of the Army, Low Intensity Conflict,FM100-20 (Washington, 1981), pp.96. 10Professor John D. Deiner, "Guerrilla Border Sanctuaries and Counterinsurgency War fare, " The Army Quarterly and Defense Jounal, 109 (April 1976), p.162. 11Horne, p.264. 12TIME, 13 October, 1958, p.28. 13George Weiss, "Bottle For the Ho Chi Minh Trail," Armed Forces Journal, 108 (February 1971), p. 18. 14Major G.R. Christmas, "Guerrilla Sanctuaries," Infantry, 63 (May-June, 1973), p.25. 15"The Cambodia Venture: An Assessment," TIME, 6 July, 1970, pp.16-17. 16Ibid, p. 17. 17Ibid. FOOTNOTES 18"Reports of More Aid to Afghan Rebels Stir Fueds," Washingtn Post, February 7, 1985, Section A, p.1. 19Major Leonard Supko, USMC, Personal Interview about observations while a member of U.N. Peacekeeping Forces in Palestine: Quantico, Virginia, 5 March 1985. 20Bard E. O'Neill, Armed Struggle in Palestine:A Political-Military Analysis (Boulder:Western Press, 1978), pp. 76-84. 21Horne, p. 264. 22Ibid, p.18. 23Weiss, pp.18-23. 24Ibid, p.18. BIBLIOGRAPHY "Algeria,Reluctant Rebel." TIME, 13 October 1985, pp. 25-29. "Behind the Lines In Algeria-Quiet, Then Sudden Death." US News and World Report, 18 April 1958, pp. 58-63. Brace, Richard and Joan. Ordeal In Algeria. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. "The Cambodia Venture: An Assessment." TIME, 6 July 1970, pp. 16-17. Christmas, Major G. R. "Guerrilla Sanctuaries." Infantry, 63(May-June 1968), 22-27. Deiner, Professor John D. "Guerrilla Border Sanctuaries and Counterinsurgent Warfare." Army Quarterly and Defense Journal 109 (April 1976), 162-178. "Fortifications," Collier's Encyclopedia (1975), Volume 10, 201-205. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Counterquerrilla Operations, FM 31-16. Washington: 1967. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Denial Operations and Barriers- FM 31-10. Washington: 1968. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Low Intersity Conflict, FM 100-20. Washington: 1981. Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. Counterinsurgency Operations, FMFM 8-2. Washington: 1980. Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace. New York: Viking Press, 1978. Hutcheson, Major John M. "Scorched Earth Policy: Soviets in Afganistan." Military Review, LXII (April 1982) 32-33. "McNamara Line: It's Still Abuilding, But." U.S. News and World Report, 13 (25 March 1968), 14. Nelson, Harold D., ed. Algeria, A Country Study. Washington: The American University, 1979. O'Neill, Bard E. Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political- Military Analysis. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978. "Reports of More Aid to Afghan Rebels Stir Fueds," Washington Post, February 7, 1985, Section A, p.1. Supko, Leonard, Major, USMC, Former member of U.N. Peace- keeping Forces, Palestine. Interview concerning Israeli security belt. Quantico, Virginia, March 5, 1985. "Tunisia, Good Offices From Friends." TIME, 3 March 1958, pp. 25-27. Weiss, George. "Battle For Control of Ho Chi Minh Trail." Armed Forces Journal, 108 (February 1971), 18-22. "Why Saigon's Neighbors Fear War Expansion." Armed Forces Management, 14 (February 1968), 83.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1985/HJR.htm
