comment: Obama’s Afghan dilemma —Shahzad Chaudhry

[fatman17]

comment: Obama’s Afghan dilemma —Shahzad Chaudhry

One thing though should be expressly clear: there is no military victory in Afghanistan. Success will be in leaving behind a stable Afghanistan minus Al Qaeda, but not minus what time has begun to define as the Taliban

Obama’s Afghan policy is in a flux. Having inherited it as work in progress, he ended up owning it by default. Of the two, Iraq and Afghanistan, he was committed to retrenching on Iraq, but had to stay the course on Afghanistan.

The difficulty with the ‘war on terror’ has been that it has always remained too open ended. While Bush’s own war was Iraq, he tended to be only gung-ho as a strategy in Afghanistan, never really defining the exact objectives. As a result, in Washington, it is back to the drawing board.

Is it possible to resurrect a war gone awry? Or was it a war that really had no defined end-state to begin with? Again, will only war deliver such an end-state, or should it be a different set of tools? Do they need to define (or re-define) the end? What entails success in Afghanistan? Should they wait to succeed or seek success in a given time to enable a decent exit out of Afghanistan? Obama and his team of experts will spend the next few weeks knocking around ideas in an attempt to seek that elusive objective for which America launched an armed war in Afghanistan.

In response to questions on Gen McChrystal’s sixty-day review on the on-going state of war in Afghanistan, President Obama struck a few right chords. He opined, “I need to know, why I am there,” before he assented to any request to augment troops in Afghanistan. A tad late, but finally he is there in asking the right question.

Even more instructive: Dianne Feinstein, the Democratic chair of the Senate intelligence committee which oversees the functioning of the entire intelligence apparatus of the US, which includes the CIA, had this to say, “I do not believe we can build a democratic state in Afghanistan. I believe it will remain a tribal entity.” Truer words have not been spoken before. Eight years should at least provide a better perspective.

Worryingly, the early bird reviews of McChrystal’s assessment to his military chiefs and the commander-in-chief is an amalgam of a military man’s hard headedness, part the realist that he is and part what he wishes to see despite the facts stating otherwise. He is driven by the never-say-die spirit but is also intellectually aware of the serious limitations of his mission. It, therefore, ends up being something for everyone as a report. Any surprise then that Obama wants the assessment to be tested against a 46-point matrix before reaching any final conclusions. These are varied: as the recent Presidential elections in Afghanistan and their likely impact on the American mission, and the need for integrated socio-economic support to Afghan society, providing it with necessary resilience against future Talibanisation, etc.

Most telling of his considerations though, from Pakistan’s point of view, relates to Pakistan’s recent successes in operations against militants, leading him to observe: if the US really needs to add troops to the ones already there when a coalition partner, and the only one for the moment I may add, is doing so well and winning the fight! Left unsaid: task the Pakistani military to continue the mission against all inimical forces impeding achievement of the US mission, especially when they perceive the bulk to be situated this side of the Durand Line. And, were it to be so, the US military may just cut its losses in deference to the growing majority opinion in the US, and in due course having successfully handed the baby and the bathtub over to the re-created Afghan forces find it opportune to beat a retreat.

There continues a serious dichotomy overriding American perceptions. Gen McChrystal, driven by the ultimate scarlet thread from his army publication on COIN — winning hearts and minds — quite evidently misses the point when he expresses the need to secure the Afghan people from the ravishes of the Taliban. Securing who from whom? They all happen to be the same kith and kin — the disenfranchised Pashtuns. In Iraq it was different: the divide identified two separate groups, Shias and Sunnis, given to historical animosity when fanned; and fertile to be exploited one against the other; providing security to a group became doable and, importantly, perceivable.

From Helmand and the East to the very North of the troubled region, fifty percent of Afghans, Pashtuns all, are in it en bloc regardless of what the Wardaks and the Karzais and the Ashraf Ghanis may proclaim. How they instead hope to benefit from the continued American presence are the easy pickings of association in terms of the dollars that the elites will enrich themselves with. Maybe it is time to heed Ms Feinstein, and question oneself, why would the graveyard of all empires play out differently this time?

Pakistani successes against the extremists within Pakistani boundaries carry an important differentiation — that of unanimous public support for the mission. In Afghanistan, the US-NATO forces are outsiders. Any surprise then that these forces remain cloistered within their garrisons, saving themselves from harm any time they wish to step out. If long-term presence were going to deliver results, there would have been some in eight years. But if there aren’t any, this baby’s broke. Mending, therefore, should begin in earnest.

President Obama stated in his recent pronouncements: perhaps the only prime objective for a way forward is to eliminate Al Qaeda. This most basic objective of the American effort got lost in Bush’s ‘smoke ‘em out’ philosophy. It got further morphed and magnificently confused when the objective list expanded into creating an oasis of Jeffersonian democracy, a.k.a. the fifty-first state of the USA in Afghanistan. Since then, forces in Afghanistan have only hunkered down waiting for their term to complete.

President Obama is right — eliminate Al Qaeda as your main military mission. Additionally, use available resources to facilitate an environment of stability by neutralising the real bad elements, not by alienating the largest segment of the Afghan population; mainstream the majority Afghan Taliban into a participatory processes of nation-building; permit the presently fragile state structure to expand its support base through a more representative interaction and integration with all ethnic denominations — assimilation must remain the key to this effort while; and finally, when all this is done, hand Afghanistan over back to the Afghans.

If a surge in troop numbers is required to strictly pursue and aid in the aforementioned objectives, so be it; but a time-line, perhaps annotating early 2012 as the cut-off, will need to be appended. That is Obama’s political and electoral compulsion. Enunciation of a time-line may also help bolster sagging public opinion.

One thing though should be expressly clear: there is no military victory in Afghanistan. Success will be in leaving behind a stable Afghanistan minus Al Qaeda, but not minus what time has begun to define as the Taliban. These so called ‘Afghan Taliban’ are but a creation of an environment, who found impetus when clubbed into the same corner as Al Qaeda. Minus Al Qaeda, they would settle down into their alternative options. That shall certainly have a salutary effect on stabilising Pakistan’s troubled regions.

For Pakistan, serious connotations exist. For one, we need to tread with caution, not knowing which way the proverbial camel squats. Afghanistan is the key to our security apprehensions, and till those get assuaged, little can be given away. A neutral Afghanistan is also the key to regional stability, and till that is assured the region may remain on tenterhooks. There must, therefore, be a chapter on regional political environment added to the McChrystal report; it must define a neutral Afghanistan, and lay out a robust political plan to achieve that goal. That might mean making Pakistan and India sit together at the table in someone’s presence and reading them the script on making life good for the people of the region. Till that happens, Pakistan will hedge her bets.

The writer is a retired air vice marshal and a former envoy. Contact shahzad.a.chaudhry***********

 

[muse]

Obama's test in Afghanistan



Tuesday, September 29, 2009
Dr Maleeha Lodhi

The writer is a former envoy to the US and the UK, and a former editor of The News.

President Barak Obama weighs his options on Afghanistan amid dwindling public support in America for the war. Political debate has escalated in Congress and the media about both the aims of the western mission and its chance of success, at a time when there is growing unease within a fractious international coalition whose members see drift and a lack of strategic clarity in Washington.

President Obama has promised a comprehensive policy re-assessment before making decisions on strategy. He has said he would not be rushed into making up his mind about sending more troops until he had "absolute clarity about strategy".

While he mulls over the assessment submitted late last month by General Stanley A McChrystal, the commander of US and NATO forces, the fraud-ridden presidential election in Afghanistan has thrown Washington's political strategy into disarray.

With no legitimate political structure in place this denudes any counterinsurgency plan of its most critical requirement. Although frenetic damage limitation efforts by western diplomats are in progress, the uncertainty created by a deeply flawed election is feeding into growing public doubts in the US as well as in Europe.

As American casualties have risen, public support for the war has waned. A series of opinion polls indicate the changing public mood in America and rising war weariness in the midst of pressing domestic concerns.

Polls show that the American public is deeply sceptical about President Obama's view that Afghanistan is a "war of necessity". A Washington Post-ABC poll found 51 per cent saying that the war is not worth fighting while 46 per cent said it is. Other polls have also found that the majority are now opposed to a troop surge.

It is among President Obama's own party that support for the war has been flagging. Leading Democrats have been calling on President Obama to resist requests for more troops. Speaker Nancy Pelosi has warned that there is little appetite in Congress to authorize additional forces beyond the 21,000 that are already on their way and which will take the total of US forces to 68,000 by year end. Liberal Democrats like Senator Russel Feingold have urged a "flexible timetable" to withdraw US forces from Afghanistan.

With most Democrats opposed to continuing or expanding the conflict, Obama has been placed in the awkward position of relying more on the Republicans for support in the war.

As the counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan has become almost entirely Americanized, this has made it even harder to garner domestic support. Eliciting such backing seems to increasingly rest on internationalizing the military effort but the western coalition itself is afflicted by dissension.

It is in this challenging environment that the White House is reflecting on the recommendations made by General McChrystal. The bulk of this review of reviews was leaked last week. In the 66-page report the general describes the situation in Afghanistan as "serious but with success still achievable". He warns that unless he is provided more troops and a robust counterinsurgency strategy the war may be lost. He suggests that the aim of the military engagement should be to protect the population and unify the coalition effort.

Last Friday McChrystal submitted a formal request to the Pentagon for additional forces, possibly as many as 40,000 troops. The administration had earlier asked the general to delay making this request, to get inputs from civilians and outsiders to rethink overall strategy.

The debate over troop numbers is really one about how deeply to commit to a conflict that has already exceeded American combat engagement in the two World Wars combined. The debate so far has been polarizing. Republicans like Senator John McCain have called for committing "decisive military force". Powerful Democrats have argued against deeper involvement in a war in which an escalation strategy offers no guarantee of success and exposes the US to the risk of being bogged down in a Vietnam-style quagmire.

The debate has also pitted Vice President Joe Biden and key Congressional leaders who advocate a narrow counterterrorism approach that focuses on Al Qaeda and those like General McChrystal who are pressing for a broader counter insurgency strategy.

It is now more than apparent that the Obama administration rushed into a policy review of Afghanistan and hastily announced its conclusions in March 2009, sixty days after assuming power. This review represented a compromise between different views and sought to bridge the minimalist/maximalist approaches by offering something to everybody. What followed was more a statement of intent than an actual plan.

What was rolled out on the ground reflected little break with past. For all the emphasis on a civilian surge and a stronger diplomatic thrust, only a military strategy was implemented, on which virtually all the reliance was placed. And as the "new approach" was pursued without taking hard decisions mission drift followed.

President Obama now confronts tough choices that many believe he sought to avoid in the first seven months of his presidency. The immediate decision is whether to accede to the military's request for more troops or to scale back and redefine both the mission and its goals. His administration probably calculates that it has less than a year (as mid-term Congressional elections are then due) to show progress before public support disappears.

The choice for him should not be one between abandoning Afghanistan and pursuing an open-ended military engagement. Both would be destabilizing for the region. They are also unfeasible. The challenge is to find the best way of preventing the country from being a haven for terrorist networks but avoiding a course in where only a military solution is pursued.

He can no longer take the decisions that are necessary without addressing strategic questions: Is the goal of the military mission now simply the avoidance of defeat? What does "success" in Afghanistan really mean? Can Afghanistan be stabilized by just military means without applying non-military elements of strategy? This is what another troop surge implies. Is it at all feasible for outsiders to undertake nation building?

If insurgencies are neutralized as much by political as by military means, how can a viable political strategy be fashioned in the aftermath of the fraud-stricken Afghan election? How can talks with the insurgents be initiated? On what terms? And with whom?

If training and expanding the Afghan National Army and police is the basis on which an ultimate exit plan depends how can progress be expected when that process remains skewed in favour of non-Pashtuns? How can such forces take over more responsibility for their country's security if they suffer from this critical deficit as well as other disabilities in training and professionalism?

It is how President Obama addresses these questions that future stability in Afghanistan may hinge. He has shown a sense of realism in stating in recent interviews that he does not believe in an indefinite occupation and is not interested in being in Afghanistan to "save face".

He needs above all to recognize the need for a transition strategy that includes a process of reconciliation undertaken by Afghans themselves, investing seriously in more representative and viable Afghan security forces, considering a peace keeping force from Muslim countries as a 'bridging step' and forging a regional compact. Unless a radically different tack is followed the outcome may not be any different than it has in the past eight years.

 

[Vassnti]

It is how President Obama addresses these questions that future stability in Afghanistan may hinge. He has shown a sense of realism in stating in recent interviews that he does not believe in an indefinite occupation and is not interested in being in Afghanistan to "save face".

He needs above all to recognize the need for a transition strategy that includes a process of reconciliation undertaken by Afghans themselves, investing seriously in more representative and viable Afghan security forces, considering a peace keeping force from Muslim countries as a 'bridging step' and forging a regional compact. Unless a radically different tack is followed the outcome may not be any different than it has in the past eight years.

Though the question would be "which" Muslim countries would provide such a force? Pakistan would hardly want the cost involved or the number of troops needed. Iran wouldnt want a Sudi presence and the Saudi's wouldnt want Iran taking over so where would the force come from and that is appart from the protests India would have.

The second point is, is it possible to build a stable "afghan" scociety, it is a country of tribes with fueds and vendettas that go back generations the only time they stop shooting each other is when some one invades or under a brutal regiem like the taliban

 

[jeypore]

As the counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan has become almost entirely Americanized

It is very interesting Mr. Muse you have highlighted this, but does anyone really knows what it means. Think about it, how can counterinsuergency become Americanized, besides bombing none based pilot aircraft, which i might add, it is going on for long time and Pakistan is also involved.

Anyways the Obama policy is not working and greater force is required, that is my opinion. Hopefully there are half of Americans that are ready to crush this cancer.