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Airpower in COIN operations
Thursday, April 08, 2010
Ikram Sehgal
The use of airpower in a counterinsurgency (COIN) became a mechanism of last resort for military planners after the Vietnam War. The most graphic etching of its horrific effect in one's memory is the widely publicised picture of a naked child on a road running away from the flames and the destruction delivered by napalm bombs, her face a mask of terror.
Destroying whatever comes in its path, airpower tends to kill and/or maim far more innocents than militants in counterinsurgency operations, whose purpose is supposed to be to win people's "hearts and minds."
Forced into COIN operations in Swat, Pakistan's military planners had many adverse factors to deal with: (1) the militants were virtually using the civilian population as human shields by fortifying positions in built-up areas; (2) the civilian population's ratio to insurgents was very high; (3) the militants were taking good advantage of the inadequately mapped mountainous terrain to build tunnel strongpoints; and (4) detailed and precise locationing of insurgent positions was lacking. The only option was for the army to take a calculated risk in turning to the PAF. The critical question was: how to avoid civilian casualties and speed up operations, particularly when use of airpower in COIN had negative connotations?
Announcing the impending operations well in advance deliberately "created" a mass exodus from the impending battleground. This "calculated risk" allowed some freedom of action as well as precision targeting of militants, thus ensuring the least amount of collateral damage. Because the number of refugee quickly swelled to over two million, the essence of the speed of the military operations become mandatory to ensure the quick return of the IDPs. The number of helicopter gunships in Army Aviation was (and still is) inadequate to deliver the quantum of lethality with the precision necessary. Could the PAF deliver?
The history of close air support in the two wars with India has been mixed. Being badly outnumbered, the PAF could only use assets sparingly, emphasising quality to win the battle for air superiority. Those of us fighting in the desert in 1971 felt especially aggrieved at being on the receiving end of the Indian air force's unhindered turkey shoot for quite some days till the PAF finally managed to dominate the air above us. Not that it was the PAF's fault. The confusion prevailing at the highest levels of the Pakistani army led to a wilful and criminal gap in air cover. The tremendous PAF firepower demonstration in Thal on Tuesday revived painful memories of our dire predicament in the Thar Desert in 1971. As I sat there during the demonstration, a 1,000 meters or so from where the bombs were dropping and machineguns and missiles were obliterating targets, I thought we had been lucky 39 years ago that the Indians, who were using napalm bombs indiscriminately, were not as precise and accurate in their targeting as our tremendous PAF pilots, nor a match for their flying skills in taking evasive action. We brought down a number of Indian aircraft by machinegun fire near Umerkot and Chhor.
Dramatically changing the negative concept of airpower in COIN operations, the PAF has responded magnificently to the army's requirement. Improvisation being the mother of invention, necessity force-multiplied the PAF's effort to develop a "counterterrorist doctrine" where none existed. Extensive training of combat crews for undertaking COIN operations was the main thrust of the PAF's exercise "Saffron Bandit" 2009-10. Joint intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) day and night included: (1) mapping of entire battle areas for COIN operations; (2) accurate imagery and target information from all areas of Swat, South Waziristan and other Agencies of FATA; (3) unarmed aerial vehicle (UAV) operations; and (4) Indigenous modification of the C-130 aircraft for undertaking day/night ISR.
This enhanced cooperation has resulted in gradual reduction in reaction time between requests for air support and fighter time over targets, as well as precise shaping of the battlefield by PAF fighter aircraft prior to the army's ground operations. Because of the extensive aerial mapping and real-time coordination, the PAF could further develop special rules of engagement for aircrew engaging targets to minimise chances of collateral damage. The PAF's Special Services Wing (SSW) worked alongside the army's Special Services Group (SSG) to ensure close air-ground liaison at the battlefield. The increased cooperation has also resulted in time-sensitive targeting (TST) and day/night real time ISR for ground troop movement. From the formation commanders down to the platoon level, all got precise information of the topography. They were flown in PAF aircraft before impending operations to work out their approach to battle, and then during the engagement itself with the militants to adjust their tactics. Thus, real-time accurate four-dimensional battlefield surveillance speeded up operations and reduced casualties
Providing combat support operations by C-130s, the PAF high command extensively educated its rank and file so that the "what and why" of the entire operations against the militants is well understood. Taking lessons from the operations already conducted, large segments of the ongoing PAF Exercise "High Mark-2010" has been dedicated to further enhancing the PAF's counterterrorist operations training levels.
The accurate mapping of the entire battlefield ensured precise aerial bombardment. Experts at photo reconnaissance were able to work out changes in the urban structures where the militants had made concealed strongpoints. This also facilitated precision attacks by Army Aviation's helicopter gunships and by well directed artillery fire. Uncovering their hideouts and targeting by the PAF of these strongpoints considerably reduced army casualties and inflicted damage on the militants with precision. This becomes invaluable in avoidance of civilian casualties. The resulting speeding up of military operations was a vital ingredient in the safe return of IDPs. By targeting the militants' strongpoints in the helicopter landing areas in Peochar Valley prior to SSG operations in more than two days before the operations, the PAF prevented the army's helicopters (and SSG personnel) from becoming sitting ducks for the well-dug-in terrorists.
The magnificent PAF response to the army's requirements for COIN operations is largely due to the personal chemistry between the army and PAF chiefs and their ready willingness to meet the challenge without being hamstrung by egos and normal inter-service rivalry and/or jealousy that bedevils such vital coordination. Among allied initiatives, the PAF has already refigured its deployment in sync with the army's plans to contend with the threat of India's Pakistan-specific "cold start" strategy. Enhanced battle effectiveness of the armed forces cannot depend upon the personal chemistry between the two chiefs alone. What happens if their respective successors don't like each other? Inter-services cooperation should be institutionalised. That effectiveness being force-multiplied for possible future wars should have been the raison d'etre for the existence of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs Committee (JCSC). Except for touring abroad for the 30 months since he became chairman of the JCSC, can anyone please tell me what else does four-star Tariq Majid do for a living? One must build on the momentum established and translate theory into reality by converting the white elephant JCSC from the lip-service showpiece of no consequence it is today into an effective instrument of war.
The writer is a defence and political analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder9.com
Airpower in COIN operations
Thursday, April 08, 2010
Ikram Sehgal
The use of airpower in a counterinsurgency (COIN) became a mechanism of last resort for military planners after the Vietnam War. The most graphic etching of its horrific effect in one's memory is the widely publicised picture of a naked child on a road running away from the flames and the destruction delivered by napalm bombs, her face a mask of terror.
Destroying whatever comes in its path, airpower tends to kill and/or maim far more innocents than militants in counterinsurgency operations, whose purpose is supposed to be to win people's "hearts and minds."
Forced into COIN operations in Swat, Pakistan's military planners had many adverse factors to deal with: (1) the militants were virtually using the civilian population as human shields by fortifying positions in built-up areas; (2) the civilian population's ratio to insurgents was very high; (3) the militants were taking good advantage of the inadequately mapped mountainous terrain to build tunnel strongpoints; and (4) detailed and precise locationing of insurgent positions was lacking. The only option was for the army to take a calculated risk in turning to the PAF. The critical question was: how to avoid civilian casualties and speed up operations, particularly when use of airpower in COIN had negative connotations?
Announcing the impending operations well in advance deliberately "created" a mass exodus from the impending battleground. This "calculated risk" allowed some freedom of action as well as precision targeting of militants, thus ensuring the least amount of collateral damage. Because the number of refugee quickly swelled to over two million, the essence of the speed of the military operations become mandatory to ensure the quick return of the IDPs. The number of helicopter gunships in Army Aviation was (and still is) inadequate to deliver the quantum of lethality with the precision necessary. Could the PAF deliver?
The history of close air support in the two wars with India has been mixed. Being badly outnumbered, the PAF could only use assets sparingly, emphasising quality to win the battle for air superiority. Those of us fighting in the desert in 1971 felt especially aggrieved at being on the receiving end of the Indian air force's unhindered turkey shoot for quite some days till the PAF finally managed to dominate the air above us. Not that it was the PAF's fault. The confusion prevailing at the highest levels of the Pakistani army led to a wilful and criminal gap in air cover. The tremendous PAF firepower demonstration in Thal on Tuesday revived painful memories of our dire predicament in the Thar Desert in 1971. As I sat there during the demonstration, a 1,000 meters or so from where the bombs were dropping and machineguns and missiles were obliterating targets, I thought we had been lucky 39 years ago that the Indians, who were using napalm bombs indiscriminately, were not as precise and accurate in their targeting as our tremendous PAF pilots, nor a match for their flying skills in taking evasive action. We brought down a number of Indian aircraft by machinegun fire near Umerkot and Chhor.
Dramatically changing the negative concept of airpower in COIN operations, the PAF has responded magnificently to the army's requirement. Improvisation being the mother of invention, necessity force-multiplied the PAF's effort to develop a "counterterrorist doctrine" where none existed. Extensive training of combat crews for undertaking COIN operations was the main thrust of the PAF's exercise "Saffron Bandit" 2009-10. Joint intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) day and night included: (1) mapping of entire battle areas for COIN operations; (2) accurate imagery and target information from all areas of Swat, South Waziristan and other Agencies of FATA; (3) unarmed aerial vehicle (UAV) operations; and (4) Indigenous modification of the C-130 aircraft for undertaking day/night ISR.
This enhanced cooperation has resulted in gradual reduction in reaction time between requests for air support and fighter time over targets, as well as precise shaping of the battlefield by PAF fighter aircraft prior to the army's ground operations. Because of the extensive aerial mapping and real-time coordination, the PAF could further develop special rules of engagement for aircrew engaging targets to minimise chances of collateral damage. The PAF's Special Services Wing (SSW) worked alongside the army's Special Services Group (SSG) to ensure close air-ground liaison at the battlefield. The increased cooperation has also resulted in time-sensitive targeting (TST) and day/night real time ISR for ground troop movement. From the formation commanders down to the platoon level, all got precise information of the topography. They were flown in PAF aircraft before impending operations to work out their approach to battle, and then during the engagement itself with the militants to adjust their tactics. Thus, real-time accurate four-dimensional battlefield surveillance speeded up operations and reduced casualties
Providing combat support operations by C-130s, the PAF high command extensively educated its rank and file so that the "what and why" of the entire operations against the militants is well understood. Taking lessons from the operations already conducted, large segments of the ongoing PAF Exercise "High Mark-2010" has been dedicated to further enhancing the PAF's counterterrorist operations training levels.
The accurate mapping of the entire battlefield ensured precise aerial bombardment. Experts at photo reconnaissance were able to work out changes in the urban structures where the militants had made concealed strongpoints. This also facilitated precision attacks by Army Aviation's helicopter gunships and by well directed artillery fire. Uncovering their hideouts and targeting by the PAF of these strongpoints considerably reduced army casualties and inflicted damage on the militants with precision. This becomes invaluable in avoidance of civilian casualties. The resulting speeding up of military operations was a vital ingredient in the safe return of IDPs. By targeting the militants' strongpoints in the helicopter landing areas in Peochar Valley prior to SSG operations in more than two days before the operations, the PAF prevented the army's helicopters (and SSG personnel) from becoming sitting ducks for the well-dug-in terrorists.
The magnificent PAF response to the army's requirements for COIN operations is largely due to the personal chemistry between the army and PAF chiefs and their ready willingness to meet the challenge without being hamstrung by egos and normal inter-service rivalry and/or jealousy that bedevils such vital coordination. Among allied initiatives, the PAF has already refigured its deployment in sync with the army's plans to contend with the threat of India's Pakistan-specific "cold start" strategy. Enhanced battle effectiveness of the armed forces cannot depend upon the personal chemistry between the two chiefs alone. What happens if their respective successors don't like each other? Inter-services cooperation should be institutionalised. That effectiveness being force-multiplied for possible future wars should have been the raison d'etre for the existence of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs Committee (JCSC). Except for touring abroad for the 30 months since he became chairman of the JCSC, can anyone please tell me what else does four-star Tariq Majid do for a living? One must build on the momentum established and translate theory into reality by converting the white elephant JCSC from the lip-service showpiece of no consequence it is today into an effective instrument of war.
The writer is a defence and political analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder9.com
Airpower in COIN operations
