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David Bergman
Bangladesh Politico – November 19, 2013
The current political stand-off between the Bangladesh's two main parties over the nature of the election-time government (BNP wants caretaker/neutral government; the AL wants an all party government under the control of the prime-minister) is not only of interest to the country's voting population, but also to a number of its neighboring, and not-so neighboring, countries.
Here is a thumbnail sketch of where United States, India, China and Russia - currently stand in relation to the conflict between the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and why they have taken these positions.
United States
Background: Historically, the United States has had a frosty relationship with the Awami League going back to the country's support for Pakistan during the war of independence in 1971. Although the US did recognise Bangladesh relatively soon after its independence in April 1971 (though the UK, for recognised it two months earlier), relations with the US continued in view of the the past, the Awami League's socialist orientation, and the party's preference for the Soviet union/India axis. Moreover, credible allegations emerged that in 1975 the CIA station chief in Dhaka had contact with the majors who subsequently murdered Sheikh Mujib (the country's first president, and leader of the AL) and his family - though this was not done under the authority of the US ambassador at the time.
In December 1975, three months after the assassination of Mujib (and following a number of attempted coups) General Zia Rahman - who in 1978 formed the Bangladesh Nationalist Party to carry out his political ambitions - assumed power, orientating Bangladesh's foreign policy towards the United States, and away from the Soviet Union/India axis.
Following the murder of Zia Rahman in 1981, General Ershard took over continued this pro-US policy.With the toppling of Ershard in 1990, and resumption of democracy, and the battle between the two main parties - AL and BNP - taking centre stage, it appears that the US has taken a relatively even handed policy towards the two parties, and the old suspicions between the AL and the US have dramatically reduced.
Current situation: The US's repeatedly stated position is that it wants there to be credible, free and fair elections in Bangladesh - and by 'credible' it has stated, at least in the past, that this includes an election which all the main political parties participate. It has therefore pushed the two parties to have a dialogue and find an amicably agreed solution which allows the BNP to take part. It has not stated which formula it prefers - one closer to the the BNP's preferred option of a caretaker government or one closer to the AL formula of an all party government in which the opposition party is a part of.
The key issue is whether the US will send observers to an election in which the BNP is not participating and whether it considers such an election to be credible. It does not appear that the US government has finally made up its mind - but it has made it clear to the BNP that simply because the party does not take part does not mean that the US will consider the elections not to be credible. The manner in which parties seek - or do not seek - to find a solution will play a part, it appears, in the US's final decision. Publicly, on this issue, the US government is now stating that its position will depend upon whether the Bangladesh people consider it to be credible. (see: transcript of press statement given on 19 November 2013 by Nisha Desai Biswal, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs)
An added complexity to the US position on Bangladesh is its close relationship with India - where the two are strategic partners. India has asserted (it being the big neighbour) that it's interests should be decisive in determining what the two country's positions should be towards the Bangladesh elections - but the United States has argued against India's apparent explicitly pro-Awami League stance and willingness to provide support for elections without the BNP's participation. The US has tried to argue that support for elections without the BNP, which will result in an unstable government is not in India's best interests and it could back-fire against it. These are on-going tensions within the two country's partnership, in which of course one should remembers, Bangladesh plays a relatively minor part (see more in section on India).
India
Background: It is no secret that India has a soft spot for the Awami League - a relationship that goes back a long way even before the 1971 war when India provided great assistance to the country's independence movement spearheaded of course by the AL itself. In recent years, the secular nature of the AL's politics (its anti-fundamentalist thinking, at least) has provided reassurance to the Indian government on security matters. And this in turn then provides a sound basis for India to pursue its own economic interests.
India has not really had much choice - assuming it wanted to make a choice. BNP's position has traditionally been 'anti-India', and this has at times been quite shrill, with the party seeking to exploit a perception, held by many people in the country, that the Awami League is willing to sell out the country's interests to its big neighbor.
Although without India, Bangladesh may never have obtained independence, it is notable that quite soon after December 1971, an anti-India feeling emerged after independence (initially directed towards Indian businessmen who were seen as exploiting the vulnerability of Bangladesh's post independence state), and the BNP has built on this.
Moreover, the perception that Pakistan's intelligence agencies have close relationships with the BNP, has also given India another reason to support the Awami League.
India's willingness to remain close with the Awami League, has of course been informed by the BNP's strong electoral alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami since 2001, and the militancy that developed during its 2001 to 2006 term of government. The Jamaat is seen in particular by India as a security threat with its islamist politics and perceived relationships with militant groups.
Interestingly, though, in the last few years, the BNP has softened its position towards India, significantly muting it anti-Indian rhetoric. Hoping to neutralise India's traditional support for the AL, the BNP has tried to prove to India - with Khaleda's visit to New Delhi in November 2012 as the most important landmark in BNP's movement away from its former position - that it can also be a solid and safe ally, and that in the future it will remain as forceful in its fight against militancy as the Awami League.
India's willingness to remain close with the Awami League, has of course been informed by the BNP's strong electoral alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami since 2001, and the militancy that developed during its 2001 to 2006 term of government. The Jamaat is seen in particular by India as a security threat with its islamist politics and perceived relationships with militant groups.
Current situation: The issue right now is whether India will support the Awami League if it undertakes elections under a so called 'all party government' (without BNP's involvement, and with Hasina retaining the position of prime minister), and without the participation BNP in the elections themselves.
It's current public position in a recent statement from Indian ambassador is non-partisan, stating that “It is for the people of Bangladesh to decide their own future. India supports holding of free and fair elections in Bangladesh.”
However, prior leaks to the media from Indian diplomats indicated that the Indian government was concerned that the US was failing to support the Awami League's position that free and fair elections could take place under an all-party government and in misunderstanding the risks to Bangladesh/India attached to a BNP/Jamaat victory. As mentioned above, India believed that in the context of the US/India strategic alliance, with India's security concerns as Bangladesh's neighbour, the US should follow India's foreign policy interests when it came to elections in Bangladesh and were irritated by what it saw as the US's independent position on this matter.
India's sees the resurgence of the Jamaat-e-Islami in any new BNP government, along with BNP's apparent support for Hefazet-e-Isalmi as inimical to its interests. The US appears to think that India's perception of these threats are overblown - that Jamaat is a very much weakened force in Bangladesh politics due to AL's policies in the last five year and in any case is a ''moderate Islamic party and that the BNP has made it clear that it will come down hard on militancy and seeks a good relationship with India.
The difference in position between the US and India can be summed up as follows: India does not want BNP/Jamaat to come to power, US does not mind if it does.
In the last five years, the AL has also been good to India in terms of providing contracts to Indian companies, so the Indian government also has economic interests in the governing party remaining in power.
India's diplomats are usually tight lipped and the fact that they decided to brief journalists about its difference of opinion with the United States was seen by many as out of character, and indicating the seriousness which India took its disagreement.
India's support for the AL's position right now has diplomatic significance - providing a counter weight to how most of the rest of the international community views the situation (seeking participatory elections). Subsequently the support could be significant in the AL's attempts to persuade this community that the elections without the BNP are credible and should be supported.
However, India's position could back-fire both against it and the party. If it appeared that the vast majority of Bangladeshis, along with the vast majority of the international community were to question the credibility of the elections held without BNP, India could look very isolated if it continued to support the AL's position. And for the AL, in the context of widespread suspicion within Bangladesh about India's motives, it would not be helpful for them to be seen to be so heavily supported by India.
However, the AL may not pay such a high political price for India's support since BNP is not publicly exploiting this issue - viewing its future strategic relationship with India as more important.
China
Background: In 1971, China was firm allies with Pakistan, and following its independence twice vetoed the country's recognition in the United Nations. With the assassination of Sheikh Mujib, Zia Rahman came to power, and changed the orientation of the country's foreign policy towards China (and away from India). As a result, historically, the country has stronger ties with the BNP than the AL. An important element of China's relationship with Bangladesh is its old, though decreasing, rivalry with India
Current situation: Under the current government, China has received some important trade deals, (though not as many as the government has given India) and the foreign minister has made a number of trips to China to improve the two country's relationship - however the failure of the AL government to allow it to build a deep sea port in Sonadia off the Chittagong coast apparently rankles. China likely sees economic advantages in a BNP victory, but its most important interest right now, due to its varied economic investments in the country, is for the political stability.
Highly unusually for China it has made a number of public statements about the current situation, calling for dialogue between the parties. Since China usually does not make any comment on the political situation in Bangladesh, these rather anodyne statements have been interpreted as slightly favoring the BNP's position.
Russia
Background: In 1971, the Soviet Union supported Bangladesh's fight for independence, as part of its alliance with India - and after the war Mujib and the Soviet Union had a good relationship. The Russian government continues to have a good relationship with the Awami League and it has won some important contracts - (an arms and nuclear power deal are particularly significant) - which involved the first visit of a Bangladesh prime minister for 40 years
Current situation: The Russian government has made no political statement on the current political stalemate in Bangladesh. Its interests in Bangladesh are primarily economic - and Russia is concerned that it may lose these contracts if the BNP comes back into power - with the BNP having told Russian diplomats that the contracts will certainly be reviewed.
Because of this, Russia is perceived as seeking an Awami League victory, though there is no direct evidence to support this suggestion.
European Union, Australia, Canada
This bloc of countries with different histories towards Bangladesh have the same basic position in relation to the elections as the USA - though there are inevitable nuances between these countries as to when elections will be deemed to be credible. Some diplomats are taking a more legalistic position than other - arguing that since the constitution allow elections to take place in the way that the AL government is now organizing them, then it is not relevant whether or not the BNP decides to boycott them. Others look beyond the black letter of the law and ask whether or not elections without a party that represents the voting intention of between a third and half of the country can in any way be deemed credible (even though the current constitution allows it).
The main interest of all these countries is political stability - for their economic and aid interests locked up in Bangladesh.
For the EU, a key question is whether or not they will send an observer team - with no decision yet firmly made, and indeed no invitation from the government either
Bangladesh Politico: International dimensions of Bangladesh's current political crisis
Bangladesh Politico – November 19, 2013
The current political stand-off between the Bangladesh's two main parties over the nature of the election-time government (BNP wants caretaker/neutral government; the AL wants an all party government under the control of the prime-minister) is not only of interest to the country's voting population, but also to a number of its neighboring, and not-so neighboring, countries.
Here is a thumbnail sketch of where United States, India, China and Russia - currently stand in relation to the conflict between the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and why they have taken these positions.
United States
Background: Historically, the United States has had a frosty relationship with the Awami League going back to the country's support for Pakistan during the war of independence in 1971. Although the US did recognise Bangladesh relatively soon after its independence in April 1971 (though the UK, for recognised it two months earlier), relations with the US continued in view of the the past, the Awami League's socialist orientation, and the party's preference for the Soviet union/India axis. Moreover, credible allegations emerged that in 1975 the CIA station chief in Dhaka had contact with the majors who subsequently murdered Sheikh Mujib (the country's first president, and leader of the AL) and his family - though this was not done under the authority of the US ambassador at the time.
In December 1975, three months after the assassination of Mujib (and following a number of attempted coups) General Zia Rahman - who in 1978 formed the Bangladesh Nationalist Party to carry out his political ambitions - assumed power, orientating Bangladesh's foreign policy towards the United States, and away from the Soviet Union/India axis.
Following the murder of Zia Rahman in 1981, General Ershard took over continued this pro-US policy.With the toppling of Ershard in 1990, and resumption of democracy, and the battle between the two main parties - AL and BNP - taking centre stage, it appears that the US has taken a relatively even handed policy towards the two parties, and the old suspicions between the AL and the US have dramatically reduced.
Current situation: The US's repeatedly stated position is that it wants there to be credible, free and fair elections in Bangladesh - and by 'credible' it has stated, at least in the past, that this includes an election which all the main political parties participate. It has therefore pushed the two parties to have a dialogue and find an amicably agreed solution which allows the BNP to take part. It has not stated which formula it prefers - one closer to the the BNP's preferred option of a caretaker government or one closer to the AL formula of an all party government in which the opposition party is a part of.
The key issue is whether the US will send observers to an election in which the BNP is not participating and whether it considers such an election to be credible. It does not appear that the US government has finally made up its mind - but it has made it clear to the BNP that simply because the party does not take part does not mean that the US will consider the elections not to be credible. The manner in which parties seek - or do not seek - to find a solution will play a part, it appears, in the US's final decision. Publicly, on this issue, the US government is now stating that its position will depend upon whether the Bangladesh people consider it to be credible. (see: transcript of press statement given on 19 November 2013 by Nisha Desai Biswal, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs)
An added complexity to the US position on Bangladesh is its close relationship with India - where the two are strategic partners. India has asserted (it being the big neighbour) that it's interests should be decisive in determining what the two country's positions should be towards the Bangladesh elections - but the United States has argued against India's apparent explicitly pro-Awami League stance and willingness to provide support for elections without the BNP's participation. The US has tried to argue that support for elections without the BNP, which will result in an unstable government is not in India's best interests and it could back-fire against it. These are on-going tensions within the two country's partnership, in which of course one should remembers, Bangladesh plays a relatively minor part (see more in section on India).
India
Background: It is no secret that India has a soft spot for the Awami League - a relationship that goes back a long way even before the 1971 war when India provided great assistance to the country's independence movement spearheaded of course by the AL itself. In recent years, the secular nature of the AL's politics (its anti-fundamentalist thinking, at least) has provided reassurance to the Indian government on security matters. And this in turn then provides a sound basis for India to pursue its own economic interests.
India has not really had much choice - assuming it wanted to make a choice. BNP's position has traditionally been 'anti-India', and this has at times been quite shrill, with the party seeking to exploit a perception, held by many people in the country, that the Awami League is willing to sell out the country's interests to its big neighbor.
Although without India, Bangladesh may never have obtained independence, it is notable that quite soon after December 1971, an anti-India feeling emerged after independence (initially directed towards Indian businessmen who were seen as exploiting the vulnerability of Bangladesh's post independence state), and the BNP has built on this.
Moreover, the perception that Pakistan's intelligence agencies have close relationships with the BNP, has also given India another reason to support the Awami League.
India's willingness to remain close with the Awami League, has of course been informed by the BNP's strong electoral alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami since 2001, and the militancy that developed during its 2001 to 2006 term of government. The Jamaat is seen in particular by India as a security threat with its islamist politics and perceived relationships with militant groups.
Interestingly, though, in the last few years, the BNP has softened its position towards India, significantly muting it anti-Indian rhetoric. Hoping to neutralise India's traditional support for the AL, the BNP has tried to prove to India - with Khaleda's visit to New Delhi in November 2012 as the most important landmark in BNP's movement away from its former position - that it can also be a solid and safe ally, and that in the future it will remain as forceful in its fight against militancy as the Awami League.
India's willingness to remain close with the Awami League, has of course been informed by the BNP's strong electoral alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami since 2001, and the militancy that developed during its 2001 to 2006 term of government. The Jamaat is seen in particular by India as a security threat with its islamist politics and perceived relationships with militant groups.
Current situation: The issue right now is whether India will support the Awami League if it undertakes elections under a so called 'all party government' (without BNP's involvement, and with Hasina retaining the position of prime minister), and without the participation BNP in the elections themselves.
It's current public position in a recent statement from Indian ambassador is non-partisan, stating that “It is for the people of Bangladesh to decide their own future. India supports holding of free and fair elections in Bangladesh.”
However, prior leaks to the media from Indian diplomats indicated that the Indian government was concerned that the US was failing to support the Awami League's position that free and fair elections could take place under an all-party government and in misunderstanding the risks to Bangladesh/India attached to a BNP/Jamaat victory. As mentioned above, India believed that in the context of the US/India strategic alliance, with India's security concerns as Bangladesh's neighbour, the US should follow India's foreign policy interests when it came to elections in Bangladesh and were irritated by what it saw as the US's independent position on this matter.
India's sees the resurgence of the Jamaat-e-Islami in any new BNP government, along with BNP's apparent support for Hefazet-e-Isalmi as inimical to its interests. The US appears to think that India's perception of these threats are overblown - that Jamaat is a very much weakened force in Bangladesh politics due to AL's policies in the last five year and in any case is a ''moderate Islamic party and that the BNP has made it clear that it will come down hard on militancy and seeks a good relationship with India.
The difference in position between the US and India can be summed up as follows: India does not want BNP/Jamaat to come to power, US does not mind if it does.
In the last five years, the AL has also been good to India in terms of providing contracts to Indian companies, so the Indian government also has economic interests in the governing party remaining in power.
India's diplomats are usually tight lipped and the fact that they decided to brief journalists about its difference of opinion with the United States was seen by many as out of character, and indicating the seriousness which India took its disagreement.
India's support for the AL's position right now has diplomatic significance - providing a counter weight to how most of the rest of the international community views the situation (seeking participatory elections). Subsequently the support could be significant in the AL's attempts to persuade this community that the elections without the BNP are credible and should be supported.
However, India's position could back-fire both against it and the party. If it appeared that the vast majority of Bangladeshis, along with the vast majority of the international community were to question the credibility of the elections held without BNP, India could look very isolated if it continued to support the AL's position. And for the AL, in the context of widespread suspicion within Bangladesh about India's motives, it would not be helpful for them to be seen to be so heavily supported by India.
However, the AL may not pay such a high political price for India's support since BNP is not publicly exploiting this issue - viewing its future strategic relationship with India as more important.
China
Background: In 1971, China was firm allies with Pakistan, and following its independence twice vetoed the country's recognition in the United Nations. With the assassination of Sheikh Mujib, Zia Rahman came to power, and changed the orientation of the country's foreign policy towards China (and away from India). As a result, historically, the country has stronger ties with the BNP than the AL. An important element of China's relationship with Bangladesh is its old, though decreasing, rivalry with India
Current situation: Under the current government, China has received some important trade deals, (though not as many as the government has given India) and the foreign minister has made a number of trips to China to improve the two country's relationship - however the failure of the AL government to allow it to build a deep sea port in Sonadia off the Chittagong coast apparently rankles. China likely sees economic advantages in a BNP victory, but its most important interest right now, due to its varied economic investments in the country, is for the political stability.
Highly unusually for China it has made a number of public statements about the current situation, calling for dialogue between the parties. Since China usually does not make any comment on the political situation in Bangladesh, these rather anodyne statements have been interpreted as slightly favoring the BNP's position.
Russia
Background: In 1971, the Soviet Union supported Bangladesh's fight for independence, as part of its alliance with India - and after the war Mujib and the Soviet Union had a good relationship. The Russian government continues to have a good relationship with the Awami League and it has won some important contracts - (an arms and nuclear power deal are particularly significant) - which involved the first visit of a Bangladesh prime minister for 40 years
Current situation: The Russian government has made no political statement on the current political stalemate in Bangladesh. Its interests in Bangladesh are primarily economic - and Russia is concerned that it may lose these contracts if the BNP comes back into power - with the BNP having told Russian diplomats that the contracts will certainly be reviewed.
Because of this, Russia is perceived as seeking an Awami League victory, though there is no direct evidence to support this suggestion.
European Union, Australia, Canada
This bloc of countries with different histories towards Bangladesh have the same basic position in relation to the elections as the USA - though there are inevitable nuances between these countries as to when elections will be deemed to be credible. Some diplomats are taking a more legalistic position than other - arguing that since the constitution allow elections to take place in the way that the AL government is now organizing them, then it is not relevant whether or not the BNP decides to boycott them. Others look beyond the black letter of the law and ask whether or not elections without a party that represents the voting intention of between a third and half of the country can in any way be deemed credible (even though the current constitution allows it).
The main interest of all these countries is political stability - for their economic and aid interests locked up in Bangladesh.
For the EU, a key question is whether or not they will send an observer team - with no decision yet firmly made, and indeed no invitation from the government either
Bangladesh Politico: International dimensions of Bangladesh's current political crisis
