With the system operational China is the third member of an elite group, along with the US and Russia, to develop a satellite navigation system.
The US spent 20 years and more than $20 billion on the GPS. Completed in 1994, the system has 24 navigation satellites and is widely used around the world.
Beidou has its own unique features, Ran said.
"It not only tells users where they are and what time it is but also allows users to tell others the information through short messages," Ran said, adding that this feature is being considered by other systems.
Russia's Glonass system achieved a 24-satellite constellation in 1996 but succumbed to funding problems.
The rebuilding of the Glonass system is almost finished and Russian media reported that the system resumed service earlier this month.
The European Union and the European Space Agency are building the Galileo satellite navigation system. Japan and India also intend to build independent regional navigation systems.
"Countries build their own systems because owning an independent satellite navigation system is important to economic development and national security," said Pang Zhihao, deputy editor-in-chief of the monthly publication Space International.
There have long been concerns that the US might take its dominant GPS offline in certain international emergencies.
Ran said that the Beidou system will be "helpful" to national defense.
An "independent and controllable" satellite navigation system can guarantee national economic development as well as scientific and industrial strength, he said.
China started to reduce its reliance on the GPS in 2000, when it sent an experimental pair of positioning satellites into orbit.
But Ran stressed that Beidou is "built for the world", as the compatibility of various systems enhances reliability for users.
"If you only use GPS there will be blind spots. But from demonstrations I saw recently, receivers that are compatible with Beidou will overcome these problems," he said.
He encouraged enterprises at home and abroad to join the research and development of application terminals compatible with Beidou.
The office put a test version of the system's Interface Control Document online on Tuesday, which is a technical document vital for the manufacturing and development of receivers and chips.
The prospects for the country's satellite navigation industry look bright, experts said.
Analysts estimated that around 2020 the industry's output will reach $500 billion globally, including 400 billion yuan ($63 billion) to 500 billion yuan from China.
According to the 2011 Report on Application of Geosaptial Information in China released on Monday, the number of satellite navigation application terminals in China has grown from less than 100,000 in 2000 to more than 10 million in 2009. The number is expected to reach 340 million by 2015.
An insider said a compatible receiver for car use costs 1,600 yuan to 3,000 yuan, higher than a GPS receiver.
"Chips supporting both GPS and Beidou systems have been developed, and terminals have been produced. There are no technical hurdles for the industry," said Han Shaowei, CEO of Beijing-based Unicore Communications Inc, a major navigation chip and core component provider.
Beidou application terminals have been put into use in vehicles, such as government cars in Guangdong province.
Ran said that private terminal makers in Guangdong are testing their receivers on the road, and the products seem stable.
"The price of the compatible terminals is expected to be slashed next year," he said.
Reasons for Compass
The Russian GLONASS was developed to support the Soviet Navy, and the U.S. GPS arose from the merger of previously separate Air Force and Navy satellite navigation efforts. China began researching satellite navigation and positioning technologies in the 1960s, but it was not until 1983 that a plan for satellite navigation and positioning system was developed. The “Double Star Rapid Positioning System” was the basis for the Beidou-1 two-satellite RDSS system that was formally approved for development in 1994. The impetus for the Compass systems is not fully known, but press reports attribute it to military requirements for more accurate missile targeting.
The Chinese were close observers of the role of GPS in the first Gulf War. Chinese writings on military doctrine began to talk of “war under informationalized conditions” and how information from space-based systems such as GPS was changing the nature of modern warfare. Exploiting these new information sources required not just space capabilities but changes in how military forces were organized, trained, and equipped.
Chinese security interests encompass not only China itself and nearby areas, but also the sea lanes that enable the import of raw materials and export of finished goods. In recent years, China has shown an increasing interest in “maritime domain awareness,” in which satellite navigation is used for monitoring the transit of ships in the Indian Ocean (for example, oil from the Middle East) and the South China Sea (minerals from Australia, fishing zones). Satellite navigation is a dual-use, commercial and military, interest for China, and this may have prompted support for the more advanced, independent GNSS that would become Beidou-2 or Compass.
Regardless of the cause, People’s Liberation Army officials have said that China needs it own satellite positioning system to ensure its ability to conduct independent military actions. The later 1990s saw continued Beidou-1 satellite deployments while design of the newer Beidou-2/Compass satellites began. China joined the Galileo consortium in 2003 but abandoned it in 2006 in dissatisfaction over access to technology and work share arrangements. Efforts on Compass accelerated, and the first experimental satellite of the new system was launched in 2007.
In a September 2010 interview with Chinese press, Duan Zhaoyu, vice president of BDStar Navigation, said that there are currently more than 20,000 civilian users of the Beidou-1 navigation system, 60 percent of whom use products from his company. More than 10,000 of these users are fishermen in the South China Sea. Not surprisingly, the Chinese government and military constituted the majority of users as it was also reported that as of August 2009, there were only 60,000 Beidou users in total. The number of registered terminal users amounted to only 1 percent of the system’s capacity, leaving the satellite resource seriously under-used.
The underutilization of Beidou-1 is both a challenge and an opportunity for the Compass system in both domestic and international applications. The designer of the first Chinese satellites and current Beidou chief designer, Sun Jiadong has stressed the importance of actual utilization in arguing that “satellites in the sky should be coordinated with ground applications” and “pushing China’s Beidou satellite navigation system to bring as much economic and social benefit as early and as quickly as possible.” In order to do this, “…the state should promulgate corresponding policies, regulations, and systems as soon as possible to support development of the new satellite navigation application industry. It should guide, encourage, and attract even more Chinese enterprises and public institutions to actively participate in the construction of an industrial chain for ground applications.”
Internationally, China has stressed cooperation with other GNSS systems. At the June 2010 meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization, the Chinese presentation said that Beidou-2 (Compass) would “provide high-quality open services free of charge from direct users, and worldwide use of Beidou is encouraged,” and that Beidou-2 will “pursue solutions to realize compatibility and interoperability with other satellite navigation systems.”
Strategic Significance of Compass
Unlike Galileo, Compass is not a multinational cooperative program nor did it ever consider being a public-private partnership. Like GPS and GLONASS, Compass was created as an independent strategic effort by a national government for military and economic benefits.
Unlike the history of GPS and GLONASS, however, the Chinese government from the beginning recognized the dual-use nature of Compass signals. Like GPS today, Compass plans to deploy CDMA signals at multiple frequencies to support a full range of application, from transportation to precision positioning and timing.
Like Galileo, Compass still has to demonstrate that its signals are stable, operationally reliable, and accurately represented by published interface control documents to attract manufacturers to build the capability into their products. Galileo, Compass, and GLONASS all have the challenge of meeting the expectation of the existing installed base of billions of GPS users — whether or not they know they are reliant on GPS.
The technical management of Compass is clearer than its policy management. Compass and Beidou-1 are the responsibility of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), the administrative holding company for the China Academy of Spaceflight Technology (CAST), the primary state-owned contractor for the Chinese space program. The military plays a large role in all Chinese space activities, and in recent years there has been uncertainty as to who is the government policy leader for space. In particular, the role of the China National Space Agency (CNSA) appears to have diminished in recent years. CNSA leaders scheduled to speak at major international conferences, such as the International Astronautical Federation, have cancelled at the last minute, while PLA speakers have presented instead.
When U.S. President Barack Obama and China’s President Hu Jintao met in Beijing in 2009, their joint summit statement included a call for the NASA administrator to meet with an unspecified Chinese counterpart. Some of this may be coincidence due to other time demands such as launch schedules, but the Chinese decision-making hierarchy for space remains as opaque as it does in so many other areas.
The opaqueness of Chinese political decision-making prompts speculation as to what China’s long-term strategic intent is with respect to Compass. The advent of open Compass signals would be potentially positive for the current installed base of GPS users — providing interoperable signals that improved the availability of positioning solutions. Internationally, the Chinese presence helps secure the international use of the RNSS spectrum and could be a potential ally in suppressing commercial sales of GNSS jamming devices — some of which are manufactured in China today. The view from Russia with respect to GLONASS is likely to be similar to that of GPS; Compass is largely a complementary system.
From a European perspective, however, Compass is more problematic, both technically and commercially. The signal overlay on the Galileo PRS is a potential complication for Europe being able to deny PRS access in times of emergency.
Perhaps more importantly, the rapid pace of Compass satellite deployments means that Compass may reach an initially operational capability sooner than Galileo. This is highly probable for coverage in Asia and increasingly likely on a global basis as Galileo faces criticism over cost increases and schedule delays. While Galileo has published an open service ICD and China has not, it would be a simple matter for China to time the release of an official Compass ICD one product cycle (that is, 18 months) before the 2012 completion of Asia-Pacific coverage. This would make Compass potentially very attractive to manufacturers looking to decide what would be of most benefit to the existing installed base.
In general, China pursues its space activities as part of broad approach to what might be termed “comprehensive national power” to include military power, economic power, diplomatic influence, scientific and technological capabilities, and even political and cultural unity. This need not necessarily mean that such power will be used for aggressive purposes.
If China’s strategic intent is to ensure its own independence and a place at the global table, then it is possible that Compass will not be harmful to U.S. interests. This outcome will depend on whether China continues to work with the international community in forums such as the ITU, the ICG, APEC, and so on, maintains open markets, and does not use Compass in military efforts to force changes in the status quo regarding Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the Indian Ocean.
Since China’s strategic intentions are unclear, it makes sense for the United States to seek bilateral discussions with China on Compass and to maintain a close strategic dialog with other countries in the region, notably Japan, Australia, Korea, Russia, and India. These countries are not only militarily and economically important, but also have their own GNSS-related systems and equities to consider.
The choices for China are whether Compass will be part of its “peaceful rise” and will serve truly national interests. Those interests could be seen as harnessing the kinds of dramatic IT productivity benefits other economies have seen in GNSS applications — enhanced by open, market-driven innovation and competition.
Alternatively, it is possible to imagine China closing off its domestic market, protecting domestic state-owned enterprises, and focusing on the space and military aspects of Compass rather than market-driven civil and commercial applications.
The question for Chinese leaders is whether they should measure the success of Compass just by the success of Chinese firms at home or by the global acceptance of Compass as a reliable brand name for GNSS services and signals.
Compass is like China itself, where there are both great promise and some concerns. The signs to date for Compass are positive and will hopefully continue on the path of engagement and cooperation. The United States and the global GPS community should continue to encourage those positive signs in working with China, commercially, diplomatically, scientifically, and (perhaps especially) with more direct military-to-military contacts. All of these efforts can increase the chances that China will join the United States as another good steward of GNSS.
