angeldemon_007
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As India prepares to sign the mother of all combat aircraft deals, the jawan remains ignored and uncared for. Our policy-planning is truly skewed.
In the last few months there have been a couple of statements that suggest India is on the verge of announcing its decision on the mother of all combat aircraft deals. This is, of course, the order to purchase 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft. Quite possibly the worlds last single largest import order thats how big it is. And it isnt simply a question of India buying the 126 aircraft, but just as much about which one it will buy, as also what happens to those that it declines to purchase.
There are enough murmurs in the industry that hint at the possible closure of certain design and assembly lines if India doesnt buy the aircraft from a particular country. So it isnt only about India, but the survival, as we know it, of some of the aircraft design bureaus. Hence, when someone in India suggests the country is on the verge of announcing its decision, the combat aircraft industry awaits with bated breath. More so since the person making that suggestion does not hold executive office.
The chief of the Indian Air Force made two statements, suggesting that India is likely to announce its choice of medium multi-role combat aircraft. This can only mean one of two things. Either the Government of India was using him to test the waters and see how those in the race for the contract react. Also, how the people of India react to what is supposedly their security future. The other less charitable reason is that he was jumping the gun and trying to force the Governments hand on this mega deal. Either way it is bad policy, poor judgement and pathetic political planning.
By the order of business, the chief of the Air Force is not in a position to pronounce on decisions that are solely the prerogative of the executive. If the Government of India was using him to float trial balloons, it reflects poorly on its self-confidence, its ability to take decisions and handle their fallout. The Government of India and its Ministry of Defence only harm their own image by resorting to such practices. If they have not encouraged the chief of Air Force to make the pronouncement, then it devolves upon the Ministry of Defence to put the matter to rest. At this level of things, and in this game, silence is not golden.
When it comes to India and its combat aircraft, the story is a shabby account of skewed, haphazard and inconsistent decision-making. It begins with the thesis that India cannot make its own aircraft, what with the scandalous manner in which it invested crores of rupees in the 1960s and 1970s in the HF-24 Marut programme. There was a problem with the mating of the airframe and the engine, and instead of rectifying the glitch through further research and upgrades of models, India closed the programme. In essence, it threw the baby out with the bathwater. Research lines were closed; scientists and engineers were assigned different tasks.
What that bizarre decision resulted in was a colossal waste of talent, time and fundamental research. India once again became dependent on imports to meet its security needs. Since there was no political stake in India making its own combat aircraft, it was easy to pull the plug on what was an excellent research and development platform. The domestic industry could have used that platform to further develop its skills.
As a result of which there are murmurs today of time and cost overruns on the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft programme. It is only logical there would be, since the decision-makers closed the previous programme without even retaining the drawings to carry domestic research and development forward. Consequently, what India has in its combat squadron strength is the strangest mix of aircraft types and nationalities, putting additional burden on logistics, the silent but ultimately decisive vehicle to victory in combat.
All of this has happened because the political direction to military planning has been absent, or it has been in cohorts with the dodgy decisions taken. The medium multi-role combat aircraft deal, order, contract, is following the same slippery footsteps of its various predecessors.
The indigenous Tejas LCA programme is in its last lap. India has the additional fifth generation fighter aircraft programme underway with the Russian Federation. Over and above all of these platforms is the Su-30 India series of heavy combat aircraft. What all of this points to is a very hazy light at the end of tunnel.
In terms of technologies available in the medium multi-role combat aircraft purchase, already available with the ongoing induction of the SU-30, and are likely to be available with the fifth generation fighter aircraft, where does India stand? Its an important question, for what India is aiming to do is to simply sustain the assembly lines of contemporary aircraft with little inputs into the countrys future research and development capabilities. As the very knowledgeable, and practical, Ajay Shukla repeatedly says, the amount of money India is willing to spend on contemporary imports is more than enough to fund its entry onto the international stage as an independent developer of combat aircraft. It is only a question of political will. Going by the recent pronouncements, there is something clearly lacking in that direction.
The nature of combat has evolved the world over and India is no exception. In fact, India is the most active practitioner of this recent form of combat. Since the late-1950s India has been active in counter-insurgency operations in one form or the other and in one terrain or the other. Other countries have only now begun to rewrite their doctrines on low-intensity operations, whereas India is an encyclopaedia in this form of combat.
It, of course, took the Indian Peace-Keeping Force experience in Sri Lanka to change military mindsets in New Delhi. But that has yet not resulted in India making its foot soldier, its unheralded infantryman, the focal point of its military planning. For it is this soldier who determines victory and defeat in modern combat as India fights its way to security.
In the four decades since 1971 India has spent a scandalous amount of money on big-ticket military items and has spent an outrageously paltry sum for its ubiquitous jawan. Food, clothing, protective gear, weapons and communication systems are the basic requirements for modernisation. And yet they remain un-organised, irrational and slapdash in their implementation.
The simplest, yet cruelest, example is that of those CRPF jawans who have died in horrendously large numbers combing the jungles for Maoists. Well, most would have lived had they been carrying a simple tourniquet to prevent bleeding to death. Realising this simple fact and taking suitable corrective action doesnt require rocket science or knowledge of avionics.
The Pioneer :: Home : >> Misguided priorities
In the last few months there have been a couple of statements that suggest India is on the verge of announcing its decision on the mother of all combat aircraft deals. This is, of course, the order to purchase 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft. Quite possibly the worlds last single largest import order thats how big it is. And it isnt simply a question of India buying the 126 aircraft, but just as much about which one it will buy, as also what happens to those that it declines to purchase.
There are enough murmurs in the industry that hint at the possible closure of certain design and assembly lines if India doesnt buy the aircraft from a particular country. So it isnt only about India, but the survival, as we know it, of some of the aircraft design bureaus. Hence, when someone in India suggests the country is on the verge of announcing its decision, the combat aircraft industry awaits with bated breath. More so since the person making that suggestion does not hold executive office.
The chief of the Indian Air Force made two statements, suggesting that India is likely to announce its choice of medium multi-role combat aircraft. This can only mean one of two things. Either the Government of India was using him to test the waters and see how those in the race for the contract react. Also, how the people of India react to what is supposedly their security future. The other less charitable reason is that he was jumping the gun and trying to force the Governments hand on this mega deal. Either way it is bad policy, poor judgement and pathetic political planning.
By the order of business, the chief of the Air Force is not in a position to pronounce on decisions that are solely the prerogative of the executive. If the Government of India was using him to float trial balloons, it reflects poorly on its self-confidence, its ability to take decisions and handle their fallout. The Government of India and its Ministry of Defence only harm their own image by resorting to such practices. If they have not encouraged the chief of Air Force to make the pronouncement, then it devolves upon the Ministry of Defence to put the matter to rest. At this level of things, and in this game, silence is not golden.
When it comes to India and its combat aircraft, the story is a shabby account of skewed, haphazard and inconsistent decision-making. It begins with the thesis that India cannot make its own aircraft, what with the scandalous manner in which it invested crores of rupees in the 1960s and 1970s in the HF-24 Marut programme. There was a problem with the mating of the airframe and the engine, and instead of rectifying the glitch through further research and upgrades of models, India closed the programme. In essence, it threw the baby out with the bathwater. Research lines were closed; scientists and engineers were assigned different tasks.
What that bizarre decision resulted in was a colossal waste of talent, time and fundamental research. India once again became dependent on imports to meet its security needs. Since there was no political stake in India making its own combat aircraft, it was easy to pull the plug on what was an excellent research and development platform. The domestic industry could have used that platform to further develop its skills.
As a result of which there are murmurs today of time and cost overruns on the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft programme. It is only logical there would be, since the decision-makers closed the previous programme without even retaining the drawings to carry domestic research and development forward. Consequently, what India has in its combat squadron strength is the strangest mix of aircraft types and nationalities, putting additional burden on logistics, the silent but ultimately decisive vehicle to victory in combat.
All of this has happened because the political direction to military planning has been absent, or it has been in cohorts with the dodgy decisions taken. The medium multi-role combat aircraft deal, order, contract, is following the same slippery footsteps of its various predecessors.
The indigenous Tejas LCA programme is in its last lap. India has the additional fifth generation fighter aircraft programme underway with the Russian Federation. Over and above all of these platforms is the Su-30 India series of heavy combat aircraft. What all of this points to is a very hazy light at the end of tunnel.
In terms of technologies available in the medium multi-role combat aircraft purchase, already available with the ongoing induction of the SU-30, and are likely to be available with the fifth generation fighter aircraft, where does India stand? Its an important question, for what India is aiming to do is to simply sustain the assembly lines of contemporary aircraft with little inputs into the countrys future research and development capabilities. As the very knowledgeable, and practical, Ajay Shukla repeatedly says, the amount of money India is willing to spend on contemporary imports is more than enough to fund its entry onto the international stage as an independent developer of combat aircraft. It is only a question of political will. Going by the recent pronouncements, there is something clearly lacking in that direction.
The nature of combat has evolved the world over and India is no exception. In fact, India is the most active practitioner of this recent form of combat. Since the late-1950s India has been active in counter-insurgency operations in one form or the other and in one terrain or the other. Other countries have only now begun to rewrite their doctrines on low-intensity operations, whereas India is an encyclopaedia in this form of combat.
It, of course, took the Indian Peace-Keeping Force experience in Sri Lanka to change military mindsets in New Delhi. But that has yet not resulted in India making its foot soldier, its unheralded infantryman, the focal point of its military planning. For it is this soldier who determines victory and defeat in modern combat as India fights its way to security.
In the four decades since 1971 India has spent a scandalous amount of money on big-ticket military items and has spent an outrageously paltry sum for its ubiquitous jawan. Food, clothing, protective gear, weapons and communication systems are the basic requirements for modernisation. And yet they remain un-organised, irrational and slapdash in their implementation.
The simplest, yet cruelest, example is that of those CRPF jawans who have died in horrendously large numbers combing the jungles for Maoists. Well, most would have lived had they been carrying a simple tourniquet to prevent bleeding to death. Realising this simple fact and taking suitable corrective action doesnt require rocket science or knowledge of avionics.
The Pioneer :: Home : >> Misguided priorities
