Naheed Janjua
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Dr James M. Dorsey |
Common wisdom has it that ultimately failed or troubled popular revolts in 2011 in the Middle East and North Africa have sparked bloody civil wars and violent extremism, and given autocracy a new lease on life.
Indeed, there is no denying that a brutal civil war in Syria has killed hundreds of thousands and dislocated millions. Iraq, like Syria, is seeking to defeat the Islamic State (IS), the most vicious jihadist movement in recent history. Sectarianism and religious supremacism is ripping apart the fabric of societies in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond.
Yet, the legacy of the 2011 revolts is not simply massive violence, brutal jihadism, and choking repression. In fact, the revolts kicked off an era of change, one that is ugly, destabilizing, violent and unpredictable, and that may not lead any time soon to more liberal, let alone democratic rule.
Iraq, like Syria, is seeking to defeat the Islamic State (IS), the most vicious jihadist movement in recent history.
It is an era that is buffeted by autocrats’ need to push diversification of their economies and economic reform that involves a radical rewriting of social contracts. It also involves the need to upgrade autocracy to ensure sustainable economic change. That means making repressive rule more palatable by broadening the margins of acceptable social life and behaviour and creating channels for expressions of discontent and frustration.
Change by hook or by crook
Jihadist groups like IS have risen on the back of policies that have excluded or marginalized societal groups, counterrevolutions that have helped reverse advances made in 2011 without producing credible alternatives, mismanagement of expectations in the immediate wake of the popular revolts, and repression of whatever channels existed to express even modest or limited criticism.
IS, like it or not, constitutes a revolutionary force in the sense that it seeks radical and fundamental social, political and economic change. It may not be the kind of change many would want to embrace, but its philosophy thrives in an environment in which alternatives have little opportunity to blossom.
Read more: Humanitarian crisis in Syria expected to worsen in 2017: War Child Canada
Saudi Arabia, for all its warts, including ideological roots that it shares with jihadism, is like others in the region experimenting with controlled, albeit risky social and economic change. Granted, the purpose of the exercise is to ensure the survival of the ruling Al Saud family.
Nonetheless, social change such as greater entertainment opportunities in a culturally austere kingdom, less religious policing, and more opportunities for women, is tangible.
The problem, however, is as detailed in the 2016 Arab Human Development Report (AHDR), that social, economic and political reform is likely to succeed only if freedom to express grievances is guaranteed.
Warning that in the absence of freedoms “some Arabs would eventually resort to violence, with dire consequences,” the report noted that “the events of 2011 and their ramifications are the outcome of public policies over many decades that gradually led to the exclusion of large sectors of the population from economic, political and social life, depriving many people of appropriate health care, good educations and suitable livelihoods.”
Read more: Difficult 2016 for Saudi Arabia? Worse to come in 2017
A recipe for disaster
Little has changed in much of the Middle East and North Africa. The youth bulge is bulging, accounting for one third of the Arab world’s population. Employment prospects are limited and likely to deteriorate in the coming years.
“In the Arab region, the policies and laws that regulate the labour market hinder the growth of jobs in a manner that matches demographic growth and the needs of the market. This affects youth in particular and prevents the economic empowerment of youth.
The prevalence of nepotism and reliance on social connections play a large role in the distribution of the limited available jobs, prompting young people who are looking for jobs to depend on social relationships and family ties,” the report said.
read full:Is discontent the legacy of the spring revolutions in Arab world?
Common wisdom has it that ultimately failed or troubled popular revolts in 2011 in the Middle East and North Africa have sparked bloody civil wars and violent extremism, and given autocracy a new lease on life.
Indeed, there is no denying that a brutal civil war in Syria has killed hundreds of thousands and dislocated millions. Iraq, like Syria, is seeking to defeat the Islamic State (IS), the most vicious jihadist movement in recent history. Sectarianism and religious supremacism is ripping apart the fabric of societies in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond.
Yet, the legacy of the 2011 revolts is not simply massive violence, brutal jihadism, and choking repression. In fact, the revolts kicked off an era of change, one that is ugly, destabilizing, violent and unpredictable, and that may not lead any time soon to more liberal, let alone democratic rule.
Iraq, like Syria, is seeking to defeat the Islamic State (IS), the most vicious jihadist movement in recent history.
It is an era that is buffeted by autocrats’ need to push diversification of their economies and economic reform that involves a radical rewriting of social contracts. It also involves the need to upgrade autocracy to ensure sustainable economic change. That means making repressive rule more palatable by broadening the margins of acceptable social life and behaviour and creating channels for expressions of discontent and frustration.
Change by hook or by crook
Jihadist groups like IS have risen on the back of policies that have excluded or marginalized societal groups, counterrevolutions that have helped reverse advances made in 2011 without producing credible alternatives, mismanagement of expectations in the immediate wake of the popular revolts, and repression of whatever channels existed to express even modest or limited criticism.
IS, like it or not, constitutes a revolutionary force in the sense that it seeks radical and fundamental social, political and economic change. It may not be the kind of change many would want to embrace, but its philosophy thrives in an environment in which alternatives have little opportunity to blossom.
Read more: Humanitarian crisis in Syria expected to worsen in 2017: War Child Canada
Saudi Arabia, for all its warts, including ideological roots that it shares with jihadism, is like others in the region experimenting with controlled, albeit risky social and economic change. Granted, the purpose of the exercise is to ensure the survival of the ruling Al Saud family.
Nonetheless, social change such as greater entertainment opportunities in a culturally austere kingdom, less religious policing, and more opportunities for women, is tangible.
The problem, however, is as detailed in the 2016 Arab Human Development Report (AHDR), that social, economic and political reform is likely to succeed only if freedom to express grievances is guaranteed.
Warning that in the absence of freedoms “some Arabs would eventually resort to violence, with dire consequences,” the report noted that “the events of 2011 and their ramifications are the outcome of public policies over many decades that gradually led to the exclusion of large sectors of the population from economic, political and social life, depriving many people of appropriate health care, good educations and suitable livelihoods.”
Read more: Difficult 2016 for Saudi Arabia? Worse to come in 2017
A recipe for disaster
Little has changed in much of the Middle East and North Africa. The youth bulge is bulging, accounting for one third of the Arab world’s population. Employment prospects are limited and likely to deteriorate in the coming years.
“In the Arab region, the policies and laws that regulate the labour market hinder the growth of jobs in a manner that matches demographic growth and the needs of the market. This affects youth in particular and prevents the economic empowerment of youth.
The prevalence of nepotism and reliance on social connections play a large role in the distribution of the limited available jobs, prompting young people who are looking for jobs to depend on social relationships and family ties,” the report said.
read full:Is discontent the legacy of the spring revolutions in Arab world?
