Delay in Afghan troop surge will be sign of US weakness: Musharraf

[EjazR]

Delay in Afghan troop surge will be sign of US weakness: Musharraf

US will make ‘disastrous mistake’ by withdrawing from Afghanistan
* ISI not aiding Taliban
* Taliban greater threat than Qaeda
* Taliban gaining strength both in Pakistan, Afghanistan

LAHORE: A delay in sending more US troops to Afghanistan will be seen as a sign of weakness, former president General (r) Pervez Musharraf told the Washington Times late on Monday.

He said the US would make a “disastrous” mistake if it withdrew from Afghanistan. “Absolutely. By this vacillation and lack of commitment to a victory and talking too much about casualties [it] shows weakness in the resolve,” Musharraf said of the US deliberations over increased troops and rising increased casualties.

Taliban aid: He denied claims that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was covertly supporting the Taliban.

Asked whether the ISI was still helping the Taliban to hedge against a US withdrawal and oppose Indian interests in Afghanistan, Musharraf denied.

“I don’t think that is correct at all,” he said. “The ISI behaves as they are ordered by the government. They never go against the government’s policy.”

The former president said Al Qaeda was less of a threat than the Taliban, which he said were growing in strength among ethnic Pashtuns on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

“We must win in Afghanistan,” he said, warning that otherwise, it would again become a haven for Al Qaeda as it had been before the 9/11 attacks.

“Quitting is not an option,” he said. “We should not delay. The earlier the better.” Musharraf said US commanders should not “pursue [the Taliban] in areas” where they had the advantage, but “draw them out” into areas where the coalition had the upper hand.

He said the Taliban “move with bread and onions”, and did not require elaborate logistical support like US troops.

Musharraf admitted that the insurgents crossed the Pak-Afghan border at will, but said the money and weapons flowed in primarily from Afghanistan into Pakistan, not the other way around.

Musharraf also denied reports that Pakistan’s nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan sold nuclear weapons materials and designs to Iran, North Korea and Libya with the knowledge of the Pakistani government.

“It is absolutely wrong to think that the Pakistan government was involved in the proliferation,” he said. “It was done by himself as an individual.”

He would not elaborate on how much influence Khan had in aiding Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear aspirations and stated that every nation with nuclear weapons had received nuclear information from some other state.

 

[muse]

The Afghanistan report



Thursday, October 01, 2009
Ikram Sehgal

The raging debate in the US whether or not to send more troops to Afghanistan is eerily reminiscent of how almost 50 years ago the military bureaucrat General Westmoreland kept asking for more US troops for the Vietnam quagmire. The huge difference between Vietnam and Afghanistan with respect to terrain and ideological motivation notwithstanding, the basic theme of the insurrection remains the same -- an armed struggle against a weak and corrupt government propped up by foreign troops. The far more pragmatic Stanley McChrystal, with years of combat experience in special operations, is many cuts professionally above Westmoreland.

This article quotes key excerpts from McChrystal's initial assessment as Commander, US and NATO allied military forces in Afghanistan. “Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population. In the struggle to gain the support of the people, every action we take must enable this effort. The population also represents a powerful actor that can and must be leveraged in this complex system. Gaining their support will require a better understanding of the people's choices and needs". Success will depend upon this theory (also expounded in Vietnam) being converted into reality on the ground.

"The fight is not an annual cyclical campaign of kinetics driven by an insurgent "fighting season." Rather, it is a year-round struggle, often conducted with little apparent violence, to win the support of the people. First, to protect the population from insurgent coercion and intimidation demands a persistent presence and focus that cannot be interrupted without risking serious setback. Second, and more importantly, we face both a short and long-term fight. The long-term fight will require patience and commitment, the short-term fight will be decisive," said McChrystal.

The US and NATO commander emphasises that "the conflict in Afghanistan is a war of ideas and perceptions, perceptions generally derived from actions and real conditions, for example by the provision or a lack of security, governance, and economic opportunity. The people of Afghanistan represent many things in this conflict -- an audience, an actor, and a source of leverage -- but above all, they are the objective. The population can also be a source of strength and intelligence and provide resistance to the insurgency. Alternatively, they can often change sides and provide tacit or real support to the insurgents. Communities make deliberate choices to resist, support or allow insurgent influence. The reasons for these choices must be better understood." The report does not address the root problems at ground zero of the insurgency, endemic unemployment and poverty. A visionary approach is required for massive economic infusion to make the area on both sides of the Durand Line, particularly FATA, into one of economic resurgence.

The report addresses corruption and abuse of power but it does not give it the primary weightage it should. Karzai and his lot should not remain in power even a day. Abdullah would probably be worse. The many excesses of the Taliban era notwithstanding, they successfully eliminated criminal networks, narcotics and corruption. In the eight years since the Talibaan were deposed in November 2001, "criminality has contributed to a pervasive sense of insecurity among the people. Extensive smuggling diverts major revenues from the government and increases its susceptibility to insurgent penetration. A number of government officials are reportedly complicit in these activities at all levels, further undermining the government's credibility. The most significant aspect of the production and sale of opium and other narcotics has a corrosive and destabilising impact on corruption within the government. Narcotics activity also funds insurgent groups. The public perceives the ISAF complicit, with no appetite or capacity -- to correct the situation."

The general notes that "the government of Afghanistan and ISAF have both failed to focus on the weakness of state institutions, malignant actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials and ISAF's own errors have alienated large segments of the Afghan population. They do not trust the government to provide their essential needs such as security, justice, and basic services. This crisis of confidence, coupled with a distinct lack of economic and educational opportunity, has created fertile ground for the insurgency. The Quetta Shura Taliban's establishment of ombudsmen to investigate abuse of power in its own cadres and remove those found guilty capitalises on this government weakness and attracts popular support for their shadow government. A foreign army alone cannot beat an insurgency; the insurgency in Afghanistan requires an Afghan solution. Eventual success requires capable Afghan governance capabilities and security forces." Sensible words – but is this possible engaging the Taliban in dialogue?

Local and regional power brokers are current or former members of the government their financial independence and armed followers give them local autonomy, further hindering efforts to build a coherent Afghan state. Outright sadists like Rashid Dostum are war criminals who should be tried by the International Criminal Court (ICC). To quote, "their interests are directed to self and self alone, not aligned with either the interests of the Afghan people or the government, this leads to conflicts that offer opportunities for insurgent groups to exploit".

McChrystal (and the US) fail to really understand the extent to which Indian presence has alienated the Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He notes the support for the Taliban within Pakistan and by elements of the ISI. "The major insurgent groups in order of their threat to the mission are -- the Quetta Shura Taliban, Haqqani network, and Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin. These groups coordinate activities loosely, often achieving significant unity of purpose and even some unity of effort, but they do not share a formal command-and-control structure. Despite our best efforts, the insurgents currently have the initiative". McChrystal admits that the current Afghan government is perceived by Islamabad as pro-Indian: "their activities largely benefit the Afghan people but increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India."

Pakistan must be made strong economically, targetting FATA especially. The US must not continue to keep Pakistan "afloat only" and fiddle with the Indian card in continuation with the Bush policy. It will not only lose Afghanistan and maybe in the bargain Pakistan, but the whole region. Take the recurring success of the drone strikes in recent months; could these be possible without Pakistani hands on the controls? If anything, this should show, along with Swat, how the Pakistan Army is the world's best bet against terrorism. By increasing the funding and equipment to the army necessary for fighting both counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency within Pakistan, the US will win the war in Afghanistan.



The writer is a defence and political analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder 9.com

 

[muse]

In the piece above, protecting the population is a key element in the US COIN strategy, but with election fraud, what's the point of protecting a population and it's government when it does not trust the legitimacy of it's government -- the COIN policy may have to be revised, on the other hand Gen. Petraeus is on record suggesting that not all elements of COIN policy need to move at the same speed:


October 1, 2009

U.S. Critic of Karzai Is Fired From U.N. Mission

By RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr. and NEIL MacFARQUHAR

KABUL, Afghanistan — The United Nations fired its No. 2 official in Afghanistan on Wednesday after the diplomat, Peter W. Galbraith, wrote a scathing letter accusing the head of the mission here of concealing election fraud that benefited the campaign of the incumbent president, Hamid Karzai.

The head of the mission, Kai Eide, angrily denied the accusation, and senior United Nations officials and diplomats said Secretary General Ban Ki-moon had decided to recall Mr. Galbraith because of irreconcilable differences with Mr. Eide, who is Norwegian.

“He reaffirms his full support for his special representative, Kai Eide,” said a terse statement attributed to Mr. Ban’s spokesman. The day before, Mr. Ban also expressed confidence in Mr. Galbraith in a news conference at the United Nations headquarters.

But the letter to Mr. Ban from Mr. Galbraith, the highest-ranking American official working for the United Nations in Afghanistan, made clear the depth of the animosity between Mr. Galbraith and Mr. Eide and illustrated the profound concerns that remain among some international observers that the presidential election was hopelessly undermined by fraud.

“For a long time after the elections, Kai denied that significant fraud had taken place, even going to the extreme of ordering U.N. staff not to discuss the matter,” Mr. Galbraith wrote in the letter, a copy of which was obtained by The New York Times.

“And, at critical stages in the process,” he wrote, “he blocked me and other U.N.A.M.A. professional staff from taking effective action that might have limited the fraud or enabled the Afghan electoral institutions to address it more effectively.” U.N.A.M.A. refers to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.

Mr. Eide and Mr. Galbraith had clashed repeatedly, United Nations officials said, and their different approaches came to a climax over the vote recount after the election on Aug. 20. Their disagreement was so severe that Mr. Galbraith proposed that he return to the United States for several weeks, and Mr. Eide accepted that suggestion. Until now, United Nations officials had been saying that Mr. Galbraith was expected to return to Kabul.

With American officials increasingly accepting the idea that Mr. Karzai will be the next president despite many well-documented irregularities in the election, Mr. Galbraith’s stance put him at odds with both the Obama administration and the United Nations. European Union officials, though, have been more vocal about the fraud.

In the letter, sent earlier this week, Mr. Galbraith suggested that Mr. Eide effectively sided with Mr. Karzai at critical junctures in the campaign, playing down credible reports of widespread fraud and preventing United Nations staff members from intervening to prevent it.

Without the fraud, Mr. Galbraith wrote, Mr. Karzai would have been forced into a runoff against the second-place finisher, Abdullah Abdullah.

Mr. Karzai won 54.6 percent of the vote, according to the preliminary tally, but Afghan national elections officials are now conducting a recount and fraud review under the oversight of a United Nations-backed agency that could reduce his vote total.

“Given our mandate to support ‘free, fair and transparent elections, I felt U.N.A.M.A. could not overlook the fraud without compromising our neutrality and becoming complicit in a cover-up,” Mr. Galbraith wrote.

In a telephone interview late Wednesday, Mr. Eide sharply disputed Mr. Galbraith’s assertions, saying that he never took any actions to benefit Mr. Karzai, that he strictly adhered to Afghan constitutional and electoral procedures and that, at times, he had been more aggressive in confronting Mr. Karzai than had other Western officials.

“I completely reject that I have been more favorable to one candidate than to any other,” he said.

Mr. Eide said much of his dispute with Mr. Galbraith boiled down to what was proper under Afghan law. “I cannot be a political freelancer,” he said. “I have a mandate which is serious and I do take it seriously. The disagreement was whether to respect the Constitution and respect the process in place.”

He said he had had a “close dialogue” with Mr. Karzai that had, “at times, been a very difficult dialogue.”

United Nations officials said, for example, that Mr. Eide had aggressively objected to Mr. Karzai’s decision in the spring to name Marshal Muhammad Qasim Fahim, a Tajik warlord, as his first vice president on his re-election ticket.

The campaign of Mr. Abdullah responded swiftly to Mr. Galbraith’s removal. Salih Mohammad Registani, Mr. Abdullah’s deputy campaign manager, called his dismissal “the first sign that fraud is victorious over the law.”

In his letter to Mr. Ban, Mr. Galbraith outlined a handful of episodes that alarmed him.

Fearful of “ghost” polling stations that would never open because of a lack of security — but which would report fraudulent ballots — Mr. Galbraith wrote that he had pressed the Afghan ministers of defense and interior to secure the sites or shut them down. But he said the ministers “complained about my intervention and Kai ordered me to drop the matter.”

“As it turned out, most of the electoral fraud occurred in these ghost polling centers,” he wrote. A spokesman for the Ministry of Defense, Gen. Zahir Azimi, said he was not aware of any complaint before the election.

In addition, Mr. Galbraith wrote that United Nations field staff members collected data showing a “minuscule” turnout in southern provinces that somehow would report large numbers of votes for Mr. Karzai. But once it became clear that the data “would be deeply disturbing to President Karzai,” he said, Mr. Eide “ordered the staff not to share the data with anyone.”

As the Afghan national election commission prepared to abandon certain safeguards, a move that would result in the inclusion of large numbers of suspect ballots for Mr. Karzai, Mr. Galbraith urged the commission to reconsider.

But Mr. Karzai and other Afghan officials protested. “Kai sided with Karzai in this matter, seemingly indifferent to the fact that these fraudulent ballots were the ones that put Karzai over 50 percent,” Mr. Galbraith wrote.

He wrote that after the elections, Mr. Eide told Mr. Karzai he was biased in his favor, and that “those who are out to get you are also out to get me.”

Mr. Galbraith said when he asked about this, Mr. Eide “explained that being biased did not mean he was supporting Karzai, and I accept that explanation.”

“But I am not sure President Karzai sees it that way.”

Several United Nations officials disputed points that Mr. Galbraith raised. They said, for example, that the United Nations could not organize the election and also act as an observer, critiquing the process. They also said it would have been wrong to close polling stations simply on the assumption that voters would not turn out. It was preferable, in their view, to have the stations open and then allow the fraud investigation process to confront any problems.

Ultimately, Mr. Ban decided the dispute between Mr. Galbraith and Mr. Eide became too public, diplomats said. “There is scope for honest differences of opinion in terms of approaching a particular issue, but we expect the team to move in a unified fashion,” said Under Secretary General Vijay K. Nambiar, Mr. Ban’s chief of cabinet.

Richard A. Oppel Jr. reported from Kabul, and Neil MacFarquhar from the United Nations. Abdul Waheed Wafa contributed reporting from Kabul.