Fighting the hordes

[Bhushan]

Fighting the hordes
By Ayesha Siddiqa

THE outcry these days is that the Taliban are now firmly in our midst. While some believe they will eventually be defeated, others are of the view that the tide of Talibanisation will wipe out everything else.
There are two important questions here: one, are the Taliban a temporary phenomenon and, two, does society have the capacity to fight them off?

The Taliban’s growing influence is no secret. The Taliban and their partners ensconced throughout the country have the capacity to weaken the state’s authority in critical parts of Pakistani territory. We are already confronted with a situation where the Taliban have established control over areas where they wield influence. This expansion has taken place over several years in small increments. And all along many of us thought that this was a one-off problem that would eventually be resolved.

In the mid-1990s we had the Taliban state in Afghanistan, then the Sufi Mohammad episode which we tried to resolve by putting him in jail. In later years, it was the Red Mosque stand-off followed by the TNSM’s resurgence in Swat along with a growing Taliban presence in other parts of the Frontier province. Now these staggered events seem to be connecting in the form of new gains for the Taliban and their numerous partners.

There are many good-hearted people who still believe that the Taliban can be defeated. Such assertions continue to be made even though our security forces have failed to gain the upper hand in Swat and other places. Call it a breach of intelligence or lack of capacity to fight an insurgency, the fact is that the state does not command the power to reclaim its territory. Unfortunately, it seems that the Taliban might win due to the combined capacity shortcomings of the security apparatus, the government and society at large.

It is clear that the political government is desperately short on the will to fight. The political actors are mired so deep in point-scoring that the primary objective has been lost. Our policymakers cannot deliberate on issues that will make or mar the Taliban’s forward march. For instance, no strategic evaluation has been undertaken of the Taliban threat and its tactical dimensions. And this applies not just to the present government but also its predecessors. The Malakand agreement and the freeing of Maulana Abdul Aziz clearly indicate this lack of capacity.

Maulana Abdul Aziz was freed on bail even though he, according to his own claim, endangered the lives of hundreds of seminary students during the military’s Red Mosque operation. The maulana’s case, in fact, dates back to 2003-04 when he was charged with sedition for issuing a fatwa considered derogatory to the armed forces and was subsequently removed from his position. He was rescued by none other than a federal minister, Ejazul Haq.

The minister took upon himself the responsibility of mending fences between the maulana and the government. So it is not surprising that a strong case was not brought against him in court to keep him behind bars longer. For those dismayed by the court’s recent decision, it would be worth noting that the judiciary has few options when the prosecution is unwilling to build a strong case.

This is not to say that the judiciary and the legal community stand absolved of responsibility. We have a judiciary that is famed for taking suo motu action. Shouldn’t then there be a judicial inquiry into the sort of environment created by the maulana for his students? Even the students’ interaction with their family members was reportedly controlled and supervised. Or what about challenging the Malakand agreement itself which is a travesty of the 1973 Constitution?

The judiciary must show more resolve than it did after the introduction of Zia’s draconian Nizam-e-Islam regulations. Then, barring a few judges such as Justice Ramday, the majority happily applied laws that trampled on all norms of justice and human rights. And let’s not forget that the legal community in general did not really resist Zia’s laws. None of the bar councils protested against laws that ultimately resulted in an increase in homicide and injustice.

As the country confronts an expansion of the Taliban, the legal community seems unable to muster the courage to launch a movement against what has happened in Swat. It is surprising that some lawyers place a higher value on the restoration of judges than on questioning the Malakand agreement which poses a greater threat to the state.

The maulana’s release sends a clear signal to men of his ilk fighting the state in Swat, Waziristan, Punjab and other places. This needs to be countered. We are in this fight together and the state envisioned by Jinnah — in which people of different castes, creeds, ethnicities and religious beliefs were to coexist — can survive only if we close ranks. Putting the blame on others and not doing our bit is not going to serve the cause. The head of state has to go beyond expecting other countries to fight his battles or capsizing to unknown pressures while signing controversial ‘peace’ deals with militants who refuse to lay down arms.

The Malakand agreement is the legal instrument that will result in the empowerment of the Taliban. These militants will not stop at Swat or even at Buner. They will not only expand their presence in the Frontier but will also move into other parts of the country. The tragedy of the present moment is that while the strength of political and human rights movements is fledgling at best, the Taliban and their ‘jihadi’ partners have increased their capacity to proliferate throughout Pakistan.

This is a time when everyone needs to stand up and not seek shelter in political expediency. As such, Mian Nawaz Sharif cannot hide behind his political deal with the PPP and support the Malakand agreement while at the same time talk about the threat posed by Talibanisation. We can fight this only if we muster the required will, develop a clear understanding of what lies ahead and then evolve a coherent implementation strategy.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

 

[Bhushan]

Disarray on Pakistan Taleban threat


The Pakistani government and army seem incapable or unwilling to tackle the Taleban threat in the north-west, argues guest columnist Ahmed Rashid.

Unprecedented political and military disarray in Pakistan and a growing public feeling of helplessness is helping fuel the rapid expansion of the Taleban across northern Pakistan, bringing them closer to paralysing state institutions in their bid to seize total power.

Even though most Pakistanis agree that the Pakistani Taleban and their extremist allies now pose the biggest threat to the Pakistani state since its creation, both the army and the government appear to be in denial of reality and the facts.

Within weeks of concluding a deal with the government on the imposition of Islamic law in the strategically located Swat valley, the Taleban have already broken the agreement by refusing to disarm, taken control of the region's administration, police and education while spilling out into adjacent valleys.

'No need to worry'

Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani persuaded parliament to pass the Sharia agreement into law, insisting the Taleban pose no threat to the state. Threats by the Taleban to abrogate the agreement forced President Asif Ali Zardari to hurriedly sign the bill, even though he had tried delaying tactics.

Only parliamentarians from the Sindh-based Muttahida Quami Movement courageously voted against the bill.

The refusal of either the government or the army to respond to its greatest threat since the country split apart with the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 reflects a chronic failure of leadership

Even though the agreement ignores the constitution by setting up a new legal system in the valley, which is not genuine Islamic law but the Taleban's brutal interpretation of it, Mr Gilani reiterated on 18 April that ''whatever we have done is in accordance with the constitution and there is no need to worry".

In fact the majority of Pakistanis are desperately worried, asking how the state could concede so quickly.

The Swat Taleban added fuel to the fire by inviting Osama Bin Laden to settle in Swat, indicating their complete control of the valley.

On 20 April, Sufi Muhammad, a radical leader who the government and the army have termed as ''a moderate" and whose son in law Fazlullah is the leader of the Swat Taleban, said that democracy, the legal system of the country and civil society should be disbanded as they were all ''systems of infidels".

The Taleban have now infiltrated western and southern Punjab province with the help of Punjabi extremist groups, the second largest city of Lahore and the southern port city of Karachi.

Even more surprising has been the attitude of the army, which has declined all international and local pressure to curb the spread of the Taleban.

The army's only military response was when it bombed the tribal areas after 25 of its soldiers were killed in a suicide bomb attack near Hangu in North West Frontier Province on 18 April.

That dismayed many Pakistanis because it showed the army was willing to only attack the Taleban when its own soldiers had suffered.

Groups of militias who have resisted the Taleban in Swat and other places were left to fight on their own without the military's support for weeks on end.

With the Taleban taking control of Buner district - although they have now said they will withdraw - and Dir as well as moving north to take over the Karakoram Highway that links Pakistan to China, there is the fear that Pakistan will soon reach a tipping point.

With the Taleban having opened so many fronts, it will soon be impossible for the army to respond to the multiple threats it faces.

US and Nato

The army's rationale for doing nothing appears deeply irrational to many Pakistanis.

The army still insists that India remains the major threat, so 80% of its forces are still aligned on the Indian border instead of defending the country against Taleban expansion.

The army has also refused to respond to US and Nato demands to oust the Afghan Taleban leadership living on its soil.

The Taleban have destroyed many schools in Swat

And despite US President Barack Obama's plan to deepen the commitment to stabilise Afghanistan, the army insists that the Americans will soon leave Afghanistan and that Pakistan must be ready with a response to help install a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul.

That rationale is also motivated by India's friendship with the present Afghan government.

Meanwhile two of Pakistan's closest allies, China and Saudi Arabia, have strongly indicated to the government that its continuing tolerance of the Taleban and al-Qaeda on its soil is endangering the national security of these two countries.

With the entire international community now pointing out that the Taleban threat to Pakistan is dire, Islamabad finds itself diplomatically isolated as it continues to fail to respond.

For the Americans and Nato the situation is quickly reaching a crisis point.

With Washington sending 21,000 additional troops to southern Afghanistan, Nato sending another 5,000 to secure the Afghan elections in August and large numbers of Western civilian experts due to arrive to help rebuild the country, neither the US nor Nato can for long tolerate the stream of supplies and recruits that continue to pour into Afghanistan from Pakistan to support the Afghan Taleban offensive against Western forces.

The Pakistani Taleban, even while continuing their penetration of central Pakistan, are also mobilising fresh recruits from all over the country to go help their Afghan Taleban brothers resist the newly arriving Western troops.

For Pakistanis and the international community the refusal of either the government or the army to respond to its greatest threat since the country split apart with the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 reflects a chronic failure of leadership, will and commitment to the people of Pakistan.

 

[Bhushan]

U.S. worried about Taliban move on Islamabad: Mullen

WASHINGTON: The chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen says he is “extremely concerned'' about indications the Taliban is moving ever closer to Islamabad.

Discussing the situation in an interview with US TV, Mullen said he believes “we're certainly moving closer to the tipping point'' where Pakistan could be overtaken by extremists.

Mullen said from Afghanistan he thinks that “events continue to move in the wrong direction'' in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. And he said he hopes the arrival soon of an additional 17,000 American combat troops will stabilize things.

Mullen said, “We're going as fast as we can go right now and we want to get it right.'' But he also said the Afghan people “have to take over security for their nation. That's the only way we're going to be successful."

 

[Bhushan]

U.S. Questions Pakistan’s Will to Stop Taliban

By Carlotta Gall and Eric Schmitt
THE NEW YORK TIMES

As the Taliban tightened their hold over newly won territory, Pakistani politicians and U.S. officials on Thursday sharply questioned the government’s willingness to deal with the insurgents and the Pakistani military decision to remain on the sidelines.

Some 400 to 500 insurgents consolidated control of their new prize, a strategic district called Buner, just 70 miles from the capital, Islamabad, setting up check points and negotiating a truce similar to the one that allowed the Taliban to impose Islamic law in the neighboring Swat Valley.

As they did, Taliban contingents were seen Thursday in at least two other districts and areas closer to the capital, according to Pakistani government officials and residents.

Yet Pakistani authorities deployed just several hundred poorly paid and equipped constabulary forces to Buner, who were repelled in a clash with the insurgents, leaving one police officer dead.

The limited response set off fresh scrutiny of Pakistan’s military, a force with 500,000 soldiers and a similar number of reservists. The army receives $1 billion in U.S. military aid each year but has repeatedly declined to confront the Taliban-led insurgency, even as it has bled out of Pakistan’s self-governed tribal areas into Pakistan proper in recent months.

Pakistan’s military remains fixated on training and deploying its soldiers to fight the country’s archenemy, India. Pakistan’s military remains ill-equipped for counterinsurgency, analysts say, and top officers are deeply reluctant to be pressed into action against insurgents who enjoy family, ethnic and religious ties with many Pakistanis.

In the limited engagements in which regular army troops have fought the Taliban in the tribal areas and sections of the Swat Valley, they not only failed to dislodge the Taliban, but also persuaded many Pakistanis that their own military is as much of a menace as the Islamic radicals it sought to repel, residents and analysts say.

In Washington, a Defense Department official who is monitoring Pakistan closely, said that the poorly trained constabulary force was dispatched on Thursday because regular Pakistani army troops were not available, and Pakistani generals were reluctant to pull reinforcements off the border with India — something U.S. officials encouraged them to do.