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Intelligence services are compelled to cope with the challenge of global terrorism using both internal and international cooperative alliances. Shlomo Mofaz about the new challenges the intelligence world faces in the current reality of terrorism
Col. (res.) Shlomo Mofaz | 25/08/2016
Security patrol at a Brussels Metro station (Photo: AP)
The range of intelligence gathering resources available to intelligence organizations dealing with terrorism includes one primary collection tool, SigInt: electronic measures that include monitoring, listening and locating capabilities plus the various Internet-monitoring tools. The evolution of technology makes it possible to develop state-of-the-art tools and methods. At the same time, some of the technologies are not just security technologies, and the range also includes 'civilian' technologies available to all – including terrorists. Those terrorists are aware of some of the capabilities, like the ability to monitor cellular telephones, the ability to locate the speakers and to access the contents within the user's mobile phone and personal computer. The importance of open-source information is critical to the current fight against terrorism, such as the global terrorism led by ISIS. Social media are used by the terrorist organizations to promote their ideology, to recruit activists, to plan their attacks and to distribute threatening and intimidating messages. In order to cope with this challenge, massive amounts of data must be collected, stored and processed very quickly (Big Data). In addition to the technological needs, one must not ignore the multilingual-multicultural capabilities required in order to support the technological capabilities and enable the consolidation of insights, alerts and counterterrorism solutions. The communication and coordination messages exchanged between the ISIS terrorists who staged the murderous terrorist attacks in Paris (November 14, 2015) and Brussels (March 22, 2016) utilized, among other means, social media, cellular telephones and Sony PlayStation consoles.
In order to attempt and enter the minds of potential terrorists, technological resources are not enough and the intelligence service must understand moods, "habitats", socio-economic backgrounds and environmental factors. This requires cultural, linguistic and mental understanding. Actual and potential terrorists do not necessarily belong to an institutionalized terrorist organization or group and often associate themselves with a terrorist organization close to the actual attack, during or after the attack. This is an "ideological association" with the concept and ideology of a radical organization, while the attacker had not been recruited in advance by the terrorist organization in question, and that organization may assume responsibility for the attack and use it to 'make more noise' and gain more influence on public opinion. The "Lone Wolf" phenomenon characterizes the type of attackers who associate themselves ideologically with a radical organization or concept. The radical ideas are absorbed in the attacker's mind and he decides to stage an attack independently, or with a handful of accomplices, within a short timetable that makes it difficult to spot the attacker during that timeframe. Incidents of this type took place around the world, as in the case of the individual attacks against the gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida (June 12, 2016), in which 49 persons were murdered and dozens were injured, in Paris (June 14, 2016), in which a police officer and his wife were murdered, and in Israel, in the context of the "Individual Attacker Terrorism" surge of the last year.
Indicators may be spotted with regard to individuals or small groups before they stage the actual attack. In some cases, these indicators may consist of trips to countries where the terrorist organization operates, like Syria and Iraq in the case of ISIS, involvement in criminal activity and previous arrests of the attacker or a high profile in the social media.
Dealing with details has always been the "daily bread" of intelligence services facing terrorism. This has become even more acute in the 21st century, owing to the massive amounts of data from open sources like social media, websites, blogs, et al, which must be collected and processed – sometimes in real time. At the same time, one of the classic sources of counterterrorism intelligence, HumInt (Human Intelligence) must not be neglected. Penetrating terrorist organizations by inserting a human agent has always been a complex and difficult task to accomplish, but the compensations are highly valuable. In the present era, where the Internet serves as a tool for influencing hearts and minds, as well as for recruiting future attackers and exchanging messages, on the other hand, it provides intelligence services with an expansive playground for influencing and recruiting highly diversified sources. The multinational basis of potential attackers around the world, with the emphasis on the Western countries, challenges the intelligence organizations with regard to the task of locating those potential attackers, but on the other hand – it creates new opportunities and methods for recruiting and entering the hearts and minds of the terrorist organizations and for maintaining and enhancing the HumInt element as a high-quality element in the range of intelligence gathering capabilities vis-à-vis the terrorist organizations.
International Intelligence Cooperation
Global terrorism does not recognize state borders and various state authorities are involved in monitoring, spotting and preventing terrorist attacks. In order to focus and streamline the relevant processes, intra-organizational and inter-organizational cooperation is required within and among the intelligence, counterintelligence and operations organizations. This includes the intelligence agencies, internal security and defense agencies, the military, law enforcement agencies and the immigration, customs and finance authorities. In most countries, these authorities operate under different frameworks and directives and cooperation between them is not common, owing to competition, prestige, ego, state legal restrictions and the need to protect their sources. For example, the individual who committed the recent attack in Orlando was known to US law enforcement agencies since 2013 and was even questioned by the FBI on the suspicion of expressing solidarity with the Islamic State organization. The file against him was closed but he kept firearms legitimately as he was employed as a security guard. The individual who committed the attack in Paris (June 14, 2016) was known to French law enforcement authorities and even served time in prison for being a member of a terrorist organization affiliated with Pakistan. These and other attackers, although they were known to the law enforcement authorities and may have also been under surveillance, managed to stage terrorist attacks nevertheless. Those attacks may have been prevented through closer monitoring and by sharing information among the various law enforcement agencies of those countries.
International cooperation is another complex challenge for intelligence organizations. A civilian with a background of solidarity with a terrorist organization of whom the intelligence and law enforcement agencies in one country are aware can easily travel to another country and operate there undisturbed, with the new country completely unaware of his problematic background. This phenomenon is particularly acute in Europe, owing to the Schengen Agreement that put an end to the borders between the 29 signatory countries.
Internal and international cooperation is also required in the context of the fight against the funding of terrorism, which supplies the 'oxygen' for the operations of the terrorist organizations. All of the intelligence, finance and law enforcement agencies must maintain close cooperation. Whereas the terrorist organizations receive their funding from various sources such as black market activity (like ISIS' oil sales), involvement in criminal activity and drug trafficking (like Hezbollah) or state support, like Iran's support for Hezbollah. This type of cooperation necessitates statutory revisions, cooperation between the intelligence community and local and international banking system and imposing coordinated political and economic sanctions on parties involved in the funding of terrorism in order to keep track of the financial resources and make it difficult for the terrorist organizations to obtain such resources for their activities. The world's leading terrorist organizations combine terrorism with guerrilla, have a diplomatic/political arm, a social element and some form of control over territory. Organizations possessing these characteristics may be defined as hybrid terrorist organizations: a non-state organization that has a military arm, a political arm and a social arm that controls a territory and a population and uses violence methodically and intentionally against the civilians, security/defense personnel and state officials in order to achieve political gains. The "institutionalization" of some terrorist organizations enables the intelligence organizations to collect information about their infrastructures and generate targets for attack – a "target bank". The latter concept is not new, but owing to the dynamics of terrorist organizations, which never adhere to the same method of operation for any length of time and adopt highly diversified operational concepts, it is difficult to consolidate a standard, long-term course of action against them. Consequently, they should be monitored constantly so as to enable the compilation of a "breathing" target bank that remains current all the time. The availability of current information, which becomes outdated within a short time, will enable immediate attacks against stationary and mobile targets as well as targeted killing of senior commanders and operatives. All of this may be accomplished while keeping collateral damage to an absolute minimum and avoiding the engagement of uninvolved parties. These restrictions compel the intelligence services to ensure maximum accuracy and optimal timing.
Finding the Smoking Gun
Intelligence, as a primary tool in the fight against terrorism, is in constant interaction with decision makers at all levels. At the tactical and operative level, it interacts with the decision makers on the ground, during on-going activities as well as before and during operations. At the strategic levels of the national security and political echelons, intelligence must maintain direct, continåuous communication with the decision makers, owing to the dynamics of the terrorist organizations and the short 'shelf life' of the information. Situation appraisals at all levels neåcessitate on-going intelligence updating and constant drawing of insights.
Moral, ethical and legal dilemmas often arise in the context of the day-to-day fight against terrorism. One prominent issue is known as the 'Smoking Gun' issue – incidents where concrete information has been obtained about an imminent terrorist attack, while the intelligence organization has an individual in custody who possesses information that can help prevent the attack, and that information can only be obtained through unconventional, prompt interrogation methods. Alternately, the potential attacker is on his way to stage an attack, and any attempt to prevent the attack might involve a substantial collateral damage or the engagement of uninvolved parties. In some cases, a focused, immediate alert that could save lives necessitates the exposure of sources that could lead to the elimination of a highly valuable source, and in the case of a human agent – to his or her immediate demise. In this way, an intelligence infrastructure that took years to develop will go down the drain – never to be restored again. Arraigning suspects and proving their guilt in a court of law often requires the presentation of evidence that relies on sensitive intelligence information. This could prevent the future employment of the same intelligence source or even lead to the public exposure of the source, which would eliminate it.
The terrorist attacks that have taken place recently in the Middle East and around the world emphasized the challenges presented by radical, local and global terrorism to the democratic countries of the West and to their intelligence communities. Those intelligence communities must internalize the changes and adapt themselves to the changing reality by introducing technological, cultural and organizational changes, revising their operating procedures within each organization and between fellow organizations and properly prioritizing the collection resources while placing the emphasis on the various types of open-source intelligence. On the other hand, they should also update and enhance their processing and analysis capabilities. Cooperation within the intelligence communities at the state level as well as international cooperation are of critical importance, especially as global terrorism continues to disrupt and undermine the life fabric of many countries worldwide.
http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/intelligence-challenges-era-terrorism
@Penguin @PARIKRAMA @salarsikander @500 @Natan
Col. (res.) Shlomo Mofaz | 25/08/2016
Security patrol at a Brussels Metro station (Photo: AP)
The range of intelligence gathering resources available to intelligence organizations dealing with terrorism includes one primary collection tool, SigInt: electronic measures that include monitoring, listening and locating capabilities plus the various Internet-monitoring tools. The evolution of technology makes it possible to develop state-of-the-art tools and methods. At the same time, some of the technologies are not just security technologies, and the range also includes 'civilian' technologies available to all – including terrorists. Those terrorists are aware of some of the capabilities, like the ability to monitor cellular telephones, the ability to locate the speakers and to access the contents within the user's mobile phone and personal computer. The importance of open-source information is critical to the current fight against terrorism, such as the global terrorism led by ISIS. Social media are used by the terrorist organizations to promote their ideology, to recruit activists, to plan their attacks and to distribute threatening and intimidating messages. In order to cope with this challenge, massive amounts of data must be collected, stored and processed very quickly (Big Data). In addition to the technological needs, one must not ignore the multilingual-multicultural capabilities required in order to support the technological capabilities and enable the consolidation of insights, alerts and counterterrorism solutions. The communication and coordination messages exchanged between the ISIS terrorists who staged the murderous terrorist attacks in Paris (November 14, 2015) and Brussels (March 22, 2016) utilized, among other means, social media, cellular telephones and Sony PlayStation consoles.
In order to attempt and enter the minds of potential terrorists, technological resources are not enough and the intelligence service must understand moods, "habitats", socio-economic backgrounds and environmental factors. This requires cultural, linguistic and mental understanding. Actual and potential terrorists do not necessarily belong to an institutionalized terrorist organization or group and often associate themselves with a terrorist organization close to the actual attack, during or after the attack. This is an "ideological association" with the concept and ideology of a radical organization, while the attacker had not been recruited in advance by the terrorist organization in question, and that organization may assume responsibility for the attack and use it to 'make more noise' and gain more influence on public opinion. The "Lone Wolf" phenomenon characterizes the type of attackers who associate themselves ideologically with a radical organization or concept. The radical ideas are absorbed in the attacker's mind and he decides to stage an attack independently, or with a handful of accomplices, within a short timetable that makes it difficult to spot the attacker during that timeframe. Incidents of this type took place around the world, as in the case of the individual attacks against the gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida (June 12, 2016), in which 49 persons were murdered and dozens were injured, in Paris (June 14, 2016), in which a police officer and his wife were murdered, and in Israel, in the context of the "Individual Attacker Terrorism" surge of the last year.
Indicators may be spotted with regard to individuals or small groups before they stage the actual attack. In some cases, these indicators may consist of trips to countries where the terrorist organization operates, like Syria and Iraq in the case of ISIS, involvement in criminal activity and previous arrests of the attacker or a high profile in the social media.
Dealing with details has always been the "daily bread" of intelligence services facing terrorism. This has become even more acute in the 21st century, owing to the massive amounts of data from open sources like social media, websites, blogs, et al, which must be collected and processed – sometimes in real time. At the same time, one of the classic sources of counterterrorism intelligence, HumInt (Human Intelligence) must not be neglected. Penetrating terrorist organizations by inserting a human agent has always been a complex and difficult task to accomplish, but the compensations are highly valuable. In the present era, where the Internet serves as a tool for influencing hearts and minds, as well as for recruiting future attackers and exchanging messages, on the other hand, it provides intelligence services with an expansive playground for influencing and recruiting highly diversified sources. The multinational basis of potential attackers around the world, with the emphasis on the Western countries, challenges the intelligence organizations with regard to the task of locating those potential attackers, but on the other hand – it creates new opportunities and methods for recruiting and entering the hearts and minds of the terrorist organizations and for maintaining and enhancing the HumInt element as a high-quality element in the range of intelligence gathering capabilities vis-à-vis the terrorist organizations.
International Intelligence Cooperation
Global terrorism does not recognize state borders and various state authorities are involved in monitoring, spotting and preventing terrorist attacks. In order to focus and streamline the relevant processes, intra-organizational and inter-organizational cooperation is required within and among the intelligence, counterintelligence and operations organizations. This includes the intelligence agencies, internal security and defense agencies, the military, law enforcement agencies and the immigration, customs and finance authorities. In most countries, these authorities operate under different frameworks and directives and cooperation between them is not common, owing to competition, prestige, ego, state legal restrictions and the need to protect their sources. For example, the individual who committed the recent attack in Orlando was known to US law enforcement agencies since 2013 and was even questioned by the FBI on the suspicion of expressing solidarity with the Islamic State organization. The file against him was closed but he kept firearms legitimately as he was employed as a security guard. The individual who committed the attack in Paris (June 14, 2016) was known to French law enforcement authorities and even served time in prison for being a member of a terrorist organization affiliated with Pakistan. These and other attackers, although they were known to the law enforcement authorities and may have also been under surveillance, managed to stage terrorist attacks nevertheless. Those attacks may have been prevented through closer monitoring and by sharing information among the various law enforcement agencies of those countries.
International cooperation is another complex challenge for intelligence organizations. A civilian with a background of solidarity with a terrorist organization of whom the intelligence and law enforcement agencies in one country are aware can easily travel to another country and operate there undisturbed, with the new country completely unaware of his problematic background. This phenomenon is particularly acute in Europe, owing to the Schengen Agreement that put an end to the borders between the 29 signatory countries.
Internal and international cooperation is also required in the context of the fight against the funding of terrorism, which supplies the 'oxygen' for the operations of the terrorist organizations. All of the intelligence, finance and law enforcement agencies must maintain close cooperation. Whereas the terrorist organizations receive their funding from various sources such as black market activity (like ISIS' oil sales), involvement in criminal activity and drug trafficking (like Hezbollah) or state support, like Iran's support for Hezbollah. This type of cooperation necessitates statutory revisions, cooperation between the intelligence community and local and international banking system and imposing coordinated political and economic sanctions on parties involved in the funding of terrorism in order to keep track of the financial resources and make it difficult for the terrorist organizations to obtain such resources for their activities. The world's leading terrorist organizations combine terrorism with guerrilla, have a diplomatic/political arm, a social element and some form of control over territory. Organizations possessing these characteristics may be defined as hybrid terrorist organizations: a non-state organization that has a military arm, a political arm and a social arm that controls a territory and a population and uses violence methodically and intentionally against the civilians, security/defense personnel and state officials in order to achieve political gains. The "institutionalization" of some terrorist organizations enables the intelligence organizations to collect information about their infrastructures and generate targets for attack – a "target bank". The latter concept is not new, but owing to the dynamics of terrorist organizations, which never adhere to the same method of operation for any length of time and adopt highly diversified operational concepts, it is difficult to consolidate a standard, long-term course of action against them. Consequently, they should be monitored constantly so as to enable the compilation of a "breathing" target bank that remains current all the time. The availability of current information, which becomes outdated within a short time, will enable immediate attacks against stationary and mobile targets as well as targeted killing of senior commanders and operatives. All of this may be accomplished while keeping collateral damage to an absolute minimum and avoiding the engagement of uninvolved parties. These restrictions compel the intelligence services to ensure maximum accuracy and optimal timing.
Finding the Smoking Gun
Intelligence, as a primary tool in the fight against terrorism, is in constant interaction with decision makers at all levels. At the tactical and operative level, it interacts with the decision makers on the ground, during on-going activities as well as before and during operations. At the strategic levels of the national security and political echelons, intelligence must maintain direct, continåuous communication with the decision makers, owing to the dynamics of the terrorist organizations and the short 'shelf life' of the information. Situation appraisals at all levels neåcessitate on-going intelligence updating and constant drawing of insights.
Moral, ethical and legal dilemmas often arise in the context of the day-to-day fight against terrorism. One prominent issue is known as the 'Smoking Gun' issue – incidents where concrete information has been obtained about an imminent terrorist attack, while the intelligence organization has an individual in custody who possesses information that can help prevent the attack, and that information can only be obtained through unconventional, prompt interrogation methods. Alternately, the potential attacker is on his way to stage an attack, and any attempt to prevent the attack might involve a substantial collateral damage or the engagement of uninvolved parties. In some cases, a focused, immediate alert that could save lives necessitates the exposure of sources that could lead to the elimination of a highly valuable source, and in the case of a human agent – to his or her immediate demise. In this way, an intelligence infrastructure that took years to develop will go down the drain – never to be restored again. Arraigning suspects and proving their guilt in a court of law often requires the presentation of evidence that relies on sensitive intelligence information. This could prevent the future employment of the same intelligence source or even lead to the public exposure of the source, which would eliminate it.
The terrorist attacks that have taken place recently in the Middle East and around the world emphasized the challenges presented by radical, local and global terrorism to the democratic countries of the West and to their intelligence communities. Those intelligence communities must internalize the changes and adapt themselves to the changing reality by introducing technological, cultural and organizational changes, revising their operating procedures within each organization and between fellow organizations and properly prioritizing the collection resources while placing the emphasis on the various types of open-source intelligence. On the other hand, they should also update and enhance their processing and analysis capabilities. Cooperation within the intelligence communities at the state level as well as international cooperation are of critical importance, especially as global terrorism continues to disrupt and undermine the life fabric of many countries worldwide.
http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/intelligence-challenges-era-terrorism
@Penguin @PARIKRAMA @salarsikander @500 @Natan
