pakistani342
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Second article on Afghanistan by Shank in a two weeks.
I'm not familiar with his work but he is associated with SCAR at George Mason University - which is one of the leading programs in conflict resolution in the world.
He main point seems to be that: unless there is an inclusive settlement amongst all he players, all bets are off.
original article here
...
The Bilateral Security Agreement deal, forged by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Afghan President Hamid Karzai, will be quickly undone since the U.S. is not focused on the right kind of settlement.
Attacks on Afghan officials in the last week show how quickly things can unravel.
That Afghanistan's Loya Jirga is now the decider on legal jurisdiction over U.S. troops post-2014 gives the impression that an independent decision on troop immunity was reached by Afghans.
That is hardly the case. In fact, it will be interesting to see how much tampering happens in choosing the delegates for the Jirga and what changes between Karzai Administration and U.S. in the next few weeks.
It can go either way. There might be a cut and run by the U.S., or a "let's stay long enough to make it look like we really tried." We witnessed this in Iraq as well.
The U.S. and Afghan government are making sure that the deal's language doesn't go public too far ahead of the Jirga, because the Afghan press would seize upon it and the public would protest loudly against troop immunity.
Karzai, consequently, is engaging in smart political strategizing. By having the Jirga accept the deal -- and he can use his influence to bring enough tribal and political delegates that favor a deal with U.S. -- he doesn't run the political risk for himself or his brother's campaign.
The Afghan President is ultimately in favor of a deal because he knows that without U.S. support the Kabul Administration will fall within months of U.S. pulling out.
In fact, despite troop immunity being a big red line for the majority of Afghans, all three leading presidential candidates -- Abdullah Abdullah, Ashraf Ghani and Qayum Karzai -- are in favor of a deal with U.S., as they know that the U.S. will not keep troops in Afghanistan without getting immunity.
The Kabul Administration, and presidential candidates, are betting that a deal will allow for a slow slippage into civil war rather than immediate chaos that could follow the presidential election. They think a slow slip will give them enough time to unite Afghans.
That is an unlikely scenario, however, considering that the Taliban have already rejected any deal for the U.S. to stay post-2014. Add troop immunity to this mix and all components of bad policies that'll lead to a civil war are there.
What's needed is an inclusive, political settlement -- with all stakeholders included -- that ends the fighting and stops the region from meddling, something we missed the mark on years ago.
Until we do that, any Afghan security deal will remain elusive.
Too bad it's twelve years in and we still haven't figured that out.
Michael Shank, Ph.D., is Director of Foreign Policy at the Friends Committee on National Legislation and Adjunct Faculty at George Mason University's School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution.
I'm not familiar with his work but he is associated with SCAR at George Mason University - which is one of the leading programs in conflict resolution in the world.
He main point seems to be that: unless there is an inclusive settlement amongst all he players, all bets are off.
original article here
...
The Bilateral Security Agreement deal, forged by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Afghan President Hamid Karzai, will be quickly undone since the U.S. is not focused on the right kind of settlement.
Attacks on Afghan officials in the last week show how quickly things can unravel.
That Afghanistan's Loya Jirga is now the decider on legal jurisdiction over U.S. troops post-2014 gives the impression that an independent decision on troop immunity was reached by Afghans.
That is hardly the case. In fact, it will be interesting to see how much tampering happens in choosing the delegates for the Jirga and what changes between Karzai Administration and U.S. in the next few weeks.
It can go either way. There might be a cut and run by the U.S., or a "let's stay long enough to make it look like we really tried." We witnessed this in Iraq as well.
The U.S. and Afghan government are making sure that the deal's language doesn't go public too far ahead of the Jirga, because the Afghan press would seize upon it and the public would protest loudly against troop immunity.
Karzai, consequently, is engaging in smart political strategizing. By having the Jirga accept the deal -- and he can use his influence to bring enough tribal and political delegates that favor a deal with U.S. -- he doesn't run the political risk for himself or his brother's campaign.
The Afghan President is ultimately in favor of a deal because he knows that without U.S. support the Kabul Administration will fall within months of U.S. pulling out.
In fact, despite troop immunity being a big red line for the majority of Afghans, all three leading presidential candidates -- Abdullah Abdullah, Ashraf Ghani and Qayum Karzai -- are in favor of a deal with U.S., as they know that the U.S. will not keep troops in Afghanistan without getting immunity.
The Kabul Administration, and presidential candidates, are betting that a deal will allow for a slow slippage into civil war rather than immediate chaos that could follow the presidential election. They think a slow slip will give them enough time to unite Afghans.
That is an unlikely scenario, however, considering that the Taliban have already rejected any deal for the U.S. to stay post-2014. Add troop immunity to this mix and all components of bad policies that'll lead to a civil war are there.
What's needed is an inclusive, political settlement -- with all stakeholders included -- that ends the fighting and stops the region from meddling, something we missed the mark on years ago.
Until we do that, any Afghan security deal will remain elusive.
Too bad it's twelve years in and we still haven't figured that out.
Michael Shank, Ph.D., is Director of Foreign Policy at the Friends Committee on National Legislation and Adjunct Faculty at George Mason University's School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution.
