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Pakistan holds key to Afghan conflict
By CLAUDE SALHANI,
UPI Contributing EditorPublished: Nov. 3, 2008 at 10:52
UPI.COM
Seven years after the start of the war in Afghanistan there is still no solution on the horizon. In fact, the security situation appears to be regressing. In recent months the Taliban have been on the resurgence, creating mounting challenges for the U.S.-led multinational force in Afghanistan. Rounding up the insurgents seems much like trying to pick up quicksilver. No sooner have they been rounded up in one locality than they appear in another.
One of the reasons why tracking down the Taliban and al-Qaida has been so difficult is because solving the Afghan problem without solving the Pakistan problem is never going to solve the problem. But as one Afghan official recently told this reporter, as long as Pakistan remains dependent on the three A's -- the army, Allah and America -- the conflict with the Taliban is unlikely to go away.
"Terrorism has become a lucrative industry for the Pakistani military," a senior Afghan said. "It has been seven years since the United States launched the war in Afghanistan to hunt down the Taliban, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida," an Afghan diplomat told this reporter. Given the resources in weaponry, personnel and finances available to the United States, greater inroads should have been made by now.
The United States and the NATO coalition, however, have committed major gaffes along the way, not least being the launch of the Iraq war. Officials and experts at all levels concur that Iraq was an unnecessary distraction.
"Unfortunately, the Americans allowed themselves to be sidetracked by Iraq," said an Afghan official. The war in Iraq took priority over Afghanistan with troops and equipment being sent to Iraq. Another major problem, Afghan officials say, was trusting former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf.
Now, the key to resolving the Afghan problem can be found beyond the borders of that war-torn country in neighboring Pakistan.
Francesc Vendrell, the European Union's special representative in Afghanistan, told a conference attended by some 380 security and conflict-resolution specialists in Geneva, Switzerland, last month that "the situation in Afghanistan today is getting worse than it has ever been."
"The Taliban have been able to mount attacks," admitted Vendrell, warning against any urge Western countries might have to pull their troops out. "We must definitely not think about moving out of Afghanistan," said the EU diplomat. "This is not the time to leave.
"We need to stay as long as the Afghan public, through their elected officials, want us to stay," he said.
Summing up what went wrong for the coalition and warning against a premature withdrawal of coalition troops, Vendrell placed part of the blame on the coalition for trusting Musharraf.
"It was one of the coalition's greatest errors," said the European diplomat.
Indeed, the mistakes committed in Afghanistan were numerous. Vendrell counted them off.
One. The international community's delay in convening the Bonn Conference, which grouped representatives from Afghanistan's major tribes and factions. By the time the Bonn meeting took place, "we were faced with a fait accompli," said the EU diplomat.
Two. The decision by the United Nations "to go for a light footprint in Afghanistan."
Three. The low profile adopted by the United Nations. One example, he cited, was the failure to reform the police force. Nor was there any concentrated effort by the international force to remove weapons, which were in abundance.
Four. The U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, which distracted from the main objective.
Five. Limiting the International Security Assistance Force.
Six. The United States' initial refusal to accept military assistance from allied countries immediately following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon, when the Bush administration failed to take advantage of the sympathy shown to the United States.
"After Sept. 11, Canadians and Europeans were ready and willing to send forces into Afghanistan," said Vendrell. "By the time the decision was made, it was too late."
But one of the gravest mistakes, said Vendrell, was trusting Musharraf. "We should not have taken Musharraf at his word," he said. "The result is that we just now realized that we cannot solve the Afghan problem without solving the problem in Pakistan."
But before any realignment of forces can be achieved, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive policy for the region. "We didn't have one then, we don't have one now," he said.
With just a little over two months left before the Bush administration hands the reins of power over to the next president, there is little left for Bush to do. On the other hand, Afghanistan will be just one of the many sensitive issues requesting immediate attention that the new resident of the White House will have to tackle. Among those issues will no doubt be the question of money. Since 2001 the United States has funneled more than $10 billion to Pakistan, much of it supposedly to combat terrorism. Yet so long as the Pakistani army continues to profit from America's financial aid, the industry that terrorism has become will remain impossible to eradicate.
(Claude Salhani is editor of the Middle East Times.)
© 2008 United Press International
By CLAUDE SALHANI,
UPI Contributing EditorPublished: Nov. 3, 2008 at 10:52
UPI.COM
Seven years after the start of the war in Afghanistan there is still no solution on the horizon. In fact, the security situation appears to be regressing. In recent months the Taliban have been on the resurgence, creating mounting challenges for the U.S.-led multinational force in Afghanistan. Rounding up the insurgents seems much like trying to pick up quicksilver. No sooner have they been rounded up in one locality than they appear in another.
One of the reasons why tracking down the Taliban and al-Qaida has been so difficult is because solving the Afghan problem without solving the Pakistan problem is never going to solve the problem. But as one Afghan official recently told this reporter, as long as Pakistan remains dependent on the three A's -- the army, Allah and America -- the conflict with the Taliban is unlikely to go away.
"Terrorism has become a lucrative industry for the Pakistani military," a senior Afghan said. "It has been seven years since the United States launched the war in Afghanistan to hunt down the Taliban, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida," an Afghan diplomat told this reporter. Given the resources in weaponry, personnel and finances available to the United States, greater inroads should have been made by now.
The United States and the NATO coalition, however, have committed major gaffes along the way, not least being the launch of the Iraq war. Officials and experts at all levels concur that Iraq was an unnecessary distraction.
"Unfortunately, the Americans allowed themselves to be sidetracked by Iraq," said an Afghan official. The war in Iraq took priority over Afghanistan with troops and equipment being sent to Iraq. Another major problem, Afghan officials say, was trusting former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf.
Now, the key to resolving the Afghan problem can be found beyond the borders of that war-torn country in neighboring Pakistan.
Francesc Vendrell, the European Union's special representative in Afghanistan, told a conference attended by some 380 security and conflict-resolution specialists in Geneva, Switzerland, last month that "the situation in Afghanistan today is getting worse than it has ever been."
"The Taliban have been able to mount attacks," admitted Vendrell, warning against any urge Western countries might have to pull their troops out. "We must definitely not think about moving out of Afghanistan," said the EU diplomat. "This is not the time to leave.
"We need to stay as long as the Afghan public, through their elected officials, want us to stay," he said.
Summing up what went wrong for the coalition and warning against a premature withdrawal of coalition troops, Vendrell placed part of the blame on the coalition for trusting Musharraf.
"It was one of the coalition's greatest errors," said the European diplomat.
Indeed, the mistakes committed in Afghanistan were numerous. Vendrell counted them off.
One. The international community's delay in convening the Bonn Conference, which grouped representatives from Afghanistan's major tribes and factions. By the time the Bonn meeting took place, "we were faced with a fait accompli," said the EU diplomat.
Two. The decision by the United Nations "to go for a light footprint in Afghanistan."
Three. The low profile adopted by the United Nations. One example, he cited, was the failure to reform the police force. Nor was there any concentrated effort by the international force to remove weapons, which were in abundance.
Four. The U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, which distracted from the main objective.
Five. Limiting the International Security Assistance Force.
Six. The United States' initial refusal to accept military assistance from allied countries immediately following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon, when the Bush administration failed to take advantage of the sympathy shown to the United States.
"After Sept. 11, Canadians and Europeans were ready and willing to send forces into Afghanistan," said Vendrell. "By the time the decision was made, it was too late."
But one of the gravest mistakes, said Vendrell, was trusting Musharraf. "We should not have taken Musharraf at his word," he said. "The result is that we just now realized that we cannot solve the Afghan problem without solving the problem in Pakistan."
But before any realignment of forces can be achieved, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive policy for the region. "We didn't have one then, we don't have one now," he said.
With just a little over two months left before the Bush administration hands the reins of power over to the next president, there is little left for Bush to do. On the other hand, Afghanistan will be just one of the many sensitive issues requesting immediate attention that the new resident of the White House will have to tackle. Among those issues will no doubt be the question of money. Since 2001 the United States has funneled more than $10 billion to Pakistan, much of it supposedly to combat terrorism. Yet so long as the Pakistani army continues to profit from America's financial aid, the industry that terrorism has become will remain impossible to eradicate.
(Claude Salhani is editor of the Middle East Times.)
© 2008 United Press International
