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It is official. India’s first Mountain Strike Corps will be christened 17 Corps. Rhetoric in the Chinese media was on expected lines since they already went ballistic earlier on India raising two Mountain Divisions (56 and 71), which actually was a move only to fill age-old voids in the Corps deployed on India’s North-Eastern borders. A Corps normally has three Divisions. The newly raised 56 and 71 Mountain Divisions constitute the third Division in the respective Corps.
Although the Mountain Strike Corps was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in July 2013, the official announcement is just in time as China has gone aggressive in East China Sea by announcing an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) encompassing Senkaku Islands and has resumed her banter over Arunachal Pradesh being ‘South Tibet’ in wake of President Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh. The latter reinforces doubts about China’s sincerity towards joint agreements including the recently concluded Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA).
The Mountain Strike Corps
The 17 Corps is estimated to cost around Rs. 64,000 crore and is slated to comprise two infantry divisions supported by three independent armoured brigades, three artillery brigades, an engineer brigade, an air defence brigade, an aviation brigade and logistics support units. Planned to be raised over the next five to seven years, 17 Corps will enhance the strength of the Indian Army by 90,000 personnel. This would include ancillary support and logistics units. In the interim, elements of the newly raised 56 and 71 Mountain Divisions deployed to plug gaps in the defences in Arunachal Pradesh, are likely to be made available as reserves to the Mountain Corps. Such an arrangement would also continue post-raising and during employment of the Mountain Strike Corps, as applicable to all Strike Corps. The defensive/reserve formations would not only be employed to secure launch pads for offensive operations of the Strike Corps, once the thrust lines have gone in, the defensive formations in wake of the thrust lines would generally come under the command of the Strike Corps to act as reserves and add weight along the axis of attack and exploit success.
Why the Mountain Strike Corps?
If India has come a long way from Nehruvian beliefs, no matter how naïve, that the country’s security can be looked after by police forces and the security of India’s North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) can be looked after by Chinese brethren, to raising of a Mountain Strike Corps, China’s obsessive territorial greed, deceit and asymmetric war on India are responsible for it. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has continued to follow Mao’s legacy of “Power flows from the barrel of the gun”.
Accelerating CNP, diminishing US stature and US withdrawal from Afghanistan have all fuelled Chinese super power ambitions. Her ‘Doctrine of Pre-emption and Surprise’ that encompasses surprise, deception and shock exposes the mockery of her peace façade. Modernisation of Chinese armed forces is ominous not only along the Tibet border but also in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). She has shown scant regard to neighbours by unilaterally extending her maritime boundaries, claiming the entire East China Sea and parts of South China Sea. She claims entire Arunachal Pradesh as “South Tibet”. China says she can wait for 100 years to take over Taiwan but Chinese defence officials are categorical that this objective will be achieved much earlier.
We should expect a similar Chinese approach to the so-called “South Tibet”. China has settled her borders with all her neighbours less India and Bhutan. Sitting smug on 38,000 sq.km. of Indian Territory of Aksai Chin and 5,180 sq.km. of the Shaksgam Valley in Azad Kashmir gifted by Pakistan, China’s claims to 90,000 sq.km. of Arunachal Pradesh are not mere deflection of the Tibet issue. It indicates her resolve to reach the warm waters of the Indian Ocean through as many land routes as possible. That is why the road and railway through the Karakoram to Pakistan, transportation corridors through Myanmar and repeated intrusions in Bhutan; claiming Doklam Plateau (last high ground overlooking the Siliguri Corridor) and renewed road construction between Zuri and Phuteogang Ridge that overlooks the disputed Charithang Valley. The threat is more serious when viewed in conjunction with the Maoists of Nepal (spawned with the blessings of Beijing) and their links with Maoists in India.
The China-Pakistan nexus is the strongest that any country can possibly have with China. Probably, Pakistan’s strategic location has a lot to do with this. Had Azad Kashmir and the Wakhan Corridor been under Indian control, China would have viewed India differently. Chinese design to use Pakistan as a front for waging asymmetric war on India dates back to the 1960s when Zhou-en-Lai suggested to Ayub Khan that Pakistan should prepare for a prolonged conflict with India instead of short-term wars. He advised Pakistan to raise a Militia force to act behind enemy lines. Pakistan raised this Militia in the form of Jihadis (LeT and JeM) and planting of armed modules in India began way back in 1992-1993.
That was the initiation of China-Pakistan asymmetric war against India and to keep us in check through terrorism, nuclear, biological and missile cooperation and arms/technology transfer. The Trans-Karakoram Highway, vital for commercial and strategic purposes connects the Northern areas of Pakistan to the Xinjiang province in China. Some 11,000 Chinese are presently undertaking so-called development projects in Azad Kashmir/Pakistan that ostensibly includes digging 22 tunnels in Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) for the deployment of missiles, Pakistan has reportedly leased GB to China for 50 years. Simultaneously, China has been making deep intrusions into Eastern Ladakh, nibbling into Indian territory that has totaled up to 400 sq.km. as per some estimates. Similarly, there have been periodic intrusions in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.
We may pray for a strong China and Pakistan but China-Pakistan will lose no opportunity to dismember India. Significantly, Zhan Loe’s article recommending China should splinter India into 20-30 parts, was published in the Journal of the Institute of Strategic Studies that has Chinese government backing. Chinese policy towards India has been no holds barred despite the facade; safeguarding Azhar Masood of JeM from being labeled a terrorist, objecting to the ADB loan to Arunachal, flooding fake currency into India, supplying arms to insurgent groups in India and permitting insurgent camps in Chinese territory. Asymmetric strategies have been crafted with great care. Pakistan is a willing ally with convergence of aims to downsize India. Despite the new Pakistani Army Chief, the military-ISI combine will likely continue to rule the roost.
There is significant Chinese presence in Nepal including PLA in Northern Nepal under the garb of development projects. China has also been known to be training Naga, Mizo and other North-East insurgents in the Paoshan area of Southern China in addition to ULFA bases and training camps in Chinese territory. China has armed the United Wa State Army (UWSA) controlling the ‘golden triangle in Myanmar with missile-fitted helicopters making it the most potent terrorist organisation in the region, far more powerful than the LTTE. This has the potential to create grave instability in India’s neighbourhood.’
China has been showing maps of Tibet’s 4,056-kilometre border with India reduced by 2,000 kilometres and Jammu & Kashmir as part of China. Peppered with questions on the map showing Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as part of its sovereign territory called Zhangnan or South Tibet, and Ladakh in China and Kashmir in Pakistan, Zhang Yan, the erstwhile Chinese Ambassador to India had the audacity to tell an Indian journalist to shut up.
Manifestation of the China Threat
Logically, China would prefer to ‘squeeze’ India through the ‘String of Pearls’ strategy; nibbling territory, psychological bullying, military posturing, economic blackmail and stoking up the internal fires of India. But, there is also this view of a cross-section in the West that China may not hesitate from using tactical nuclear weapon(s) to force India into territorial submission. However, what is certain is that should conflict happen, China will exploit all five domains of aerospace, land, sea, cyber and electro-magnetic. Sun Tzu had said, “The essence of warfare is creating ambiguity in the perceptions of the enemy.”
To this end, China is likely to optimise her considerable cyber warfare capabilities not only to attack command and control networks but also cripple the country’s critical infrastructure. Using her continuous border surveillance cover, she is likely to make full use of PGMs and Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs), space-based assets and stealth platforms, both manned and unmanned and even psychotropic weapons, if developed by then. Her penchant for outflanking moves and manoeuvers as demonstrated in 1962 will, in all likelihood, be replaced through the third dimension, attacking and holding ground in depth.
Implications of a Mountain Strike Corps
In viewing the Mountain Strike Corps, the urgency of its raising needs to be viewed in the context that China is effectively hedged in the East by US Asia Pivot Policy and in the West by the countervailing interests of Eurasia despite her investments in the Central Asian Republics (CAR). What is most crucial to China is the ‘open’ South, which can also be her nemesis. Therefore, her increased belligerence and attempts to grab as much territory as possible to soft-pad her underbelly. That is the reason China wanted a new agreement – the BDCA that India foolishly agreed to including most devastatingly agreeing to not shadow intruding Chinese patrols.
But the fact is that dissident groups inside China can eschew overt political protest for covert sabotage, hacking, swarming and systems disruption while minority elements, particularly Muslims and cults such as Falun Gong will gravitate toward terrorism and criminal enterprises to fund their activities. The first car bomb in Beijing though crude and blast close to a CCP office in North China, are only pointers.
An equally vital issue is that it would be naïve to view the Mountain Strike Corps in isolation as mere addition of 90,000 troops can hardly make a dent as mountains absorb manpower at unbelievable rates. While the Mountain Strike Corps would pose a ‘threat in being’, the real impact will be felt by China when a number of associated issues are addressed. The location of the Mountain Strike Corps formations should be such that it offers quick mobilisation but does not give away the intended thrust lines. Then is the vital issue of building border infrastructure, lack of which has actually encouraged Chinese intrusions. The BRO had been tasked in 2006 to construct 73 strategic roads that were to be completed by 2012 but only a fraction of this has been implemented. Unfortunately, the quality of BRO works has also deteriorated over the years and new roads constructed lose their surfacing in just one winter – more because of corruption than the vagaries of weather. Then is the total void of planning alternative routes. Roads reconnoitered by the Indian Army to bypass communication centres for faster mobilisation are not cleared for stupid reasons such as felling of trees.
Next is the requirement of surveillance. This cannot be restricted to border surveillance but must go in depth right up to the objectives of the Mountain Strike Corps but beyond to the area of interest including the areas from where enemy interference to the Corps thrust lines, as well as the flanks. This must be on 24×7 basis throughout the spectrum of conflict and must optimise Human Intelligence (HUMIMT) aside from all other forms of intelligence. India needs to optimise its satellite-based surveillance, UAVs and stealth drones. Command and control networks and weapon platforms would need to work in a cyber and electronic warfare-intensive setting.
The formation must have adequate potent firepower and punch; PGMs such as the Brahmos and DEWs. The artillery requirements need to be built up early, similar to positioning required armour for speedy thrusts where terrain permits. An effective air defence cover would be a vital need. While it is not known whether the inordinately delayed proposed procurement of 145 x M-777 ultra-light Howitzers from the US also cater for the Mountain Strike Corps. Knowing the system, it is unlikely this requirement would have been taken into account. It would, therefore, be prudent to work on this, in addition to speeding up indigenisation of the Bofors gun.
The third dimension will come into play in a major way including for capture/establishment of air head(s) and subsequent follow-up of troop induction, with Special Forces inducted much before the outbreak of hostilities. Synergy between the Indian Army and the IAF would be of vital importance in Strike Corps operations. Not only will the IAF need to blast the enemy out, it would need to establish an EW corridor for successful airborne operations. The Army Special Forces and the Special Frontier Force battalions must train for simultaneous operations in Tibet including influencing the border area populations, as being done by China.
Concurrently, we must develop the capability to control the fault lines in China (which are many) by employing our Special Forces covertly in Xinjiang, Tibet and Gilgit-Baltistan in conjunction the Mountain Strike Corps. Special Forces provide us the tools to address non-traditional challenges by providing a silent and effective medium to achieve our security objectives. Special Forces are a vital element of national power possessing capability of enormous freedom of action in methodology of execution of assigned operations and should be fruitfully employed to meet any challenge. The key lies in achieving strategic objectives through the application of modest resources with the essential psychological component. This would not only tie up the PLA in knots, it would also be a befitting response to China’s nefarious designs on our territory.
On balance, the Mountain Strike Corps must have capacity (inbuilt and supported) for: information dominance and information assurance; ability to paralyse enemy C4I2 infrastructure; stand-off weapons to pre-empt enemy attack; adequate mix of DEWs and PGMs; ability to disrupt enemy logistics and sustenance including the Qinghai-Tibet rail line; mix of hard-kill and soft-kill options; layered air defence; improved ISR and communications systems, and fully networked forces.
At the national level, we need to push for across-the-board military integration at the operational and tactical levels and develop state-of-the-art technologies in spheres of space, cyber-space, stealth and smart technologies, improved nukes, lasers, intense lasers and plasma, nano-technology and robotics. In fact, we need to network all elements of national power.
Conclusion
China’s past history is laced with aggression and blatant disregard to world opinion. The PLA is well ahead of the Indian Army and this ever-widening gap, if not checked and bridged, will catapult Chinese adventurism. We should expect no respite from increasing Chinese pressure. China-Pakistan are hand in glove in waging asymmetric war against India and the situation is likely to get increasingly volatile inadvertently egged on by US-China and US-Pakistan equations and heightened Chinese aggressive posture. India needs to be prepared for a Chinese thrust into Arunachal Pradesh. We should have the capacity to thwart that and go for North Tibet employing not just the Mountain Strike Corps but all elements of national power.
Implications of a Mountain Strike Corps » Indian Defence Review