Patriot
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Please tell us something about your early life?
In the terms of today my early life would be considered exciting and interesting. My father belonged to the Survey of India whose job was to make maps of the un-mapped regions of India, in the thirties, parts of the Central Province and Orissa, now in India were being mapped. Mapping at that time was done by starting from a base line of two points which had been accurately fixed and taking intersecting bearings of terrain features which had to be shown on a map, measuring distances from one of the base line points with a 22 yard steel wire chain called a jareeb, contours were hand drawn by measuring height differences with an instrument called a theodolite, everything was hand drawn in pencil by the surveyor.
My fathers job was to supervise a number of surveyors, walking from one surveyor to another. The mapping work on the ground was done in the winter months, in the summer it was considered too hot to work in the field, the surveying parties retired to hill stations, Murree, Mussorie, Shillong, etc where the drawings made on the ground in pencil were re-drawn in coloured inks. My mother accompanied my father when he went to the field, from the age of about four years I remember living in tent camps of what was known as EP/IP tents and choldaris smaller tents. I remember the orderly who was assigned the duty of looking after me showing pug marks left by visiting animals but the best sight used to be when a troop of langurs passed over the camp.
I used to accompany my father on his inspection trips perched on top of baggage loaded on a camel.I started going to school when I was six years old that ended my field trips with my father. I started school at the Loreto Convent in Shillong when I was six years old. At the end of the summer my father decided that my mother would not accompany him to the field but live in Allahabad and hired a house there, our native village was about 15 miles from Allahabad and I spent two years in Anne Besant School.
After two years my father managed a transfer to the Calcutta office of Survey of India where his job did not require field work. We moved to Calcutta, I was enrolled in St. Xaviers in a class lower than the 1st Standard and there my formal schooling began. I walked two miles on the busy Calcutta roads carrying a tin box containing my books. In the school the Roman Catholic priests made us work very hard and punished very severely, I got a beating two or three times, once for not doing my homework, the homework used to be a lot of work in the subjects that were to be taught the next day.We stayed in Calcutta for three years, my father had joined the Indian Army as a reserve officer in 1936 and he was called for active service in August 1941 in the Survey Department of the Corps of Engineers. He had a choice of leaving his family in any place in India and he chose Bangalore, we packed up our belongings and made a very long train journey to Madras and from there to Bangalore. My father carried a letter informing the principals of schools that he was to proceed on army service and we were to be accommodated in the school.
I was accommodated in the 3rd standard in Bishop Cotton Boys School. Bishop Cottons was a very fine school, in academics, sports, games, outdoor activities, it had a swimming pool, competition was organised on a house basis.We lived on the edge of the vast Bangalore cantonment, soon we made friends with neighbourhood boys and on bicycles roamed a radius of eighty miles on weekends and during holidays. Our fathers were away, either fighting the war or were prisoners of war, we had complete freedom for roaming the countryside and doing what ever took our fancy.
In August 1945 the Second World War ended with the surrender of Japan, my father was with the 14th Army Headquarters at Rangoon and when the war ended he was posted to Singapore. I was to appear in the Senior Cambridge examination in December 1945, on the way to Singapore he stopped in Bangalore to decide what I was to do after passing my examination, he wanted me to become an engineer and go the Aligarh Muslim University where he had studied, I did not want to go to college but agreed to go to a local college. After the Senior Cambridge results were announced I sent for the application forms for the Indian Military Academy where regular courses were to start but on receiving them found that the minimum age required was 18, I had to wait for over two years before I could become eligible.
In December 1946 my father was reverted to his job in the Survey of India and posted to Murree. in March 1947 we said goodbye to all our friends and left Bangalore by train for Rawalpindi. We started at about mid-day and reached Bombay the next day, we spent the whole day at the Victoria Terminus, there were Hindu-Muslim riots going on in the city and from railway station I could see the riot police lathi charging. In the evening we boarded the famous Frontier Mail which ran from Bombay to Peshawar, after travelling two nights and one day we arrived at Delhi early in the morning, the station was deserted, a rumour spread that the Sikhs were attacking trains and Frontier Mail would go no further but after some delay it left Delhi with a disconnected system for emergency stopping of the train. From the train windows we could see parties of Sikhs marching in single file with their kirpans and other weapons. Jullunder, Amritsar and Lahore were burning, we arrived at Lahore at night, it was pitch dark and fires could be seen burning.
The next morning we reached Rawalpindi, there was curfew in the city but my father was at the station to receive us, he told us that there was rioting in Rawalpindi and in Murree houses were being burnt, we moved into the Mall Hotel in Rawalpindi for about a week, then went to Murree. Late March schools opened, my brothers Firoz and Shuaib and I was admitted in Lawrence College, Ghora Gali, my sister in St. Denys, Shamim and Shamoon in the Convent of Jesus and Mary in Murree. In 1948 I passed my FSc exam but did not have enough marks to apply for admission in the engineering colleges, I still wanted to join the army but my father insisted on either engineering or medical profession.
Very reluctantly I joined Forman Christian College in Lahore, from there towards the end of 1948, I applied for the 3rd PMA Course and was selected for the 1st Pre-Cadet Course, the 4th PMA Course.In March 1949 my father and our family were in Hyderabad where my father was conducting the initial survey for the building of the barrage between Kotri and Hyderabad.
I left Forman Christian College and went to Hyderabad, my father was very annoyed when I told him that I had joined the army and was on my way to Quetta, he told me to go back to college but I refused, my father did not speak to me for the three days that I stayed at home before leaving for Quetta.After I joined the army, four of my brothers Firoz, Shamim, Aijaz and Javed joined the army, three brothers Shuaib, Aftab and Mushtaq joined the air force and Shamoon joined the navy, my father was not able to persuade anyone of us to become an engineer or a doctor.In the 1965 war I was away in the United States, Firoz, Shuaib, Shamim, Shamoon, Aftab and Mushtaq fought in the war, Shuaib and Shamim were decorated with the Sitara Jurrat, Aftab was also awarded the Sitara Jurrat for shooting down an Indian aircraft but he refused the award saying that was what he had joined the air force for and had only done his duty, later he was awarded the Tamgha Basalat. Mushtaq crashed in 1967 and was killed, by 1971 the two youngest, Aijaz and Javed had also joined the army, in the 1971 war there were eight of us in the army, navy and air force, all saw action in combat units, Aijaz, serving with 13 Lancers, was killed in the Bara Pind tank battle. Now all of us have retired except Javed who is the youngest and is a major general.
Who exercised a formative influence on your personality in your early years?
This is difficult to answer, my father was away for about five years, my mother controlled us during this period, even when my father returned after the war I was in boarding in college.
You were born and received your schooling in a region which is today a part of India and is culturally different from the areas comprising Pakistan. After 1947 did you feel any cultural change or what todays psychologists refer as cultural shock?
We, as family, were used to moving from one place to another to areas which were culturally different because of fathers job, this and the fact that we were safely in Murree during the partition troubles, we did not find anything different or culturally shocking.
How was the Pakistan of early 1940s?
The British disappeared almost overnight, the Sikhs and Hindus vanished, everyone claimed to be a refugee who required resettling and compensation for his losses. I accompanied my father on tours to Campbellpur-Mianwali area and Hyderabad-Badin area, Hyderabad was crowded with refugees otherwise everything was functioning as before independence.
Anything that you would like to state about your school and college life?There was nothing special or spectacular.Why did you choose the army as a profession?
First of all it offered an easy way out instead of spending years studying, secondly I grew up in an era when everyone was in uniform and thirdly I liked the kind of life it promised.How was life at PMA?It differed very little from boarding school. Any instructor who made a deep impression on your personality at PMA?The two instructors that impressed me were Captain Syed Ali El-Edroos (later brigadier) and Captain Ghulam Jilani Khan (later Lieutenant Generall and Governor of Punjab), both from the Frontier Force Regiment.Captain Edroos was our platoon commander in the second and third terms, he had five years of service and was all spit and polish. He was a good instructor, he created a unity in the platoon; he became the adjutant and was replaced by Captain Jilani in our final term.
Captain Jilani had fought in Burma, his idea of discipline was different from that of the other platoon commanders, he even allowed us to smoke when he was teaching us, he established excellent rapport with our number 15 Platoon which was notorious for getting up to mischief and trouble but worked hard. Jilani helped 15 Platoon members throughout his army career and as the governor of Punjab.
Any contemporaries at the PMA about whom you would like to say anything?
My good and close friends from the Academy were Lieutenant General Khusdil Khan Afridi, Brigadier Mansur-ul-Haq Malik and Lieutenant Colonel Syed Sultan-ul-Islam from our No 15 Platoon, Major Zia-uddin Ahmad Abbasi, SJ and Brigadier Akram Hussain Syed who was in Lawrence College in my class.Lieutenant General Afridi won the Sword of Honour and became the governor of Balochistan.
Brigadier Mansur-ul-Haq could think up more mischief than the rest of our platoon put together, a person of great moral and physical courage who always stated what he considered right, regardless of the consequences.
Lieutenant Colonel S. S. Islam was a strange personality, a very good friend but he made very few friends, a bitter enemy who continued a vendetta till he destroyed the personality of his opponent, he also had the habit of mimicking people whenever he described what they had said.
Major Z. U. Abbasi was from Tariq Company, he had come to the Military Academy after doing the full 1st OTS course at Kohat; he and I became friends during our Young Officers Course at the Armoured Corps School, he had a rare personality, efficient in his work, a good writer and speaker in English and Urdu, exceptional sense of humour and a practical joker who did not spare his seniors, he was killed in the 1965 war and was awarded the SJ.
Brigadier Akram Syed was from Qasim Company, he and I had lived in the same dormitory, in Lawrence College; he was a very handsome, flamboyant person, who did not seem to take soldiering seriously but was a good commander who attended to minor details; a very good friend who was always ready to help out.
With the benefit of hindsight how would you rate PMA of your days in terms of:--(1) Realism in Training.(2) Development of initiative and leadership.
As I have stated in my book The Way It Was the PMA authorities, planners, trainers and educators had no idea of the requirements and methods of creating the foundations required for regular professional officers for the army. There was no realism in the training and no development of initiative and leadership, both initiative and leadership require the creation of situations where these have to be displayed, decision making, as a subject of training was not known.
The military subjects, training in military organisation, administration, military law, military history, etc were badly organised and since there were no examinations in these subjects they were not taken seriously by the cadets. The academic subjects were also purposelessly organised and even simple English writing was not taught.
Was the Armoured Corps your first choice and if so what were your reasons for joining the Armoured Corps?
The Armoured Corps was my first choice because it was the arm of decision. How was 13 Lancers of the 1950s?In the early 1950s there were six armoured corps regiments, after 1955 there were two more, each considered itself the best in the Corps.
13 Lancers, the senior most armoured corps regiment, was non-Indianised regiment and when it came to Pakistan had only three Pakistani officers, the first two commanding officers were British, the other officers were from regiments which became the Indian Armoured Corps, Lieutenant Colonel I. U. Babar, originally from 5 Horse and a para-trooper of 3rd Cavalry was the first Pakistani commanding officer, he had fought in Burma and set a very high standard which was maintained.
There was good esprit de corps amongst the officers of the regiment. 13 Lancers was a qanooni regiment, well disciplined and was run according to rules and regulations. The regiment maintained its high standard and performed well in the 1965 and 1971 wars.
You have written in your book about the caste system and the abolishment of squadrons based on caste while the castes were retained in regiments general composition. How in your view did this system increase or decrease the operational efficiency of an armoured unit?
Because of the caste system and recruitment from specified areas the Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) had a very strong hold in the armoured and infantry units.
The mixing of the castes, Punjabis from various areas, Pathans from various areas, Rangars, Kaimkhanis broke the hold of JCOs. The retaining of the proportions and promotion according to the proportion in each unit prevented discontentment. It was a very clever and a very good decision.
How was the training in the army of the 1950s?
The Army of the 1950s, consisted of the veterans of the Second World War as far as the men were concerned, they were illiterates or near illiterates, the British had designed a good system of training and the men knew their jobs well, some had war experience and they required very little training in their trades and duties. Recruits were trained by the methods set by the British and was good.
The officer cadre was very weak. There was shortage of officers, officers had received very fast promotion, unit commanding officers had about 10 years service, brigade commanders had about 12 years service, division commanders about 15. In the Armoured Corps there were three categories of officers, one category had fought in Burma and seen troop level action in support of infantry, a second lot had been commissioned in the Armoured Corps but had seen no action or had been employed in jobs like RTOs (Rail Transport Officer, officers at key railway stations who arranged rail accommodation for officers and troops), the third category were transferees from the Supply and Pioneer Corps.
The Artillery was in a similar state.The Armoured Corps also did not have senior officers who could develop an armour employment doctrine.
The Armoured Corps training was advance to contact and tank infantry co-operation in the attack, defence was taken for granted; the training developed into manoeuvre training with emphasis of on outflanking, specially because T-16 infantry Bren gun carriers were issued to be used instead of tanks for training.Tactics is said to be fire and movement ours was only movement.
Both armour and infantry did not differentiate between recruit firing and trained unit firing. The tactical employment of fire by troop and squadron was not there and there was no field firing area and no proper training area where use of cover etc could be taught, villages and crops had to be avoided.
In the Military Training Directorate there was a British general and brigadiers who advised on training and planned and conducted formation level training, a number of formation level exercises were held, Hazard in 1952, Vulcan in 1953, November Handicap in 1954, Agility in 1956 to train formation commanders, staff officers and unit commanders.
What was your perceptions about Pakistans politics in the period 1947-58?
We thought politics was a joke, nobody bothered, governments came and went.
Any general officer who particularly impressed you in terms of being a fine professional in the period 1950-58?
My regiment 13 Lancers belonged to 3rd Armoured Brigade, we had no dealings with general officers and never saw any.
What were your impressions about General Ayub Khan as you saw him as a subaltern and young officer?
He made a very good impression, everyone thought that he was training and moulding the army in the right way.
Please tell us something about your service profile from passing out of PMA till 1958.
I served in 13 Lancers upto March 1956 as a troop leader and squadron second in command then I was posted to the Armoured Corps Centre as incharge of wireless training of recruits, in 1957 I was posted to the Armoured Corps School as Research and Development Officer, in April 1958 I went to the Special Service Group.
In the early years very few officers came to the army from the East Wing. How did you see them and was there any discrimination which these officers experienced?
I do not know the reason but my guess is that they received their education in Bengali and were very poor in English, even in the PMA they were very badly hampered by language problem, their physical performance was also comparatively poor.
There was no discrimination. What were your impressions about General Musa as you saw him as a young officer?The promotion of General Musa was disappointment to most of us and was interpreted that efficiency was not important for promotion only personal loyalty counted.
What were your impressions about the various famous exercises like November Handicap etc in terms of:---(1) Realism in Training (2) Lessons learnt?
There were a number of large exercises, Hazard in 1952, Vulcan in 1953, November Handicap in 1954, Agility in 1956 or 1957, Tezgam in 1960 and Milestone in 1961. (Some of the dates may be incorrect). They were designed to train senior commanders in handling large formations and to test organisational changes, they served their purpose.
How did you perceive the martial law of 1958 as you saw it in 1958?
It came as a surprise, we had been taught that the armed forces had no business to interfere with the government. Later the reforms and actions taken by the martial law authorities seemed to justify the martial law.
With the benefit of hindsight how would you rate the martial law of 1958 in terms of its effect on the Pakistan Army as an organisation and on Pakistans political system?
The army very hesitatingly took over the running of the administration of the country and did a fairly good job, a lot of malpractices that had crept in were ended, a lot of problems like the settlement of the refugees, the disposal of evacuee property etc were dealt with and finished, economic progress was accelerated. Ayubs political ambitions were tolerated till we failed in the 1965 war, after the war he lost his charisma and nobody cared whether he remained or went.There was no political system, the Muslim League had broken up and every politician seemed to have a political party they got together to bring down Ayub in 1968-69.
Please tell us something about your service profile from 1958 till 1965?
I was in the Armoured Corps School in 1958 as Research and Development Officer, in April 1958 I volunteered for the Special Service Group, I raised, trained and commanded a commando company in the SSG, in 1962 I reverted to the Armoured Corps and was posted to 23 Cavalry as a squadron commander.
In 1963 I attended the staff course and was posted to the Armoured Corps Directorate, in April 1965 I was posted as DQ 6 Armoured Division, in August 1965 was detailed on the Armour Career Officers Course in USA but had to come back in September when the 1965 war started and joined 23 Cavalry in the first week of October.
You were one of the first batch of officers who joined the SSG. How would you compare the SSG of that time with the SSG of today?
The SSG of that time was trained to stay behind operations in case the country was overrun. I have no idea of what the SSG is trained for now.
Anything that you would like to say about the school of armour as you saw it as a young officer attending the basic course
?As young officers we were treated as officers and were expected to behave as officers. We were always up to some mischief and every day in the tea break some one was in the adjutants office and some times the commandant.
We were familiarised with the driving and maintenance of vehicles and tanks, taught the operation of wireless sets and wireless communication and the mechanisms of the tank weapons, loading and firing of guns. The training did not relate to the technical aspect with the battle employment of tanks like application of fire in a tank battle.
With our course, a two weeks tactics course was also introduced which taught us basic battle drills.Here I will quote from my book The Way It Was: in retrospect, after learning what a junior officer should know the YOs course at that time was badly planned.
The purpose was not to train tank commanders and troop leaders but to give young officers a basic technical training in driving, communications and gunnery training as a tank gunner. ...The connection between technical training and the tactical or battlefield application was missing. ...The tests, as elsewhere in Pakistan, were tests of memory rather application of the acquired knowledge.
The training of officers was left to the regiments and in most regiments, they were left to their own devices.
How realistic was the standard of training in the School of Armour once you did your basic course?
As far as officers were concerned the Armoured Corps School ran driving, wireless and gunnery instructor courses, every officer was expected to do at least one of them, it was not clear to what purpose as officers were never employed as instructors; besides this there was a Crew Commanders Course which I attended before it was abolished, the course was about the same as the basic gunnery course; besides these, there was the Technical Officers Course of nine months which taught the repair and maintenance of vehicles and tanks and most officers trained in this course were employed in the supervision of vehicle and tank maintenance; on the tactics side the tactics course called Tac-Armour was run at the staff college but later shifted to the Armoured Corps School and split into junior-tac for captains and senior tac for majors.
I did every course run at the School of Armour except the Technical Officers Course and the Junior Tac. In technical training there was no difference between officers training and JCOs and NCOs training and as stated above the connection between the technical training and its battle field application was missing.
The Armoured Corps School lacked a tank driving course where the handling of tanks in crossing of obstacles and loading of tanks on transporters, railway flats and taking up of fire positions could be taught.Tank gunnery of the early forties, as taught at Babina (pre-partition training centre) was taught, for instance a tank gun firing procedure called semi-indirect fire, with artillery method of registering of the target by bracketing which related to the Lee-Grant (which became obsolete in 1943) where the commander could see the target and the gunner could not because in the Lee-Grant tank the main 75 mm gun was fitted in a sponson on the side of the tank while the tank commander was up in a turret which housed a 37 mm gun; I had a number of arguments about this method of target engagement, till 1964, even the M47 and M48 tanks were modified to continue this method of firing. In 1964, while I was in Armour Directorate I questioned it again and it was finally discontinued.
The application of tank gunnery, in the attack, defence and encounter, the importance of the vertical bracket, and the use of the range finder was never understood and applied.In wireless communications also we stuck to the inherited British system of regimental and later squadron net. When we bought the M4A1 (Sherman II, 76 mm gun) tank these came fitted with the SCR 528 sets which enabled the tuning and locking of ten frequencies and permitted independent command nets for the troop leader, squadron commander and the regimental commander; these were removed and British No 19 sets were purchased and fitted.
The No 19 set frequency locking device required frequent re-tuning.On the regimental net of the armoured regiment nearly a hundred sets operated on one frequency with frequent jamming. With the American Aid the AN/GRC 3 and 4 became the main sets with the same frequencies as the SCR 528, and as described above they provided independent command nets to troop level but probably because we had JCO troop leaders whose favourite enquiry was mayray leeay kia hukam hai, troop net could not be introduced.In training in voice procedure in the use of the inter-com and the wireless set no methods of giving orders to the crew, orders by the troop leader to the troop and squadron and regimental commanders to their commands were taught.
In short it can be said that the standard of training at the School of Armour was not battlefield related.
How would you compare the School of Armour with the Infantry School in terms of (1) Realism of Training (2) Transparency of Grading System (3) Quality of Instruction (4) Inter arm bias?
In realism of training both were equally poor; in transparency of grading system the School of Armour was better; quality of instruction in both was about equal; the School of Armour had no inter arm bias because there were no inter-arm trainees. How would you compare the standard of training in the army in the two periods 1952-58 and 1958-65?The standard of training remained the same.
How would you assess the negative or positive impact of General Musa as C-in-C of the Pakistan Army from 1958-66?
There was no positive impact, the negative impact was felt in the 1965 war, with our superiority in equipment, specially tanks, we should have won the 1965 war very easily.We had enough tanks to form two armoured divisions, one of M 47s and one of M 48s, and armoured brigade of M4A1s (Sherman IIs) and providing a Sherman III/V regiment to each infantry division and forming an anti-tank regiment with the M 36b2s.
The re-organisation of 1962-63 with the introduction of the Recce and Support battalions of infantry wasted infantry battalions and anti-tank fire power, the reduction of infantry divisions from nine to seven battalions reduced the capability of infantry divisions, specially with the vast frontages that they had to defend, (an infantry division front was supposed to be 10,000 yards 10 Division had nearly 50,000 yards.)
Since there was a limitation on the manpower and ammunition supply was also restricted by the terms of the US Aid methods should have been worked out to overcome these, manpower could have been easily managed.The conduct of the 1965 war, under General Musas leadership was deplorable.
Maj Gen Shaukat Riza and many others have alleged that there was lot of anti-artillery bias in the pre-1971 army and this included the 1971 war. How far in your opinion is this assertion correct?
There was no bias as far I know, the only allegations against the artillery was that they ran out of ammunition in the 1965 war and in the 1971 war it was that certain divisions fire was controlled by divisional artillery commander and was not provided when it was required.
What were your impressions of the Command and Staff College as a student?
The college was well organised and well administered, it taught staff work involved in the functioning of formations. The flaw in the instruction was that application was always under ideal conditions, but that was the flaw in all our training, there was no stress created by the failure of plans and surprise actions by the enemy, the enemys legs were always tied and our plans were always successful.
You saw the transition in the Pakistan Armoured Corps from British to US tanks. Please describe the process and also elucidate how far the allegations that Patton was too sophisticated a tank for the Pakistani tank crew, correct or incorrect?
The tanks in the Pakistan Army were always American, some armoured cars were British. The change was from Stuart light tanks to M 24 Chaffee tanks, Sherman II (M4A1), Sherman III and Sherman V to M 47 and M 48 tanks.The allegation that the Patton was too sophisticated for the Pakistan Armoured Corps is incorrect, the fault lay in our officers who trained the crew.
In the Armoured Corps at that time the best and most educated recruit was trained as a wireless operator, the next best was trained as a driver (this was the most desired trade because a job could be got as a driver outside the army), as far as the tank drivers and operators were concerned they quickly learnt their functions on the new tanks, in fact the operation of the AN/GRC 3 and 4 and the SCR 528 sets made wireless operation very simple.
The Sherman and Stuart gunnery was very simple so normally the least educated and the dopiest recruits were made gunners, the only sophistication the M 47 and M 48 had was the optical range finder which required understanding and a little intelligence in its operation to get accurate ranges for direct anti-tank and other direct shooting.
The range finder was an optical instrument whose working and operation was difficult to make our gunners understand and required about a thousand practice ranging, these were never mastered.
What should have been done was to select the most intelligent recruits as gunners.The M 47 and the M 48 tanks were not too sophisticated for our tank crew but the Armoured Corps did not want to change and shed what it had brought from Babina.
You attended a course in USA. What were your impressions of Fort Knox?
I went on a nine months Career Officers Course but a fortnight after the course started the 1965 war started and I was taken off the course to return to Pakistan.Instruction was function oriented, for instance the Driving and Maintenance was the supervision of maintenance, the documentation of vehicles, and the check of the battle worthiness of the equipment according to laid down standards, a company commander could declare his equipment unfit and the Ordnance the equivalent of our EME had to put it right.
The course was organised to train company commanders (squadron commanders) in every aspect of administration, the maintenance of equipment, tactics. The commands of the number of companies that would be available for command at the end of the course was made known and that commands would be allocated in order of merit, the others would be posted to staff and instructional jobs.
You have written a detailed account of the 1965 war in your book The Way It Was. What sources did you use since you did not see combat in the 1965 war?
In my book I have described events in all the sectors not a particular sector. I came back from USA and joined my regiment 23 Cavalry in October when troops were still in contact and memories were fresh.
I learnt of the major events of the 10 Division front since 23 Cavalry was the integral tank regiment of 10 Division, I carried out a reconnaissance of the 8 and 15 Division areas where 1 Armoured Division and 6 Armoured Division were located there, I learnt about the Khem Karan and Chawinda sector, from 13 Lancers and 11 Cavalry learnt about the events in Chamb-Akhnoor area; three SSG officers and a Baluch Regiment officer described Gibralter.
I was in GHQ Infantry Directorate where the officers who were para dropped in India were called by the Chief of the General Staff and interviewed, they described how this operation was conducted, the 4th Cavalry surrender was described to me by a 4th Cavalry squadron commander who had surrendered.
I also got access to a Staff College study of all the sectors giving the details of operations and units involved. I had collected the information for writing about the 1965 and 1971 wars but did not write it as a separate book.
You have stated some commanding officers of some tank regiments collapsed in Khem Karan. Why did this happen?
In Khem Karan the armoured division commander, two brigade commanders and four out of five armoured regiment commanders collapsed. This happened because our commanders are neither trained nor tested for working under battlefield stress.
How far do you agree or disagree with Lieut General Gul Hassan Khans theory that the prime reason for the failure of 1st Armoured Divisions was Major General Nasir?
Major General Nasir was responsible to the extent that he failed to get a grip on the division. The 1st Armoured Division operation was planned to be conducted with 7 Division, less brigade, providing the required infantry support, GHQ, which includes General Musa, the CGS and DMO (Gul Hassan Khan) moved 7 Division for the Chamb operation Grand Slam and ordered the Armoured Division to conduct the operation without the required infantry; the failure of the division commander, firstly, was in not pointing out the inadequacy of troops and, secondly, not ensuring that subordinate commanders carried out the tasks given to them.
How would you sum up operation Gibralter?
I agree with Colonel S. G. Mehdis summing up of the operation in a written note before the operation started which stated that it will be a fiasco greater than the Bay of Pigs operation, in this operation about 5,000 volunteers died and remain unsung.
What do you have to say about the system of awarding awards in the Pakistan Army from what you saw and heard in 1965 and 1971 wars?
I was told by the AA&QMG of 6 Armoured Division after the 1965 war that the Indians announced their awards first which caused a panic in GHQ and General Musa ordered formations to forward their recommendations immediately, anybody who was recommended was immediately given the award.Some awards were won by fighting a telephone battle, including HJ by a brigade commander.
After the ceasefire officers wrote their own recommendations and went about looking for someone to sign and forward the recommendation. In the 1971 war in East Pakistan it was the likes and dislikes of Lieutenant General Niazi and Major General Abdul Rahim Khan.
On the whole I would say a lot of awards were deserved, some deserving cases were ignored because they did not have backing, some who deserved the highest award got lesser awards, Major Khadim Hussain, 24 Cavalry, manned a recoilless rifle whose crew had been killed, knocked out two Indian tanks and was killed by the third Indian tank, he qualified for the highest gallantry award but was awarded a SJ. How would you compare the Indian Armoured Corps with the Pakistan Armoured Corps in terms of gunnery, tactical efficiency, and squadron/unit/divisional leadership in the 1965 war?In gunnery both sides were about equal.
The Indian tactical doctrine was to capture ground which would force us to counter attack giving them all the advantages of firing from a stationary position, our doctrine was based on counter-attacks with all its disadvantages. Squadron, unit and divisional leadership on both sides was about the same and showed nothing exceptional. At the troop level the Indians had officers with a three tank troop and we had JCOs with a four tank troop this gave them some advantage.
Please tell us something about your service profile from 1965 to 1971?
In 1965 I was serving in the Armour Directorate in GHQ, in April when the army moved to the border I was posted as DQ 6 Armoured Division and was involved in the logistic planning.
In August I left for USA for a nine months Career Officers Course at Fort Knox. A fortnight after the course started the 1965 war started and I returned to Pakistan and joined my regiment, 23 Cavalry, 10 Division integral armoured regiment. In May 1966 I was posted to the SSG, at first as GSO II at GHQ and later as second in command of the 2nd Commando Battalion.
In August 1968, was posted as the commanding officer of 22 Cavalry in the 1st Armoured Division, after assuming the command of the regiment I went to Jordan as part of a team led by Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid Khan.
After spending three months in Jordan I returned to command 22 Cavalry which I did till May 1970. In May 1970 I was posted to command 3 Commando Battalion in Comilla in East Pakistan. I took part in the military action in East Pakistan and returned to West Pakistan, on an adverse report by Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi.
The adverse report was squashed in toto and I was sent to raise 38 Cavalry at Hyderabad which I raised and the regiment took part in the abortive operation Labaik in Rajasthan.
In February 1972 I was posted as Colonel Staff 6 Armoured Division. How was the experience of commanding 22 Cavalry, a newly raised unit?22 Cavalry was not a newly raised unit, it was 6 years old and had three commanding officers before me and fought the 1965 war.
I found the command most interesting and the regiment responded very well when I introduced methods and control which made each appointment holder responsible for his job.Although it was raised by transferring men from the older regiments, it developed a complex when it compared itself with 5 Horse, 6 Lancers, 19 Lancers and 12 Cavalry the other regiments of the 1st Armoured Division.
This I overcame by making the regiment convert from M 48 to T 59 tanks without assistance from any other regiment and other things till the regiment considered itself the best in the division.
How would you describe the armoured divisions of the 1960s as compared with those of today in terms of overall environment, training and operational efficiency?
I have been out of the army for nearly 30 years, I am not familiar with organisations, training etc of today.Was there any marked change in the armys training after the 1965 war or not?There was no change.
You served as a SSG Battalion commander in East Pakistan in 1971. How was the experience?
When I took over the command the battalion was in disgrace for getting into a fight with students in the Chandni Chowk market in Chittagong. The unit was in Comilla, it was confined to the cantonment, the men were sullen and made themselves a nuisance as far as other units were concerned, the frogmen platoon had killed a man in Rangamati and disposed of the body in the Kaptai lake but the District Commissioner informed the authorities and every intelligence unit was making inquiries.I was given very good advice by Maj Gen A. O. Mitha that while restoring discipline I must not break the fighting spirit of the unit.
I managed to discipline and restore confidence in about four months by introducing close quarter combat firing, blindfolded demolition, night firing in daytime with simulated night conditions and other training. After some time the men accepted that being a commando was more than swaggering and bullying and behaved very well during the military operations.3 Commando Battalion was under command 14 Division lodged in Comilla, I had constant trouble with the Comilla brigade commander who wanted the unit under his command.
Later when the military action started in East Pakistan brigade and division commanders wanted commandos for personal guards, everyone wanted commandos wherever any fighting was expected, two men who were by chance with the Chittagong brigade were made to do pointsmen from Coxs Bazaar to Chittagong, we had to bail out Maj Gen Abdul Rahim Khan twice, once in securing the bridge over the Meghna at Bhairab Bazaar and then when his brigade attack with artillery support failed at the Belonia salient, two platoons of SSG cleared the salient.Similarly on other occasions commandos were asked for unit and brigade commanders and used as assault troops instead of using their own units.
A platoon deputed to the Comilla brigade was placed under command 39 Baluch, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel S. M. Naeem who had served in the SSG, he used the commandos to do all the fighting and cleared the area given to his battalion by a series of one commando platoon attacks. Commanders at all levels avoided using their troops and asked for commandos.3 Commando, a two company battalion, reduced to five platoons, cleared an area of about 2,000 square miles in the Hill Tracts and gained the co-operation of the people and got no credit for it.
In the planning of the defence of East Pakistan, Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi did not understand the strategic and tactical use of the commandos, when the defence of East Pakistan was being planned I suggested a raid on Calcutta, the general refused to listen and remarked that
I wanted to become a brigadier. In the war in East Pakistan the SSG played no role except one company which acted as the personal guard of Major General Abdul Rahim Khan, HJ.
In the terms of today my early life would be considered exciting and interesting. My father belonged to the Survey of India whose job was to make maps of the un-mapped regions of India, in the thirties, parts of the Central Province and Orissa, now in India were being mapped. Mapping at that time was done by starting from a base line of two points which had been accurately fixed and taking intersecting bearings of terrain features which had to be shown on a map, measuring distances from one of the base line points with a 22 yard steel wire chain called a jareeb, contours were hand drawn by measuring height differences with an instrument called a theodolite, everything was hand drawn in pencil by the surveyor.
My fathers job was to supervise a number of surveyors, walking from one surveyor to another. The mapping work on the ground was done in the winter months, in the summer it was considered too hot to work in the field, the surveying parties retired to hill stations, Murree, Mussorie, Shillong, etc where the drawings made on the ground in pencil were re-drawn in coloured inks. My mother accompanied my father when he went to the field, from the age of about four years I remember living in tent camps of what was known as EP/IP tents and choldaris smaller tents. I remember the orderly who was assigned the duty of looking after me showing pug marks left by visiting animals but the best sight used to be when a troop of langurs passed over the camp.
I used to accompany my father on his inspection trips perched on top of baggage loaded on a camel.I started going to school when I was six years old that ended my field trips with my father. I started school at the Loreto Convent in Shillong when I was six years old. At the end of the summer my father decided that my mother would not accompany him to the field but live in Allahabad and hired a house there, our native village was about 15 miles from Allahabad and I spent two years in Anne Besant School.
After two years my father managed a transfer to the Calcutta office of Survey of India where his job did not require field work. We moved to Calcutta, I was enrolled in St. Xaviers in a class lower than the 1st Standard and there my formal schooling began. I walked two miles on the busy Calcutta roads carrying a tin box containing my books. In the school the Roman Catholic priests made us work very hard and punished very severely, I got a beating two or three times, once for not doing my homework, the homework used to be a lot of work in the subjects that were to be taught the next day.We stayed in Calcutta for three years, my father had joined the Indian Army as a reserve officer in 1936 and he was called for active service in August 1941 in the Survey Department of the Corps of Engineers. He had a choice of leaving his family in any place in India and he chose Bangalore, we packed up our belongings and made a very long train journey to Madras and from there to Bangalore. My father carried a letter informing the principals of schools that he was to proceed on army service and we were to be accommodated in the school.
I was accommodated in the 3rd standard in Bishop Cotton Boys School. Bishop Cottons was a very fine school, in academics, sports, games, outdoor activities, it had a swimming pool, competition was organised on a house basis.We lived on the edge of the vast Bangalore cantonment, soon we made friends with neighbourhood boys and on bicycles roamed a radius of eighty miles on weekends and during holidays. Our fathers were away, either fighting the war or were prisoners of war, we had complete freedom for roaming the countryside and doing what ever took our fancy.
In August 1945 the Second World War ended with the surrender of Japan, my father was with the 14th Army Headquarters at Rangoon and when the war ended he was posted to Singapore. I was to appear in the Senior Cambridge examination in December 1945, on the way to Singapore he stopped in Bangalore to decide what I was to do after passing my examination, he wanted me to become an engineer and go the Aligarh Muslim University where he had studied, I did not want to go to college but agreed to go to a local college. After the Senior Cambridge results were announced I sent for the application forms for the Indian Military Academy where regular courses were to start but on receiving them found that the minimum age required was 18, I had to wait for over two years before I could become eligible.
In December 1946 my father was reverted to his job in the Survey of India and posted to Murree. in March 1947 we said goodbye to all our friends and left Bangalore by train for Rawalpindi. We started at about mid-day and reached Bombay the next day, we spent the whole day at the Victoria Terminus, there were Hindu-Muslim riots going on in the city and from railway station I could see the riot police lathi charging. In the evening we boarded the famous Frontier Mail which ran from Bombay to Peshawar, after travelling two nights and one day we arrived at Delhi early in the morning, the station was deserted, a rumour spread that the Sikhs were attacking trains and Frontier Mail would go no further but after some delay it left Delhi with a disconnected system for emergency stopping of the train. From the train windows we could see parties of Sikhs marching in single file with their kirpans and other weapons. Jullunder, Amritsar and Lahore were burning, we arrived at Lahore at night, it was pitch dark and fires could be seen burning.
The next morning we reached Rawalpindi, there was curfew in the city but my father was at the station to receive us, he told us that there was rioting in Rawalpindi and in Murree houses were being burnt, we moved into the Mall Hotel in Rawalpindi for about a week, then went to Murree. Late March schools opened, my brothers Firoz and Shuaib and I was admitted in Lawrence College, Ghora Gali, my sister in St. Denys, Shamim and Shamoon in the Convent of Jesus and Mary in Murree. In 1948 I passed my FSc exam but did not have enough marks to apply for admission in the engineering colleges, I still wanted to join the army but my father insisted on either engineering or medical profession.
Very reluctantly I joined Forman Christian College in Lahore, from there towards the end of 1948, I applied for the 3rd PMA Course and was selected for the 1st Pre-Cadet Course, the 4th PMA Course.In March 1949 my father and our family were in Hyderabad where my father was conducting the initial survey for the building of the barrage between Kotri and Hyderabad.
I left Forman Christian College and went to Hyderabad, my father was very annoyed when I told him that I had joined the army and was on my way to Quetta, he told me to go back to college but I refused, my father did not speak to me for the three days that I stayed at home before leaving for Quetta.After I joined the army, four of my brothers Firoz, Shamim, Aijaz and Javed joined the army, three brothers Shuaib, Aftab and Mushtaq joined the air force and Shamoon joined the navy, my father was not able to persuade anyone of us to become an engineer or a doctor.In the 1965 war I was away in the United States, Firoz, Shuaib, Shamim, Shamoon, Aftab and Mushtaq fought in the war, Shuaib and Shamim were decorated with the Sitara Jurrat, Aftab was also awarded the Sitara Jurrat for shooting down an Indian aircraft but he refused the award saying that was what he had joined the air force for and had only done his duty, later he was awarded the Tamgha Basalat. Mushtaq crashed in 1967 and was killed, by 1971 the two youngest, Aijaz and Javed had also joined the army, in the 1971 war there were eight of us in the army, navy and air force, all saw action in combat units, Aijaz, serving with 13 Lancers, was killed in the Bara Pind tank battle. Now all of us have retired except Javed who is the youngest and is a major general.
Who exercised a formative influence on your personality in your early years?
This is difficult to answer, my father was away for about five years, my mother controlled us during this period, even when my father returned after the war I was in boarding in college.
You were born and received your schooling in a region which is today a part of India and is culturally different from the areas comprising Pakistan. After 1947 did you feel any cultural change or what todays psychologists refer as cultural shock?
We, as family, were used to moving from one place to another to areas which were culturally different because of fathers job, this and the fact that we were safely in Murree during the partition troubles, we did not find anything different or culturally shocking.
How was the Pakistan of early 1940s?
The British disappeared almost overnight, the Sikhs and Hindus vanished, everyone claimed to be a refugee who required resettling and compensation for his losses. I accompanied my father on tours to Campbellpur-Mianwali area and Hyderabad-Badin area, Hyderabad was crowded with refugees otherwise everything was functioning as before independence.
Anything that you would like to state about your school and college life?There was nothing special or spectacular.Why did you choose the army as a profession?
First of all it offered an easy way out instead of spending years studying, secondly I grew up in an era when everyone was in uniform and thirdly I liked the kind of life it promised.How was life at PMA?It differed very little from boarding school. Any instructor who made a deep impression on your personality at PMA?The two instructors that impressed me were Captain Syed Ali El-Edroos (later brigadier) and Captain Ghulam Jilani Khan (later Lieutenant Generall and Governor of Punjab), both from the Frontier Force Regiment.Captain Edroos was our platoon commander in the second and third terms, he had five years of service and was all spit and polish. He was a good instructor, he created a unity in the platoon; he became the adjutant and was replaced by Captain Jilani in our final term.
Captain Jilani had fought in Burma, his idea of discipline was different from that of the other platoon commanders, he even allowed us to smoke when he was teaching us, he established excellent rapport with our number 15 Platoon which was notorious for getting up to mischief and trouble but worked hard. Jilani helped 15 Platoon members throughout his army career and as the governor of Punjab.
Any contemporaries at the PMA about whom you would like to say anything?
My good and close friends from the Academy were Lieutenant General Khusdil Khan Afridi, Brigadier Mansur-ul-Haq Malik and Lieutenant Colonel Syed Sultan-ul-Islam from our No 15 Platoon, Major Zia-uddin Ahmad Abbasi, SJ and Brigadier Akram Hussain Syed who was in Lawrence College in my class.Lieutenant General Afridi won the Sword of Honour and became the governor of Balochistan.
Brigadier Mansur-ul-Haq could think up more mischief than the rest of our platoon put together, a person of great moral and physical courage who always stated what he considered right, regardless of the consequences.
Lieutenant Colonel S. S. Islam was a strange personality, a very good friend but he made very few friends, a bitter enemy who continued a vendetta till he destroyed the personality of his opponent, he also had the habit of mimicking people whenever he described what they had said.
Major Z. U. Abbasi was from Tariq Company, he had come to the Military Academy after doing the full 1st OTS course at Kohat; he and I became friends during our Young Officers Course at the Armoured Corps School, he had a rare personality, efficient in his work, a good writer and speaker in English and Urdu, exceptional sense of humour and a practical joker who did not spare his seniors, he was killed in the 1965 war and was awarded the SJ.
Brigadier Akram Syed was from Qasim Company, he and I had lived in the same dormitory, in Lawrence College; he was a very handsome, flamboyant person, who did not seem to take soldiering seriously but was a good commander who attended to minor details; a very good friend who was always ready to help out.
With the benefit of hindsight how would you rate PMA of your days in terms of:--(1) Realism in Training.(2) Development of initiative and leadership.
As I have stated in my book The Way It Was the PMA authorities, planners, trainers and educators had no idea of the requirements and methods of creating the foundations required for regular professional officers for the army. There was no realism in the training and no development of initiative and leadership, both initiative and leadership require the creation of situations where these have to be displayed, decision making, as a subject of training was not known.
The military subjects, training in military organisation, administration, military law, military history, etc were badly organised and since there were no examinations in these subjects they were not taken seriously by the cadets. The academic subjects were also purposelessly organised and even simple English writing was not taught.
Was the Armoured Corps your first choice and if so what were your reasons for joining the Armoured Corps?
The Armoured Corps was my first choice because it was the arm of decision. How was 13 Lancers of the 1950s?In the early 1950s there were six armoured corps regiments, after 1955 there were two more, each considered itself the best in the Corps.
13 Lancers, the senior most armoured corps regiment, was non-Indianised regiment and when it came to Pakistan had only three Pakistani officers, the first two commanding officers were British, the other officers were from regiments which became the Indian Armoured Corps, Lieutenant Colonel I. U. Babar, originally from 5 Horse and a para-trooper of 3rd Cavalry was the first Pakistani commanding officer, he had fought in Burma and set a very high standard which was maintained.
There was good esprit de corps amongst the officers of the regiment. 13 Lancers was a qanooni regiment, well disciplined and was run according to rules and regulations. The regiment maintained its high standard and performed well in the 1965 and 1971 wars.
You have written in your book about the caste system and the abolishment of squadrons based on caste while the castes were retained in regiments general composition. How in your view did this system increase or decrease the operational efficiency of an armoured unit?
Because of the caste system and recruitment from specified areas the Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) had a very strong hold in the armoured and infantry units.
The mixing of the castes, Punjabis from various areas, Pathans from various areas, Rangars, Kaimkhanis broke the hold of JCOs. The retaining of the proportions and promotion according to the proportion in each unit prevented discontentment. It was a very clever and a very good decision.
How was the training in the army of the 1950s?
The Army of the 1950s, consisted of the veterans of the Second World War as far as the men were concerned, they were illiterates or near illiterates, the British had designed a good system of training and the men knew their jobs well, some had war experience and they required very little training in their trades and duties. Recruits were trained by the methods set by the British and was good.
The officer cadre was very weak. There was shortage of officers, officers had received very fast promotion, unit commanding officers had about 10 years service, brigade commanders had about 12 years service, division commanders about 15. In the Armoured Corps there were three categories of officers, one category had fought in Burma and seen troop level action in support of infantry, a second lot had been commissioned in the Armoured Corps but had seen no action or had been employed in jobs like RTOs (Rail Transport Officer, officers at key railway stations who arranged rail accommodation for officers and troops), the third category were transferees from the Supply and Pioneer Corps.
The Artillery was in a similar state.The Armoured Corps also did not have senior officers who could develop an armour employment doctrine.
The Armoured Corps training was advance to contact and tank infantry co-operation in the attack, defence was taken for granted; the training developed into manoeuvre training with emphasis of on outflanking, specially because T-16 infantry Bren gun carriers were issued to be used instead of tanks for training.Tactics is said to be fire and movement ours was only movement.
Both armour and infantry did not differentiate between recruit firing and trained unit firing. The tactical employment of fire by troop and squadron was not there and there was no field firing area and no proper training area where use of cover etc could be taught, villages and crops had to be avoided.
In the Military Training Directorate there was a British general and brigadiers who advised on training and planned and conducted formation level training, a number of formation level exercises were held, Hazard in 1952, Vulcan in 1953, November Handicap in 1954, Agility in 1956 to train formation commanders, staff officers and unit commanders.
What was your perceptions about Pakistans politics in the period 1947-58?
We thought politics was a joke, nobody bothered, governments came and went.
Any general officer who particularly impressed you in terms of being a fine professional in the period 1950-58?
My regiment 13 Lancers belonged to 3rd Armoured Brigade, we had no dealings with general officers and never saw any.
What were your impressions about General Ayub Khan as you saw him as a subaltern and young officer?
He made a very good impression, everyone thought that he was training and moulding the army in the right way.
Please tell us something about your service profile from passing out of PMA till 1958.
I served in 13 Lancers upto March 1956 as a troop leader and squadron second in command then I was posted to the Armoured Corps Centre as incharge of wireless training of recruits, in 1957 I was posted to the Armoured Corps School as Research and Development Officer, in April 1958 I went to the Special Service Group.
In the early years very few officers came to the army from the East Wing. How did you see them and was there any discrimination which these officers experienced?
I do not know the reason but my guess is that they received their education in Bengali and were very poor in English, even in the PMA they were very badly hampered by language problem, their physical performance was also comparatively poor.
There was no discrimination. What were your impressions about General Musa as you saw him as a young officer?The promotion of General Musa was disappointment to most of us and was interpreted that efficiency was not important for promotion only personal loyalty counted.
What were your impressions about the various famous exercises like November Handicap etc in terms of:---(1) Realism in Training (2) Lessons learnt?
There were a number of large exercises, Hazard in 1952, Vulcan in 1953, November Handicap in 1954, Agility in 1956 or 1957, Tezgam in 1960 and Milestone in 1961. (Some of the dates may be incorrect). They were designed to train senior commanders in handling large formations and to test organisational changes, they served their purpose.
How did you perceive the martial law of 1958 as you saw it in 1958?
It came as a surprise, we had been taught that the armed forces had no business to interfere with the government. Later the reforms and actions taken by the martial law authorities seemed to justify the martial law.
With the benefit of hindsight how would you rate the martial law of 1958 in terms of its effect on the Pakistan Army as an organisation and on Pakistans political system?
The army very hesitatingly took over the running of the administration of the country and did a fairly good job, a lot of malpractices that had crept in were ended, a lot of problems like the settlement of the refugees, the disposal of evacuee property etc were dealt with and finished, economic progress was accelerated. Ayubs political ambitions were tolerated till we failed in the 1965 war, after the war he lost his charisma and nobody cared whether he remained or went.There was no political system, the Muslim League had broken up and every politician seemed to have a political party they got together to bring down Ayub in 1968-69.
Please tell us something about your service profile from 1958 till 1965?
I was in the Armoured Corps School in 1958 as Research and Development Officer, in April 1958 I volunteered for the Special Service Group, I raised, trained and commanded a commando company in the SSG, in 1962 I reverted to the Armoured Corps and was posted to 23 Cavalry as a squadron commander.
In 1963 I attended the staff course and was posted to the Armoured Corps Directorate, in April 1965 I was posted as DQ 6 Armoured Division, in August 1965 was detailed on the Armour Career Officers Course in USA but had to come back in September when the 1965 war started and joined 23 Cavalry in the first week of October.
You were one of the first batch of officers who joined the SSG. How would you compare the SSG of that time with the SSG of today?
The SSG of that time was trained to stay behind operations in case the country was overrun. I have no idea of what the SSG is trained for now.
Anything that you would like to say about the school of armour as you saw it as a young officer attending the basic course
?As young officers we were treated as officers and were expected to behave as officers. We were always up to some mischief and every day in the tea break some one was in the adjutants office and some times the commandant.
We were familiarised with the driving and maintenance of vehicles and tanks, taught the operation of wireless sets and wireless communication and the mechanisms of the tank weapons, loading and firing of guns. The training did not relate to the technical aspect with the battle employment of tanks like application of fire in a tank battle.
With our course, a two weeks tactics course was also introduced which taught us basic battle drills.Here I will quote from my book The Way It Was: in retrospect, after learning what a junior officer should know the YOs course at that time was badly planned.
The purpose was not to train tank commanders and troop leaders but to give young officers a basic technical training in driving, communications and gunnery training as a tank gunner. ...The connection between technical training and the tactical or battlefield application was missing. ...The tests, as elsewhere in Pakistan, were tests of memory rather application of the acquired knowledge.
The training of officers was left to the regiments and in most regiments, they were left to their own devices.
How realistic was the standard of training in the School of Armour once you did your basic course?
As far as officers were concerned the Armoured Corps School ran driving, wireless and gunnery instructor courses, every officer was expected to do at least one of them, it was not clear to what purpose as officers were never employed as instructors; besides this there was a Crew Commanders Course which I attended before it was abolished, the course was about the same as the basic gunnery course; besides these, there was the Technical Officers Course of nine months which taught the repair and maintenance of vehicles and tanks and most officers trained in this course were employed in the supervision of vehicle and tank maintenance; on the tactics side the tactics course called Tac-Armour was run at the staff college but later shifted to the Armoured Corps School and split into junior-tac for captains and senior tac for majors.
I did every course run at the School of Armour except the Technical Officers Course and the Junior Tac. In technical training there was no difference between officers training and JCOs and NCOs training and as stated above the connection between the technical training and its battle field application was missing.
The Armoured Corps School lacked a tank driving course where the handling of tanks in crossing of obstacles and loading of tanks on transporters, railway flats and taking up of fire positions could be taught.Tank gunnery of the early forties, as taught at Babina (pre-partition training centre) was taught, for instance a tank gun firing procedure called semi-indirect fire, with artillery method of registering of the target by bracketing which related to the Lee-Grant (which became obsolete in 1943) where the commander could see the target and the gunner could not because in the Lee-Grant tank the main 75 mm gun was fitted in a sponson on the side of the tank while the tank commander was up in a turret which housed a 37 mm gun; I had a number of arguments about this method of target engagement, till 1964, even the M47 and M48 tanks were modified to continue this method of firing. In 1964, while I was in Armour Directorate I questioned it again and it was finally discontinued.
The application of tank gunnery, in the attack, defence and encounter, the importance of the vertical bracket, and the use of the range finder was never understood and applied.In wireless communications also we stuck to the inherited British system of regimental and later squadron net. When we bought the M4A1 (Sherman II, 76 mm gun) tank these came fitted with the SCR 528 sets which enabled the tuning and locking of ten frequencies and permitted independent command nets for the troop leader, squadron commander and the regimental commander; these were removed and British No 19 sets were purchased and fitted.
The No 19 set frequency locking device required frequent re-tuning.On the regimental net of the armoured regiment nearly a hundred sets operated on one frequency with frequent jamming. With the American Aid the AN/GRC 3 and 4 became the main sets with the same frequencies as the SCR 528, and as described above they provided independent command nets to troop level but probably because we had JCO troop leaders whose favourite enquiry was mayray leeay kia hukam hai, troop net could not be introduced.In training in voice procedure in the use of the inter-com and the wireless set no methods of giving orders to the crew, orders by the troop leader to the troop and squadron and regimental commanders to their commands were taught.
In short it can be said that the standard of training at the School of Armour was not battlefield related.
How would you compare the School of Armour with the Infantry School in terms of (1) Realism of Training (2) Transparency of Grading System (3) Quality of Instruction (4) Inter arm bias?
In realism of training both were equally poor; in transparency of grading system the School of Armour was better; quality of instruction in both was about equal; the School of Armour had no inter arm bias because there were no inter-arm trainees. How would you compare the standard of training in the army in the two periods 1952-58 and 1958-65?The standard of training remained the same.
How would you assess the negative or positive impact of General Musa as C-in-C of the Pakistan Army from 1958-66?
There was no positive impact, the negative impact was felt in the 1965 war, with our superiority in equipment, specially tanks, we should have won the 1965 war very easily.We had enough tanks to form two armoured divisions, one of M 47s and one of M 48s, and armoured brigade of M4A1s (Sherman IIs) and providing a Sherman III/V regiment to each infantry division and forming an anti-tank regiment with the M 36b2s.
The re-organisation of 1962-63 with the introduction of the Recce and Support battalions of infantry wasted infantry battalions and anti-tank fire power, the reduction of infantry divisions from nine to seven battalions reduced the capability of infantry divisions, specially with the vast frontages that they had to defend, (an infantry division front was supposed to be 10,000 yards 10 Division had nearly 50,000 yards.)
Since there was a limitation on the manpower and ammunition supply was also restricted by the terms of the US Aid methods should have been worked out to overcome these, manpower could have been easily managed.The conduct of the 1965 war, under General Musas leadership was deplorable.
Maj Gen Shaukat Riza and many others have alleged that there was lot of anti-artillery bias in the pre-1971 army and this included the 1971 war. How far in your opinion is this assertion correct?
There was no bias as far I know, the only allegations against the artillery was that they ran out of ammunition in the 1965 war and in the 1971 war it was that certain divisions fire was controlled by divisional artillery commander and was not provided when it was required.
What were your impressions of the Command and Staff College as a student?
The college was well organised and well administered, it taught staff work involved in the functioning of formations. The flaw in the instruction was that application was always under ideal conditions, but that was the flaw in all our training, there was no stress created by the failure of plans and surprise actions by the enemy, the enemys legs were always tied and our plans were always successful.
You saw the transition in the Pakistan Armoured Corps from British to US tanks. Please describe the process and also elucidate how far the allegations that Patton was too sophisticated a tank for the Pakistani tank crew, correct or incorrect?
The tanks in the Pakistan Army were always American, some armoured cars were British. The change was from Stuart light tanks to M 24 Chaffee tanks, Sherman II (M4A1), Sherman III and Sherman V to M 47 and M 48 tanks.The allegation that the Patton was too sophisticated for the Pakistan Armoured Corps is incorrect, the fault lay in our officers who trained the crew.
In the Armoured Corps at that time the best and most educated recruit was trained as a wireless operator, the next best was trained as a driver (this was the most desired trade because a job could be got as a driver outside the army), as far as the tank drivers and operators were concerned they quickly learnt their functions on the new tanks, in fact the operation of the AN/GRC 3 and 4 and the SCR 528 sets made wireless operation very simple.
The Sherman and Stuart gunnery was very simple so normally the least educated and the dopiest recruits were made gunners, the only sophistication the M 47 and M 48 had was the optical range finder which required understanding and a little intelligence in its operation to get accurate ranges for direct anti-tank and other direct shooting.
The range finder was an optical instrument whose working and operation was difficult to make our gunners understand and required about a thousand practice ranging, these were never mastered.
What should have been done was to select the most intelligent recruits as gunners.The M 47 and the M 48 tanks were not too sophisticated for our tank crew but the Armoured Corps did not want to change and shed what it had brought from Babina.
You attended a course in USA. What were your impressions of Fort Knox?
I went on a nine months Career Officers Course but a fortnight after the course started the 1965 war started and I was taken off the course to return to Pakistan.Instruction was function oriented, for instance the Driving and Maintenance was the supervision of maintenance, the documentation of vehicles, and the check of the battle worthiness of the equipment according to laid down standards, a company commander could declare his equipment unfit and the Ordnance the equivalent of our EME had to put it right.
The course was organised to train company commanders (squadron commanders) in every aspect of administration, the maintenance of equipment, tactics. The commands of the number of companies that would be available for command at the end of the course was made known and that commands would be allocated in order of merit, the others would be posted to staff and instructional jobs.
You have written a detailed account of the 1965 war in your book The Way It Was. What sources did you use since you did not see combat in the 1965 war?
In my book I have described events in all the sectors not a particular sector. I came back from USA and joined my regiment 23 Cavalry in October when troops were still in contact and memories were fresh.
I learnt of the major events of the 10 Division front since 23 Cavalry was the integral tank regiment of 10 Division, I carried out a reconnaissance of the 8 and 15 Division areas where 1 Armoured Division and 6 Armoured Division were located there, I learnt about the Khem Karan and Chawinda sector, from 13 Lancers and 11 Cavalry learnt about the events in Chamb-Akhnoor area; three SSG officers and a Baluch Regiment officer described Gibralter.
I was in GHQ Infantry Directorate where the officers who were para dropped in India were called by the Chief of the General Staff and interviewed, they described how this operation was conducted, the 4th Cavalry surrender was described to me by a 4th Cavalry squadron commander who had surrendered.
I also got access to a Staff College study of all the sectors giving the details of operations and units involved. I had collected the information for writing about the 1965 and 1971 wars but did not write it as a separate book.
You have stated some commanding officers of some tank regiments collapsed in Khem Karan. Why did this happen?
In Khem Karan the armoured division commander, two brigade commanders and four out of five armoured regiment commanders collapsed. This happened because our commanders are neither trained nor tested for working under battlefield stress.
How far do you agree or disagree with Lieut General Gul Hassan Khans theory that the prime reason for the failure of 1st Armoured Divisions was Major General Nasir?
Major General Nasir was responsible to the extent that he failed to get a grip on the division. The 1st Armoured Division operation was planned to be conducted with 7 Division, less brigade, providing the required infantry support, GHQ, which includes General Musa, the CGS and DMO (Gul Hassan Khan) moved 7 Division for the Chamb operation Grand Slam and ordered the Armoured Division to conduct the operation without the required infantry; the failure of the division commander, firstly, was in not pointing out the inadequacy of troops and, secondly, not ensuring that subordinate commanders carried out the tasks given to them.
How would you sum up operation Gibralter?
I agree with Colonel S. G. Mehdis summing up of the operation in a written note before the operation started which stated that it will be a fiasco greater than the Bay of Pigs operation, in this operation about 5,000 volunteers died and remain unsung.
What do you have to say about the system of awarding awards in the Pakistan Army from what you saw and heard in 1965 and 1971 wars?
I was told by the AA&QMG of 6 Armoured Division after the 1965 war that the Indians announced their awards first which caused a panic in GHQ and General Musa ordered formations to forward their recommendations immediately, anybody who was recommended was immediately given the award.Some awards were won by fighting a telephone battle, including HJ by a brigade commander.
After the ceasefire officers wrote their own recommendations and went about looking for someone to sign and forward the recommendation. In the 1971 war in East Pakistan it was the likes and dislikes of Lieutenant General Niazi and Major General Abdul Rahim Khan.
On the whole I would say a lot of awards were deserved, some deserving cases were ignored because they did not have backing, some who deserved the highest award got lesser awards, Major Khadim Hussain, 24 Cavalry, manned a recoilless rifle whose crew had been killed, knocked out two Indian tanks and was killed by the third Indian tank, he qualified for the highest gallantry award but was awarded a SJ. How would you compare the Indian Armoured Corps with the Pakistan Armoured Corps in terms of gunnery, tactical efficiency, and squadron/unit/divisional leadership in the 1965 war?In gunnery both sides were about equal.
The Indian tactical doctrine was to capture ground which would force us to counter attack giving them all the advantages of firing from a stationary position, our doctrine was based on counter-attacks with all its disadvantages. Squadron, unit and divisional leadership on both sides was about the same and showed nothing exceptional. At the troop level the Indians had officers with a three tank troop and we had JCOs with a four tank troop this gave them some advantage.
Please tell us something about your service profile from 1965 to 1971?
In 1965 I was serving in the Armour Directorate in GHQ, in April when the army moved to the border I was posted as DQ 6 Armoured Division and was involved in the logistic planning.
In August I left for USA for a nine months Career Officers Course at Fort Knox. A fortnight after the course started the 1965 war started and I returned to Pakistan and joined my regiment, 23 Cavalry, 10 Division integral armoured regiment. In May 1966 I was posted to the SSG, at first as GSO II at GHQ and later as second in command of the 2nd Commando Battalion.
In August 1968, was posted as the commanding officer of 22 Cavalry in the 1st Armoured Division, after assuming the command of the regiment I went to Jordan as part of a team led by Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid Khan.
After spending three months in Jordan I returned to command 22 Cavalry which I did till May 1970. In May 1970 I was posted to command 3 Commando Battalion in Comilla in East Pakistan. I took part in the military action in East Pakistan and returned to West Pakistan, on an adverse report by Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi.
The adverse report was squashed in toto and I was sent to raise 38 Cavalry at Hyderabad which I raised and the regiment took part in the abortive operation Labaik in Rajasthan.
In February 1972 I was posted as Colonel Staff 6 Armoured Division. How was the experience of commanding 22 Cavalry, a newly raised unit?22 Cavalry was not a newly raised unit, it was 6 years old and had three commanding officers before me and fought the 1965 war.
I found the command most interesting and the regiment responded very well when I introduced methods and control which made each appointment holder responsible for his job.Although it was raised by transferring men from the older regiments, it developed a complex when it compared itself with 5 Horse, 6 Lancers, 19 Lancers and 12 Cavalry the other regiments of the 1st Armoured Division.
This I overcame by making the regiment convert from M 48 to T 59 tanks without assistance from any other regiment and other things till the regiment considered itself the best in the division.
How would you describe the armoured divisions of the 1960s as compared with those of today in terms of overall environment, training and operational efficiency?
I have been out of the army for nearly 30 years, I am not familiar with organisations, training etc of today.Was there any marked change in the armys training after the 1965 war or not?There was no change.
You served as a SSG Battalion commander in East Pakistan in 1971. How was the experience?
When I took over the command the battalion was in disgrace for getting into a fight with students in the Chandni Chowk market in Chittagong. The unit was in Comilla, it was confined to the cantonment, the men were sullen and made themselves a nuisance as far as other units were concerned, the frogmen platoon had killed a man in Rangamati and disposed of the body in the Kaptai lake but the District Commissioner informed the authorities and every intelligence unit was making inquiries.I was given very good advice by Maj Gen A. O. Mitha that while restoring discipline I must not break the fighting spirit of the unit.
I managed to discipline and restore confidence in about four months by introducing close quarter combat firing, blindfolded demolition, night firing in daytime with simulated night conditions and other training. After some time the men accepted that being a commando was more than swaggering and bullying and behaved very well during the military operations.3 Commando Battalion was under command 14 Division lodged in Comilla, I had constant trouble with the Comilla brigade commander who wanted the unit under his command.
Later when the military action started in East Pakistan brigade and division commanders wanted commandos for personal guards, everyone wanted commandos wherever any fighting was expected, two men who were by chance with the Chittagong brigade were made to do pointsmen from Coxs Bazaar to Chittagong, we had to bail out Maj Gen Abdul Rahim Khan twice, once in securing the bridge over the Meghna at Bhairab Bazaar and then when his brigade attack with artillery support failed at the Belonia salient, two platoons of SSG cleared the salient.Similarly on other occasions commandos were asked for unit and brigade commanders and used as assault troops instead of using their own units.
A platoon deputed to the Comilla brigade was placed under command 39 Baluch, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel S. M. Naeem who had served in the SSG, he used the commandos to do all the fighting and cleared the area given to his battalion by a series of one commando platoon attacks. Commanders at all levels avoided using their troops and asked for commandos.3 Commando, a two company battalion, reduced to five platoons, cleared an area of about 2,000 square miles in the Hill Tracts and gained the co-operation of the people and got no credit for it.
In the planning of the defence of East Pakistan, Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi did not understand the strategic and tactical use of the commandos, when the defence of East Pakistan was being planned I suggested a raid on Calcutta, the general refused to listen and remarked that
I wanted to become a brigadier. In the war in East Pakistan the SSG played no role except one company which acted as the personal guard of Major General Abdul Rahim Khan, HJ.
n 1 October, I raised 38 Cavalry and commanded it till February 1972 then I was appointed colonel staff 6 Armoured Division.
