Defence Preparedness: Top-10 Challenges

[Break the Silence]

India shares borders with as many as seven countries - Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Two of these countries have long-standing border disputes with India while three others have had a love-hate relationship going with New Delhi.

While Myanmar shared a frozen relationship with India between 1962-1988 due to drug trafficking and the rule of the Military Junta, it is only with Bhutan that India has consistently had close ties ever since Independence more than 60 years ago.

Given the security situation in the peninsula, it is but natural that India's defence preparedness levels will keep haunting both policy makers and the man on the street. After all, we have fought as many as five wars with our neighbors since 1947, four of them being against Pakistan.

Though non-proliferation experts believe that future wars would be fought without weapons and on the strength of economic muscle, India has enough on its plate by way of fidgety neighbours and internal trouble makers, for us to constantly monitor our military might. In the subsequent pages, we have attempted to list out the top-10 challenges we believe is adversely impacting India's defence...

It is one thing to be unprepared and another to be unwilling. But, India's defense strategy since Independence is marked by large dollops of both as it remained both unprepared and to a large extent unwilling from a strategy perspective to decide its military strategy. Despite fighting three wars (plus Kargil) against Pakistan and one with China, New Delhi has repeatedly proffered the olive branch hoping that its neighbours will let the doves fly.

Time after time, India's unwillingness to bite the bullet came to the fore, be it the annexation of territory by Pakistan a year after Independence or the Chinese invasion of 1962. The Socialist (read pro-USSR) policies of Pandit Nehru made India resist American overtures while the idiosyncratic Non-Aligned Movement meant that New Delhi basked in the glory of global self-importance while ignoring more local threats.
The Congress regime at the centre has continued this confused defence policy right through Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. In fact, veteran cartoonist R K Laxman once drew a cartoon where an aide passes a message from "someone back home" who wants to know when Rajiv Gandhi (shown at a NAM meeting) will return home and solve domestic issues. What Laxman predicted in 1986 came true in 1989 when Gandhi lost his massive mandate to govern India.

If things were unclear in the 1980s, the 1990s and the two decades of the twentieth century have seen India oscillating wildly between its preferences. They ditched the Russians, but didn't join the Americans. We extended an arm of friendship with Pakistan only to be bitten by the Kargil skirmish of 1999. We went nuclear in 1998, but went ballistic with our statements that it would be only used for "peaceful purposes". We bore the brunt of sanctions, but didn't get any N-expertise.
And things are only getting worse now. As defense expert and editor of Indian Defense Review Bharat Verma says, India is now surrounded by totalitarian regimes coupled with non-state actors who may not think twice before shrinking the democratic space in Asia. Islamic fundamentalist regimes, communist dictatorships, military junta and non-state actors might well redraw the international boundaries, a phenomenon which India cannot hope to be left out of.

He argues that once the Americans leave Afghanistan, Pakistan could resurrect the Taliban who will jointly hold fort in the two countries. And with that India will lose its defense and financial interests in Kabul. We may be pleading with President Obama to hang on, but we have not made any commitment to militarily support the US forces in combing and clean-up operations. So, the muddle continues!

Inadequate Defence Research

At first glance, the header might seem blasphemous given the yeoman service rendered by the DRDO and other defence labs in the country. But, our intention here is not to mock at the efforts of our scientists but to point out that political will has seldom kept pace with scientific capabilities. Where else but in India can anyone see a second nuclear coming almost a quarter of a century after the first one?

Defence Minister A.K. Antony lamented India's slow pace of defence indigenisation whereby we continue to import 70% of our equipment. With private sector not allowed to participate in defence R&D or production, the defence production and research industry has been more of a gravy train for bureaucrats. And so, we had a scenario where DRDO had as many failures as successes since its inception in 1958. While the successes were largely related to missile technology, the failures spread far and wide.

Though there have been some moves to unfetter the DRDO in recent times, it remains to be seen whether they have any impact. Experts are concerned about whether our plans for modernisation will lead to a major upgrade of defence technology base and manufacturing ability, or will the country's defence procurement remain mired in mundane buyer-seller, patron-client relationships?

The point to be noted is that Defence research has always been and will always be at the mercy of funds and in a Parliamentary Democracy the money needs to be authorised. So, if India is not doing enough R&D, the onus is with the facilitators - in this case the executive and the administration. India stands tenth amongst the top-15 countries with highest military expenditure, a group that is headed by Washington, Beijing and Paris in that order.

But wait! A back of the envelope calculation on defense spending as a percentage of GDP reveals that India spends about 2.5 per cent of its GDP on defence of which hardly an iota would be directed towards research. Several African and Asian nations including the likes of Singapore spends more on defence. And believe it or not, the top five spenders are all Arab nations!

If we cannot make it, we have to buy it. And this is where India's military preparedness has taken a huge hit as has its credibility as a strategic buyer in the global arms market. At the "DefExpo" held in New Delhi last month, a wannabe defence equipment provider made a comment that pretty much summed up the condition of our defense administrators who are largely responsible for ensuring that India's forces are equipped to defend.
Anand Mahindra, the CEO of M&M was heard saying that "it is now time to understand that the gun is innocent". He was obviously referring to the Bofors gun that his company now hopes to sell to the government. A gun that had embarrassed a former prime minister more than two decades ago and resulted in a scandal that continues to affect the Congress party's first family as well as some of their erstwhile friends like the Bachchans.

The allegation of a $50 million bribe reverberated through administrative corridors to such an extent that defence ministers and their officials have been running scared of placing major international orders. In fact, the current incumbent A.K. Antony has perhaps cancelled more defence contracts than he has signed in the past six years of his holding forte.


Corruption in Arms Deals

It is not as if only the Congress is running scared. Defence Minister George Fernandes had to face trouble over a coffin scam after the Kargil skirmish. So, now the ministers and their mandarins have decided that the only way to suppress corruption charges is to defer all purchases, a feature that defence experts believe will only hamper India's defence preparedness more.

The Army Chief had recently revealed that 80 per cent of India's armoured tanks were night blind as against Pakistan where 80 per cent of tanks can battle at night. Even basic weaponry like automatic rifles and ammunition takes forever to reach the forces. A former army officer Ajai Shukla recently wrote in his column that the Defence Minister's fetish for a clean image is costing India 125 per cent more for buying half the equipment. This is because India abandons defence tenders in favour of negotiated settlements and many times prices rise by the time we make up our minds!

A Farewell to Sophisticated Arms

After the 1999 Kargil war in which India lost more than 500 of its soldiers, there was intense debate on the tactics adopted by India to reclaim the heights from the Pak paramilitary forces and Kashmiri insurgents in the sector. Orders were to climb the heights head-on as India could not adopt the tactic of blocking off the supplies to enemy positions without crossing the line of control (LoC).

Given this situation, the soldiers had to climb the steep hillocks at night with the enemy firing at them from a height and making them easy targets. Reports suggested that many soldiers bore bullet marks up the neck and above as the enemy picked off their ill-equipped targets. Defence experts were outraged that the soldiers weren't even wearing enough protective equipment before taking up such a mission.
And if that wasn't enough, we had the gunning down of three top police officers of Mumbai during the 26/11 terror strikes on the city. Hemant Karkare, Ashok Kamte and Vijay Salaskar fell to bullets because their vests were either of inferior quality or had passed its sell by date. The callous manner in which the investigations were carried out where charges and counter-charges flew thick and fast shows that quality of defence equipment is not on anyone's minds.

Coming to more important things, India's major defence purchases vis-a-vis battle tanks, armoury and sophisticated equipment have taken place more than a decade ago. At a time when the world is talking night vision goggles and guns, Indian soldiers are left to handle ramshackle equipment that even a local goonda might disapprove of.
Year after year, the Republic Day parade showcases equipment that might appear juvenile to our neighbours like China which spends more than two per cent of its GDP on defence research and as much as 2.5 per cent of GDP on military expenditure. After the recent Maoist attack in West Bengal, it came to light that the Naxals had more modern equipment than those who have been given the brief to guard our country.

 

[Break the Silence]

Technological Obsolescence

The Comptroller & Auditor General (CAG) had recently highlighted the level of technological obsolescence that has marred India's defence preparedness. Sample this: India has 10 Russian Kilo-class, four German HDW and two virtually-obsolete Foxtrot submarines while China boasts of 57 attack submarines, a dozen of them nuclear ones.

In fact, the CAG report highlighted that if India were to go to war against Pakistan at this moment, it will have to make do with only seven to eight submarines, even less than Pakistan's dozen or so submarines, which include three spanking new French Agosta-90B vessels. In fact, it is only after 2012 that India will benefit from the Scorpene submarine projects that is being constructed at the Mazagaon Docks.
At last year's DefExpo in New Delhi, it was revealed that India would be spending a whopping 50 billion US dollars over the next decade in arms acquisition and modernisation. This is in addition to a similar amount that India has spent since 1999 under the same accounting head. This is a situation that has been brought about by the policymakers' lethargy to plan local production infrastructure and R&D.

Given China's increasing defence expenditure, India is left with no option but to get its act right and buy modern equipment to replace its arsenal that is of some considerable vintage. A search on Wikipedia for equipment of the Indian army reveals that our soldiers use a good bunch of equipment that is probably been given a send-off by other major armies of the world.

The NSV and KPV machine guns are from the former Soviet Union while India continues to use some assault rifles from former Czechoslovakia and East Germany. It is a case where the weapon suppliers have faded into history books but their weapons continue to be used by our soldiers to defend the country. And this happens to be the major problem facing India's defence capabilities.
Sophisticated and effective equipment costs money and that is something India is now willing to spend. A stealth fighter could cost in excess of $200 million while an aircraft carrier comes at a close to $8 billion. Today, India is left with no option but to spend this sort of money whereas with better planning in the past it could have ensured on joint development, joint testing and trials, joint production, joint marketing and joint product improvement.

 

[Break the Silence]

Effective External Defence

The sub-continent's nuclear environment means that India needs to preserve an effective external defence preparedness model. In other words, this means that India needs to have the capability to wage a limited war, the kind where a short-sharp burst can punish an adversary for indiscretions but also ensure that chances of the conflict escalating into a major war is under strict control.

A perfect sample would be a quick strike across the LoC to flush out anti-India terror elements or a sharp reaction to the Chinese incursions in Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh. India's policy makers till date have been overtly bothered about controlling the end result of a possible war than the actual battle itself. This attempt at wariness has resulted in India being called a soft state by many defence and strategy experts.

So, the question before our policy makers is whether India can adapt to this new style of war that puts a premium on speedy decisions on attack and equally fast ones on the termination of offensive action. For e.g. what stops Indian troops crossing the LoC and flushing out a bunch of Lashkar goons and then calling off the action when the international community gets fidgety?

Unfortunately, even the United States is not good at such tactics, instead requiring loads of time to mobilise the forces, deploy them and hope to grind the adversary down. The Pakistani army has been smarter in this respect, having used the Jihadis and other trained operatives to make quick strikes time and again on Indian Territory while the Indian forces have just waited and watched.

The only way India can prepare for the so-called "limited war" will be large investments in emerging technologies. Of course, it would also require a drastic and dramatic change in the training methods that needs to focus on commando type hit-and-run warfare instead of the more traditional ones. A few lessons from the Israelis might go a long way in preparing our soldiers, but how do we prepare our politicians to approve of this tactical change?

 

[Break the Silence]

Fidgety Neighbours

The lack of an effective external defence policy combined with the salami tactics employed by India's two major neighbours - China and Pakistan - since 1948 means that India has lost territory in the past and is perennially in danger of losing more of it in the future.

Having lost ground to Pakistan in 1948 and China in 1962, the Indian side tightened things up for most of the 1970s through to 1990s though it was a classic case of oversight from our side that allowed militants to gain control of some Indian positions in the Kargil sector during the winter of 1999.

Similarly, China has been hyper active along the Arunachal border though New Delhi seems to be in self-denial mode despite media reports from the border areas where locals were quoted as saying that the Chinese even protested India building a road on our side of the Line of Control.

India seems to be hoping that pressure from the international community will stop our neighbours from acting against our interests. Maybe, the foreign office mandarins have not heard of the old saying that "Even God only helps those who help themselves."

 

[Break the Silence]

Internal Security Threat

The roles of the defence forces and police have been defined clearly but the spate of internal security threats meant that the army has had to perform double duty of securing our borders and stepping into a policing role when asked to.

This writer recalls a conversation with the then Army Chief Gen. S.F. Rodrigues in the mid-1980s where he expressed concern over the growing civilian role of the army. He was also critical of the government calling in the army to assist civil authorities when the situation "gets out of hand" in the first place.

Instead of ensuring that the police and paramilitary forces are adequately empowered to ensure domestic peace, the government probably hopes that the police will control things and when it doesn't quickly hands over control to the army.

It is not as if the defence forces do not have a role in peacetime. Natural calamities like floods, earthquakes definitely call for every bit of assistance from the defence personnel, but it is quite another thing for them to be put on policing tasks like maintaining law and order during a curfew.

And this brings us to the other question on what prompts the civil administration to call in the army? Should we be called in when one person dies? When ten die? Or when the toll crosses 50? When is the right time and does that mean that casualties prior to the army getting in does not matter? No wonder that the army is miffed at having to perform this additional, if somewhat, thankless task.

 

[Break the Silence]

Tactical Shortcomings

A television camera captured an army commando raising his automatic weapon and firing indiscriminately into Chabad House (one of the buildings where the 26/11 Mumbai carnage played out). This picture tells an eloquent story about our defence preparedness and does so in a manner that no research report can.

That an NSG commando trained in guerilla warfare had to resort to blind firing proves the tactical inadequacy of our armed forces. An entire bunch of commandos took more than a day to flush out a handful of terrorists from the Taj Hotel.
Search and combing operations carried out by the army to flush out terrorists from the narrow alleys of Kashmir is a regular routine these days, but the security forces have thrived more on their own courage than on strategy of their officers.

When the infamous IC-814 hijack happened, Indian authorities rued the fact that the aircraft had landed in Kandahar, arguing that had the hijackers not been allowed to take off from Amritsar, the Indian army would have come to the fore.

This might well be true, but past experience tells us that the army has seldom managed a high precision tactical strike without loss of life.

Now juxtapose this with the famous Entebbe hijacking where Israel sent 100 elite commandos to Uganda and managed to rescue all 103 hostages. Their only casualty was the 30-year-old leader of the crack force Yonatan Netanyahu, elder brother of the current Israeli Premier Benjamin Netanyahu.