INSIGHT: Attacking army’s centre of gravity —Ejaz Haider

[fatman17]

INSIGHT: Attacking army’s centre of gravity —Ejaz Haider

Creating news is of course an inevitable objective of any such plan. The basic motive remains the same: if the TTP can actually take on the army’s command nucleus, no place is really safe from its outreach

The Saturday terrorist attack on General Headquarters in Rawalpindi shows, once again, how a combination of innovative tactics and the element of surprise can work to the advantage of non-state militant groups.
One television Napoleon — he appears regularly on an Urdu channel to deliver his inane monologue — said the attack was stupid because it could not have achieved anything and the attackers should have known that they would be taken out. Given his understanding of these issues, a smart move to finish off the TTP would be to make him their advisor.

A good way of determining success is to be clear about the objective. Would an operation, whose objective was attacking the GHQ, the army’s centre of gravity (COG), to show its will and outreach be called a failure; especially, if it ends up making big news, killing army personnel including two senior officers, and taking security personnel hostage?

What could be the objective of the attack on GHQ? It does not seem like entry into GHQ was the primary objective though it could be a bonus for one odd attacker if he did manage to slip in. Normally, that kind of plan would have required more than one team of attackers. While one or two teams engaged the security forces, a third team could try to enter the GHQ and take some personnel hostage. After the fire exchange those trying to exfiltrate seem to have found the opportunity to enter into a building close to GHQ and take some security personnel hostage.

Reports first put the number of attackers at six and said four had been killed in the fire exchange outside the GHQ perimeter. Later, it was said that those who had entered a side building and take some personnel hostage may number from five to six. That would mean the number was at least 10. That also means that some might have reached the area separately. In any case the hostage situation is the icing on the cake since at the time of writing this the incident had become top news across the world.

The attack is a clear signal to the Pakistan Army that the TTP retains its resolve and capacity to engage and attack any target of its own choosing including such high profile ones as the GHQ. Creating news is of course an inevitable objective of any such plan. The basic motive remains the same: if the TTP can actually take on the army’s command nucleus, no place is really safe from its outreach. Also, every such attack forces the state to beef up security in and around such installations; that inevitably translates into higher direct and indirect costs. The Mall remained blocked for the most part of the day and one can be sure that commuting on this road, one of the main arteries, will be heavily controlled.

Insurgents and terrorists start out with two advantages. One, their objective is to deny the other side a win; they win by not losing. Two, if we accept at the beginning of a conflict that the two sides are symmetric, then winning in any conflict relates to one side gaining an asymmetric advantage over the other as the conflict proceeds. The non-state actors, for several reasons, start out with an asymmetric advantage over the adversary. The adversary has to first blunt their asymmetric advantage and then seek to gain its own on them.

For the armies, therefore, winning may be a mixed bag of losses and small wins before the effort, over a longer trajectory and cumulatively, moves towards an overall win in any strategic sense.

The TTP is under pressure. It has lost territorial control over several areas — Buner, Swat, Lower Dir, Bajaur etc. The army has 1 divisional headquarters, one brigade and 11 infantry battalions deployed to South Waziristan. This number is excluding 7 wings of Frontier Corps in the area and deployments in North Waziristan. SW is accepted as the COG of TTP. TTP’s former supremo, Baitullah Mehsud has been taken out; its factions have fought among themselves and the organisation only now seems to have come together (the exact damage to its cohesion is not clear at this stage).

Given this scenario the TTP has to do three things. It must convert loss of territory to its advantage. That means reverting to hit and run tactics against troops deployed to its area; plan terrorist attacks across the country; and, the new leader must do something to establish his writ and command.

It will do all this and this attack is part of that. Just a day before, on Friday, the TTP mounted a suicide bomb attack in Peshawar city which killed 52 people and left over 170 injured.

The attackers were wearing army uniforms. That was one reason guards at the first check post were late in reacting and lost lives. One of the most important lessons in this kind of conflict is the constant realisation that the other side will reinforce its advantage of surprise by being innovative. And innovation is always a simple affair; the best innovative techniques usually are those that create something new from what is obvious and easily available.

The thought experiment would be simple enough. If a group wants to go for a bold, frontal attack on a place like GHQ and in broad daylight, and if its objective is not beyond signalling that it can and is prepared to have a gun battle in front of army headquarters, it would wear army uniforms. Considering that the army uniform would be the obvious hiding the reality, I would call it the purloined approach.

The rest requires basic recce about gates, their positioning and the number of guards, their positions and whether they can provide interlocking fire, the SOPs etc. A keen eye can beget one a good plan. For instance, a sentry at the start of his duty would be far more alert than after three or four hours; like all humans he is more likely to be looking for something odd rather than what he is habituated to and so on. Like uniform, uniformity of a function is also a dulling experience which is why more drivers report the possibility of falling asleep on the motorway than on the GT Road where the levels and types of traffic defy uniform expectations.

The planners must therefore remain a step ahead of the adversary. Unlike an army which is trained to look at armed conflict in conventional terms, the non-state actors are likely to mount attacks that may not seem to add up to a larger strategic picture. But bringing the conventional calculus to bear on their motives would be a mistake we cannot afford.

Postscript: At the time of going into print, planners were still debating the best option to take out the attackers while saving the lives of the hostages.

Ejaz Haider is op-ed editor of Daily Times, consulting editor of The Friday Times and host of Samaa TV’s programme “Siyasiyat”. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk

 

[Khajur]

One television Napoleon — he appears regularly on an Urdu channel to deliver his inane monologue — said the attack was stupid because it could not have achieved anything and the attackers should have known that they would be taken out. Given his understanding of these issues, a smart move to finish off the TTP would be to make him their advisor.

Could this be the self styled defence analyst Mr zaid Hamid??

 

[fatman17]

EDITORIAL: Interpreting the GHQ attack

The Saturday attack on the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi martyred a number of military personnel including a Brigadier and Lieutenant-Colonel. The army reacted swiftly, killing four of the terrorists and locating their safe house in a nearby suburban settlement. While this was going on, five terrorists managed to get into a security building and held hostage more than 40 personnel including civilians. The operation, launched in two phases got all the hostages released except three who got killed; four terrorists were killed while their leader was arrested. The attacking force lost four personnel.

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed the act and named the “group” that had undertaken it: Amjad Farooqi Group. A member of the group reportedly demanded that the government stop the military operation in the Tribal Areas, hold former General Pervez Musharraf accountable for his actions, force Blackwater US private security firm to leave the country; shut down all western non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and release detained Taliban. Al Qaeda had earlier named the killers of khassadars in Khyber after its founder, Abdullah Azzam.

Amjad Farooqi was a terrorist affiliated with Al Qaeda through Sipah-e-Sahaba and Jaish-e-Muhammad. He was involved in the attempt on the life of General Musharraf, the beheading of the American journalist Daniel Pearl, and the bombing of a church in Islamabad. He was killed in 2004 in Sindh. The Al Qaeda link was disclosed after his death. His handler was the Libyan Abu Faraj al-Libi, who had replaced the planner of 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, as Al Qaeda commander in Pakistan, after the latter’s arrest.

Punjab had warned of the impending attack on the GHQ as early as July 15 this year, and had named Lashkar-Jhangvi and Jaish-e-Muhammad whose terrorists “would be dressed in military uniforms” and would be carrying specific weapons. Again, it was South Punjab which was in focus and, against all assertions to the contrary, this time counter-intelligence was clearly effective against the terrorists. How else can one judge counter-intelligence if not from this forewarning that even named the outfits? If this tip-off was ignored, it can only mean that there is “denial” somewhere of there being terrorist trouble in South Punjab.

Most attacks in and around Islamabad, including the one on Marriott Hotel, have been traced to South Punjab. Today, in the so-called Seraiki Belt, no one dare speak against the erstwhile jihadi organisation now clearly aligned with Al Qaeda. The government stance is that the leader of Jaish-e-Muhammad, Maulana Masood Azhar, is not to be found, but the foreign press has reported his presence in Bahawalpur with new training facilities for his terrorists in the nearby desert.

Interior Minister Rehman Malik says the deed is done by terrorists aligned with Al Qaeda, but he also adds some other connections that introduce breaches of logic that only he can understand. He says the terrorists are working for their foreign masters against the integrity of Pakistan. “Foreign masters” have been named by others as India and the US. Unless explained more fully, this means that India and the US are paying Al Qaeda — which Mr Malik says runs the TTP — to wreck Pakistan.

The US is keen that Pakistan help it catch Osama bin Laden and destroy the safe havens of Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is simply not logical that it should fund Al Qaeda to destroy Pakistan. India has been hit by the “minions” of Al Qaeda and is challenging Pakistan to take action against certain organisations the Punjab CID has named in connection with the latest GHQ hit. Many TV commentators angrily assert that a reference to them in the Kerry-Lugar Bill was inserted by the Indian lobby in Washington.

An entire international community that includes the US, India and China, wants Pakistan to take the battle to the “GHQ of the Taliban” in South Waziristan. The Pakistan army has blockaded the area and made initial moves to open the way for a ground assault. This attack, from what it appears, is likely to hasten the process and we should expect the forces to start moving on the ground by the end of this month. In any case, the army knows that as winter approaches, the operation may well be delayed beyond March-April in 2010 and that could give the other side time to reorganise and consolidate.

The NWFP government wants the attack on South Waziristan to proceed and wants Punjab to clear its southern region of old jihadis now aligned with Al Qaeda terrorists. Clearing South Punjab is important because at this stage it does not require more than local police intelligence and a combined police and paramilitary operation against specific targets. As for how effective local intelligence can be is clear from the forewarning about the attack that did materialise.

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

 

[fatman17]

GHQ raid highlights Punjab risk: analysts

* Targeting all of country’s militants at once can bring disparate groups together

LONDON: The attack on the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi has highlighted not only the threat from the Taliban in the Tribal Areas bordering Afghanistan, but also from those based in Punjab.

Security officials said some of the militants involved in the attack on the GHQ appeared to have links to Punjab. “South Punjab has become the hub of jihadism,” analyst Ayesha Siddiqa wrote in a magazine article last month. “Yet, somehow, there are still many people in Pakistan who refuse to acknowledge this threat,” she wrote.

Security officials said a militant arrested after the attack and hostage-taking at the GHQ was believed be a member of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Some hostage takers’ phone calls were intercepted and they were speaking Punjabi, another security official said. However, Interior Minister Rehman Malik has said it is too early to say whether Punjab-based groups were involved.

Separate danger: NWFP Information Minister Iftikhar Hussain called on Saturday for the elimination of militant bases in Punjab as well as South Waziristan. But targeting all of the country’s militants at once could create an even more dangerous coalition by driving disparate groups closer together, analysts say. The army also draws many of its recruits from Punjab, making any efforts to root out militants there all the harder.

“Deploying the military is not an option. In the Punjab this will create a division within the powerful army because of regional loyalty,” wrote Siddiqa. But the police force in the province is inadequate and unlikely to be able to take on the thousands of armed men belonging to different militant groups. Complicating the picture further are pressures from both the US and India, which want Pakistan to target the groups directly in conflict with them.

Pakistan has focused largely on acting against groups representing a direct domestic threat, leading some analysts to suggest it may want to retain groups like the Afghan Taliban and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba to be used as “strategic assets” against India. But defence analyst Brian Cloughley said the attack on the army’s headquarters showed how little support militants had in the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence.

reuters

 

[pakdefender]

Off lately the 'South Punjab' thingy seems to have become an analyst favourite , in light of this following is a police report from 'South Panjab' ( or what ever that means

================================================

Police deny presence of Taliban cells in south Punjab Dawn Report

MULTAN: Police officials have dismissed the statement of an NWFP minister about the presence of Taliban training camps in south Punjab and said they were ready to capture the militants fleeing Waziristan agencies in the wake of an imminent military operation there.

Reacting to NWFP Information Minister Iftikhar Husain’s demand that a Swat-like operation be launched in south Punjab, they said some individuals from the region had gone to FATA to join the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and their activities were restricted only to those areas.

They said though some splinter factions of the banned outfits were active in the region, who were not more than 30, the situation did not warrant any operation in south Punjab. Police had plugged all routes linking Punjab with the NWFP, they claimed. About the role of seminaries in terror-related activities, Khanewal’s top police boss claimed that none of the militants from Punjab arrested or killed ever got admission to any madressas in Punjab. In Vehari, police arrested 11 alleged militants after the GHQ attack and started interrogating them.

Police officials of Multan region rejected the demand of a Swat-like military operation in south Punjab, saying the government had a complete writ in the area.

Regional Police Officer (RPO) Arif Ikram told Dawn that the law and order situation in south Punjab was under control. He compared south Punjab to the NWFP in these words: ‘In the NWFP, there were many no-go areas and massive bloodshed while in south Punjab, there is no such situation.’

Lodhran District Police Officer (DPO) Syed Khurram Ali also rejected the talk of army operation in south Punjab, especially in Lodharan, saying there was no need for any military operation there as police were keeping an eye on individuals having links with sectarian or jihadi outfits in the past.

Multan City Police Officer Syed Saud Aziz, however, admitted that explosives were being dumped in parts of south Punjab but ‘this material is coming from the NWFP,’ he said.

SARGODHA: RPO Mian Javed Islam said police had been tasked with frisking the vehicles and people coming from Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu and Tank to Punjab areas. Police had been deployed at all routes linking Mianwali and Bhakkar with the NWFP, particularly all hilly passages, Dajil and riversides in Mianwali and Bhakkar, he said. He said there were no madressa in Sargodha involved in terror-related activities, however, some of them had been marked for their role in sectarianism. He added he was satisfied with arrangements made by Mianwali and Bhakkar police to stop the inflow of militants fleeing Waziristan agencies. He said he had directed all DPOs of the four districts of Sargodha to maintain the record of tenants.

KHANEWAL: Khanewal DPO Muhammad Kamran Khan said some people from the district were involved in terrorism but they were active in the NWFP and not in Punjab. He said two militants, Asmatullah Muavia and Rana Afzal, involved in major terrorist activities in the NWFP and other parts of the country belonged to Khanewal. ‘As per intelligence reports, both Muavia and Afzal would impart training to young people in the name of jihad in the NWFP,’ Mr Kamran told Dawn.

‘Muavia and Afzal never got admission to any seminary in Punjab,’ the DPO said. These militants received training till 2000 in Afghanistan and now they were working as trainers in terrorist camps in the NWFP. He dismissed the NWFP government’s statement that the TTP was gaining roots through religious seminaries in south Punjab, saying some of the militants captured by the police, law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies belonged to southern Punjab but none of them ever studied or received military training in any local seminary.

He said police woke up to the terrorism threat very late. ‘Till 2003, many militants were not on police record. Later, we started updating the record, which was yet to be updated,’ he said. He said the main accused of the Mianchannu blast, Master Riaz Kamboh, had never been on police data. After the blast, police started updating the record and came to know that there were 48 alleged militants missing from the police record. ‘Now, we have forwarded the names of 48 alleged militants to sensitive agencies.’

BAHAWALPUR: Senior police officers have denied the presence of any militant training camp in any part of the Bahawalpur division.

Bahawalpur RPO Mushtaq Ahmed Sukhera said it was proper for the political leadership of Punjab to comment on the statement of the NWFP minister.

Bahawalpur DPO Humayun Bashir Tarar said he was posted in the district a month ago and so far he received no such report about militants’ activities in the district.

VEHARI: At least 40 to 50 activists of banned outfits were present in the Vehari district, which had links with militants, said Vehari DPO Akhtar Umer Lalika. He said Vehari police detained 10 activists after the GHQ attack and they all belonged to the banned Lashkar-i-Jhangvi.

He said south Punjab had been the hub of the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi in the past and Mailsi and Jalla Jeem towns of the district were ‘sensitive’ areas. However, due to police and other law enforcement agencies’ crackdown, those activists had fled their homes. He said there were no training camps in the district, however, some trained militants were present in the district and their activities were being watched. He admitted that several terrorists involved in blasts were from south Punjab. He said police and sensitive agencies were keeping an eye on seminaries.

MIANWALI: Mianwali DPO Abdul Jabar Rana said there could be some sympathisers of the Taliban in the district but there were no reports of any training camps or any other banned outfits in the district.

He said Mianwali was a peace-loving district and no one from here was reportedly found involved in any terrorist or sabotage activity in any part of the country. He said the government should organise proper policing and a counter-intelligence system to root out terrorism from the country.

LAYYAH: Police have made a team, consisting of 50 personnel, to have a close watch on the activists of banned outfits, said DPO Chaudhry Saleem. He said according to police data 55 alleged militants from the district had received training from Afghan camps. He said police registered cases against three of these people and barred them from leaving their homes without informing the police.

The DPO said 145 seminaries were operational in Layyah and police frequently monitored their activities. He said police were also monitoring the people crossing Indus River through boats. He said police had got no report of recruitments for militant outfits in the district.

In Bhakkar, police staged a flag march on Saturday and would conduct search operation along with security agencies in the riverside, said Bhakkar DSP Zahid Hussain Naqvi. He said Bhakkar could be the first stopover for the south Waziristan militants fleeing the area due to a military operation likely to be launched in days.

MUZAFFARGARH: Acting DPO Mahr Javed said there were no training camps of the Taliban in Muzaffargarh and police were maintaining strict eye on the activists of banned outfits. He said the police were reviewing the statement of the NWFP minister that there were camps of banned outfits in Punjab.

TOBA TEK SINGH: DPO Rana Ahmad Hassan said there was no evidence that people, even from banned sectarian groups, were going to Waziristan to join the Taliban.

JHANG: DPO Sultan Chaudhry said police had not found any terror-related activities in the district in the recent past. He said the only militant tracked in anti-state activities was Abdur Rehman, of Shorkot, who had returned from Waziristan after spending two weeks there. Sources said since the murder of Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan leader Azam Tariq, the network of this body had almost been eliminated.


DAWN.COM | Provinces | Police deny presence of Taliban cells in south Punjab

 

[pakdefender]

Speaking of No-Go areas , isnt MQM's nine-zero also a no go area awashed with illegal arms and a hub for terror related activities

 

[S-2]

K,

Tet.

The attack on the American embassy in Saigon, as part of a general country-wide offensive was-aside from the delayed assault on Hue, the single-most successful element of that particular operational campaign during the Vietnamese war.

It led to LBJ ultimately declaring his non-candidacy two months later for the 1968 elections. As such, the political impact far outweighed the fore-ordained outcome of the temporary seizure.

This, too, is a political act whose resonance will FAR exceed any nominal military objective-as it was intended. Therein lies the value to the TTP.

 

[third eye]

The sordid saga of the GHQ at Rawalpindi has ended with avoidable losses not only to human lives but also to the image of the Army. It is difficult to prevent situations like these when they happen. What can happen is to look ahead to attempt to prevent re occurrence of such situations. It does not matter where they happen since the aim of such actions by organized groups of terrorists is to draw attention and cause embarrassment , the next target could be a school bus or a Civilian Government establishment or any thing for the matter.

Pakistan will need to take a hard look at where its policies have taken it thus far and where will they lead to in the days ahead if mid course changes are not made. Making changes should not be a problem as U- Turns have been successfully executed in the past and the national ( and international) sentiment would expect / welcome it.

The prophetic remark made not long ago by the US ambassador to Pk about having ‘snakes in the bossom’ seems to have come true. Incalculable harm is being done to Pk by :

a) Having more than one center of power.

b) The Army / ISI running with the hare and hunting with the hound.

c) Disconnect from realities.

d) A govt in power with no teeth which is at loggerheads with its Army.

e) Absence of institutions vital to run a state.

We often give our enemies the tools to destroy us. Pk is perfecting this by fighting and colluding simultaneously with the Taliban and other ‘ non state ‘ players who are not only ruining Pk but also playing havoc with region & the image of the nation worldwide.

While it would be right for any non Pakistani to suggest what Pk should do ,what I feel needs to be done is to take a long hard look at where the existing policies ( or lack of them) have led the nation thus far and where the nation will stand in the days ahead. A year ago did anyone think that such a mess would be created wherein the Govt would hand over a part of its territory to the Taliban only to rescind it and go to war with them ? Can anyone foresee a worse situation that may emerge in the days ahead ?

However a patriotic Pk citizen would like to defend it , the fact is that US is bombing at will - the fact that GOP approves it only makes it worse. Are the Saudis really helping Pk ? If so then why are they funding the extremists ? This may be denied by some , but the facts speak for themselves. Why has aggression become second nature to the psyche of the nation ? The ‘ live wires’ trained by the ISI are causing electrocution within the state.

Where has the nation been led to ? The obsession with J&K has led nowhere. Whatever the perpetrators of Kargil may crow about, nothing has changed on the ground – nor will it ever . The international community are like a bunch of traders who see only profit / loss in any given situation. If a ‘ profit’ is seen by temporarily appeasing Pk sentiment appropriate noises are made . Soon thereafter when the ‘ loss’ is noted with India by doing so, the issue is ignored and Drones strike again.

Are we S Asians so dumb that we cannot see thru this charade ?

How many more must die before realization dawns that we have wasted a lifetime in hatred and ruined ourselves and our land. We need to realize that all actions are not reversible.

Playing with fire seems fun but burns even when treated leave behind ugly scars.

 

[sonicboom]

Deciphering the GHQ attack

Tuesday, October 13, 2009
Hassan Abbas

Before Pakistan could start recovering from a suicide bombing at a UN office in Islamabad and a massive bomb blast in a Peshawar market last week, the brazen Oct 10 attack targeting Pakistan's most secure military complex – the Army Headquarters -- jolted it further. During the initial gunbattle, the army lost a brigadier and a lieutenant-colonel. This episode concluded with the arrest of the commander of the operation, Aqeel, alias Dr Usman, and the killing of his seven associates who wore army fatigues and had coordinated their attack on the GHQ from at least two directions.

This was neither the first attack on an army structure in the country nor the most deadly -- but it is unprecedented, given the extent of the breach of GHQ security, the confusion that it created in its initial stage and its timing vis-a-vis the planned launch of a ground operation in South Waziristan. It could be a transformational event for the army – strengthening its resolve against local militants, bridging internal divisions and forcing a review of intelligence estimates. However, jumping to conclusions without thorough investigation and reacting rashly based on preconceived notions would be highly counterproductive. Additionally, though Pakistan's nuclear installations are not in the immediate vicinity of GHQ, the nature of the attack raises questions about how security agencies would react if a future attack targets any of the nuclear weapons facilities.

Before attempting to analyse the attack further, let's look at the facts that have come to light so far. The Crime Investigation Department of Punjab, a civilian law-enforcement body, recently shared its assessment with relevant government departments that "terrorists belonging to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in collaboration with Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), were planning to attack the GHQ." It even warned that the terrorists could be clad in military uniforms and while riding a military vehicle or a vehicle designed to pass as one belonging to the military (this was first disclosed in a report in this newspaper on Oct 5). This information was partly based on interrogations of suspects involved in the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in March this year. Poor coordination between civilian law-enforcement and the military is obvious.

Secondly, a profile of Aqeel, the only terrorist arrested at the scene at the GHQ, is quite instructive. Hailing from Kahuta in northern Punjab, he was a nursing assistant with the Army Medical Corps before he joined local militant groups (first the LeJ and then the JeM). Later he became a member of the TTP and remained a close associate of Ilyas Kashmiri, Al Qaeda's chief of paramilitary operations in Pakistan who was recently killed in a drone strike in South Waziristan. Punjab police were looking for him in connection with a number of recent terrorist attacks in Punjab, and he is suspected of involvement in the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team.

Thirdly, the TTP's Amjad Farooqi group claimed responsibility for the attack shortly after it became public. The links between Amjad Farooqi, an old Harkatul Mujahideen fighter, and Al Qaeda are well established. And lastly, some Pakistani media analysts known for their hawkish views openly speculated on Pakistani television about Indian intelligence agencies' possible role in the attack -- especially in the context of a growing India-Pakistan rivalry inside Afghanistan, but there is no proof of Indian involvement in this attack. In fact, these terrorists' links to indigenous militant groups in Waziristan have already been acknowledged by the army and police.

To understand how the Pakistani Army will view this developing situation, three other factors are also very relevant. Effective military operations in Swat have taught the army that a stitch in time saves nine and that without public support no military campaign can succeed. Additionally, Indian allegations about the Pakistani army's direct involvement in every attack on its personnel and interests in Afghanistan help those extremist elements in Pakistan who see India and Pakistan clashing on every path. And finally, the divergence in the civil-military perspectives about the intent and content of the Kerry-Lugar Bill has generated a major debate in Pakistan about the nature of the US-Pakistan relations. A trust deficit is unfortunately growing on both sides despite regular interaction between leaders of the two countries and public cooperation in counterterrorism field.

The complexity of the challenge at hand for both Pakistan and the US is vividly apparent in this context. Despite this setback, Pakistan cannot afford to delay the ground operation in South Waziristan, as that will only provide TTP with more time to resolve its leadership crisis, reorganise, and acquire more armour and weaponry. For the TTP and its associates, the GHQ attack will be deemed a successful operation, useful for attracting more recruits. But on the flip side, public support for more effective counterterrorism measures will also increase. As most polls and surveys indicate, support for effective action against TTP and other militant groups increased after the rise of violence in the Swat Valley area. So, the time is ripe to cleanse the FATA as well as parts of south Punjab, where extremism is brewing. For this to happen, intelligence-sharing between the ISI and the civilian law-enforcement agencies, especially the competently-led FIA and the newly-constituted National Counterterrorism Authority will be critical.

The Indian political leadership, despite its reservations about the 2008 Mumbai attack investigation in Pakistan, can also help by fully reviving the peace process with Pakistan and by restraining itself from accusing Pakistan of blame for everything that negatively affects India. The Obama administration can lend a hand by convincing the US Congress to reframe the few provisions of the recently-passed aid bill that have become controversial in Pakistan.

Despite the military's past track record with regard to interference in political affairs and pursuance of illegitimate foreign policy goals through non-state actors, Pakistan needs a disciplined, cohesive and efficient army today more than ever before. Anything less than a full-on counterterrorism effort from the Pakistani military will attract more serious challenges tomorrow than those it confronted yesterday.



The writer is a Bernard Schwartz fellow at the Asia Society and senior adviser at the Belfer Centre, Harvard Kennedy School. This article first appeared in Foreign Policy.

Deciphering the GHQ attack

 

[pakdefender]

Its very easy to see through the undelying objectives of these type of articles , without further elaboration I will only say that we need to make one thing clear that no one should try and push any sort of ethnic and sectarian agenda in these testing times.