Iran's fist still clenched

[waraich66]

Iran's fist still clenched
By Austin KnuppeDecember 1, 2009 12:22 PM
IRGCN-fast-attack-boat.jpg

An IRGC Navy fast attack speed boat (near boat). Image from Fars News.

Thanksgiving weekend gave President Obama little to be thankful for in terms of the administration’s nuclear negotiations with Iran. Not only did Tehran turn down the offer of sending its nuclear material to Russia for enrichment, but the Iranians also declared a plan to construct 10 more nuclear enrichment facilities in future years. Despite the fact that mounting sanctions and technical hurdles make the construction of these new plants difficult, the recent rebuff by Ahmadinejad is disconcerting.

Even more troubling is news from the US Office of Naval Intelligence that Iran is in the process of restructuring its naval forces to give an arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps full responsibility for strategic operations in the Persian Gulf. This transformation, which began in 2007, equips the IRGC with asymmetric assets like fast attack boats and cruise missiles. The goal of this restructuring is to craft a layered defense strategy aimed at protecting the Straight of Hormuz from foreign interference, especially from the US 5th Fleet, a central component of US military strategy in the Middle East. One IRGC Navy commander stated that if the 5th Fleet attempted to interfere in Iranian affairs, it would be turned into a “sea of fire” and “200,000 American soldiers will be seriously imperiled in the region.”

From the US Naval Intelligence report:

Additionally, Iran uses its naval forces for political ends such as naval diplomacy and strategic messaging. Most of all, Iranian naval forces are equipped to defend against perceived external threats. Public statements by Iranian leaders indicate that they would consider closing or controlling the Strait of Hormuz if provoked, thereby cutting off almost 30 percent of the world’s oil supply.

Both Ayatollah Khamenei and Ahmadinejad favor the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) over the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN)—the conventional armed forces (called the Artesh) that existed prior to the 1979 Revolution. Many in the current regime view the IRIN as an imperial vestige left over from the days of the Shah. The report further explains that the IRGCN has been given “full responsibility for operations in the Persian Gulf” while the IRIN has been assigned to the Gulf of Oman and the Caspian Sea (less economically important waters).

The Guard Corps' ideological disposition towards preserving the Khomeinist Revolution makes them strong political allies of the current regime, and this allegiance has not gone unnoticed. In the last decade, the Guard Corps’ navy has been given carte blanche for procuring new weapons systems. In addition to the over 2,000 mines already present in the Strait of Hormuz, the IRGCN is purchasing small attack boats that are less than 60 feet in length but are equipped with heavy firepower and can reach speeds of 60-70 knots. To pack an additional punch, Tehran has developed the Kowsar anti-ship cruise missile (a variant of the Chinese-made C-802) with an effective range that could inflict heavy damage in any ship in the strait. These naval assets are transforming the Strait of Hormuz into a shooting gallery for anyone attempting passage.

The Obama administration’s goal of deterring Iran via a strategy of collective security is challenged by the expansion of the Iranian navy. Discounting the US 5th Fleet (which is currently stretched while supporting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan), there are no regional sea powers that could challenge Iranian hegemony. Are Western energy consumers comfortable with an Iranian stranglehold on one-third of the world’s oil supply? Time will only tell.

Read more: Iran's fist still clenched - Threat Matrix

 

[DaveKimble]

The report also mentions that the Iranians have realised that their IRIN warships are not well-suited to working in the confines of the Persian Gulf, particularly since the development of more intelligent missiles. The report mentions how easily the Iraqi navy was side-lined in 1991 and 2003.

Rather than putting more money into out-dated and unsuitable technology, the Iranians have allocated their classical warships to the more open waters of the Gulf of Oman, and instead focussed on asymmetric solutions for the Persian Gulf. This makes a lot of sense, and is in no way a slur on IRIN.

The report discusses Iran's anti-ship cruise missiles, but makes no mention of the possibility of IRGCN having supersonic ASCMs, such as the Russian 3M54E series, the Russian-Indian BrahMos, or Chinese C-80x. These are referred to collectively as "Threat type D" missiles. The US Navy's Aegis BMD system has no response to Threat D - the Threat Representative target missile, the MMST project, is not due to fly until 2012 and so Aegis tests against it are non-existent. Even the most complex Aegis tests have only been of 2 sub-sonic missiles - 1 ballistic 'Scud-type' and 1 cruise Tomahawk type. And these tests are not simulating a real battlefield scenario, with radar jamming and many aircraft and missiles in the air simultaneously.

Consequently the US carrier groups in the Persian Gulf may prove to be as vulnerable as IRIN's warships to a volley of sea-skimming, swerving ASCMs coming from different directions at Mach 3. The announcement of BrahMos-2, which will fly at Mach 6, means the age of the aircraft carrier is probably over. So it is perhaps not surprising that ONI should choose not to mention this information.

The ONI report can be download from

 

[Thomas]

The report also mentions that the Iranians have realised that their IRIN warships are not well-suited to working in the confines of the Persian Gulf, particularly since the development of more intelligent missiles. The report mentions how easily the Iraqi navy was side-lined in 1991 and 2003.

Rather than putting more money into out-dated and unsuitable technology, the Iranians have allocated their classical warships to the more open waters of the Gulf of Oman, and instead focussed on asymmetric solutions for the Persian Gulf. This makes a lot of sense, and is in no way a slur on IRIN.

The report discusses Iran's anti-ship cruise missiles, but makes no mention of the possibility of IRGCN having supersonic ASCMs, such as the Russian 3M54E series, the Russian-Indian BrahMos, or Chinese C-80x. These are referred to collectively as "Threat type D" missiles. The US Navy's Aegis BMD system has no response to Threat D - the Threat Representative target missile, the MMST project, is not due to fly until 2012 and so Aegis tests against it are non-existent. Even the most complex Aegis tests have only been of 2 sub-sonic missiles - 1 ballistic 'Scud-type' and 1 cruise Tomahawk type. And these tests are not simulating a real battlefield scenario, with radar jamming and many aircraft and missiles in the air simultaneously.

Consequently the US carrier groups in the Persian Gulf may prove to be as vulnerable as IRIN's warships to a volley of sea-skimming, swerving ASCMs coming from different directions at Mach 3. The announcement of BrahMos-2, which will fly at Mach 6, means the age of the aircraft carrier is probably over. So it is perhaps not surprising that ONI should choose not to mention this information.

The ONI report can be download from

it's not over, the evolved sea sparrow can take out a brahmos. Which all U.S. carriers have been equipped with. In 2015 the U.S.S. Gerald Ford will be commissioned. This newest generation carrier will have 150% more power output. One of the reasons for this is the navy has their eye on directed energy weapons as a defense against incoming missiles and aircraft.

 

[DaveKimble]

the evolved sea sparrow can take out a brahmos

Has it been tested against a "Threat Representative D" or should that quote read "the evolved sea sparrow has been designed to take out a BrahMos"?

My information is certainly not the last word on this subject, but I would have thought that if the guidance system has never been tested against a supersonic target, let alone a volley of sea-skimming swerving Mach 3 targets, then it is a long way from being a battle-ready solution.

IMHO the most likely battle scenario in the Persian Gulf in 2009-10 (if there is to be one) would be an Israeli air attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, with US acquiescence and (deniable) logistical support, followed by an Iranian massive retaliation against US warships and Gulf bases, and mining the Straits while attacking oil tankers and loading berths. There are a million variations, obviously, but if this happened tomorrow, no one could then claim that this was a surprise scenario - it is exactly what Iran has said it would do.

The surprise might be that India has sold 100 bunker-launched BrahMos to Iran and that a US carrier is sunk and 40% of the OECD's oil imports are cut off. This is too serious a scenario to be relying on how an un-tested ESSM/Aegis layered defence works on paper.

To my mind this is why the attack on Iran hasn't been sanctioned. The ONI report should have addressed this if it was a realistic coverage of all the likely scenarios. That fact that this was ignored implies the report was more for public confidence-boosting than serious advice to the top-level military planners.

Always willing to learn more.

 

[Thomas]

Has it been tested against a "Threat Representative D" or should that quote read "the evolved sea sparrow has been designed to take out a BrahMos"?

My information is certainly not the last word on this subject, but I would have thought that if the guidance system has never been tested against a supersonic target, let alone a volley of sea-skimming swerving Mach 3 targets, then it is a long way from being a battle-ready solution.

IMHO the most likely battle scenario in the Persian Gulf in 2009-10 (if there is to be one) would be an Israeli air attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, with US acquiescence and (deniable) logistical support, followed by an Iranian massive retaliation against US warships and Gulf bases, and mining the Straits while attacking oil tankers and loading berths. There are a million variations, obviously, but if this happened tomorrow, no one could then claim that this was a surprise scenario - it is exactly what Iran has said it would do.

The surprise might be that India has sold 100 bunker-launched BrahMos to Iran and that a US carrier is sunk and 40% of the OECD's oil imports are cut off. This is too serious a scenario to be relying on how an un-tested ESSM/Aegis layered defence works on paper.

To my mind this is why the attack on Iran hasn't been sanctioned. The ONI report should have addressed this if it was a realistic coverage of all the likely scenarios. That fact that this was ignored implies the report was more for public confidence-boosting than serious advice to the top-level military planners.

Always willing to learn more.

RIM-162 ESSM - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"The RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) is a development of the RIM-7 Sea Sparrow missile used to protect ships from attacking missiles, aircraft and surface threats. ESSM is designed to counter supersonic maneuvering anti-ship missiles. Compared to the Sea Sparrow, ESSM has a larger, more powerful rocket motor for increased range and agility, as well as upgraded aerodynamics using strakes and skid-to-turn. In addition, ESSM takes advantage of the latest missile guidance technology, with different versions for Aegis/SPY-1, Sewaco/APAR, and traditional target illumination all-the-way. ESSM also has the ability to be "quad-packed" in the Mk 41 VLS system, allowing up to four Sea Sparrows to be carried in a single cell.

ESSM will be used by many allied countries. The first country to achieve operational status for ESSM after the United States was Australia. Other countries which have also integrated the ESSM are Canada, Germany, Greece, Japan, Denmark, The Netherlands,and Norway. Countries in the process of integrating ESSM are New Zealand, Spain, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates."

Nato has tested it on maneuverable hypersonic missiles with success. I'm sure a brahmos missile will not be that much harder to hit. it's interesting that the sparrow uses thrust vectoring. But it's the guidance system that makes this missile so special.

 

[gambit]

Has it been tested against a "Threat Representative D" or should that quote read "the evolved sea sparrow has been designed to take out a BrahMos"?

Brahmos-like.

My information is certainly not the last word on this subject, but I would have thought that if the guidance system has never been tested against a supersonic target, let alone a volley of sea-skimming swerving Mach 3 targets, then it is a long way from being a battle-ready solution.

The 'system' would assign each missile to each attacker, no different in principle than how an airborne radar, fighter or AWACS, detect and track multiple targets. Once a missile is launched, data link would guide the missile to the assigned target, the closest inbound would be classified the highest threat. The current AEGIS system proved it is more than capable of detection and tracking multiple inbounds. AWACS would augment the AEGIS to give the defense several hundreds km worth of response time.

Horizon calculator - radar and visual

If we assign h1 to be an attacking missile at 10 meters, which would be the 'sea skimming' altitude of an Exocet-like missile, and assign the radar mast of h2 to 10,000 meters, which would make it an AWACS, we would have a visual horizon of about 370 km and a radar horizon of 425 km.

MissileThreat :: AM-39 Exocet

The Exocet family of missiles are all the same basic shape, the only differences being the length and wing shape. The AM-39 has four delta-shaped wings at mid-body, and four delta-shaped control fins at the rear. The missile is 4.69 m long, 0.35 in body diameter, has a wingspan of 1.1 m, and has a launch weight of 670 kg. It carries a high explosive fragmentation warhead weighing 165 kg. The AM-39 has a maximum range of 50 km if launched from a low altitude, but a range of up to 70 km if launched from a high-altitude of over 10 km.

After its launch, the AM-39 stabilizes in the direction of its target at its first cruising altitude, low enough to avoid detection by its target yet high enough to allow its active radar seeker head to acquire the target. Midcourse guidance is by an inertial navigation system (INS) and a radio altimeter, allowing the missile to fly a sea-skimming trajectory to its target. The AM-39 descends to its second cruise altitude for the terminal phase, with a final approach at an altitude determined by prevailing sea conditions, sometimes as low as 3 m. Terminal guidance is provided by an active radar.

If we use the Exocet to be a profile guide for this type of attack, take note of the highlighted, specifically the part about 'prevailing sea conditions'.

Douglas Sea Scale - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Douglas Sea Scale is a scale which measures the height of the waves and also measures the swell of the sea. The scale is very simple to follow. The Douglas Sea Scale is expressed in one of 10 degrees.

A 3 meters cruising altitude is extremely optimistic and it is based upon the most favorable, read 'calm', sea state. The attacker cannot assume that Mother Nature or Allah will be on his side no matter how much the government orders the people to pray.

That mean, if we go back to the radar horizon calculator, a more realistic flight altitude for an Exocet-like attacking missile should be around 30-50 meters. Recalculate h1 for 30 meters and we would have a radar horizon increase to 435 km. Recalculate h1 to 50 meters and the radar horizon is increased to about 445 km. Recalculate h1 for 100 meters, even more likely, and the radar horizon increased to 453 km. Water present unique multipath propagation issues for radar so in order to have a balance between target echo reliability and 'sneakiness', the missile should cruise at 150 meters altitude. Recalculate h1 to 150 meters and radar horizon increase to 462 km. Get the picture?

In less than five seconds, the fleet could launch seduction/distraction chaff/flare defense that would overwhelm the attacker's radar and IR view in the orders of several THOUSANDS km2. Missile radars are already physically limited in scan angles because of radome size. The attacking missile would be blinded. The defenders' missile would not be affected since its guidance commands would come from sources outside and above of that electronic and IR shield.

Does the attacking missile maneuvers? Maneuvers uses fuel and fuel affect range. Maneuvers also increase flight time and give the fleet even more time to enhance its defense. It also mean the American fleet can stay outside of the Iranians' ASCM range and still can attack Iranian missile batteries.

IMHO the most likely battle scenario in the Persian Gulf in 2009-10 (if there is to be one) would be an Israeli air attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, with US acquiescence and (deniable) logistical support, followed by an Iranian massive retaliation against US warships and Gulf bases, and mining the Straits while attacking oil tankers and loading berths. There are a million variations, obviously, but if this happened tomorrow, no one could then claim that this was a surprise scenario - it is exactly what Iran has said it would do.

The surprise might be that India has sold 100 bunker-launched BrahMos to Iran and that a US carrier is sunk and 40% of the OECD's oil imports are cut off. This is too serious a scenario to be relying on how an un-tested ESSM/Aegis layered defence works on paper.

To my mind this is why the attack on Iran hasn't been sanctioned. The ONI report should have addressed this if it was a realistic coverage of all the likely scenarios. That fact that this was ignored implies the report was more for public confidence-boosting than serious advice to the top-level military planners.

Always willing to learn more.

Here is the truth...A newly promoted commodore, admiral, general, field marshall, warlord or whatever title the person is given, it does not guarantee there will be innovative thinking that will result in new tactics or strategies. But a new weapon, be it something mechanical like a machine gun or a piece of software that can collate multi-sensor information, will ALWAYS produce options for the humans and it will be up to that newly promoted admiral or general to exploit those options. Remove the machine gun and no matter how creative is the general, he will have to reassign more infantry troops to maintain the same rate of fire that machine gun used to give him. Give him back that machine gun and see what happen.

Supposedly an Indian general, post Desert Storm, commented that the ultimate lesson of Desert Storm was: Do not go to war against the US without nuclear weapons. Drastic perhaps but the unspoken lesson here is that limited war waging capabilities inevitably limit war waging strategies and tactics. The only recourse for any enemy of the US in a war is to resort to the most destructive force known to man -- a nuclear explosion.

Iran does not have the capability to 'seal' off the Strait and hold that defense for the long term. Iran can only launch volleys of ASCM from one direction, giving the US predictability of Iranian tactics and strategies. Iran does not have AWACS, or at least to the extent a US aircraft carrier battle group has, giving the US gross advantage in information and ability of anticipate Iranian tactics. The Iranians are blustering and they know it.