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'ARJUN MK I' - INDIA'S MBT-70 OR WHITE ELEPHANT?

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'ARJUN MK I' - INDIA'S MBT-70
OR WHITE ELEPHANT?


Adam GEIBEL has sent us an exhaustive study on
India's indigenous try at making a main Battle Tank

Relations between India and Pakistan have been in a state of simmering hostility since the 1971 War, which was characterized by some intense armour battles on both the Eastern and Western fronts.
At the end of that war, the Indian army realized the limitations of their tank fleet in the harsh desert conditions of Rajasthan (a northwestern Indian state bordering Pakistan) so they initiated their own indigenous MBT design. The first MBT-80 proof-of-concept vehicle was laid out in 1974 by the Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE) of the Defence Research & Development Organization (DRDO).

Twenty six years later the end product strongly resembles the Leopard II, though it's development process was plagued with delays and it's future is in doubt.

Based on 1971 battlefield experiences, the MBT-80 would have a locally-designed, rifled 120mm main gun, a diesel powerplant (The Indians consider turbine engines fuel guzzlers) and a computerized fire control system with a laser range finder. One of the early 'Chetek' prototypes was unveiled to the public on Indian Republic Day, 26 January 1984.

Another public rollout followed in April 1985, after which the name 'Arjun' (named after a mythical Hindu warrior prince1) became the official name. A number of prototypes (five, with an ultimate goal of 20 preproduction vehicles) undergoing technical testing were scheduled for desert trials that summer. Indian Army Chief of Staff Gen A.S. Vaidya and Dr V.S. Arunachalam (Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister) presided at the ceremony, announcing that they planned to have the Arjun in service by the end of the decade.

At the time, it was reported to have a German MTU-based 1400 HP diesel (until an indigenous one was ready), with a weight of 'about' 50 tons (actually 52, though the sketch concepts were around 40-45 tons) and a price tag of US $1.6 million (2 crore rupees, to total 15.5 crore for the whole project). The locally-developed engine, which the Indians hoped to squeeze 1300-1500 HP from, only delivered 500 with it's turbocharger fitted. However, in 1984 the DRDO was claiming that the transmission was Indian, not German. The tank's 'brains' were a modified Tank Fire Control System (TCFS), which was an upgrade project for the Vicker's Vijayanta based on the Marconi SFCS600, linked to a Barr & Stroud Tank Laser Sight and IR8 Thermal Imager.

The project was further spurred by Pakistan's announcement to fit Royal Ordnance 105mm L7 Main Guns to their Type 69 fleet in December 1985 as well as China's assistance in developing the Type-85 based P-90 (or MBT-2000) at the end of the 80's.

Meanwhile, Arjun development costs continued to rise, from October 1980 Rs. 56.55 crores to Rs 280 crores in May, 1987. The DRDO conducted the first technical trials in 1988. According to Indian Defence Minister Sharad Pawar, as of October 1991, there were 12 prototypes Arjun MBT's 'in an advanced stage of development'. General B.C. Joshi, the former Army Chief (now deceased), foresaw two Armoured Regiments of 45 Arjuns apiece, but insisted that 10 imperatives be met in 1994 before the tank could be accepted by the Army.

In 1993 the first six prototype tanks were handed over to the 43rd Cavalry Regiment for troop trials at Rajasthan's Mahajan range. Accuracy trials from mid-1994 indicated an erratic first hit ratio that ranged from 20-80%, though this was supposedly reduced to 90% during subsequent troubleshooting. At that point, the first production, Arjuns were projected to be in service by 1995.

Years of fire-power and tactical tests on the firing ranges in desert and semi-arid conditions followed, until the Indian Army considered the results 'excellent'. The Pakistani deal with the Ukraine to purchase T-80UD/T-84's announced in the fall of 1995 caused another flurry of activity in the Indian military community.

At that point, the Arjun had just failed field trials in June. More were set for August and November but observers figured that the US $ 100 million programme has progressed too far to be easily terminated.

On 9 January 1996 the Arjun was formally unveiled and cleared for mass production in a ceremony presided over by Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao2. According to Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister, Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam, the Indians consider the Arjun comparable to the M1A2 Abrams, Leopard 2 and Leclerc.

However, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Shankar Roy chowdhury pointed out that, while some of the tank's parameters needed to be 'further finetuned', they have enough confidence to plan Arjun variants; mobile assault guns ('self-propelled platforms' or self-propelled artillery), Observation Post Vehicle and Air Defence (Gun or Missile), recovery, engineer and bridgelayers. New bridgelayers and recovery vehicles would be necessary, given the Arjun's substantial weight increase over the T-72M1 series. Most of India's roads are in the 40 ton military classification range, save for national highways' 70 ton range.

The 59-ton (58.5 tons) 15th Variant can achieve a maximum speed of 70 kph (55 mph) and cross-country of 40 kph with it's 1400 HP powerplant. The Arjun's hydropneumatic suspension can be hardened or softened, according to the terrain and the 1610 litre fuel tank allows for a cruising range of 200 km (120 miles).

The semi-automatic transmission, hydrodynamic torque converter, retarder and integral system are local designs (The designers seek to raise local from 70 % to 80 %) . The service brake consists of a hydraulically operated high-performance brake disc that is incorporated into the final drive.

The Arjun's crew compliment is the traditional four; commander, gunner, loader and driver. There are both limitations and advantages to this arrangement that any tanker will recognize; three-man crew with autoloaders can develop a higher rate of fire for shorter periods of time, but four-men crew allow the crew to accomplish more maintenance-related tasks with less fatigue.

To insure crew survivability, production versions will have the indigenously-researched and developed Kanchan' composite armour, an automatic fire detection and suppression system, and a NBC protection system designed and built by Bhabha Atomic Research Centre.

It exerts a ground pressure of .84 kg/cm. square and can climb a gradient of 35 degrees (necessary for crossing Rajasthan sand dunes). Since the river-strewn Punjab area 'ditch cum bund'' defences caused innumerable problems during the 1971 War, the Arjun can cross 1.4 meters deep channels and 2.43 meter trenches.

The MRS-equipped, rifled l20 mm gun (known as Gandiva', or Arjun's Bow) is made of ESR steel and fitted with a thermal sleeve and fume extractor. It's Rate of Fire is listed as six to eight rounds. All main gun rounds use a semi-combustible cartridge case with increased energy propellant for higher muzzle velocity and greater penetration characteristics. In addition to the usual suite of rounds, an anti-helicopter round is under development as well. On-board ammo is stowed in water-tight containers (indicating possible wet-stowage).

The Arjun's fire control system includes a laser rangefinder, ballistic computer, thermal imaging night sight, stabilized panoramic sight for the tank commander, and a secondary telescopic sight. (One source had this system based on the Vijayanta's Mk 1B FCS developed by BHEL, which may have been fitted to one of the earlier prototype tanks).

The gunner's main sight consists of a daylight, thermal sight and laser rangefinder channels. The common sighting head mirror is stabilized in elevation and azimuth. The daylight sight has dual magnification while the thermal imager provides a night vision facility to the gunner and the commander.

The LRF (integral to the gunner's sight) has a range of nearly 10 km. and a Thermal Imager (which can 'see'' at around five-and-a half km, recognize a target at 3.1 km. and identify targets at 2.5 km). The Arjun Fire Control System's ability to fire on the move during the night is a major step forward for Indian armoured forces3.

The commander's panoramic sight all-round surveillance without the TC moving his eyes from the sight and also without disturbing the lay of the turret. The Field of View is stabilized with the help of a two-axis rate gyro mounted on the platform of the head mirror.

Apparently, some problems were identified since the Arjun design profile was frozen again in July 1996, which would have allowed production to commence when funding became available. However, some design elements fell far short of army specifications.

The 15 Pre-Production Series (PPS) tanks were supposed to be supplied to three armoured regiments for testing in 1996, but it wasn't until 27 August that the Defence Production and Supplies Secretary ordered them from the Heavy Vehicles Factory, Avadi (at which point, one Indian media estimate placed the project cost at US $ 112 million or 400 million Rupees).

However, the Indian Defence Ministry's publicised cost for these 15 tanks was US $ 38.2 million (RI.62 billion).

At least one Arjun fielded by the 43rd Armoured Regiment participated in the 48th Republic Day parade on 27 January 1997. Delivery of the prototype lot was completed in April, field trials were again declared completed and series production was to start in early June '97.

However, the list of faults after twenty years of development was not encouraging. In addition to unspecified but numerous technical modifications to its fire and gun control systems (the Commanders Periscopic Sight, the Laser Warning Sight and the Muzzle Reference Sight have been found 'unreliable'), the fire control system in particular has been found unable to perform in temperatures above 42 degrees Celsius. The DRDO has been comptemplating scraping the current Arjun FCS in favour of whatever is accepted for the T-72M1 upgrade programme.

Since the Arjun extends 6cm beyond the official 3cm limit on either side of a standard Indian flatbed railcar, strategic transport would be extremely difficult. This would also require that India refurbish large sections of her rail network, as well as acquiring new rolling stock (This is nothing new, as the Germans had this problem with the ÔTiger' Mk VI in World War II). It's width and weight, Indian Rail to charge the Army over-dimensional consignment (ODC) costs, which are 150% over normal costs. The Indian Ministry of Defence allocated US$ 3.9 million (R165 million) to develop three Arjun-capable flatbed rail cars wagon by January 1999.

The German MTU MB 838 Ka-SOl 1 ,4OOhp diesel engine and transmission derated at high temperatures, with an estimated 20-25% powerloss from engine to drive sprocket while operating in desert temperatures of 45-500 Celcius. Ammunition stowage had to be reduced in order to increase engine cooling and the 15th PPS can not fire over the engine deck at 00 elevation because of the bulky cooling pack. This powerpack choice also resulted in bulges in the hull side walls.

The problems with the hydropneumatic suspension can possibly be linked to the Arjun's difficulty in climbing sand dunes and other obstacles easily, with a sharp drop in speed in its attempt to do so. Furthermore, the inert gases needed would be another item added to the supply trains.

As of mid-year, the 15th Arjun Mk I was to be the basis for the production model4. The defects noticed during the user trials of Mk.1 , including overheating of the engine in Rajasthan desert areas, had been 'by and large overcome' and certain other complaints were being addressed. CVRDE has mostly rectified the other problems in the hydro-pneumatic suspension.

Another problem in the Arjun's development was that more than half the components (FCS, engine, transmission unit, tracks, thermal sight, night sight) are imported, with the design components 1970's and 80's vintage.

Furthermore, the technology transfer agreements for the imported engine, gun control system, fire-control system had most vendors (like MTU and Holland's Oldelft, which makes the LRS 5 Fire Control System) producing components in India in a phased manner.

The production of 100 Arjun Mk.1 MBTs was expected to start by late 1997 (during the Ninth Defence Plan) at an estimated cost of US$ 2.8 million [Rs. 10 crores] each, though the Army feels that the 100-tank lot might take more than five years, given the capacity at the Avadi Heavy Vehicles Factory near Chennai and its commitments to various sectors of the armed forces. The first production tank was promised by 19985.

A later claim by DRDO stated that it needed up to (Rs 1,800 crores) to produce 120 tanks over the next five years, with each one costing US $ 4.2 million [Rs 15 crores] (about a 2,000 % increase in project cost since 1974).

Another cost estimate figured that the Arjun will be over Rs 26 billion by 2001 for two or three regiments (124 tanks), totalling around US $5.6 million (Rs 200 million) per tank. This escalating estimate does not include the cost of ammunition, spares and engineering support for the Arjun's induction into service, which is estimated at over (Rs 5 billion).

One reported Government-sanctioned figure for Arjun development and T-72M1 upgrade (with most going to the Arjun) is US $1.12 Billion (Rs 40 billion) spread out over the next three to five years.

Despite promises made by the Finance Minister, Mr. P. Chidambaram, that lack of funds would not come in the way of India's defence needs, some officials were skeptical over deadlines being maintained by the production and subcontractors which might result not only in cost escalation but also affect defence preparedness. Detractors think that (baring drastic changes) the country's progressively shrinking defence budget, coupled with the persistent technical problems, would delay any serious Arjun serial production until 2002/2004.

In early August, 1997 General Shankar Roy Chowdhury, Army chief of staff, promised officers and soldiers of the 13th Armoured Regiment that the Arjun would enter production soon. Less than two months later, DRDO was shaken by the desertion of scores of military scientists and engineers lured to the more lucrative private sector, jeopardizing the success of the Arjun project.

As of 18 September, the Indian Parliament approved a $6.9 Billion (250 billion Rupee) Five-Year Defence Budget. In this 1997-2002 budget, some 40 Billion Rupees has been allocated for the Ajeya rebuild programme, and another 1 Billion Rupees for the first 100 Arjuns.

Yet BG D. R. Gole went on record in October saying that the Arjun's Fire Control System has a 20-80% First Shot hit ratio. The DRDO blamed this on the test crew from the 43rd Cavalry, whom they accused of having a mindset left-over from the T-72M1's (which cannot fire on the move). Before official acceptance, the Army wants the tank lightened, fitted with an internal APU and reactive armour.

In mid-November, DRDO chief A.P.J. Abdul Kalam told a closed-door meeting of his ministry's Parliamentary Consultative Committee that the Arjun had been tested for 20,000 km and cleared for 'limited series production'.

Before a crowd at the National Defence Academy in early December, the Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ved Prakash Malik denied that Arjun's induction into the army was being delayed and added that some unspecified tests and improvements had to be carried out before the army could accept them.

By early May, 1998, the US decision to impose sanctions on India could possibly jeopardize the Arjun's further development, since some US companies were supplying elements of the main gun-sighting and fire-control systems for the Arjun tank. There was also speculation as to whether Germany would stop supplying MTU engines. Arjun Executive Board (AEB) narrowed their choices for an FCS to Thomson CSF and Elbit of Israel (which could also be used in the T-72M1 ÔRhino'). The imported components used in the Arjun rose from 27% in the 1987 Prototype to 60% in the current PPS version.

The Comptroller and Auditor General's report on the Summer 1997 trials, released in mid-1998, noted six premature transmission failures and frequent overheating of the transmission fluid, probably because the imported transmission assembly had been overloaded.

The latest estimate is that the first Arjun MBT would roll out in 2000, with 20 to 30 more manufactured per year. After the 124 Arjun I's are finished, the Arjun II would begin series manufacture.

ARJUN Mk 1 (15th Preproduction Model)

Weight 59 tons (58.5 tonnes)
Length (gun forwards) 10.19m
Width (over tracks) 3.5m
(w/ skirts) 3.85m
Height (w/o 12.7mm AAMG) 2.32m
Engine 1400 HP MTU 838 Ka 501Diesel
Transmission Semi-automatic with 4 forward and 2 reverse gears.(also reported as ZF automatic)
Fuel 1610 ltrs
PERFORMANCE
Max Speed 72-70 kph (55 mph)
Cross Country Speed 40 kph
Cruising Range 200 km (120 miles)
Ground Pressure . 84 kg/cm Square
Ground Clearance .45m
Slide Slope: 60%
Climbing Gradient 35°
Trench 2.43 m (also given as 3m)
Vertical Obstacle .9m
Ford 1.4 m
ARMAMENT
Main Gun 120mm, stabalized w/ MRS (APFSDS, HE, HEAT, HESH and smoke)
12.7mm AA Gun (probably NVST)
7.62mm Coax (probably PK-T)
2 X 9 Smoke Grenade Launchers
LRF Range 10 km
Sights Thermal (Max Rng 5.5 km)
Active and Passive
Defensive Systems 'Arena' a possibilty, probable Laser Warning System
 
Don’t have to read the article...... it’s a WHITE DUCK.......:rofl:
 
Hmmm It would be interesting to see how things have progressed in the last 8 years though.
According to the Indian guys (On this forum) it is being inducted but I haven't seen any evidence of this. Maybe if they read this they can dig something up?
 
http://pib.nic.in/archieve/others/2...ov_may2006/defence_2years_upa_gov_may2006.asp

Plus there were numerous media reports that 126 Arjuns are to be inducted.

It was bogged with delays and problems, but it ended up as an excellent tank, incomparable in the sub-continent. There have been numerous discussions on Arjun, and all those who commanded a certain degree of knowledge have said that this is an excellent tank. Kudos to DRDO for FINALLY giving a good product. Not to mention this is Mark1. This means that all the faults and problems will be rectified in future models. Even the Markava's had problem initially, all started getting better and better with subsequent models.

Anyways, Arjuns will be inducted, and just the development of Arjun has been a huge experience + for DRDO. India had never before designed a tank or attempted on anything of this scale,so they now know the complexities. It gave the engineers, scientists some very valuable experience and the country, the industrial infrastructure to create and design such things, including armour, etc which it did not have when the project was undertaken. I am sure, the Mk2 would be far better and so on. Its the knowledge they gained from this first try is what counts. Many of te technologies developed for Arjun and LCA have had spinoff uses in other places.
 
Indeed. Malaymishra, do share Arjun MBT pictures in the military photos section.

Thanks.
 
Read this. A very good article.
http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/jan/17spec1.htm
And there are more good articles in the link above.
Its a 3 part series.

DRDO: Media's whipping boy?

There has been a spate of 'investigative' reports and analyses in the Indian media of late, which have all taken Indian defence research efforts to task, with special focus on the Indian government funded nodal agency, the Defence Research and Development Organisation.

The criticisms range from the mundane to the mind-boggling with the common ones being: The DRDO is a white elephant that does not produce enough output justifying its 'bloated' budget.

* Most big projects undertaken by the DRDO to date, such as the Arjun tank, the Light Combat Aircraft etc. have been 'failures.'
* The Indian armed forces still have to shop for weapons abroad despite decades of multi-crore government investments in DRDO.

These allegations, some of which have become ingrained in Indian media circles over the years, are now almost accepted as fact by almost every person who wishes to criticise the Indian defence industry.

But how much of this is true?

To find that out, one must establish some quantifiable benchmarks and compare the DRDO's performance with that of the R&D establishments of China, Pakistan and even Western nations.

First, DRDO's total annual budget, in terms of US dollars is around $800 million. That may seem to be a lot, but compare that to China's, which is conservatively estimated to be at 15% of its defence budget or close to $10 billion.

Another point of comparison is with India's major defence deals, which usually run into the multi billion-dollar range. Even at the 30,000 feet level, one can point out that it is naïve to expect an investment of $800 million to yield results worth many times more.

Second, what are the usual objectives for any developing world power when it comes to its native military industry? Most experts would say that the goals for a nation's Defence R&D efforts include:

# Self-reliance in terms of key technologies that are simply unavailable elsewhere, such as nuclear, missile and strategic forces
# Reduction of imports in terms of technologies available elsewhere but at prohibitive costs. These include systems such as fighter jets, warships, radar, electronics, armour and artillery etc.
# Nimbleness in terms to developing unique systems specific to the country's armed forces. In the Indian context, these include devices that help in detecting and preventing infiltration, counter-insurgency weapons etc.

Note that we are not talking about self-sufficiency, which is more of a function of the manufacturing of military products and meeting the services' quantity requirements. In India, they are mainly the responsibilities of the various Defence Public Sector Undertakings such as Bharat Dynamics Limited, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited etc.

DRDO: An investigation

In terms of the above criteria, where exactly does DRDO stand?

When it comes to strategic forces, one needs to look no further than the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) which was initiated in 1983 under DRDO's auspices. While DRDO took care of the R&D, BDL was created for the production of developed products.

In the strategic arena, IGMDP has successfully developed the Prithvi series of short-range ballistic missiles and the Agni series of intermediate-range ballistic missiles, both of which are nuclear capable and in serial production.

The reader may wonder why there are regular tests of these missiles, if they are all ready to use. This is because once a particular system is developed, DRDO has to work with its end user, be it the Army, Navy or the Air Force to fine tune it to meet the user's requirements.

The Prithvi is among the most modern short-range battlefield missiles in the world. It has the highest warhead-weight to overall-weight of any missile in its class, a testament to the ingenuity of the designers.

Prithvi-I is the army variant, last tested in 1994 and currently deployed by the 333rd missile regiment. Prithvi-II is the Air Force variant, last tested in 2003 and currently with the IAF. Prithvi-III is a submarine fired variant, just tested successfully. Dhanush is a surface ship-launched variant, also tested successfully.

The Agni series of missiles have two successful versions in the armed forces inventory today. Agni-II, which confusingly was the first one to be produced, can carry a 1 tonne nuclear warhead to ranges over 2,000 km. Agni-I, which is a Pakistan specific asset, can carry a 1 tonne nuclear warhead to a maximum of 1,200 km range. Both the missiles are rail capable and are equipped with accurate guidance and solid fuel systems ensuring a flight time fast enough for an assured retaliation or a second strike capability. Both are under induction by the armed forces.

Clearly, it is hard to make an argument that DRDO has not delivered on the nuclear/missile front. They did the job when no one else would.

Moving on to the defence systems that are expensive to procure from abroad, one needs to look at the full picture.

For the Army, the systems needed include Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), Artillery, and Radars etc. But so far, the Indian media has exclusively focused on DRDO's Arjun MBT project, which has been deemed a disaster because the Army has still not used it after 30 years and over Rs 300 crores of development cost.

The tank has been trashed in the Indian press through the oft-used 'anonymous' sources at Army HQ. It is said it is 'too heavy' and 'slow' and it's 'too expensive' etc. Other media experts trumpet excerpts from reports by Parliamentary defence committees and the Comptroller and Auditor General pointing out problems with the Arjun project.

One could write a book debunking these claims, but it would suffice to say that the Arjun tank, as it stands today, meets almost all the Army's General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQRs) which is what the designers go by.

But the Army changed the GSQRs repeatedly.

The original requirement was for a 40-ton tank armed with a 105mm gun, and DRDO had to start from scratch. Midway through this process, the Army changed its requirement to a 120mm gun armed heavier tank, capable of going toe-to-toe with the American Abrams tank, which Pakistan, was about to acquire from the United States in the 1980s.

Those were the benchmarks that the Arjun had to meet and the Arjun of today is more than a match for the Abrams and equivalent Western tanks in terms of armour, firepower, mobility and protection. DRDO also successfully test-fired the advanced Israeli LAHAT anti-tank missile, which has a much longer range. Pakistan still does not have missile-firing tanks, by the way.

Now, if the Arjun is not exactly what the armoured corps wanted, the blame goes equally to army officials who set the requirements along with DRDO. Can one place an order with Tata for a Sumo type vehicle, keep changing the specs and expect a vehicle with the Indica's size and cost?

While the Arjun's media trial continues, the project itself resulted in a number of successful spin-offs. For instance, the bulk of India's tank fleet comprises aging T-72 tanks, some 1,700 of which are in India's inventory. One successful upgrade effort includes the mating of the Arjun's turret with the T-72's chassis, christened the 'Karna.'

This includes the Arjun's IGMS, a state-of-the-art, homegrown fire control system, Laser Warning System, Nuclear/Biological/Chemical detection and filtration system, Land Navigation System and night vision gear. Under trials now, the Army has indicated that it could order 300 or more Karnas in the coming years.

DRDO's 125mm piercing-piercing tank round is also a direct spin-off from the Arjun MBT program. These rounds are meant for the T-72 tanks. Over 130,000 such rounds have been produced by the state-owned Ordnance Factory Board's (OFB) since 2001, saving the army over Rs 200 crores per year in foreign exchange.

Another Arjun spin-off is the 'Bhim' self-propelled gun, which mates an Arjun chassis with the lethal Denel T-6 turret from South Africa, making it a system that is unmatched in the region in terms of firepower, mobility and survivability. A Rs 2,000 crore deal for 100 such guns is reported to be signed soon.

Most dispassionate observers would agree that the above results are enough not to deem a Rs 300 crore R&D effort to build a tank from scratch a failure. And there are more Arjun spin-offs to come!



DRDO: A stellar success

The Indian media's DRDO bash-fest usually keeps a laser-like focus on the alleged failures of DRDO, like the Arjun tank and the Trishul missile system.

But the reader may be surprised to know that there is a whole slew of DRDO designed and developed products that have proved to be a big hit with the armed services, in addition to saving the exchequer of many crores of rupees. Let us look at some specific examples.

When it comes to military modernisation, some of the priciest systems to modernise are radars, detection and surveillance and electronic warfare equipment. Most cutting edge technologies are simply not available in the market while the available technology is prohibitively expensive.

So how did DRDO respond to the Indian requirements in the above area?

In January 2004, the Indian Army accepted the Samyuktha electronic warfare (EW) system developed by DRDO.

Consisting of 145 vehicles with various subsystems, the Samyuktha provides the army with the ability to detect and jam enemy communications, monitor movements -- an ability that only a few select nations possess. In fact, even though the US imposed sanctions in 1998 could have impaired the Samyuktha project, DRDO scientists overcame the obstacles to develop this state of the art system.

The advanced phased-array radar associated with the Samyuktha, called the Rajendra, was also indigenously developed by DRDO. The Rajendra radar is also part of the Akash medium range surface-to-air missile system, which is currently undergoing advanced trials with the army and air force. A 3D Central Acquisition Radar (3DCAR) is also undergoing trials with users.

DRDO has also leveraged the Rajendra project to develop an advanced Weapon-Locating Radar (WLR), the likes of which would have been invaluable in a war like Kargil, where the Pakistanis had American WLRs and the Indian Army lacked a similar product.

The EW suites for the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force, titled Sangraha and Tempest respectively, have also met with great success.

DRDO to develop new fighter aircraft

For instance, the Tarang Radar Warning Receiver (RWR), a key aircraft EW component, has been successfully installed in the upgraded IAF MiG-21 fighters, the MiG-27 strike planes and the incomparable Su-30MKI air-dominance fighters. Another EW component, the Tusker Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) pod, is also in IAF service.

In fact, the IAF has been a happy DRDO customer for a long time and now routinely relies on local innovations in the fields of avionics, radar and communications.

The Su-30MKI, for instance is a cut above the similar Su-30MKK that the Russians developed for China because the former relies on cutting edge Indian components such as the Mission Computer, Display Processor, Radar Computer, Integrated communication equipment, Radar Altimeter and Programmable Signal Processors, all designed and developed by DRDO under a project titled 'Vetrivale.'

This avionics suite, built locally, costs less than 20 per cent of Western made systems, which may not even offer the same level of technology to the IAF. The Russians were so impressed by the Vetrivale avionics that they asked to incorporate some of the technology to the Su-30 variants they sold to Malaysia.

DRDO technology was also used in IAF's local upgrade efforts of the MiG-27 and Jaguar strike aircraft, saving millions of dollars in foreign exchange. The IAF has also lavishly praised and ordered DRDO developed Indra-II advanced low-level detection radar.

The IAF is widely using the indigenous multi-mission Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH), named Dhruv, developed by the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited with support from DRDO. Dhruv has won international accolades and have evoked interest from nations like Chile. It recently set a world record by flying at an altitude of 27,000 feet above mean sea level. The Indian Army and Indian Navy are also acquiring purpose-built Dhruv variants.

The biggest IAF system built by DRDO is the Light Combat Aircraft. While a detailed analysis of the LCA project is beyond the scope of this article, one can safely say that the LCA is a definite success for Indian aviation and has silenced all detractors, at least the ones who stick to facts.

The LCA has also resulted in spin-offs such as the Sitara Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT), which was built from scratch in a record time of 22 months and has received accolades from the end user. Efforts are now underway to build an indigenous Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) and a small indigenous Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS).

The Indian Navy has even more enthusiastically embraced DRDO products.

Many navy vessels such as the Rajput class and Veer class ships use DRDO's Ajanta Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system. Under the Sangraha EW program, DRDO has completed the development of five types of EW systems. Sanket, an ESM system for patrol boats has already been ordered by the navy. An airborne EW system called KITE has also been successfully tested.

The navy is also testing submarine EW systems, all developed under the Sangraha project. Essentially, thanks to DRDO, the Indian Navy now has airborne, surface ship borne and submarine electronic warfare systems. Given the fact that Pakistan is getting advanced naval reconnaissance systems from the US under the guise of the war on terror, DRDO's work in the Naval EW area goes beyond the savings of millions of dollars.

India US join hands to make futuristic soldier

DRDO has also produced the APSOH, Nagan, Ushus, Humsa and Panchendriya (submarine) sonars for the Indian Navy as well as the SV-2000 maritime patrol radar and the Mihir Sonar for the naval version of the Dhruv helicopter. A lightweight torpedo for helicopter and ship launched attacks on submarines, developed by DRDO, has also been recently cleared for production.

The lethal BrahMos, which is the world's only supersonic stealth cruise missile, was jointly developed by DRDO with Russia. The BrahMos is deadlier than the American Tomahawk missile which flies at a sub-sonic speed. DRDO's contribution to BrahMos includes the onboard navigation system, onboard computer, electronics, fire control system, software and some parts of the propulsion system.

In general, one can see that the navy and air force, which usually don't have the army's big budget to go shopping abroad for everything, have developed an excellent working relationship with DRDO to get whatever they can locally and are satisfied with the results.

Despite the well-publicised 'failings' of the Arjun, the army too has silently built up fruitful partnership with DRDO agencies for systems that are unavailable overseas and India-specific assets for use in counter-insurgency and high-altitude operations.

India tests Lakshya

For instance, the army's aviation wing recently decided to trim its purchase of foreign-made high-altitude helicopters from 198 to 35, reducing the expected bill from $440 million to $80 million, and procure the HAL Dhruv because of the Dhruv's excellent high-altitude performance.

The 5.56mm INSAS fixed-butt rifle, which has been put through one of the most gruelling series of user trials in the history of small arms development, has become a mainstay of the Indian infantry since 1997, with lakhs of units in service. Other versions of the INSAS are now being inducted as well.

The Army has also inducted many counter-insurgency assets developed by DRDO. They include Sujav, a frequency jamming equipment and Safari, a jamming device for Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

The indigenous battery-powered man portable battlefield surveillance radar (BFSR-SR) weighing 27kg was developed by DRDO in a short period of 24 months. It is capable of detecting crawling men at 500 metres, moving groups of people at 5 km and a group of vehicles at 10 km -- a tremendous asset along the Line of Control with Pakistan.

The army has also ordered DRDO's Nishant Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), which is fully capable of instantly providing time-sensitive battlefield intelligence to field commanders.

Other unheralded DRDO products for the army include the lethal Pinaka Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher, the Shakti Artillery Combat Command Control System which connects massed artillery guns and makes them 10 times more effective, the Lakshya pilotless target aircraft, the Bridge Layer Tank on a T-72 chassis, the Sarvatra multi-span bridge, various combat simulators, a mobile Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) decontamination system -- all of which are in production or already in service.

These form just a part of DRDO's products that have proven to be successful with the defence services. Yet all we hear in our media is an endless stream of negativity about India's Defence R&D efforts.



What's behind the DRDO bashing?

In the previous two parts of this series, the reader would have seen the objective criteria to evaluate the performance of a nation's defence R&D effort as well as some of the Indian DRDO's successful efforts.

If the facts are against it, why then does the DRDO come in for such excoriation in the Indian media? Are all the experts quoted in the desi DRDO critiques flat out wrong? To understand this, one must look at the possible reasons behind the Indian media's negative reportage on local military products.

The first reason is the simplest one to fathom -- namely that many of Indian defence reporters simply don't know what they are talking about. That sounds harsh and the reader may wonder if I'm saying there are no good defence reporters in India -- which is definitely not the case.

For instance, a leading Indian magazine recently featured a cover story claiming that the DRDO is a white elephant.

The report claimed, for instance, that the Indian Navy had to buy Israeli Barak missiles, because the naval version of the Prithvi missile was delayed. That is funny because the Barak is a Surface-to-Air missile while the Prithvi is a Surface-to-Surface missile. This was unlikely to be a one-off mistake because the report went on to call the Nag anti-tank missile a Surface to Air missile as well.

Surely it's the DRDO's fault that India does not have the ability to protect against airborne tanks and sea-borne aircraft!

While the story went on to say that many of DRDO's projects never resulted in products, it did not quote independent investigations which placed the blame for this malaise equally at the feet of the services, which on many an occasion refused to buy products that they asked for even after they agreed that their requirements were met.

The prestigious magazine did not even print any rebuttal story in later issues, instead settling for short letters that conveniently left out the ones exposing their whoppers and egregious false claims. Bashing Indian product makes good copy, so why let the facts stand in the way of a good story?

These are not isolated examples.

Even a casual reading of defence related reports in the Indian media would turn up errors relating to fundamental military concepts and equipment.

There are exceptions of course, such as NDTV's Vishnu Som, The Statesman's Srinjoy Chowdhury and a few others, but it is still a shame that much of the defence reporting in India is left to people who just reproduce what their 'sources' tell them, without doing any fact-checking. That their 'sources' could have an axe to grind seems to be lost with these people. And very rarely do these negative reports contain quotes from those who have an opposite point of view.

India in the big league: Fernandes

The second big source of the local defence industry baiting is the ever-growing club of retired mid level to senior military officers.

Now, these are people who know the field and their views must be taken seriously. A vast majority of retired servicemen and officers want nothing but the best for their colleagues in service and speak out with that good interest at heart. They must be applauded for this. But one must also look for possible ulterior motives in some of the more strident spokesmen.

There are retired officers who are on the payrolls of foreign military firms, which is quite legal, but when one takes in their views on the pluses and minuses of a local made system, one must ask if their judgement isn't clouded by the possibility of their employer landing a lucrative contract.

The bizarre saga of the AJT

For instance, the Russian arms lobby would like to see India forever dependent on them for tanks and combat vehicles. It is good business for them, but a bad deal for India in the long run.

And then there are retired senior officers who have become peaceniks. There are two former services chiefs who have taken up DRDO bashing earnestly.

But if one reads their writings carefully, one could see that they are making a general 'guns vs butter' type argument. In other words, they'd much rather spend money on welfare and entitlement programs rather than defence research. One is unlikely to see these gentlemen call for an investigation of loss-making non-military public sector undertakings.

And then there are those ex-servicemen who write with the attitude that they know what's best for the country's military and whenever the government decides to promote all local product that they deem of low value, they start fulminating against it. For instance, there is one television-based defence reporter, who is also a retired military officer, who has long been attacking the DRDO with special focus on the Arjun programme.

When the government recently decided to go ahead with the Bhim artillery system, which uses the Arjun as its basis, this gentleman went ballistic and started trashing the Bhim acquisition.

India lagging in research and development work

First, he claimed that India is never going to need this type of self-propelled artillery because it is 'unlikely to fight a war in the near future!' Then he claimed that there are no similar products in the world (there are) and then went on to say that he cannot quote other experts who share his views because he is the expert!

Evidently, the Indian Army's planners have a different idea of what's good for them and they are going ahead with this deal. God save the army! Past reports filed by this gentleman have also blasted DRDO for not delivering products asked for by the army. He used the army's need for a kitchen lorry to serve hot meals to servicemen as an example.

What he failed to point out in his report was that the government itself faulted the army for going to DRDO with a request for a simple system that can be rigged up on the field. It is not very clever of a person to go to a Nobel Prize-winning physicist to solve a 10th standard physics problem, is it?

In fact an independent investigation later on found that the army gave a list of specifications for a kitchen lorry to DRDO and once the latter built a vehicle meeting those needs, the army changed its mind. But this gentleman left out all the facts in these reports.

There are other reporters with military experience too who have perfected the art of passing off their personal opinions as journalism. Real journalism -- be it military-related or otherwise -- involves the setting aside of one's personal views, presenting of facts from both sides and letting the reader make his/her own judgement.

Does this mean that the Indian media should become cheerleaders for the DRDO or local defence products?

Definitely not.

It is the role of the media in a democracy like India to point out government wastage, lack of performance in taxpayer-funded organisations etc. But such criticism should be fact-based and will serve a purpose if it is constructive in nature.

Consider the Light Combat Aircraft as a test case. Virtually every report filed in Indian media on the LCA ends up bemoaning the delays in the project, which is conveniently laid at the feet of the DRDO. But there is hardly a report that puts the LCA in perspective. A 'fair and balanced' report on the LCA would state the facts that:

Few other developing countries in the world have even tried to build a fourth generation fighter from scratch. Compared to them, the LCA is a roaring success.

* Many of LCA's current critics had claimed on the past that it would never fly. But they still continue to maintain their credibility for some strange reason.
* The post-Pokhran sanctions hit the LCA project very hard but DRDO overcame it by balancing components on its own when it was previously expected from abroad.
* Even Western nations have delays in fighter projects despite the fact that hey have had to face fewer budget or access issues. For instance, take the example of the Eurofighter project, which combined the money and technological abilities for the UK, Germany, Italy and Spain and decades of prior military aircraft building experience. The plane was first expected to enter service in the late 1980s and is still facing delays today.
* Neutral observers have lauded the LCA's technologies as being on the cutting-edge.

It is not at all hard to write a balanced report, as the above example shows, but once one brings in hard facts, it tends to blunt the report's objective in bashing DRDO. Perhaps this is why most Indian DRDO-bashing reports stick to old myths and fallacies.

Money, money everywhere, not a note to spend

In summary, the cup is not necessarily half empty when it comes to India's indigenous defence research and development. In fact, it may even be three-quarters full, when one considers how far our scientists and engineers have come since DRDO was set up in 1958.

There are still many challenges, including the need for better communication between DRDO and the defence services, especially the Army, the bureaucratic delays, the large number of non-productionised projects and the services' continuing reliance on foreign nations for critical defence technology.

The Indian media must keep reporting these issues to keep DRDO on its toes. But the time has also come for the Indian media to bring the defence reporting at an objective level rather than using old shibboleths to tarnish local defence R&D efforts.

There are also two articles with a diff view there. Chk the link above.
 
Whilst it may be going over old ground again. I feel that the problem is not the results when they get there eventually, but that they take soooo long that the IA or IAF have to go elsewhere in order to fullfill needs. (e.g. the T90 or the Heron UAV)
It defeats the purpose of self reliance if you have to go to foreign powers to cover shortfalls (not to mention the supposed cost benefits)
 
I agree Keysersoe,
But i think that first attempts are exempt from such requirements. It is a start, the next designs will hopefully be more practical, professional and on time. Every country starts somewhere! Atleast India now has the knowledge to design such things and the industrial strength to manufacture it. It comes from experience which was the thing we lacked before.
 
I agree Keysersoe,
But i think that first attempts are exempt from such requirements. It is a start, the next designs will hopefully be more practical, professional and on time. Every country starts somewhere! Atleast India now has the knowledge to design such things and the industrial strength to manufacture it. It comes from experience which was the thing we lacked before.

That would be true if it was the only problem. However it is the repeated problems that seem to dog the organisation that are the problem (documented on numerous other threads). There is the old saying that you must learn to walk before you can run.......... Even the U.S. takes ideas and designs and equpiment from other nations and simply gets the best equipment available regardless of source (politics withstanding)
 
I agree again Keysersoze,
but all the problems that were there have been rectified, Now the development focus has shifted to MKII. Arjun 1 is done. Now we have the intellectual and industrial prowess to make tanks. The next tank will be a very very good one. Indeed even Arjun, after rectifying its faults is a very very good tank.
 
Which tank does pak have to counter T-90

Himeed this goes to the heart of the issue..most of the tanks of the newer variety (T90/T80UD and AK) are of very similar build and design hence they can take out each other no problem.

If the Arjun is inducted in large amounts it changes the balance. In the current numbers I do not feel it would be significant. (Due to newer AT systems being inducted into the PA)
 
I agree again Keysersoze,
but all the problems that were there have been rectified, Now the development focus has shifted to MKII. Arjun 1 is done. Now we have the intellectual and industrial prowess to make tanks. The next tank will be a very very good one. Indeed even Arjun, after rectifying its faults is a very very good tank.

Indeed on paper the Arjun would change the balance. However as the saying goes "there is no smoke without fire".And it has yet to be seen whether the bugs have been ironed out.Perhaps if they ran a public test or try to sell it elsewhere.
Plus another thing I have to ask is how many of the original staff are still around? I mean the knowledge and experience is only of value if the people who gained the experience are still around.

It will be interesting to see which tank is developed first the AK2 or the ARJUN2
 

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