Mujraparty
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The army was constitutionally mandated to be an arm of the Pakistan state. All the organs of the state, in turn, were supposed to be subservient to the executive of the day.
In time to come, however, the army through the office of the COAS seized the commanding heights of the state, amended the constitution and subordinated other institutions to its own ends.
Thus, even when elected civilians were nominally in office, the COAS ruled the roost in all critical areas of domestic and foreign policy.
But something even more sinister has been transforming the civil-military landscape in recent decades. This is the creeping consolidation of the ISI through its DG from an arms-length intelligence directorate (Interservices Intelligence Directorate) in the first three decades of independent Pakistan to its metamorphosis in the last three decades as an unaccountable and all-powerful 'deep state within the state' that now controls both military strategy and civilian national security policy.
The unprecedented appointment of a serving DG-ISI as COAS (General Ashfaq Kayani) by President Pervez Musharraf was the first step in this direction.
The second was Kayani's own decision to routinely rotate senior serving ISI officers to positions of control in the army and vice-versa, coupled with his insistence on handpicking the appointment or extension in service of the DG-ISI.
Together, they reflect a cold new reality. The ISI has walked into GHQ and seized control of the military. This is a deeply troubling development because it violates the established order of all militaries in democratic societies that have consciously striven to keep intelligence services at arms length from GHQ because of concerns that soldiers and commanders in the field should not get contaminated by cloak and dagger spooks in unmarked cars and buildings.
That is why Gen Zia kicked DG-ISI Gen Akhtar Abdul Rehman upstairs to Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee in 1977 instead of giving him command of soldiers on the ground. That is why COAS Gen Asif Nawaz reluctantly brought back DGISI Gen Asad Durrani to GHQ in 1992 and sidelined him there in Training and Evaluation Dept, and that is why COAS Gen Abdul Waheed first prematurely retired Gen Durrani from service in 1994 and recommended Chief of Staff Gen Jehangir Karamat as his COAS successor rather than DG-ISI Gen Javed Ashraf Qazi.
That is why the CIA, R&AW, MI6, KGB, MOSSAD etc remain civilian Intel agencies under full civilian control even though soldiers may be seconded to them or head them occasionally. THE ISI's meteoric rise dates back to the 1980s when it was mandated by General Zia to be the official but secret conduit for tens of billions of dollars of arms and funds from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia to be used by the Mujahideen against the Soviets in Afghanistan.
Three serving generals of the time were billed to be 'the richest generals in the world' by Time in 1986. Two of them, Gen Akhtar Abdul Rehman and Gen Hameed Gul were in turn DGs-ISI while the third, General Fazle Haq, was the Peshawar Corps Commander/Governor gatekeeper to Afghanistan.
Three Prime Ministers in the last three decades have tried, in vain, to control the ISI through their constitutional power to select and appoint the DG-ISI. Mohammad Khan Junejo sought to hold DG-ISI General Hameed Gul accountable and former DG-ISI Gen Akhtar Abdul Rehman for the Ojri Camp explosion in 1978 and was booted out by the COAS Gen Zia ul Haq even for harbouring the thought.
Benazir Bhutto was able to shove Gen Gul out of the ISI in 1989 but had to eat humble pie from COAS Gen Aslam Beg who promoted him from Maj-Gen to Lt-Gen and gave him a corps commander's position in Multan.
They paid her back a year later by using the ISI to mount her ouster via President Ishaq Khan and Punjab Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif. Gen Beg and the new DG-ISI Gen Asad Durrani hunted as a pair, much like Gen Gul and Zia-ul-Haq in 1988 and Gen Gul and Gen Beg in 1989, to thwart Ms Bhutto's quest for re-election in 1990.
Nawaz Sharif eased Gen Durrani out in 1992 only after seeing the back of General Beg in 1991 and breathed easy only after handpicking Gen Javed Nasir as DG-ISI over the COAS Gen Asif Nawaz. But he lost his job in 1993 when COAS Gen Abdul Waheed (handpicked by President Ishaq Khan over his head) and DG-ISI Gen Javed Ashraf Qazi (handplicked by Gen Waheed) lined up against him.
There was no trouble subsequently between Ms Bhutto and DG-ISI or COAS Waheed and Gen Jehangir Karamat mainly because both army chiefs steered clear of political interventions.
Sharif subsequently handpicked both the COAS (General Musharraf) and DG-ISI (Gen Ziauddin Butt) and was comfortable until he stepped on the toes of the COAS over the Kargil misadventure. Indeed, if he had understood the nature of the army and ISI generals arrayed against him at that time, he would not have tried to sack Gen Musharraf and provoke them. Musharraf, it may be recalled, had lost control of the ISI to the PM but had cunningly moved Gen Mohammad Aziz, a Kargil co-planner, from the ISI to the post of COS in charge of GHQ.
He had also retained Gen Mahmood Ahmad , a Kargil co-executor, as corps commander Pindi. Both generals had charge of the coup-making Brigade 111. And both united in General Musharraf's absence to launch a counter coup against Sharif after the PM appointed Gen Ziauddin Butt as COAS.
The ISI's silent coup against GHQ is problematic. For starters, it has eroded the credibility and capacity of both the DGISI and COAS. ISI's spectacular failures (Benazir's assassination, Mumbai, Raymond Davis case, missing persons, Memogate, Mehrangate, Abbottabad, Get- Zardari, Saleem Shehzad case) are all GHQ's failures simultaneously no less than GHQ's loss of over 3000 soldiers to the Pakistani Taliban and the terrorist attacks on GHQ and Mehran Navy Base on account of the ISI's failure to formulate a proper strategy to pursue the war against terrorism by distinguishing between friends and foes, allies and liabilities.
The fact that both the COAS and DGISI have taken extensions in service has not gone down well inside the military and outside. This is a critical point in Pakistan's political history.
On one hand, civilians are on the same page regarding civilian supremacy over the military, on the deconstruction of the national security state and on regional peace based on interests and not notions of friends or enemies.
On the other side, the military top brass is lacking credibility than at any time in history. Meanwhile, the judiciary and media want to hold both accountable.
A Truth and Reconciliation Commission is desperately needed to lay the groundwork for bringing errant civilians, soldiers and intelligence operators to book.
The ISI must be controlled by parliament and its internal political wing must be abolished. GHQ must obey the orders of elected civilians.
And the civilians should join hands to fashion a new welfare state for the wellbeing of the people instead of indulging the khakis in their pursuit of 'national security'
Read more: An ISI coup in the Pakistan military | Mail Online
hope this is the appropriate thread ...
In time to come, however, the army through the office of the COAS seized the commanding heights of the state, amended the constitution and subordinated other institutions to its own ends.
Thus, even when elected civilians were nominally in office, the COAS ruled the roost in all critical areas of domestic and foreign policy.
But something even more sinister has been transforming the civil-military landscape in recent decades. This is the creeping consolidation of the ISI through its DG from an arms-length intelligence directorate (Interservices Intelligence Directorate) in the first three decades of independent Pakistan to its metamorphosis in the last three decades as an unaccountable and all-powerful 'deep state within the state' that now controls both military strategy and civilian national security policy.
The unprecedented appointment of a serving DG-ISI as COAS (General Ashfaq Kayani) by President Pervez Musharraf was the first step in this direction.
The second was Kayani's own decision to routinely rotate senior serving ISI officers to positions of control in the army and vice-versa, coupled with his insistence on handpicking the appointment or extension in service of the DG-ISI.
Together, they reflect a cold new reality. The ISI has walked into GHQ and seized control of the military. This is a deeply troubling development because it violates the established order of all militaries in democratic societies that have consciously striven to keep intelligence services at arms length from GHQ because of concerns that soldiers and commanders in the field should not get contaminated by cloak and dagger spooks in unmarked cars and buildings.
That is why Gen Zia kicked DG-ISI Gen Akhtar Abdul Rehman upstairs to Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee in 1977 instead of giving him command of soldiers on the ground. That is why COAS Gen Asif Nawaz reluctantly brought back DGISI Gen Asad Durrani to GHQ in 1992 and sidelined him there in Training and Evaluation Dept, and that is why COAS Gen Abdul Waheed first prematurely retired Gen Durrani from service in 1994 and recommended Chief of Staff Gen Jehangir Karamat as his COAS successor rather than DG-ISI Gen Javed Ashraf Qazi.
That is why the CIA, R&AW, MI6, KGB, MOSSAD etc remain civilian Intel agencies under full civilian control even though soldiers may be seconded to them or head them occasionally. THE ISI's meteoric rise dates back to the 1980s when it was mandated by General Zia to be the official but secret conduit for tens of billions of dollars of arms and funds from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia to be used by the Mujahideen against the Soviets in Afghanistan.
Three serving generals of the time were billed to be 'the richest generals in the world' by Time in 1986. Two of them, Gen Akhtar Abdul Rehman and Gen Hameed Gul were in turn DGs-ISI while the third, General Fazle Haq, was the Peshawar Corps Commander/Governor gatekeeper to Afghanistan.
Three Prime Ministers in the last three decades have tried, in vain, to control the ISI through their constitutional power to select and appoint the DG-ISI. Mohammad Khan Junejo sought to hold DG-ISI General Hameed Gul accountable and former DG-ISI Gen Akhtar Abdul Rehman for the Ojri Camp explosion in 1978 and was booted out by the COAS Gen Zia ul Haq even for harbouring the thought.
Benazir Bhutto was able to shove Gen Gul out of the ISI in 1989 but had to eat humble pie from COAS Gen Aslam Beg who promoted him from Maj-Gen to Lt-Gen and gave him a corps commander's position in Multan.
They paid her back a year later by using the ISI to mount her ouster via President Ishaq Khan and Punjab Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif. Gen Beg and the new DG-ISI Gen Asad Durrani hunted as a pair, much like Gen Gul and Zia-ul-Haq in 1988 and Gen Gul and Gen Beg in 1989, to thwart Ms Bhutto's quest for re-election in 1990.
Nawaz Sharif eased Gen Durrani out in 1992 only after seeing the back of General Beg in 1991 and breathed easy only after handpicking Gen Javed Nasir as DG-ISI over the COAS Gen Asif Nawaz. But he lost his job in 1993 when COAS Gen Abdul Waheed (handpicked by President Ishaq Khan over his head) and DG-ISI Gen Javed Ashraf Qazi (handplicked by Gen Waheed) lined up against him.
There was no trouble subsequently between Ms Bhutto and DG-ISI or COAS Waheed and Gen Jehangir Karamat mainly because both army chiefs steered clear of political interventions.
Sharif subsequently handpicked both the COAS (General Musharraf) and DG-ISI (Gen Ziauddin Butt) and was comfortable until he stepped on the toes of the COAS over the Kargil misadventure. Indeed, if he had understood the nature of the army and ISI generals arrayed against him at that time, he would not have tried to sack Gen Musharraf and provoke them. Musharraf, it may be recalled, had lost control of the ISI to the PM but had cunningly moved Gen Mohammad Aziz, a Kargil co-planner, from the ISI to the post of COS in charge of GHQ.
He had also retained Gen Mahmood Ahmad , a Kargil co-executor, as corps commander Pindi. Both generals had charge of the coup-making Brigade 111. And both united in General Musharraf's absence to launch a counter coup against Sharif after the PM appointed Gen Ziauddin Butt as COAS.
The ISI's silent coup against GHQ is problematic. For starters, it has eroded the credibility and capacity of both the DGISI and COAS. ISI's spectacular failures (Benazir's assassination, Mumbai, Raymond Davis case, missing persons, Memogate, Mehrangate, Abbottabad, Get- Zardari, Saleem Shehzad case) are all GHQ's failures simultaneously no less than GHQ's loss of over 3000 soldiers to the Pakistani Taliban and the terrorist attacks on GHQ and Mehran Navy Base on account of the ISI's failure to formulate a proper strategy to pursue the war against terrorism by distinguishing between friends and foes, allies and liabilities.
The fact that both the COAS and DGISI have taken extensions in service has not gone down well inside the military and outside. This is a critical point in Pakistan's political history.
On one hand, civilians are on the same page regarding civilian supremacy over the military, on the deconstruction of the national security state and on regional peace based on interests and not notions of friends or enemies.
On the other side, the military top brass is lacking credibility than at any time in history. Meanwhile, the judiciary and media want to hold both accountable.
A Truth and Reconciliation Commission is desperately needed to lay the groundwork for bringing errant civilians, soldiers and intelligence operators to book.
The ISI must be controlled by parliament and its internal political wing must be abolished. GHQ must obey the orders of elected civilians.
And the civilians should join hands to fashion a new welfare state for the wellbeing of the people instead of indulging the khakis in their pursuit of 'national security'
Read more: An ISI coup in the Pakistan military | Mail Online
hope this is the appropriate thread ...
