Manticore
RETIRED MOD
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With all of the recent discussion on Air Sea battle and how it might affect a "pivot to the Pacific", it may be useful to examine the last attempt at such a strategy by a great power with major interests but few military forces in the region. That power was of course the British Empire. These two ships represent the end of that attempt. These photos show HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse leaving their forward base at Singapore on Dec. 8 1941 to intercept Japanese amphibious forces invading Malaya. Two days later they were both sunk with heavy loss of life by Japanese aircraft. Singapore itself fell to Japanese forces less than two months later. The British had been planning a "pivot to the Pacific" with just this sort of war in mind for over twenty years. Why did their effort fail?
Some background is in order. In 1919 with victory over the Central Powers at hand, Great Britain should have been looking forward to a period of peace. The Empire's immediate opponent, Imperial Germany was substantially crippled by the Peace of Versailles. Recent friends, but historical opponents like France and now Soviet Russia were exhausted by war and in no position to challenge the victorious Royal Navy at sea or attempt to conquer British imperial possessions. Instead the British warily eyed two friends and allies, the United States and the Empire of Japan as its next probable enemies. Although still the single biggest country for British investment, the United States had grown powerful and some American navalists demanded a navy "second to none" as a guarantee of safety against their former friends. Japan's naval forces had also grown during the war and while eager to take German colonial possessions in the Pacific, Japan had shown no interest in sending large formations of ground troops to die in the trenches of Europe or the deserts of the Middle East. Both powers were rising economies and the British may have been justified in feeling threatened.
Britain was in no position to wage a new naval race. Debts from the First World War, widespread disgust for all things military in the wake of the conflict and public demand for armaments reduction and social spending left the British no choice but to seek accommodation and defense reductions. If this was not bad enough, internal divisions in the British Empire essentially forced them to choose between the U.S. and Japan for the nation with which Britain would accept naval parity. The Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand wanted Britain to choose Japan for obvious geographic reasons while others like Winston Churchill (himself half American by birth) wanted a closer relationship with the United States. The British chose the Americans and in the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 accepted naval parity in capital ships with the U.S. The Anglo-Japanese defense treaty, which had been in place since 1902, was allowed to lapse in 1923. In return for Commonwealth concerns and based on feelings by some British military and civilian leaders that Japan might some day be hostile, Britain conceived its own planned "pivot to the Pacific" in case of hostilities with Japan.
When first conceived by British military leaderships, war with Japan was still considered unlikely. Even Churchill doubted there would be a war with Japan in his own lifetime. While planning to transfer a significant part of its battle fleet and air forces to the Pacific, the British still proceeded throughout the 1920s to reduce military spending. In the 1930s however, preparations became more serious. Japanese aggression against China and indifference to world condemnation spurred further British efforts in the Pacific. Singapore was re-constructed as a naval fortress. More troops and aircraft were dispatched to Malaya and British plans were revised to include updates in technology such as anti-submarine and anti-air defenses for the city. The British naval effort to relieve its Pacific possessions entitled "Main Fleet to Singapore" was well planned and war gamed on par with the U.S. War Plan Orange strategy for war in the Pacific. All should have gone well. The British should have been able to relieve Singapore and at least successfully defend the Malaya peninsula against a Japanese invasion.
Sadly no war planning should be done in a vacuum. Britain was first confronted by a resurgent fascist Germany and Italy. A successful defense of France and Western Europe might have allowed the British to send part of their fleet to the Far East, but France fell. U-boat and surface raider attacks in the Atlantic scattered the British fleet and losses in the Mediterranean subduing the Italian fleet and its German Air Force allies further sapped British strength. In addition, in late 1941 half of the British battle fleet and aircraft carriers were undergoing badly needed refits at home in Britain as well as the United States. The British had only begun to effectively increase military spending in 1937, and long-delayed refits of badly worn out ships were finally being completed. When the Japanese occupied former French colonial airfields in Indochina and Winston Churchill needed to send at least a deterrent force to the Far East, all he really had to send were Prince of Wales and Repulse.
As the U.S. contemplates its own "pivot to the Pacific", what lessons might be learned from the British experience? (1). Be mindful that a lot can happen in a mere twenty years. Many senior leaders are conditioned to a Cold War that went on for decades. The period from 1990 to the present may not have seen the same level of change that transpired between 1919 and 1939, but the world today is significantly changed from the end of the Cold War. (2). Do not conduct war planning in a vacuum. Yesterday's friend could be tomorrow's enemy. Today's weakened former opponent may quickly rise again in a decade or two, and provide sophisticated arms to a rising theocracy. All three could also be simultaneous opponents. Forces must be available to cover a wide range of threats. The British planned to have "just enough" forces to fight in the Far East. When that fight actually came they were already too stressed on multiple fronts to send enough quality forces to the Pacific. (3) The choices made by a nation and the risks it is willing to accept have consequences. The British gambled that Japan would not attack in the 25 years after the First World War. When they did, the results cost them their Pacific imperial possessions and influence. Australia and New Zealand sought closer ties with the U.S. and Indian Empire troops captured in Singapore eventually joined the Japanese as an anti-colonial army to free India. If the U.S. gambles and looses, the cost both in lost allies and economic relationships could be staggering by comparison with Britain' s defeat in 1941. (4) Finally, this time there is no safety net. When the British failed to preserve their Pacific possessions, the United States was able to step in and fight the Pacific war against Japan near singled handed until 1945. Unlike then, no great democratic power like ourselves will step in to save the United States from a failed Pacific pivot.
The United States can successfully conduct a Pacific pivot of its military forces provided it heeds these lessons from Britain's failure. In the end, it really comes down to what choices a nation makes and what level of risk it chooses to sustain in pursuit of a given strategy. China might remain a friend for the next 25+ years, but then again it might become more aggressive and hostile. The Russians might again become strategic competitors and Iran remains unpredictable and dangerous. The British took risks then that we now cannot afford to do. Hopefully own own Pacific pivot will take these lessons into account. We do not want to be left some day with only a USS Prince of Wales and USS Repulse to counter aggression in the Pacific.
HMS Prince of Wales
HMS Repulse
Information Dissemination: Lessons from a previous "Pivot to the Pacific"
Some background is in order. In 1919 with victory over the Central Powers at hand, Great Britain should have been looking forward to a period of peace. The Empire's immediate opponent, Imperial Germany was substantially crippled by the Peace of Versailles. Recent friends, but historical opponents like France and now Soviet Russia were exhausted by war and in no position to challenge the victorious Royal Navy at sea or attempt to conquer British imperial possessions. Instead the British warily eyed two friends and allies, the United States and the Empire of Japan as its next probable enemies. Although still the single biggest country for British investment, the United States had grown powerful and some American navalists demanded a navy "second to none" as a guarantee of safety against their former friends. Japan's naval forces had also grown during the war and while eager to take German colonial possessions in the Pacific, Japan had shown no interest in sending large formations of ground troops to die in the trenches of Europe or the deserts of the Middle East. Both powers were rising economies and the British may have been justified in feeling threatened.
Britain was in no position to wage a new naval race. Debts from the First World War, widespread disgust for all things military in the wake of the conflict and public demand for armaments reduction and social spending left the British no choice but to seek accommodation and defense reductions. If this was not bad enough, internal divisions in the British Empire essentially forced them to choose between the U.S. and Japan for the nation with which Britain would accept naval parity. The Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand wanted Britain to choose Japan for obvious geographic reasons while others like Winston Churchill (himself half American by birth) wanted a closer relationship with the United States. The British chose the Americans and in the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 accepted naval parity in capital ships with the U.S. The Anglo-Japanese defense treaty, which had been in place since 1902, was allowed to lapse in 1923. In return for Commonwealth concerns and based on feelings by some British military and civilian leaders that Japan might some day be hostile, Britain conceived its own planned "pivot to the Pacific" in case of hostilities with Japan.
When first conceived by British military leaderships, war with Japan was still considered unlikely. Even Churchill doubted there would be a war with Japan in his own lifetime. While planning to transfer a significant part of its battle fleet and air forces to the Pacific, the British still proceeded throughout the 1920s to reduce military spending. In the 1930s however, preparations became more serious. Japanese aggression against China and indifference to world condemnation spurred further British efforts in the Pacific. Singapore was re-constructed as a naval fortress. More troops and aircraft were dispatched to Malaya and British plans were revised to include updates in technology such as anti-submarine and anti-air defenses for the city. The British naval effort to relieve its Pacific possessions entitled "Main Fleet to Singapore" was well planned and war gamed on par with the U.S. War Plan Orange strategy for war in the Pacific. All should have gone well. The British should have been able to relieve Singapore and at least successfully defend the Malaya peninsula against a Japanese invasion.
Sadly no war planning should be done in a vacuum. Britain was first confronted by a resurgent fascist Germany and Italy. A successful defense of France and Western Europe might have allowed the British to send part of their fleet to the Far East, but France fell. U-boat and surface raider attacks in the Atlantic scattered the British fleet and losses in the Mediterranean subduing the Italian fleet and its German Air Force allies further sapped British strength. In addition, in late 1941 half of the British battle fleet and aircraft carriers were undergoing badly needed refits at home in Britain as well as the United States. The British had only begun to effectively increase military spending in 1937, and long-delayed refits of badly worn out ships were finally being completed. When the Japanese occupied former French colonial airfields in Indochina and Winston Churchill needed to send at least a deterrent force to the Far East, all he really had to send were Prince of Wales and Repulse.
As the U.S. contemplates its own "pivot to the Pacific", what lessons might be learned from the British experience? (1). Be mindful that a lot can happen in a mere twenty years. Many senior leaders are conditioned to a Cold War that went on for decades. The period from 1990 to the present may not have seen the same level of change that transpired between 1919 and 1939, but the world today is significantly changed from the end of the Cold War. (2). Do not conduct war planning in a vacuum. Yesterday's friend could be tomorrow's enemy. Today's weakened former opponent may quickly rise again in a decade or two, and provide sophisticated arms to a rising theocracy. All three could also be simultaneous opponents. Forces must be available to cover a wide range of threats. The British planned to have "just enough" forces to fight in the Far East. When that fight actually came they were already too stressed on multiple fronts to send enough quality forces to the Pacific. (3) The choices made by a nation and the risks it is willing to accept have consequences. The British gambled that Japan would not attack in the 25 years after the First World War. When they did, the results cost them their Pacific imperial possessions and influence. Australia and New Zealand sought closer ties with the U.S. and Indian Empire troops captured in Singapore eventually joined the Japanese as an anti-colonial army to free India. If the U.S. gambles and looses, the cost both in lost allies and economic relationships could be staggering by comparison with Britain' s defeat in 1941. (4) Finally, this time there is no safety net. When the British failed to preserve their Pacific possessions, the United States was able to step in and fight the Pacific war against Japan near singled handed until 1945. Unlike then, no great democratic power like ourselves will step in to save the United States from a failed Pacific pivot.
The United States can successfully conduct a Pacific pivot of its military forces provided it heeds these lessons from Britain's failure. In the end, it really comes down to what choices a nation makes and what level of risk it chooses to sustain in pursuit of a given strategy. China might remain a friend for the next 25+ years, but then again it might become more aggressive and hostile. The Russians might again become strategic competitors and Iran remains unpredictable and dangerous. The British took risks then that we now cannot afford to do. Hopefully own own Pacific pivot will take these lessons into account. We do not want to be left some day with only a USS Prince of Wales and USS Repulse to counter aggression in the Pacific.
HMS Prince of Wales
HMS Repulse
Information Dissemination: Lessons from a previous "Pivot to the Pacific"
