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Militants likely to increase attacks on soft targets to challenge Pakistan Army's current control of security policy
Omar Hamid - IHS Jane's Intelligence Weekly
Pakistani Christians gather at a church damaged from a suicide bombing attack in Lahore, Pakistan
Key Points
The nature of major militant attacks in Pakistan has changed in the past three months. After the attack on the army Public School in Peshawar in December 2014, IHS forecast that the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its constituent groups would attempt to expand their target patterns to include "softer" targets affiliated with the government or security forces.
Over the past few months, this pattern has become established, with all major attacks since Peshawar targeting either religious minorities, such as Christians or Shias, or soft targets. In February 2015, there were major attacks on Shia mosques in Shikarpur and Rawalpindi, while police families' accommodation was attacked in Lahore. The latest attack came on 15 March, when 15 people were killed in suicide attacks on two churches in Lahore.
There are several reasons for this change in pattern. The TTP has been weakened by the Army operation in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) since June 2014. With its own logistics and command-and-control disrupted, it has become dependent on affiliate groups to carry out major attacks outside the FATA. These affiliate groups mostly consist of Sunni extremist militant factions whose natural focus has always been on targeting Shia and Christian minority communities. Furthermore, the increase in security surrounding established targets, such as military and government institutions, also means that attacking targets with a lower level of security carries a greater likelihood of success.
Following the Peshawar school attack, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government forged a national consensus on the issue of fighting terrorism. In practice, the army essentially took de facto control of security policy and forced all political parties into backing a new National Action Plan (NAP) against terrorism. The plan envisages more severe anti-terrorism laws, removal of the government's previous moratorium on the death penalty, greater controls on madrassahs and foreign funding, and de-politicisation of civilian law enforcement agencies to ensure a more effective response against militancy. Although the NAP has not yet been fully implemented, its effects are already being felt, with a number of high profile TTP militants having been executed since December as a direct response to the army school attack.
IHS assesses that the move towards softer targets is also an indicator of the TTP's growing desperation. Over the past year, the army has not only pushed the TTP out of its tribal strongholds, but before the operation it was also successful in provoking splinters within the TTP, with several key commanders refusing to fight under the TTP head, Mullah Fazlullah. Increased co-operation between the Pakistani and US and Afghan security forces has ensured that the TTP leadership, which is now in hiding in eastern Afghanistan, continues to be targeted across the border in Afghanistan. On 13 March, the Pakistan government announced that Pakistani would produce an armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), further increasing the risk for the TTP leadership that crossing the border into Afghanistan will not place them beyond the reach of Pakistani government forces.
FORECAST
The TTP is likely to continue its strategy of attacking 'soft' government or civilian targets. Its objective is to try to build up a critical mass of public opinion with enough such attacks to force both the military and the PML-N government to back off from implementation of the NAP and towards negotiations with the militants, which would enable them to re-establish themselves in their strongholds in North Waziristan. The militants are unlikely to expand their target pattern to industrial targets, but religious minorities, as in the case of the attack on the churches in Lahore and on several Shia mosques over the past few months, will remain at high risk. Military and police housing areas, and public spaces such as shopping centres, malls and schools, will also remain at high risk as they are considered vulnerable and easily achievable targets.
Omar Hamid - IHS Jane's Intelligence Weekly
Pakistani Christians gather at a church damaged from a suicide bombing attack in Lahore, Pakistan
Key Points
- On 15 March, 15 people were killed in suicide attacks on two churches in Lahore, reflecting a change in strategy by the TTP.
- The army's operation in Pakistan's Tribal Areas, and the implementation of the government's new National Action Plan to combat terrorism, is increasing pressure on militant groups.
- With their traditional target set of security forces and government institutions having become harder to attack due to increased security, Islamist militants are likely to resort to more attacks against softer targets in order to put pressure on the government to make concessions.
The nature of major militant attacks in Pakistan has changed in the past three months. After the attack on the army Public School in Peshawar in December 2014, IHS forecast that the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its constituent groups would attempt to expand their target patterns to include "softer" targets affiliated with the government or security forces.
Over the past few months, this pattern has become established, with all major attacks since Peshawar targeting either religious minorities, such as Christians or Shias, or soft targets. In February 2015, there were major attacks on Shia mosques in Shikarpur and Rawalpindi, while police families' accommodation was attacked in Lahore. The latest attack came on 15 March, when 15 people were killed in suicide attacks on two churches in Lahore.
There are several reasons for this change in pattern. The TTP has been weakened by the Army operation in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) since June 2014. With its own logistics and command-and-control disrupted, it has become dependent on affiliate groups to carry out major attacks outside the FATA. These affiliate groups mostly consist of Sunni extremist militant factions whose natural focus has always been on targeting Shia and Christian minority communities. Furthermore, the increase in security surrounding established targets, such as military and government institutions, also means that attacking targets with a lower level of security carries a greater likelihood of success.
Following the Peshawar school attack, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government forged a national consensus on the issue of fighting terrorism. In practice, the army essentially took de facto control of security policy and forced all political parties into backing a new National Action Plan (NAP) against terrorism. The plan envisages more severe anti-terrorism laws, removal of the government's previous moratorium on the death penalty, greater controls on madrassahs and foreign funding, and de-politicisation of civilian law enforcement agencies to ensure a more effective response against militancy. Although the NAP has not yet been fully implemented, its effects are already being felt, with a number of high profile TTP militants having been executed since December as a direct response to the army school attack.
IHS assesses that the move towards softer targets is also an indicator of the TTP's growing desperation. Over the past year, the army has not only pushed the TTP out of its tribal strongholds, but before the operation it was also successful in provoking splinters within the TTP, with several key commanders refusing to fight under the TTP head, Mullah Fazlullah. Increased co-operation between the Pakistani and US and Afghan security forces has ensured that the TTP leadership, which is now in hiding in eastern Afghanistan, continues to be targeted across the border in Afghanistan. On 13 March, the Pakistan government announced that Pakistani would produce an armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), further increasing the risk for the TTP leadership that crossing the border into Afghanistan will not place them beyond the reach of Pakistani government forces.
FORECAST
The TTP is likely to continue its strategy of attacking 'soft' government or civilian targets. Its objective is to try to build up a critical mass of public opinion with enough such attacks to force both the military and the PML-N government to back off from implementation of the NAP and towards negotiations with the militants, which would enable them to re-establish themselves in their strongholds in North Waziristan. The militants are unlikely to expand their target pattern to industrial targets, but religious minorities, as in the case of the attack on the churches in Lahore and on several Shia mosques over the past few months, will remain at high risk. Military and police housing areas, and public spaces such as shopping centres, malls and schools, will also remain at high risk as they are considered vulnerable and easily achievable targets.
