123, US-India Civilian Nuclear Deal-An Analysis
Recently concluded US-India agreement for civilian nuclear cooperation, has generated huge controversy in the Indian and international political circles. After the 1974 Pokharan nuclear explosion, India had become out-cast among the nuclear club countries and the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India, being not a signatory of the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty), there is a blanket ban on transfer of nuclear technology and the nuclear fuel.
However, the agreement makes India an exception. It marks a strategic shift in the US policy by designating India a virtual guest member of the official nuclear club. The 2006 Hyde Act, which prohibits the export of nuclear technology and the fuel to such countries, also endorsed Bush's approach of helping India safeguarded civil nuclear programme.
At present 31 countries use nuclear energy contributing about 17% of the world's electricity output. India has 17 operational nuclear plants, while 6 more are under construction. In India, nuclear energy contributes only 3% of total electricity generation, which it proposes to increase up to 7% by 2020. India, with modest uranium reserves of about 54,000 tonnes only, cannot achieve the proposed target without importing the nuclear fuel. The proposed nuclear agreement opens the door to the import of the fissile material and civilian nuclear technology and to develop technology to reprocess spent fuel. The agreement fulfils India's long-standing requirements of building a number of nuclear power plants.
India is second richest in thorium deposits in the world. Its long-term goal is to produce energy through use of thorium. Moreover, plutonium retrieved from the spent fuel can be used with thorium in nuclear fast-breeder power plants securing energy independence. Scientists contend that reprocessed fuel, though expensive, yields 30 times more energy than conventional energy plants.
Thorium-plutonium technology is a complex and a three-stage process: The second stage is expected to be completed by 2010 at Kalpakkam and stage three and the fast breeder reactors, by 2020. Till then, India will have to depend on the import of uranium from the NSG countries.
Those opposing the pact say there are certain clauses, which need clarification. They say India is still on the US blacklist for acquiring duel use items rendering the pact useless. (Duel-use articles are the ones developed for civilian use, but could be used for military purposes as well.) Hyde Act also clearly prohibits the export of duel-use items. Article 5 (2) of the agreement clearly states, "Transfer of duel-use will be subjected to the parties' respective applicable laws, regulations and licence policies." The US spokesperson, Sean McCormack also declared that if India conducts a nuclear weapon test, the agreement would stand scraped with provision of return of all materials including reprocessed material. They also doubt the intention of Washington. They opine, India, if goes ahead, will become subordinate ally of the US.
Those favouring say, in reality reverse is true. According to them, India is free to conduct nuclear test should national interest so dictate and that termination clause does not even mention the word test. It merely mentions "the party seeking termination has the right to cease further cooperation...if it determines that a mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues has not been possible or cannot be achieved through consultations". There is no mention of "return of materials."
To becoming the US ally, it is argued: In sixty years history, there is no evidence of India having compromised on its foreign policy as a quid pro quo. It alone withstood UN Security Council resolution on Kashmir favouring Pakistan; in 1971 went ahead liberating Bangladesh, defying US and China backed 110 nations UN resolution; withstood the pressure of Indo-Soviet Peace and Friendship Treaty; defied NPT and conducted first Pokhran test in 1974 and accepted the penalties; again, India did not join US and China and majority of the non-aligned in supporting Pol Pot's representation in the UN General Assembly; it also did not join anti-Soviet campaign on Afghanistan; and lastly conducted Shakti tests in 1998 defying the non-proliferation community.
However, there are many slips between sip and lip. Deal is yet to undergo endorsement of the US Congress, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 45-member NSG. The IAEA must agree to ensure that India must have unrestricted supply of raw material from NSG. They must reach consensus making huge exception for the world's second nuclear state that has not joined NPT; other is China.
To sum up, the deal is of mutual benefit: Washington views India a rising democracy with a youthful population and a reservoir of talent that will help its objectives. The deal will give the US access to Indian market for both reactor technology and military hardware. Concerned by growing terrorism and rise of China, United States sees in India a reliable long-term strategic partner. Joint military exercises also are the way to the same destination.
Comparatively, India will be a much greater beneficiary. It will come out of the international nuclear apartheid and be able to develop advanced nuclear technology to meet its increasing energy demands. Those who talk about the costs of this partnership have not taken into account India's history. At this advance stage, if India backs out, its credibility in the international community will take a severe beating.
Dr RP Mishra, Manuj Features
Central Chronicle--Column
Recently concluded US-India agreement for civilian nuclear cooperation, has generated huge controversy in the Indian and international political circles. After the 1974 Pokharan nuclear explosion, India had become out-cast among the nuclear club countries and the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India, being not a signatory of the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty), there is a blanket ban on transfer of nuclear technology and the nuclear fuel.
However, the agreement makes India an exception. It marks a strategic shift in the US policy by designating India a virtual guest member of the official nuclear club. The 2006 Hyde Act, which prohibits the export of nuclear technology and the fuel to such countries, also endorsed Bush's approach of helping India safeguarded civil nuclear programme.
At present 31 countries use nuclear energy contributing about 17% of the world's electricity output. India has 17 operational nuclear plants, while 6 more are under construction. In India, nuclear energy contributes only 3% of total electricity generation, which it proposes to increase up to 7% by 2020. India, with modest uranium reserves of about 54,000 tonnes only, cannot achieve the proposed target without importing the nuclear fuel. The proposed nuclear agreement opens the door to the import of the fissile material and civilian nuclear technology and to develop technology to reprocess spent fuel. The agreement fulfils India's long-standing requirements of building a number of nuclear power plants.
India is second richest in thorium deposits in the world. Its long-term goal is to produce energy through use of thorium. Moreover, plutonium retrieved from the spent fuel can be used with thorium in nuclear fast-breeder power plants securing energy independence. Scientists contend that reprocessed fuel, though expensive, yields 30 times more energy than conventional energy plants.
Thorium-plutonium technology is a complex and a three-stage process: The second stage is expected to be completed by 2010 at Kalpakkam and stage three and the fast breeder reactors, by 2020. Till then, India will have to depend on the import of uranium from the NSG countries.
Those opposing the pact say there are certain clauses, which need clarification. They say India is still on the US blacklist for acquiring duel use items rendering the pact useless. (Duel-use articles are the ones developed for civilian use, but could be used for military purposes as well.) Hyde Act also clearly prohibits the export of duel-use items. Article 5 (2) of the agreement clearly states, "Transfer of duel-use will be subjected to the parties' respective applicable laws, regulations and licence policies." The US spokesperson, Sean McCormack also declared that if India conducts a nuclear weapon test, the agreement would stand scraped with provision of return of all materials including reprocessed material. They also doubt the intention of Washington. They opine, India, if goes ahead, will become subordinate ally of the US.
Those favouring say, in reality reverse is true. According to them, India is free to conduct nuclear test should national interest so dictate and that termination clause does not even mention the word test. It merely mentions "the party seeking termination has the right to cease further cooperation...if it determines that a mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues has not been possible or cannot be achieved through consultations". There is no mention of "return of materials."
To becoming the US ally, it is argued: In sixty years history, there is no evidence of India having compromised on its foreign policy as a quid pro quo. It alone withstood UN Security Council resolution on Kashmir favouring Pakistan; in 1971 went ahead liberating Bangladesh, defying US and China backed 110 nations UN resolution; withstood the pressure of Indo-Soviet Peace and Friendship Treaty; defied NPT and conducted first Pokhran test in 1974 and accepted the penalties; again, India did not join US and China and majority of the non-aligned in supporting Pol Pot's representation in the UN General Assembly; it also did not join anti-Soviet campaign on Afghanistan; and lastly conducted Shakti tests in 1998 defying the non-proliferation community.
However, there are many slips between sip and lip. Deal is yet to undergo endorsement of the US Congress, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 45-member NSG. The IAEA must agree to ensure that India must have unrestricted supply of raw material from NSG. They must reach consensus making huge exception for the world's second nuclear state that has not joined NPT; other is China.
To sum up, the deal is of mutual benefit: Washington views India a rising democracy with a youthful population and a reservoir of talent that will help its objectives. The deal will give the US access to Indian market for both reactor technology and military hardware. Concerned by growing terrorism and rise of China, United States sees in India a reliable long-term strategic partner. Joint military exercises also are the way to the same destination.
Comparatively, India will be a much greater beneficiary. It will come out of the international nuclear apartheid and be able to develop advanced nuclear technology to meet its increasing energy demands. Those who talk about the costs of this partnership have not taken into account India's history. At this advance stage, if India backs out, its credibility in the international community will take a severe beating.
Dr RP Mishra, Manuj Features
Central Chronicle--Column
