Battle of Loc Ninh - 1972 AD Vietnam War Series

[jhungary]

This is the second battle of my Vietnam War Series, today's battle is not widely see as one of the battle change the outcome of the war, mostly because it was at the end of the war, after US direct involvement has ceased. On the other hand, it often seen as the begining of the fall of South Vietnamese government.

Today's battle will bring you to Loc Ninh - An Loc area, which is near the Cambodia Border and was connected to the Capital of South Vietnam Saigon with Highway 13. This battle is the not too well know of a set of 2 battles, fought in the same engagement. The other battle being Battle of An Loc.

Background of the battle :

The Town of Loc ninh is the Northern Most of a chain of important town linking Saigon to Cambodia border, the same border where Ho Chi Ming Trail were originated.

Going back to 1967, a series of battle were fought in the very hotly contested Binh Long province in South Vietnam, it was a hot spot of VC insurgency activities back before tet.
All the town along High Way 13 were subject to serious VC infilitration up from An Loc down to Cu Chi, and it was also a battlesite where a few important engagement were fought between US/ARVN and NVA/VC force during the last fews years of 1960s

Fast forward to 1971. US has winded down all non-essential troop strength in the country and with only a fraction of strength left in the South, the NVA supported VC has become increasely agressive toward a bigger engagement aiming to inflict a sound defeat to the Southern Military.

December 1971 saw the failed Southern Response in the form of Operation Lam Son 719, the NVA top brass is considering an spring offensive (Later known as Easter Offensive) to follow up with the defeat of the South Vietnamese troop at Lam Son 719. US and ARVN knows something is up, as troop movement were detected near warzone C and near cambodia border. With large scale attack immement, the only thing lacking is the place. where would be the enemy attack from? And where are they going to hit??

Where not much enemy intel indicate anything, tradition suggested that the Northern objective is Tay Ninh province but infact it was the one next to it, the Binh Long Province, especially the target is An Loc

Over the next 3 months, the North is prepare a big organised combine arms strike toward An Loc while the Southern lay down plan to defend Tay Ninh, add to the confusion to the American, on April Fool days, NVA attack and sieze a Special Force base out of Tay Ninh area.

Loc Ninh is the northern most city in Binh Long Area. it have 2 outposts surrounding an airstrip that run North to South. With a camp on either end of the strip. Next to the airfield is thick rubber plantation run thru the airstripe from East to West. The town is a small town, moderatedly defended by part of 9th Infantry Regiment

With the die casted and the diversion in place, NVA force move into the attack on April 4, 1972.

Deposition of Forces :

As stated, Loc Ninh is a relatively small town with aboiut 4000 local resident. The defence on this town islight to moderate. The intown garrison comprise of the 9th ARVN Infantry Regiment, 5th Infantry Division, complemented by the 1st Cav Squadron, 1st Regional Force Battalion of 200 men and part of 74th Border Ranger battalion Both deployed North of Loc Ninh.

There were also a Regiment Level Task Force south of town - TF52 in reserve comprise of element of 52nd Regiment and 48th Regiment south of Loc Ninh

Opposition to thE Southern Force were the North Vietnam 5th and 9th VC Division 14,000 strength in total, they were stationed west of Loc Ninh and attacaking from the town from the west via direct apporach, effective seperating the defending garrision (9th Regiment) and their Reserve (TF-52)

Start of Battle :
On April 4 0650, VC 5th Division crossed the Cambodia border and attack Loc Ninh, preceding with Artillery (81mm mortar, 105mm howitzer and 122 mm rocket) bombardment.With Jump off point, the incoming NVA division spearheaded first time with 25 supporting tanks (PT-76) and a few Armored Vehicle with an organised assault, their target is the overhelm the garrsion of 9th Regiment HQ located southern end of the airstrip.

US advisor provided invalued Support fire and mark the first ever close air support use of AC-130 Spectra gunships of the war. The gunship rotating calibre weapon is proven to be a good match for the incoming agressor where 40mm Bofor used for breaking up incoming enemy troop and the 7.62 minigun and 20mm vulcan used to pin down or strip across a secton of enemy in close range.

Repeated assault were made on the first day trying to break into the 9th HQ, but was beated back by a mix of Spectra and Snake and Nape Airstirke provided by US Carrier stationed off Vietnam Coast.

At the end of the first day, HQ was intact and the 5th VC Division were beaten back, with high cost on both side all the while making the defender to confine in a smaller out post instead of soreading out in a vast area

Nothing has change much on the 5th, with repeating attack fro mthe west and those attack were repeatingly repulsed by superior US Air Power with Southern Casuality mounted.

ON April 6, afraid the garrison cannot hold out for any longer, the overall threater commander Brigadier General Le Van Hung ordered TF-52 to relieve the 9th Regiment. However, before the lead element of TF-52 reaches the outskirt of the area, they were pushed back by a combine ambushes and artillery fire by the NVA.

With man power dwindling, at night of April 6, only about 200 of the original 1800 defender left, the other were either killed, wounded or surrendered to the VC. Of the 200 defender, more than half were able body wounded (Walking wounded)
At this point, the garrision command surrendered first light April 7, leaving some 100 defender and the 7 American advisor to continue the fight with 2 Enemy division. That afternoon, TF-52 failed to reach the 9th and pull back to an loc to avoid being the next to be eliminated, seeing all hope is lost. the garrision in the Loc Ninh dissolve and make their way back to An Loc. Of the original nearly 2000 defender, less than 100 reappear in An Loc, all of the US Advisor were capture or killed by the VC force as well as any functioning leadership structure of the 9th Regiment, command structure are either killed, wounded or surrendered to the Enemy. And 5th VC division took Loc Ninh somewhere at 1000, 3 hours after the garrison commander surrendered.

Importance of the battle

The reason i choose this battle instead of the better known Operate Lam Son 719 or battle of An Loc is that, this mark the true high water mark of South Vietnamese government, beside Battle of An Loc (Which the victory of ARVN is mostly because of this battle) it has been failure after failure.

This battle, coupled with Lam Son 719 see the incompententce of South Vietnamese Military as a fighting force alone, however, seeing LS719 is an offensive run and Loc Ninh is an offensive run. It is literally worse for a force not to be able to defence a static structure or location than attacking one. As you will not lose the war if you failed at attack, however, you lose ground when you failed to defend. This is the reason why i think this battle is important

What Went Wrong??
If i have to pick one reason and blame it for the outcome, i would say this battle should never happened in the first place.

Whatever way you see it, either you are more than compentent enough to know where the enemy will strike and prevent them from striking their intented target. or once you realise you are too late to react to the battle, you pull everyone out before they were trapped and eliminated. This battle did neither.

Okay, it's easy to blame the Military Intelligence for their failure to warn of the correct target. But one fact just bugged me for the whole battle, that is, even you know they are going to strike, why there aren't any combat patrol send out to notify where the major enemy column heading?

It is already 2 late when the VC/NVA force strike, by then only thing keeping the defender alive is the air support. And you cannot rely on air support forever. When you are facing an overhelming enemy and you are in defensive, what you should do is to gather the troop for a last stand type defence instead of breaking them up for a few pocket. That way, you concentrate the air and ground support while you maximize your defence capability, pick a place where the main piece is going to happen, instead of trying to defend every inch of your area. This is a serious tactical error.

Another tactical error happened on that battle is the order of TF-52 to relieve the stranded 9th. It would have make sense if the order came on immediately after the attack (On April 4) or i will let it slide if you order them the next day (April 5) But waited 2 and a half day before knowing that particular regiment need relieve?? You better off not doing it at all, as you will just feeding the enemy in a piecemeal course and you WILL ended up losing both 9th and the TF-52 for sure.

At the end of the day, they did do one thing right, actually 2 things if you counted the recall of TF-52 is one of them. That is they hold out 2 divisons of VC troop as long as they can, and allowing the necessarily force to regroup and resupply and fortified their position in An Loc. 1,800 successfully hold out 2 divison of 14,000 men for 3 days and 2 nights, that is the main contribution why An Loc survive to fight another day in just 3 days time, after the battle of Loc Ninh concluded.

And that concluded the 2nd battle of our Vietnam Series

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

Dead-on conclusions,but north vietnamese intelligence and use of deception should be praised.Prepared for teh attack after the blue,was not disheartened by losses by airstrikes and also found out the incoming taskforce relief and blunted it.Deception and perseverance. 
Found this guy's report on the net,he was the main american advisor in the battle and commanded it.



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Captain Mark Allyn Smith of Advisory Team 70, MACV, call sign Zippo, the American main figure on the ground in the Battle of Loc Ninh (April 1972). He was captured after the battle on 8th April 1972 during his E & E (Escape and Evasion) and held in a jungle prison camp in Kratie, Cambodia for the remaining 10 months. He was released at Loc Ninh in the general POW release on 12th February 1973 in accordance with the Paris Peace Accord 1973. Zippo retired from the US-Army as a Major in December 1996.

II. Prelude to Battle :
During the winter of 1971-72, the 5th ARVN Division conducted operations of a limited nature in Binh Long, Phuoc Long, and Binh Duong provinces. These operations rarely made contact with the enemy, except for limited incursions into Cambodia toward the town of Snoul. It should be noted that, within the 9th ARVN Regiment, contacts with the enemy increased when advisors again accompanied battalions on operation. This practice was reinstituted by myself in November 1971. SFC Lull and myself accompanied battalions on operations on a regular basis.

One small battle between Lai Khe and Ben Cat was initiated by the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry, in December 1971. The area had been worked by numerous units without advisors. By pushing the ARVN commander to move farther off the highway, contact with a company of NVA was achieved. This indicated to LTC Schott, Colonel Bill Miller, and to me that all was not as pacified as the 5th ARVN Division staff would have us believe.

Contacts around Loc Ninh were rare, as the enemy could see you coming for a very long distance. Members of the Border Ranger Battalion and the French plantation manager, however, assured me that the NVA were in the area continuously. The Frenchman also told me that he paid the NVA not to start trouble in the plantation. This was done to preclude damage to the trees. The 9th Regiment soon learned that by operating only within the confines of the rubber plantation, one could avoid trouble.

One operation conducted northwest of Loc Ninh was to put a « scissor » bridge in place on a small river at the border. The reason given was to allow units to avoid using QL13 as the single avenue of approach to Cambodia. My observation was that the bridge offered an excellent avenue of approach for the enemy. The ARVN, however, left the bridge in place and never guarded it or used it for operations because of its size and location, in the jungle. The NVA made fine use of this bridge, and one other, to put the 5th NVA Division in place for battle; and, the 9th Division used it to by-pass Loc Ninh for points South. During the battle of Loc Ninh it took one full day to destroy this bridge.

A short time prior to the battle, LTC Schott and myself drove to Fire Support Base (FSB) Alpha. At the Montagnard village, short of Fire Base Alpha, is a river. The bridge there had long since been destroyed; however, « someone » had been building an underwater bridge with rocks. Inquiries to the Rangers and to the 9th Regiment Headquarters drew a negative response on knowledge of this endeavor. A stop at the village and a discussion with some children made it clear that « someone » had ordered the people to bring rocks to build this structure. Further questioning about « who » only solicited the response: « The Vietnamese ». When asked if it was the ARVN or the enemy, the response was that all Vietnamese were the enemy. When LTC Schott and I raised the issue with Colonel Vinh, he was not worried. Me was sure the Montagnards were using the underwater bridge to smuggle wood from Cambodia. This structure held no tactical implications for Colonel Vinh. He further stated that it was good for the « scissor » bridge to remain in place as it gave the NVA the opportunity to by pass Loc Ninh. He also said that if the NVA came with full combat power, using the tanks and armored personnel carriers (APC), captured in an earlier battle, we would have to surrender. He also stated that he had been a prisoner in the 1950's and it was better than being dead.

I made up my mind to two things at this time:
1. Loc Ninh would not surrender without a fight.
2. The bridges would become prime targets at the onset of any battle. With this in mind, the stage was set for the battle of Loc Ninh.

On 30 March 1972 the Stars and Stripes published a picture of NVA T-54 tanks on the « Ho Chi Minh Trail » headed South. Colonel Vinh, however, remained convinced that the only armor the 9th ARVN Regiment faced was captured M-41 tanks and APCs. An inventory of high explosive anti tank (HEAT) ammunition, for the sole 106mm Recoilless Rifle at Loc Ninh, showed the presence of precisely six rounds on-hand ! There were also fifty rounds of canister ammunition on-hand. Colonel Vinh assured me he would request more ammunition. On the afternoon of 4 April 1972 Major Carlson, SOT Wallingford, a French photographer named Michael Dummond, and myself journeyed from Lai Khe to An Loc. We were passed by numerous overloaded vehicles fleeing south. Just south of Loc Ninh the French plantation manager passed us and waved for us to go back. We proceeded on to Loc Ninh. The village square was basically deserted, except for some drunk ARVN soldiers at the local « soup stand ». They said they were drunk because tomorrow they would die. Colonel Vinh was not alone in his defeatism. Amazingly the National Police station was erecting additional barbed wire and filling sandbags. This for a staff of six people ! These personnel included one female and five male police. When I inquired of Major Davidson as to the district chief's plans for the police, he stated that they had been ordered to defend the police station.

Other after action reports state that the 1st ARVN Cavalry was operating in Cambodia just prior to the battle. This is a myth concocted by Col. Vinh and the Commander of the 1st ARVN Cavalry. They were, in fact, at FSB Alpha. The only exception to this was a total of five APCs and one tank at the intersection of QLIS and QL14. These vehicles were placed here for two reasons:

1. To provide a blocking force to protect the flank of the 1ST Cavalry Regiment moving to Loc Ninh;
2. To assist or reinforce the 1st Battalion, 9th infantry, at Bu Dop.

The small size of this force indicates the lack of tactical awareness of the 9th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Regimental Commanders; because if is not tactically sound to appose a force of two NVA regiments with an ARVN force of only five APCs and one tank. Colonel Bill Miller, SRA 5th DCAT and myself both attempted to convince Colonel Vinh and General Hung to pull the 1st Cavalry back to Loc Ninh. Colonel Vinh's thinking was that the NVA would attack FSB Alpha and leave Loc Ninh alone. Also this was his reasoning to move the two companies of the 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry, not to the west of Loc Ninh as previously reported, but to place them on the first hill mass south of Loc Ninh to cover a withdrawal by the 9th Regiment. This movement was ordered immediately after the departure of General Hung and Colonel Miller from Loc Ninh. There was a contact to the west of Loc Ninh on the afternoon of 4 April. It was actually made by the 9th Regiment Reconnaissance (Recon) Company but it was reported as a contact made by the 3rd Battalion because Colonel Vinh had told General Hung that the 3rd Battalion remained to the west. After this contact, all that remained of the Recon Company was one wounded soldier with a radio. He remained on the radio until the afternoon of 6 April and provided me with targets to the west of Loc Ninh.

When I returned from An Loc, late in the afternoon of 4 April, I advised Colonel Vinh to move the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry, except for one company, back to Loc Ninh from Fire Support Base Alpha. I also advised him to leave a PF Platoon and RF Company at the Cam Le bridge to assure it's destruction. Again, Colonel Vinh stated that we could « survive » if we provided the enemy a variety of targets. Also he felt that ordering the destruction of the bridge would anger not only General Hung, but also the NVA Commander ! Colonel Vinh's theory was that, « when we surrender », we could bring up certain things to show we actually helped the enemy. The term « when we surrender »became more and more common in Colonel Vinh's discussions, until he did in fact try to surrender Loc Ninh on 7 April 1972.

When I learned this at 03:00 hours, I carried the E-6 Regiment west of Loc Ninh on the situation map and added the 272nd Regiment to the south and the remainder of the 5th NVA Division as the attacking force.

The events described above and the resulting disposition of friendly and enemy forces, as depicted on my map as of 03:00 hours, 5 April 1972, set the stage for the battle of Loc Ninh. As the battle scenario develops, it will become evident why I continued to place the 272nd Regiment of the 9th NVA Division south of Loc Ninh.

III. The Battle :
The battle of Loc Ninh began during the afternoon of 4 April 1972 when the Recon Company, 9th ARVN Regiment, was destroyed by what was believed to be elements of the NVA E-6 Regiment West of Loc Ninh. A lone surviving soldier, with a radio, reported tanks and infantry in large numbers moving toward Loc Ninh and the South.

At 03:00 hours, 5 April, a rocket attack on Loc Ninh was initiated by the NVA. At this point Colonel Vinh became concerned about Loc Ninh itself. He informed LTC Schott and myself that now he would order the 1st Cavalry Regiment back to Loc Ninh. We told him in no uncertain terms that it was too late. Besides, FSB Alpha had an anti-tank ditch and four tubes of artillery. Colonel Vinh disregarded this advice and ordered the Rangers, 2/9 Rifle Companies and the 1st Cavalry at FSB Alpha to return to Loc Ninh. The five APCs and one tank at the intersection of QL13 and QL14 were to « cover the withdrawal ».

At 03:35 hours, the Commander of the 1st Calvary informed Colonel Vinh he was surrendering. Vinh said he understood ! As a result of Vinh's action, it became clear to me that he did not intend to fight the NVA and I told Vinh he no longer commanded anything. The regimental staff, with the exception of the regimental XO, backed me. LTC Schott also backed me. As of that moment, and for the rest of the battle of Loc Ninh, I commanded the 9th ARVN Regiment.

I immediately contacted the commander of the 1st ARVN Cavalry Regiment and told him I would « air strike » him if he surrendered without a fight. He stated that they would try. Ten minutes later the Rangers and 2/9 contacted me and said they were attempting to fight on to Loc Ninh; but, the 1st Cavalry had surrendered and was moving West with the NVA !

I contacted the United States Air Force (USAF) Forward Air Controller (FAC) and requested air strikes on all personnel and vehicles moving toward the west and into Cambodia (Note 1).
A Spectre Gunship reported attacking armored vehicles moving west, five kilometers from QL13.
The Rangers and 2/9 made contact with the five APCs and one tank from the 1st Cavalry at the intersection of QL13 and QL14. As many personnel as possible mounted the vehicles and they tried to break through to Loc Ninh. I requested that « Spectre » try to cover their withdrawal.
This is the unit that was ambushed just north of Loc Ninh. The Rangers reported an ambush one kilometer long. I ordered them to fight through the ambush and ordered air strikes in support. The Rangers reported that Colonel Vinh had ordered them back to FSB Alpha. It was at this point that we noticed Colonel Vinh on another radio. We disconnected Vinh's handle - and told the staff to keep him off the radio to subordinate units. Vinh was told that if he wanted to do something, talk to 5th Division and tell them what was happening.

As the battle began to develop, the sensor operator from 5th Division began to bang on the side of his console. All the little black buttons on his console had turned white. I knew nothing about sensors; but I asked him if this real function had ever happened before. He stated that animals would sometimes cause an individual sensor to activate but that he had never before observed all sensors activated at one time. I asked him for the sensor locations. He said only 5th Division knew the locations. I then asked Colonel Vinh and later General Hung about these locations.
I was unable to obtain a satisfactory answer. I finally asked the « Sundog » FAC to contact 5th Division and Corps for the positions of the sensor fields and then for him to bomb them. He said, « which one ? » I took another look at the sensor console and said, « all of them ». What was done about this request I don't know; the sensor console ceased to operate after our TOC received a hit that morning from a 75mm Recoilless Rifle round.


The volume of fire into Loc Ninh increased over the next two days. The vast majority of the fire was rockets and tube artillery, with some mortar rounds. The tube artillery was from three locations:
1. Four tubes of 105mm, captured from the 1st Cavalry Regiment;
2. 105mm and 155mm firing from the south, probably captured at Hung Tam on 6 April;
3. fire coming from the north and northwest. The artillery from this third source was fired from a great distance and I believe it was 130mm gun rounds rather than the 155mm previously reported.
I spoke to an advisor (Note 2) at Hung Tam by radio and he assured me that his counterpart had « spiked the tubes » prior to their attempting to pullout. On 6 April, however, the Company Commander of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry, at Cam Le bridge informed me that the guns from Hung Tam were firing on Loc Ninh. I ordered an air strike on Hung Tam at approximately 19:00 hours, 6 April. General Hung, however, canceled my order as he still believed the guns were in the hands of the 52nd Regiment. By evening of the same day the guns had disappeared to the west. Earlier, on the morning of-5 April, direct fire weapons had commenced firing into Loc Ninh from across the airstrip to the east. One round from a 75mm recoilless rifle struck the 9th Regiment TOC directly in front of the command radio. Both LTC Schott and I were wounded in the head and neck (Note 3). Major Carlson, Sergeant Wallingford, and Michael Dummond came through the fire and patched us up as best they could.
Major Carlson, in the mean time, attempted to direct the air campaign. MG James Hollingsworth, however, demanded to know why « Zippo » was not using all of the air support he had provided. I got back on the radio and informed MG Hollingsworth that he would have to wait until I got the holes in my head patched up. He apologized to me and in ten minutes I was back on the radio. Major Carlson, SGT Wallingford, and Michael Dummond returned to the inner perimeter. I never saw Major Carlson again during the battle. At approximately 10:00 hours, 5 April, a platoon (two) tanks pulled into the tree line to the west of Loc Ninh. I took a portable radio, LTC Schott, and SFC Lull and headed for the perimeter just outside of our bunker.

When we reached the bunker with the single 106mm RR on it, SFC Lull was no longer with us. We climbed to the top of the bunker and engaged the tanks with the 106mm RR. This, I believe, is the tank that has been described in various after action reports as being destroyed by direct fire artillery. Infantry engaged us on the bunker and I was wounded again (Note 3). LTC Schott and I then went to the artillery compound, got the gunners of their bunkers, and ordered them to direct fire into the tree line. I requested an air strike west of the camp. The FAC on station offered the « Spectre » Gunship as a solution. The second tank in the woodline was either destroyed by « Spectre » or the 105mm direct fire. I suspect that the « Spectre » actually did the job as there was the appearance of « flash bulbs » going off on the back deck of the tank just prior to it blowing up.

I must dispute the after action reports that claim the tanks stayed exclusively in the woodline and supported the infantry. In daylight hours this was true; at night, this was not the case. Twice on the night of 5 April, T-54s rolled through the perimeter from the west and back out on the airfield side. The first time this happened they were hardly noticed because of the intense indirect fire assault on Loc Ninh. The second time this happened the 106mm engaged them with canister ! The commander and driver of both tanks were killed. The tanks then sat in the wire to the east, next to the airfield, for about thirty minutes. There was no Spectre on station at the time; and, the FAC on station and I both thought the tanks were knocked out of action. I was called by the defenders on the east of the compound as the 174th NVA Regiment was making a ground assault across the airfield. I called for CBU and NAPALM. This forced them to withdraw. The real objective of their attack became obvious when two new drivers from the 174th Regiment drove the « knocked out » tanks into the rubber trees across the airfield. During this entire first day, I tried to coordinate with Major Davidson and Captain Wanat in the District Compound.
Captain Wanat would get out of the bunker, look around, and report targets. He reported the mortars firing from the swimming pool on the grounds of the plantation house. These mortars were subsequently destroyed by Spectre. He also alerted me to the presence of an NVA forward observer located on the top floor of the plantation house. General Hung would not clear « Spectre » to fire on the plantation house. As a result, LTC Schott and I took with 106mm canister fire. During this entire period, Major Davidson whined on the radio. His complaint was that I was « hogging all the air strikes » for the main compound. A simple look at a picture of Loc Ninh from the air, however, will show that all these compounds were interconnected. I told him to get off the bunker and look at where the air was going in. Later in the night Captain Wanat described the Major as being « distraught ». Under the circumstances, I think the Captain's words were most kind. I consider Major Davidson's actions as being most unprofessional, to the point of being childish and cowardly. Nothing that happened, to include his « escape » from Loc Ninh, alters my initial impression that this officer acted in a cowardly fashion throughout the battle !

At approximately 22:00 hours, 5 April, I saw Colonel Vinh tell his bodyguard and two other soldiers to do something. They donned flack jackets and helmets. They then sprinted from the bunker. I finally ascertained, upon their return, that Vinh had ordered them to open the gates of the compound. Vinh explained: « we had do this so we can run out easier ». By this time we had approximately one hundred wounded, from all compounds, in the hospital bunker. Colonel Vinh was preparing to desert them and run away. I seriously considered shooting Vinh there and then bur I had not reached that point yet; that would come later.

The remainder of the first night was basically artillery fire on the compounds. I established with the FACs (Note 4) and the Spectre Gunships, that only I would clear each target and would provide my initials to take responsibility. From that point on they never allowed anyone, including Vinh and General Hung, to cancel a target.

At 0500 hours, 6 April, I saw tracers coming up from the area of the rubber plantation office and processing plant. These were east of the airfield and I ordered them destroyed by NAPALM and 250 pound bombs, (« Snake & Nape »). This was done and no more fire came from that area. Amazingly, I also saw tracers coming from the police station on the edge of town. The brave policemen and one policewoman continued to hold out !

At 09:00 hours, 6 April, I was informed by a Spectre Gunship that an anti-aircraft gun on a vehicle was firing from the village square in Loc Ninh. I cleared Spectre to engage this target. I refused to allow jet aircraft to engage this target to protect the Loc Ninh village from collateral damage. At approximately 11:00 hours, I was notified by the forces on the east side of the perimeter that women and children were coming up the road from the village. This was verified by the FAC on station (Note 1). When LTC Schott and I climbed to the top of bunker, we saw one of the most pitiful sights I have ever witnessed. The NVA were forcing the children and teachers to walk toward the compounds carrying an American flag. I fired in front of them and they fled back into the village. At approximately 14:00 hours, the lone survivor, from the Recon Company, reported tanks and infantry moving toward Loc Ninh from the west in regimental strength. I called for air strikes on these targets. The soldier on the radio adjusted this fire until the bombs were heard on our radio and transmissions ceased. I did not know his name but he was a real hero.

At 17:00 hours, 6 April, Loc Ninh's main compound was overrun the first time by infantry. Elements of the 174th Regiment attacked in company strength across the airfield and a battalion of E-6 Regiment attacked from the west. The company from the 174th massed and tried to run through the front gate as a group. They were decimated by the CBU that I called onto the camp's perimeter. The battalion from the west stopped in the wire when Spectre engaged their supporting tanks. The tanks turned tail and ran. Earlier that morning two TOC radio operators, the regimental surgeon, and myself had crawled into the barbed wire on the west perimeter. With LTC Schott and SGT Lull covering us, we placed claymore mines and white phosphorous grenades behind the six « FOOGAS » drums on that side. We then attached the mines and grenades to a blasting machine with communications wire. When I climbed the steps, I saw hundreds of NVA « standing » in the wire and the ARVN soldiers staring at them. When I detonated the « FOOGAS »,it was brutal, as if coming out of a daze the ARVN soldiers began firing. The NVA battalion was decimated. When I went outside to check the soldiers, a single T-54 Tank rolled from the woodline and entered the perimeter. I grabbed an M-72 LAW and fired directly into the front of the tank. The tank and crew were not impressed ! Finally, Spectre munitions « sparkled » on the rear deck of the tank and it took a round into the engine compartment. The defenders on the bunker line then killed the crew as they exited the tank. That evening when I checked the bunker lines, the 9th Regiment was down to about fifty defenders. There were about 150 wounded in the hospital bunker. The regimental surgeon and I went to the hospital and ordered all who could walk back to the perimeter. There was no whining, they just went and did their duty.

As the surgeon and I were putting the wounded on the perimeter, I noticed that the disabled enemy tank was gone. I questioned a young soldier in the bunker near where the tank had been sitting concerning what had happened to the tank. He explained: « Another pair of tanks had come out of the rubber trees and drug the disabled tank away ». I then asked him why he had not fired his X-72 LAW at the tanks. In response, he said « the tanks were not shooting and he didn't want to make them mad ». I understood his reasoning and could only pat him on theshoulder to convey my feelings. It is my experience that the M72-LAW is ineffective when attacking the frontal armor of the T54 Tank.

That night Colonel Vinh ordered all the warm soda pop stored in the TOC be opened and passed out to the troops. This was Colonel Vinh's last contribution to the battle. He had stripped off his uniform and was wearing only white under shorts and a T-shirt. He told me we would have to surrender soon. He advised me to keep a white shirt handy. He also told me we were lucky because we were officers. We could surrender. Junior enlisted men would be shot by the NVA. The regimental surgeon confirmed Vinh's statement. We went around the perimeter and told all the Border Rangers to strip to their underwear and try to get to the Cam Le bridge. This was done because it was generally accepted that the Montagnard, Cambodian, and Nung soldiers would be executed by the NVA. It was then that I learned that most of the unwounded Infantry soldiers on the perimeter were from the 2nd FSB Alpha and the bridge. They stated that they had been given the option to go north, south, or stay. This group had come to Loc Ninh. That night about twenty men straggled in from the 3rd Battalion which had been located south of the camp. The 3rd Battalion had been virtually wiped out by the NVA 272nd Regiment on the high ground south of the camp.

That night, 6 April, at approximately 20:00 hours, lights were seen in the open south of the camp. I directed CBU and NAPALM onto the lights. These lights were within 500 meters of the barbed wire. I did not determine until the next evening what they were. At about 23:00 hours, two 240mm rockets landed almost simultaneously on the Loc Ninh Infantry and Artillery compounds. What these notoriously inaccurate, weapons achieved is amazing. One struck the hospital bunker, killing every wounded soldier and medic inside. The regimental surgeon was with me and was spared. The other hit the ammunition dump, in the Artillery compound, and totally destroyed the guns and soldiers. General Hollingsworth, who was flying overhead at the time, said: « it looked like a nuclear explosion ».

At 23:30 hours, 6 April there was another major attack from the east across the airfield and through the wire from the west. This was repulsed with air strikes and the last few rounds of 106mm canister ammunition. After the attack, Sergeant Wallingford and Michael Dummond brought food and encouragement from the inner perimeter. I did not see Major Carlson; the others said he was manning the radio. Sergeant Lull had become moody and refused to leave the bunker after the second major attack. He asked what my plan was and I said: « To fight ». He was not happy with my response. Though he had been wounded only slightly, his mental attitude had greatly deteriorated.

LTC Schott and I moved throughout the perimeter that night and used a portable radio to direct air strikes. We were both wounded a number of times during the night (Note 3) and LTC Schott kept repeating: « I'm glad you are here ». By early morning, I noted that there was some mental
deterioration in LTC Schott. I believe it was caused by the head wound he had received on the first night of the battle. Despite his head wound, LTC Schott continued to fight throughout the battle. His bravery under fire is unquestionable and he gave me his loyalty and support to the very end of the fight. I further believe this mental deterioration significantly influenced his actions on the following day.

Early on the morning of 7 April Loc Ninh became strangely quiet. There were occasional artillery rounds and mortars but little else. It was as if the attacking force and the defending force were holding their breath for some reason. I increased the air strikes to the west and observed numerous secondary explosions. I also cleared the Spectre Gunship on station to fire at will into the plantation house and grounds. Major Davidson, during this phase of the battle, continued to periodically come up on the radio from his bunker and complain the lack of fire support he was receiving. His statements were totally absurd and embarrassed LTC Schott, Major Carlson, Captain Wanat, Sergeant Wallingford and myself. The FACs tried to reassure him, to no avail. Major Davidson was scared to death.

About 0700 hours, 7 April, there was another major ground attack, from the west and north from the town of Loc Ninh itself. Tanks entered the perimeter from the west. One T-54 Tank chased me around the perimeter until I could get behind it and shoot an into its rear section. During this « chase » Captain Dey, a brave helicopter pilot from the 1st of the 9th Cavallry, tried to draw the tank's fire off of me with his LOH. In fact, it is most probable his actions enabled me to eventually destroy the tank (Note 7).

Captain Dey also observed the mass of bodies in the barbed wire and the trench lines. Many of the bodies were entangled, friend and foe, indicating that at some point in the late evening hours of 6 April the fighting had been close quarter, « hand-to-hand »-combat.

At approximately 08:00 hours, 7 April, Colonel Vinh, his loyal body guards still trailing him, ran out through the front gate of Loc Ninh and surrendered. The 9th Regiment Executive Officer (XO) observing Colonel Vinh's desertion and surrender, immediately ran from the bunker toward the inner perimeter. I understood why only when I saw him begin to lower the flag of the Republic of Vietnam. When I observed his action, I ran after him. When I reached him he was pulling off his white T-shirt which he then ran up to the top of the flag pole, signifying to the NVA that we were surrendering. I demanded that he pull the T-shirt down from the pole. We argued and fought for the rope. As we were fighting over possession of the rope, I glanced around and saw all of the soldiers in the TOC were watching from the doorway and other soldiers on the perimeter were starting to strip off-their shirts. It appeared that the XO's act of surrender was going to end the battle then and there. As the commander, I felt the defenders of Loc Ninh could hold on until reinforcements or firepower could be provided to enable us to prevail over the NVA. Accordingly, I shot the XO dead and hauled down the white flag. The soldiers, upon observing my actions, put their shirts back on and faced out again to defend the perimeter. I do not know if anyone put up another white flag after I shot the XO. I assume that it was his white T-shirt that was observed by some pilots. This shirt,however, flew for no more than five or ten minutes.

From this point through the end of the battle things became absolutely bizarre. A major attack at about 09:30 hours, 7 April, required that I call for air strikes on the camp itself. I lost all communications with the other members of the team on the inner perimeter. I was later told that they had been forced to hide inside the roof when chased from the bunker by a tank. At 11:15 hours two APCs entered the front gate. Initially we thought these were 1st Cavalry troops but when the ramps lowered, NVA soldiers piled out.

At 10:00 hours, 7 April, a flight of B-52 aircraft made a bombing run west of Loc Ninh. During the bombing mission there was a short lapse in air support over Loc Ninh; but this, as some claim, did not cause the fall of Loc Ninh. Also, during the B-52 strike a LOH from 1st of the 9th Cavalry came in and attempted to rescue friendly personnel. I left the bunker with an M-60 Machine Gun and covered the Vietnamese soldiers jumping onto the skids of the LOH. During this action I was shot by NVA soldiers coming across the airfield. Contrary to previous reports by the LOH helicopter pilots, the personnel who pulled me to my feet were ARVN Rangers, not NVA soldiers (Note 8).

I returned to the TOC and asked for all available fire power to destroy the camp (Note 9). SFC Lull then grabbed the radio handset and screamed « no NAPALM ». Major Davidson also came on the net and yelled « no NAPALM ». LTC Schott then took the handset and talked to « someone ». He recommended me for a high award and signed off. At that moment I told Schott and Lull that we should now fight our way out. Colonel Schott said he couldn't make it with his wounds and that Lull and I should go. I said, « that's it, we all stay ». As the NVA began to throw satchel charges into the bunker, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Schott, understanding there was no time to argue; believing he could not physically endure an attempt to E & E, and knowing I would not leave him; sat down on a stool and shot himself between the eyes with his own .45 caliber pistol !

LTC Schott's action was not an act of fear, Dick Schott died to save SFC Lull and myself. I have heard disparaging remarks about LTC Schott's action from a number of people, including some General Officers. In response to these people, I say: « On the best day of your life, you should hope to be half as brave as LTC Richard Schott ». His was an act of sacrifice, not personal desperation. He died for me ! No one else was there, except Lull. No one has the right to judge Dick Schott except for me because I was there. He is the bravest man I have ever known. He is dead, not missing in action (MIA) and the North Vietnamese know it ! Then I went to the roof the NVA entered the bunker. They cut off LTC Schott's collar and name tag and, then tried to cut off his head !!! During this, SFC Howard Lull and twelve ARVN soldiers « played dead » in the TOC !

I went to the roof of the bunker and tried to organize the three soldiers left in the trench line. They just ran back and forth yelling « May Bay » - the Vietnamese word for helicopter. I tried to call for air support on the radio but it was destroyed by gunfire from an NVA who had mounted a
tower in the inner perimeter. One bullet went through my radio, and the back pack, and entered my back. This bullet, or part of it, lodged in the base of my left lung (Note 3).

Immediately after I was shot, by the NVA soldier located on the inner perimeter tower, I saw a LOH swooping in on my position from the west. He headed straight toward me. At the same moment I saw NVA coming out of the bunker line to fire on the LOH. I tried to wave him off as I no longer had a radio. Finally, just before he flared to land, I shot out his windshield and the LOH moved away to the South (Note 7).

I reentered the bunker and killed three NVA who were attempting to cut off LTC Schott's head. The instant they were dead, SFC Lull and the twelve ARVN soldiers « came back to life ». I tried to organize the thirteen people and with the Regimental Surgeon, who came down the other stairwell, led them outside. We retook two bunkers on the bunker line. We held these bunkers until 18:30 hours. Then as « Spectre » made a pass on targets to the west, we escaped through the mine field to the southwest. Just on the other side of the perimeter road, a squad of NVA jumped up and engaged us. During this engagement I was shot in the groin with a pistol. I also received a small schrapnel wound in the lower right abdomen (Note 3).

We returned fire and killed all five NVA but my bowels filled with blood and I had to pull down my pants and defecate. While I was in this position, SFC Howard Lull stood up and announced that I had to be left behind. I was virtually immobile and so physically and emotionally drained that I could only cry. SFC Howard Lull and all but two of the ARVN soldiers chose to desert me. They moved toward a hill mass where they felt they would be secure until they could escape or be rescued. The Regimental Surgeon and my bodyguard, Corporal Hen, stayed with me. We started south and avoided any movement by the NVA. When we reached the small stream bed about 500 meters south of the camp, we saw what the lights the night before were from. A reinforced company had tried to dig into the walls of the stream bed. They were still there, almost all had been killed by the CBU and NAPALM. We looked at the wounded; they looked at us; we moved on. During the night we observed a massive air strike go onto the hill mass that SFC Lull and the ARVNs had run up. I believe they were killed by the air strike. Subsequent to my capture the NVA Commander told me they had all been killed. During this night, we had three contacts with the NVA. After the third contact we were all crawling from exhaustion and wounds.

At 08:00 hours, 8 April, I spotted a FAC. I used my LRRP mirror to signal him. In response, the FAC called in a flight of two fast movers dropping CBU. I was again wounded (Note 3). We fled, as best we could, toward the rubber trees south of the camp. As we stumbled up the hill, I saw a white rice bowl fall to the ground. I shot the soldier who was eating with my pistol and we continued on. The next thing I saw was a huge orange flash and then my left leg was knocked from under me (Note 3). I was knocked unconscious. When I came to my senses, I had a great weight on my head. An NVA soldier was standing on my head. I saw them shoot my bodyguard dead. They were lining up the Regimental Surgeon when I forced my way to my feet.

I tried to shoot my .45 caliber pistol but the slide was back and it was empty. The NVA just took it out of my hand. I explained that they did not want to kill a doctor. He could help them. Right or wrong, I intended to preserve at least one friend from that battle. The Surgeon cursed me for telling them he was a doctor but the NVA let him live. He was eventually released with me in 1973.

When they took me to their headquarters an older officer ran down the hill and hit me across the face with a bamboo stick (Note 3). A distinguished looking officer then ran down the hill and threw the man who had hit me aside. He kicked the man and told him in Vietnamese that I was a good soldier. The whacking came because the doctor had, inadvertently, called me « Zippo ».
It seems that « our friend » Colonel Vinh had told the NVA much during his short stay with them. The distinguished looking officer had me undressed and my wounds treated. Treatment was superficial at best. They tried to give me food but I was afraid to eat because of the abdominal wounds. The interpreter, who spoke perfect English, told me I had been captured by the 272nd Regiment, 9th NVA Division. He further stated that I was the guest of the « Group Commander », « Mr. Tra ». When I asked if he didn't mean Regiment or Division Commander, he said that Mr. Tra had many Divisions.

Soon, my old jeep arrived carrying Major Carlson, SGT Wallingford, and Mick Dummond. Mr. Tra had no words for any of them. We were added to the load in the jeep and I was then tied to the floor boards. We went to the West until we reached the road to the scissor bridge. We then went North to the river and east back toward QL13. When a Spectre Gunship flew over they laid branches on the jeep and left me tied to the floor board. They also left the engine running.

I knew the destruction Spectre did to tanks and I couldn't even imagine what it would do a jeep. Although I probably gave away a secret, I finally yelled to them, in Vietnamese, to turn off the engine. At QL13 we crossed the underwater bridge. We also met up with a number of captured ARVN M577 vehicles hauling items for the NVA. When we reached Snoul, I was given additional medical treatment for the benefit of photographers.

 

[jhungary]

Dead-on conclusions,but north vietnamese intelligence and use of deception should be praised.Prepared for teh attack after the blue,was not disheartened by losses by airstrikes and also found out the incoming taskforce relief and blunted it.Deception and perseverance.

 
Found this guy's report on the net,he was the main american advisor in the battle and commanded it.



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Captain Mark Allyn Smith of Advisory Team 70, MACV, call sign Zippo, the American main figure on the ground in the Battle of Loc Ninh (April 1972). He was captured after the battle on 8th April 1972 during his E & E (Escape and Evasion) and held in a jungle prison camp in Kratie, Cambodia for the remaining 10 months. He was released at Loc Ninh in the general POW release on 12th February 1973 in accordance with the Paris Peace Accord 1973. Zippo retired from the US-Army as a Major in December 1996.

II. Prelude to Battle :
During the winter of 1971-72, the 5th ARVN Division conducted operations of a limited nature in Binh Long, Phuoc Long, and Binh Duong provinces. These operations rarely made contact with the enemy, except for limited incursions into Cambodia toward the town of Snoul. It should be noted that, within the 9th ARVN Regiment, contacts with the enemy increased when advisors again accompanied battalions on operation. This practice was reinstituted by myself in November 1971. SFC Lull and myself accompanied battalions on operations on a regular basis.

One small battle between Lai Khe and Ben Cat was initiated by the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry, in December 1971. The area had been worked by numerous units without advisors. By pushing the ARVN commander to move farther off the highway, contact with a company of NVA was achieved. This indicated to LTC Schott, Colonel Bill Miller, and to me that all was not as pacified as the 5th ARVN Division staff would have us believe.

Contacts around Loc Ninh were rare, as the enemy could see you coming for a very long distance. Members of the Border Ranger Battalion and the French plantation manager, however, assured me that the NVA were in the area continuously. The Frenchman also told me that he paid the NVA not to start trouble in the plantation. This was done to preclude damage to the trees. The 9th Regiment soon learned that by operating only within the confines of the rubber plantation, one could avoid trouble.

One operation conducted northwest of Loc Ninh was to put a « scissor » bridge in place on a small river at the border. The reason given was to allow units to avoid using QL13 as the single avenue of approach to Cambodia. My observation was that the bridge offered an excellent avenue of approach for the enemy. The ARVN, however, left the bridge in place and never guarded it or used it for operations because of its size and location, in the jungle. The NVA made fine use of this bridge, and one other, to put the 5th NVA Division in place for battle; and, the 9th Division used it to by-pass Loc Ninh for points South. During the battle of Loc Ninh it took one full day to destroy this bridge.

A short time prior to the battle, LTC Schott and myself drove to Fire Support Base (FSB) Alpha. At the Montagnard village, short of Fire Base Alpha, is a river. The bridge there had long since been destroyed; however, « someone » had been building an underwater bridge with rocks. Inquiries to the Rangers and to the 9th Regiment Headquarters drew a negative response on knowledge of this endeavor. A stop at the village and a discussion with some children made it clear that « someone » had ordered the people to bring rocks to build this structure. Further questioning about « who » only solicited the response: « The Vietnamese ». When asked if it was the ARVN or the enemy, the response was that all Vietnamese were the enemy. When LTC Schott and I raised the issue with Colonel Vinh, he was not worried. Me was sure the Montagnards were using the underwater bridge to smuggle wood from Cambodia. This structure held no tactical implications for Colonel Vinh. He further stated that it was good for the « scissor » bridge to remain in place as it gave the NVA the opportunity to by pass Loc Ninh. He also said that if the NVA came with full combat power, using the tanks and armored personnel carriers (APC), captured in an earlier battle, we would have to surrender. He also stated that he had been a prisoner in the 1950's and it was better than being dead.

I made up my mind to two things at this time:
1. Loc Ninh would not surrender without a fight.
2. The bridges would become prime targets at the onset of any battle. With this in mind, the stage was set for the battle of Loc Ninh.

On 30 March 1972 the Stars and Stripes published a picture of NVA T-54 tanks on the « Ho Chi Minh Trail » headed South. Colonel Vinh, however, remained convinced that the only armor the 9th ARVN Regiment faced was captured M-41 tanks and APCs. An inventory of high explosive anti tank (HEAT) ammunition, for the sole 106mm Recoilless Rifle at Loc Ninh, showed the presence of precisely six rounds on-hand ! There were also fifty rounds of canister ammunition on-hand. Colonel Vinh assured me he would request more ammunition. On the afternoon of 4 April 1972 Major Carlson, SOT Wallingford, a French photographer named Michael Dummond, and myself journeyed from Lai Khe to An Loc. We were passed by numerous overloaded vehicles fleeing south. Just south of Loc Ninh the French plantation manager passed us and waved for us to go back. We proceeded on to Loc Ninh. The village square was basically deserted, except for some drunk ARVN soldiers at the local « soup stand ». They said they were drunk because tomorrow they would die. Colonel Vinh was not alone in his defeatism. Amazingly the National Police station was erecting additional barbed wire and filling sandbags. This for a staff of six people ! These personnel included one female and five male police. When I inquired of Major Davidson as to the district chief's plans for the police, he stated that they had been ordered to defend the police station.

Other after action reports state that the 1st ARVN Cavalry was operating in Cambodia just prior to the battle. This is a myth concocted by Col. Vinh and the Commander of the 1st ARVN Cavalry. They were, in fact, at FSB Alpha. The only exception to this was a total of five APCs and one tank at the intersection of QLIS and QL14. These vehicles were placed here for two reasons:

1. To provide a blocking force to protect the flank of the 1ST Cavalry Regiment moving to Loc Ninh;
2. To assist or reinforce the 1st Battalion, 9th infantry, at Bu Dop.

The small size of this force indicates the lack of tactical awareness of the 9th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Regimental Commanders; because if is not tactically sound to appose a force of two NVA regiments with an ARVN force of only five APCs and one tank. Colonel Bill Miller, SRA 5th DCAT and myself both attempted to convince Colonel Vinh and General Hung to pull the 1st Cavalry back to Loc Ninh. Colonel Vinh's thinking was that the NVA would attack FSB Alpha and leave Loc Ninh alone. Also this was his reasoning to move the two companies of the 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry, not to the west of Loc Ninh as previously reported, but to place them on the first hill mass south of Loc Ninh to cover a withdrawal by the 9th Regiment. This movement was ordered immediately after the departure of General Hung and Colonel Miller from Loc Ninh. There was a contact to the west of Loc Ninh on the afternoon of 4 April. It was actually made by the 9th Regiment Reconnaissance (Recon) Company but it was reported as a contact made by the 3rd Battalion because Colonel Vinh had told General Hung that the 3rd Battalion remained to the west. After this contact, all that remained of the Recon Company was one wounded soldier with a radio. He remained on the radio until the afternoon of 6 April and provided me with targets to the west of Loc Ninh.

When I returned from An Loc, late in the afternoon of 4 April, I advised Colonel Vinh to move the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry, except for one company, back to Loc Ninh from Fire Support Base Alpha. I also advised him to leave a PF Platoon and RF Company at the Cam Le bridge to assure it's destruction. Again, Colonel Vinh stated that we could « survive » if we provided the enemy a variety of targets. Also he felt that ordering the destruction of the bridge would anger not only General Hung, but also the NVA Commander ! Colonel Vinh's theory was that, « when we surrender », we could bring up certain things to show we actually helped the enemy. The term « when we surrender »became more and more common in Colonel Vinh's discussions, until he did in fact try to surrender Loc Ninh on 7 April 1972.

When I learned this at 03:00 hours, I carried the E-6 Regiment west of Loc Ninh on the situation map and added the 272nd Regiment to the south and the remainder of the 5th NVA Division as the attacking force.

The events described above and the resulting disposition of friendly and enemy forces, as depicted on my map as of 03:00 hours, 5 April 1972, set the stage for the battle of Loc Ninh. As the battle scenario develops, it will become evident why I continued to place the 272nd Regiment of the 9th NVA Division south of Loc Ninh.

III. The Battle :
The battle of Loc Ninh began during the afternoon of 4 April 1972 when the Recon Company, 9th ARVN Regiment, was destroyed by what was believed to be elements of the NVA E-6 Regiment West of Loc Ninh. A lone surviving soldier, with a radio, reported tanks and infantry in large numbers moving toward Loc Ninh and the South.

At 03:00 hours, 5 April, a rocket attack on Loc Ninh was initiated by the NVA. At this point Colonel Vinh became concerned about Loc Ninh itself. He informed LTC Schott and myself that now he would order the 1st Cavalry Regiment back to Loc Ninh. We told him in no uncertain terms that it was too late. Besides, FSB Alpha had an anti-tank ditch and four tubes of artillery. Colonel Vinh disregarded this advice and ordered the Rangers, 2/9 Rifle Companies and the 1st Cavalry at FSB Alpha to return to Loc Ninh. The five APCs and one tank at the intersection of QL13 and QL14 were to « cover the withdrawal ».

At 03:35 hours, the Commander of the 1st Calvary informed Colonel Vinh he was surrendering. Vinh said he understood ! As a result of Vinh's action, it became clear to me that he did not intend to fight the NVA and I told Vinh he no longer commanded anything. The regimental staff, with the exception of the regimental XO, backed me. LTC Schott also backed me. As of that moment, and for the rest of the battle of Loc Ninh, I commanded the 9th ARVN Regiment.

I immediately contacted the commander of the 1st ARVN Cavalry Regiment and told him I would « air strike » him if he surrendered without a fight. He stated that they would try. Ten minutes later the Rangers and 2/9 contacted me and said they were attempting to fight on to Loc Ninh; but, the 1st Cavalry had surrendered and was moving West with the NVA !

I contacted the United States Air Force (USAF) Forward Air Controller (FAC) and requested air strikes on all personnel and vehicles moving toward the west and into Cambodia (Note 1).
A Spectre Gunship reported attacking armored vehicles moving west, five kilometers from QL13.
The Rangers and 2/9 made contact with the five APCs and one tank from the 1st Cavalry at the intersection of QL13 and QL14. As many personnel as possible mounted the vehicles and they tried to break through to Loc Ninh. I requested that « Spectre » try to cover their withdrawal.
This is the unit that was ambushed just north of Loc Ninh. The Rangers reported an ambush one kilometer long. I ordered them to fight through the ambush and ordered air strikes in support. The Rangers reported that Colonel Vinh had ordered them back to FSB Alpha. It was at this point that we noticed Colonel Vinh on another radio. We disconnected Vinh's handle - and told the staff to keep him off the radio to subordinate units. Vinh was told that if he wanted to do something, talk to 5th Division and tell them what was happening.

As the battle began to develop, the sensor operator from 5th Division began to bang on the side of his console. All the little black buttons on his console had turned white. I knew nothing about sensors; but I asked him if this real function had ever happened before. He stated that animals would sometimes cause an individual sensor to activate but that he had never before observed all sensors activated at one time. I asked him for the sensor locations. He said only 5th Division knew the locations. I then asked Colonel Vinh and later General Hung about these locations.
I was unable to obtain a satisfactory answer. I finally asked the « Sundog » FAC to contact 5th Division and Corps for the positions of the sensor fields and then for him to bomb them. He said, « which one ? » I took another look at the sensor console and said, « all of them ». What was done about this request I don't know; the sensor console ceased to operate after our TOC received a hit that morning from a 75mm Recoilless Rifle round.

The volume of fire into Loc Ninh increased over the next two days. The vast majority of the fire was rockets and tube artillery, with some mortar rounds. The tube artillery was from three locations:
1. Four tubes of 105mm, captured from the 1st Cavalry Regiment;
2. 105mm and 155mm firing from the south, probably captured at Hung Tam on 6 April;
3. fire coming from the north and northwest. The artillery from this third source was fired from a great distance and I believe it was 130mm gun rounds rather than the 155mm previously reported.
I spoke to an advisor (Note 2) at Hung Tam by radio and he assured me that his counterpart had « spiked the tubes » prior to their attempting to pullout. On 6 April, however, the Company Commander of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry, at Cam Le bridge informed me that the guns from Hung Tam were firing on Loc Ninh. I ordered an air strike on Hung Tam at approximately 19:00 hours, 6 April. General Hung, however, canceled my order as he still believed the guns were in the hands of the 52nd Regiment. By evening of the same day the guns had disappeared to the west. Earlier, on the morning of-5 April, direct fire weapons had commenced firing into Loc Ninh from across the airstrip to the east. One round from a 75mm recoilless rifle struck the 9th Regiment TOC directly in front of the command radio. Both LTC Schott and I were wounded in the head and neck (Note 3). Major Carlson, Sergeant Wallingford, and Michael Dummond came through the fire and patched us up as best they could.
Major Carlson, in the mean time, attempted to direct the air campaign. MG James Hollingsworth, however, demanded to know why « Zippo » was not using all of the air support he had provided. I got back on the radio and informed MG Hollingsworth that he would have to wait until I got the holes in my head patched up. He apologized to me and in ten minutes I was back on the radio. Major Carlson, SGT Wallingford, and Michael Dummond returned to the inner perimeter. I never saw Major Carlson again during the battle. At approximately 10:00 hours, 5 April, a platoon (two) tanks pulled into the tree line to the west of Loc Ninh. I took a portable radio, LTC Schott, and SFC Lull and headed for the perimeter just outside of our bunker.

When we reached the bunker with the single 106mm RR on it, SFC Lull was no longer with us. We climbed to the top of the bunker and engaged the tanks with the 106mm RR. This, I believe, is the tank that has been described in various after action reports as being destroyed by direct fire artillery. Infantry engaged us on the bunker and I was wounded again (Note 3). LTC Schott and I then went to the artillery compound, got the gunners of their bunkers, and ordered them to direct fire into the tree line. I requested an air strike west of the camp. The FAC on station offered the « Spectre » Gunship as a solution. The second tank in the woodline was either destroyed by « Spectre » or the 105mm direct fire. I suspect that the « Spectre » actually did the job as there was the appearance of « flash bulbs » going off on the back deck of the tank just prior to it blowing up.

I must dispute the after action reports that claim the tanks stayed exclusively in the woodline and supported the infantry. In daylight hours this was true; at night, this was not the case. Twice on the night of 5 April, T-54s rolled through the perimeter from the west and back out on the airfield side. The first time this happened they were hardly noticed because of the intense indirect fire assault on Loc Ninh. The second time this happened the 106mm engaged them with canister ! The commander and driver of both tanks were killed. The tanks then sat in the wire to the east, next to the airfield, for about thirty minutes. There was no Spectre on station at the time; and, the FAC on station and I both thought the tanks were knocked out of action. I was called by the defenders on the east of the compound as the 174th NVA Regiment was making a ground assault across the airfield. I called for CBU and NAPALM. This forced them to withdraw. The real objective of their attack became obvious when two new drivers from the 174th Regiment drove the « knocked out » tanks into the rubber trees across the airfield. During this entire first day, I tried to coordinate with Major Davidson and Captain Wanat in the District Compound.
Captain Wanat would get out of the bunker, look around, and report targets. He reported the mortars firing from the swimming pool on the grounds of the plantation house. These mortars were subsequently destroyed by Spectre. He also alerted me to the presence of an NVA forward observer located on the top floor of the plantation house. General Hung would not clear « Spectre » to fire on the plantation house. As a result, LTC Schott and I took with 106mm canister fire. During this entire period, Major Davidson whined on the radio. His complaint was that I was « hogging all the air strikes » for the main compound. A simple look at a picture of Loc Ninh from the air, however, will show that all these compounds were interconnected. I told him to get off the bunker and look at where the air was going in. Later in the night Captain Wanat described the Major as being « distraught ». Under the circumstances, I think the Captain's words were most kind. I consider Major Davidson's actions as being most unprofessional, to the point of being childish and cowardly. Nothing that happened, to include his « escape » from Loc Ninh, alters my initial impression that this officer acted in a cowardly fashion throughout the battle !

At approximately 22:00 hours, 5 April, I saw Colonel Vinh tell his bodyguard and two other soldiers to do something. They donned flack jackets and helmets. They then sprinted from the bunker. I finally ascertained, upon their return, that Vinh had ordered them to open the gates of the compound. Vinh explained: « we had do this so we can run out easier ». By this time we had approximately one hundred wounded, from all compounds, in the hospital bunker. Colonel Vinh was preparing to desert them and run away. I seriously considered shooting Vinh there and then bur I had not reached that point yet; that would come later.

The remainder of the first night was basically artillery fire on the compounds. I established with the FACs (Note 4) and the Spectre Gunships, that only I would clear each target and would provide my initials to take responsibility. From that point on they never allowed anyone, including Vinh and General Hung, to cancel a target.

At 0500 hours, 6 April, I saw tracers coming up from the area of the rubber plantation office and processing plant. These were east of the airfield and I ordered them destroyed by NAPALM and 250 pound bombs, (« Snake & Nape »). This was done and no more fire came from that area. Amazingly, I also saw tracers coming from the police station on the edge of town. The brave policemen and one policewoman continued to hold out !

At 09:00 hours, 6 April, I was informed by a Spectre Gunship that an anti-aircraft gun on a vehicle was firing from the village square in Loc Ninh. I cleared Spectre to engage this target. I refused to allow jet aircraft to engage this target to protect the Loc Ninh village from collateral damage. At approximately 11:00 hours, I was notified by the forces on the east side of the perimeter that women and children were coming up the road from the village. This was verified by the FAC on station (Note 1). When LTC Schott and I climbed to the top of bunker, we saw one of the most pitiful sights I have ever witnessed. The NVA were forcing the children and teachers to walk toward the compounds carrying an American flag. I fired in front of them and they fled back into the village. At approximately 14:00 hours, the lone survivor, from the Recon Company, reported tanks and infantry moving toward Loc Ninh from the west in regimental strength. I called for air strikes on these targets. The soldier on the radio adjusted this fire until the bombs were heard on our radio and transmissions ceased. I did not know his name but he was a real hero.

At 17:00 hours, 6 April, Loc Ninh's main compound was overrun the first time by infantry. Elements of the 174th Regiment attacked in company strength across the airfield and a battalion of E-6 Regiment attacked from the west. The company from the 174th massed and tried to run through the front gate as a group. They were decimated by the CBU that I called onto the camp's perimeter. The battalion from the west stopped in the wire when Spectre engaged their supporting tanks. The tanks turned tail and ran. Earlier that morning two TOC radio operators, the regimental surgeon, and myself had crawled into the barbed wire on the west perimeter. With LTC Schott and SGT Lull covering us, we placed claymore mines and white phosphorous grenades behind the six « FOOGAS » drums on that side. We then attached the mines and grenades to a blasting machine with communications wire. When I climbed the steps, I saw hundreds of NVA « standing » in the wire and the ARVN soldiers staring at them. When I detonated the « FOOGAS »,it was brutal, as if coming out of a daze the ARVN soldiers began firing. The NVA battalion was decimated. When I went outside to check the soldiers, a single T-54 Tank rolled from the woodline and entered the perimeter. I grabbed an M-72 LAW and fired directly into the front of the tank. The tank and crew were not impressed ! Finally, Spectre munitions « sparkled » on the rear deck of the tank and it took a round into the engine compartment. The defenders on the bunker line then killed the crew as they exited the tank. That evening when I checked the bunker lines, the 9th Regiment was down to about fifty defenders. There were about 150 wounded in the hospital bunker. The regimental surgeon and I went to the hospital and ordered all who could walk back to the perimeter. There was no whining, they just went and did their duty.

As the surgeon and I were putting the wounded on the perimeter, I noticed that the disabled enemy tank was gone. I questioned a young soldier in the bunker near where the tank had been sitting concerning what had happened to the tank. He explained: « Another pair of tanks had come out of the rubber trees and drug the disabled tank away ». I then asked him why he had not fired his X-72 LAW at the tanks. In response, he said « the tanks were not shooting and he didn't want to make them mad ». I understood his reasoning and could only pat him on theshoulder to convey my feelings. It is my experience that the M72-LAW is ineffective when attacking the frontal armor of the T54 Tank.

That night Colonel Vinh ordered all the warm soda pop stored in the TOC be opened and passed out to the troops. This was Colonel Vinh's last contribution to the battle. He had stripped off his uniform and was wearing only white under shorts and a T-shirt. He told me we would have to surrender soon. He advised me to keep a white shirt handy. He also told me we were lucky because we were officers. We could surrender. Junior enlisted men would be shot by the NVA. The regimental surgeon confirmed Vinh's statement. We went around the perimeter and told all the Border Rangers to strip to their underwear and try to get to the Cam Le bridge. This was done because it was generally accepted that the Montagnard, Cambodian, and Nung soldiers would be executed by the NVA. It was then that I learned that most of the unwounded Infantry soldiers on the perimeter were from the 2nd FSB Alpha and the bridge. They stated that they had been given the option to go north, south, or stay. This group had come to Loc Ninh. That night about twenty men straggled in from the 3rd Battalion which had been located south of the camp. The 3rd Battalion had been virtually wiped out by the NVA 272nd Regiment on the high ground south of the camp.

That night, 6 April, at approximately 20:00 hours, lights were seen in the open south of the camp. I directed CBU and NAPALM onto the lights. These lights were within 500 meters of the barbed wire. I did not determine until the next evening what they were. At about 23:00 hours, two 240mm rockets landed almost simultaneously on the Loc Ninh Infantry and Artillery compounds. What these notoriously inaccurate, weapons achieved is amazing. One struck the hospital bunker, killing every wounded soldier and medic inside. The regimental surgeon was with me and was spared. The other hit the ammunition dump, in the Artillery compound, and totally destroyed the guns and soldiers. General Hollingsworth, who was flying overhead at the time, said: « it looked like a nuclear explosion ».

At 23:30 hours, 6 April there was another major attack from the east across the airfield and through the wire from the west. This was repulsed with air strikes and the last few rounds of 106mm canister ammunition. After the attack, Sergeant Wallingford and Michael Dummond brought food and encouragement from the inner perimeter. I did not see Major Carlson; the others said he was manning the radio. Sergeant Lull had become moody and refused to leave the bunker after the second major attack. He asked what my plan was and I said: « To fight ». He was not happy with my response. Though he had been wounded only slightly, his mental attitude had greatly deteriorated.

LTC Schott and I moved throughout the perimeter that night and used a portable radio to direct air strikes. We were both wounded a number of times during the night (Note 3) and LTC Schott kept repeating: « I'm glad you are here ». By early morning, I noted that there was some mental
deterioration in LTC Schott. I believe it was caused by the head wound he had received on the first night of the battle. Despite his head wound, LTC Schott continued to fight throughout the battle. His bravery under fire is unquestionable and he gave me his loyalty and support to the very end of the fight. I further believe this mental deterioration significantly influenced his actions on the following day.

Early on the morning of 7 April Loc Ninh became strangely quiet. There were occasional artillery rounds and mortars but little else. It was as if the attacking force and the defending force were holding their breath for some reason. I increased the air strikes to the west and observed numerous secondary explosions. I also cleared the Spectre Gunship on station to fire at will into the plantation house and grounds. Major Davidson, during this phase of the battle, continued to periodically come up on the radio from his bunker and complain the lack of fire support he was receiving. His statements were totally absurd and embarrassed LTC Schott, Major Carlson, Captain Wanat, Sergeant Wallingford and myself. The FACs tried to reassure him, to no avail. Major Davidson was scared to death.

About 0700 hours, 7 April, there was another major ground attack, from the west and north from the town of Loc Ninh itself. Tanks entered the perimeter from the west. One T-54 Tank chased me around the perimeter until I could get behind it and shoot an into its rear section. During this « chase » Captain Dey, a brave helicopter pilot from the 1st of the 9th Cavallry, tried to draw the tank's fire off of me with his LOH. In fact, it is most probable his actions enabled me to eventually destroy the tank (Note 7).

Captain Dey also observed the mass of bodies in the barbed wire and the trench lines. Many of the bodies were entangled, friend and foe, indicating that at some point in the late evening hours of 6 April the fighting had been close quarter, « hand-to-hand »-combat.

At approximately 08:00 hours, 7 April, Colonel Vinh, his loyal body guards still trailing him, ran out through the front gate of Loc Ninh and surrendered. The 9th Regiment Executive Officer (XO) observing Colonel Vinh's desertion and surrender, immediately ran from the bunker toward the inner perimeter. I understood why only when I saw him begin to lower the flag of the Republic of Vietnam. When I observed his action, I ran after him. When I reached him he was pulling off his white T-shirt which he then ran up to the top of the flag pole, signifying to the NVA that we were surrendering. I demanded that he pull the T-shirt down from the pole. We argued and fought for the rope. As we were fighting over possession of the rope, I glanced around and saw all of the soldiers in the TOC were watching from the doorway and other soldiers on the perimeter were starting to strip off-their shirts. It appeared that the XO's act of surrender was going to end the battle then and there. As the commander, I felt the defenders of Loc Ninh could hold on until reinforcements or firepower could be provided to enable us to prevail over the NVA. Accordingly, I shot the XO dead and hauled down the white flag. The soldiers, upon observing my actions, put their shirts back on and faced out again to defend the perimeter. I do not know if anyone put up another white flag after I shot the XO. I assume that it was his white T-shirt that was observed by some pilots. This shirt,however, flew for no more than five or ten minutes.

From this point through the end of the battle things became absolutely bizarre. A major attack at about 09:30 hours, 7 April, required that I call for air strikes on the camp itself. I lost all communications with the other members of the team on the inner perimeter. I was later told that they had been forced to hide inside the roof when chased from the bunker by a tank. At 11:15 hours two APCs entered the front gate. Initially we thought these were 1st Cavalry troops but when the ramps lowered, NVA soldiers piled out.

At 10:00 hours, 7 April, a flight of B-52 aircraft made a bombing run west of Loc Ninh. During the bombing mission there was a short lapse in air support over Loc Ninh; but this, as some claim, did not cause the fall of Loc Ninh. Also, during the B-52 strike a LOH from 1st of the 9th Cavalry came in and attempted to rescue friendly personnel. I left the bunker with an M-60 Machine Gun and covered the Vietnamese soldiers jumping onto the skids of the LOH. During this action I was shot by NVA soldiers coming across the airfield. Contrary to previous reports by the LOH helicopter pilots, the personnel who pulled me to my feet were ARVN Rangers, not NVA soldiers (Note 8).

I returned to the TOC and asked for all available fire power to destroy the camp (Note 9). SFC Lull then grabbed the radio handset and screamed « no NAPALM ». Major Davidson also came on the net and yelled « no NAPALM ». LTC Schott then took the handset and talked to « someone ». He recommended me for a high award and signed off. At that moment I told Schott and Lull that we should now fight our way out. Colonel Schott said he couldn't make it with his wounds and that Lull and I should go. I said, « that's it, we all stay ». As the NVA began to throw satchel charges into the bunker, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Schott, understanding there was no time to argue; believing he could not physically endure an attempt to E & E, and knowing I would not leave him; sat down on a stool and shot himself between the eyes with his own .45 caliber pistol !

LTC Schott's action was not an act of fear, Dick Schott died to save SFC Lull and myself. I have heard disparaging remarks about LTC Schott's action from a number of people, including some General Officers. In response to these people, I say: « On the best day of your life, you should hope to be half as brave as LTC Richard Schott ». His was an act of sacrifice, not personal desperation. He died for me ! No one else was there, except Lull. No one has the right to judge Dick Schott except for me because I was there. He is the bravest man I have ever known. He is dead, not missing in action (MIA) and the North Vietnamese know it ! Then I went to the roof the NVA entered the bunker. They cut off LTC Schott's collar and name tag and, then tried to cut off his head !!! During this, SFC Howard Lull and twelve ARVN soldiers « played dead » in the TOC !

I went to the roof of the bunker and tried to organize the three soldiers left in the trench line. They just ran back and forth yelling « May Bay » - the Vietnamese word for helicopter. I tried to call for air support on the radio but it was destroyed by gunfire from an NVA who had mounted a
tower in the inner perimeter. One bullet went through my radio, and the back pack, and entered my back. This bullet, or part of it, lodged in the base of my left lung (Note 3).

Immediately after I was shot, by the NVA soldier located on the inner perimeter tower, I saw a LOH swooping in on my position from the west. He headed straight toward me. At the same moment I saw NVA coming out of the bunker line to fire on the LOH. I tried to wave him off as I no longer had a radio. Finally, just before he flared to land, I shot out his windshield and the LOH moved away to the South (Note 7).

I reentered the bunker and killed three NVA who were attempting to cut off LTC Schott's head. The instant they were dead, SFC Lull and the twelve ARVN soldiers « came back to life ». I tried to organize the thirteen people and with the Regimental Surgeon, who came down the other stairwell, led them outside. We retook two bunkers on the bunker line. We held these bunkers until 18:30 hours. Then as « Spectre » made a pass on targets to the west, we escaped through the mine field to the southwest. Just on the other side of the perimeter road, a squad of NVA jumped up and engaged us. During this engagement I was shot in the groin with a pistol. I also received a small schrapnel wound in the lower right abdomen (Note 3).

We returned fire and killed all five NVA but my bowels filled with blood and I had to pull down my pants and defecate. While I was in this position, SFC Howard Lull stood up and announced that I had to be left behind. I was virtually immobile and so physically and emotionally drained that I could only cry. SFC Howard Lull and all but two of the ARVN soldiers chose to desert me. They moved toward a hill mass where they felt they would be secure until they could escape or be rescued. The Regimental Surgeon and my bodyguard, Corporal Hen, stayed with me. We started south and avoided any movement by the NVA. When we reached the small stream bed about 500 meters south of the camp, we saw what the lights the night before were from. A reinforced company had tried to dig into the walls of the stream bed. They were still there, almost all had been killed by the CBU and NAPALM. We looked at the wounded; they looked at us; we moved on. During the night we observed a massive air strike go onto the hill mass that SFC Lull and the ARVNs had run up. I believe they were killed by the air strike. Subsequent to my capture the NVA Commander told me they had all been killed. During this night, we had three contacts with the NVA. After the third contact we were all crawling from exhaustion and wounds.

At 08:00 hours, 8 April, I spotted a FAC. I used my LRRP mirror to signal him. In response, the FAC called in a flight of two fast movers dropping CBU. I was again wounded (Note 3). We fled, as best we could, toward the rubber trees south of the camp. As we stumbled up the hill, I saw a white rice bowl fall to the ground. I shot the soldier who was eating with my pistol and we continued on. The next thing I saw was a huge orange flash and then my left leg was knocked from under me (Note 3). I was knocked unconscious. When I came to my senses, I had a great weight on my head. An NVA soldier was standing on my head. I saw them shoot my bodyguard dead. They were lining up the Regimental Surgeon when I forced my way to my feet.

I tried to shoot my .45 caliber pistol but the slide was back and it was empty. The NVA just took it out of my hand. I explained that they did not want to kill a doctor. He could help them. Right or wrong, I intended to preserve at least one friend from that battle. The Surgeon cursed me for telling them he was a doctor but the NVA let him live. He was eventually released with me in 1973.

When they took me to their headquarters an older officer ran down the hill and hit me across the face with a bamboo stick (Note 3). A distinguished looking officer then ran down the hill and threw the man who had hit me aside. He kicked the man and told him in Vietnamese that I was a good soldier. The whacking came because the doctor had, inadvertently, called me « Zippo ».
It seems that « our friend » Colonel Vinh had told the NVA much during his short stay with them. The distinguished looking officer had me undressed and my wounds treated. Treatment was superficial at best. They tried to give me food but I was afraid to eat because of the abdominal wounds. The interpreter, who spoke perfect English, told me I had been captured by the 272nd Regiment, 9th NVA Division. He further stated that I was the guest of the « Group Commander », « Mr. Tra ». When I asked if he didn't mean Regiment or Division Commander, he said that Mr. Tra had many Divisions.

Soon, my old jeep arrived carrying Major Carlson, SGT Wallingford, and Mick Dummond. Mr. Tra had no words for any of them. We were added to the load in the jeep and I was then tied to the floor boards. We went to the West until we reached the road to the scissor bridge. We then went North to the river and east back toward QL13. When a Spectre Gunship flew over they laid branches on the jeep and left me tied to the floor board. They also left the engine running.

I knew the destruction Spectre did to tanks and I couldn't even imagine what it would do a jeep. Although I probably gave away a secret, I finally yelled to them, in Vietnamese, to turn off the engine. At QL13 we crossed the underwater bridge. We also met up with a number of captured ARVN M577 vehicles hauling items for the NVA. When we reached Snoul, I was given additional medical treatment for the benefit of photographers.

Yeah, the NVA/VC deception has done exceptionally well, both US and ARVN commander failed to notice something is going on in their sector until it was too late.

However, as i said so in the report, the failure of military intelligence is just a tiny contribution to the outcome of said battle, the problem lies with the command structure of ARVN force and this is the reason i choose this battle for my report.

There are many OPs that done with bad intel before, and not everytime went to shit. The after action report I saw with the senior officer on that pointed out something very amazing, that the ARVN ground leader was thinking about surrendering during the whole operation.

Now i don't really know if this is true or not but this seems like fishy command structure to me ....

And i saw the Mark Smith report as well, he was given command by LTC Schott on the day, and his view is probably the most agressive from the rest of the advisor, well, i think he critize both report from 2 other advisor.