Afghanistan: Taliban guerrila tactics

[Marwat Khan Lodhi]

(a 2009 article)

International forces have been fighting the Taliban on and off for almost a decade since the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001.

Throughout that time, Afghan fighters have stuck doggedly to the same guiding principles of guerrilla warfare honed by the Mujahideen, the forerunners of the Taliban who fought the Soviet army to a standstill in the late 1980s.

Speed, surprise, mobility and flexibility are integral factors in such 'asymmetric' campaigns; where a smaller, irregular force faces a far larger, better-armed one.

History has shown that a smaller, local force will often fare better.

Favoured guerrilla methods include ambush, sabotage, roadside bombings and assassination.

Taliban manpower remains difficult to estimate, especially given the shifting and complicated network of tribal allegiances stretching across the porous border region with Pakistan.

Leading defence analyst Colonel Christopher Langton from the International Institute for Strategic Studies told BBC News:

"On a basic tactical level, nothing has changed.

"Some new technologies have been deployed, and the recent discovery of anti-aircraft guns has caused some nervousness because of the possible threat to helicopters.

"In Helmand, the Taliban have had time to develop detailed defensive networks with excellent lines of communication, which is why we're seeing IEDs [Improvised Explosive Device] appearing on roads which had been previously declared clear.

"But they're doing very much what the mujahideen did in terms of defence. It's raw instinctive local knowledge against forces of much greater number and firepower.

Mastiff armored vehicle destroyed by IED

MOBILITY

Mobility is a major factor in guerrilla warfare and Taliban fighters often operate as a 'pick-up truck cavalry' force in adapted four-wheel drive vehicles such as the Toyota Hi-Lux.

Nicknamed 'Ahu' (the deer), these trucks are renowned for their sturdy design and reliability, and offer good manoeuvrability across harsh terrain.

They can carry about a dozen guerrillas armed with heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, who fight either from the back of the moving truck, or dismount and adopt ground positions.

Colonel Langton told the BBC: "The Toyota is not just a mainstay, they exist in large quantities across the country. They're a vehicle of convenience - they don't have to ride horses, camels or walk. And they go anywhere."

Such a force can be quickly mustered into a surprise attack and equally quickly dispersed afterwards.

In isolation, Taliban vehicles often display no outward sign of their military purpose allowing them to blend into everyday scenery in towns and villages.

Motorbikes and push-bikes are also favoured as relatively quick, cheap and easy means of travelling distances over rough ground.

In contrast, international forces have turned to a series of increasingly heavyweight armoured vehicles to protect against the rising threat of Improvised Explosive Devices.

Mastiff II
Defences: Heavy armour and V-shaped hull to protect against roadside bombs and mines
Strengths: State-of-the-art, heavily armed, armoured patrol vehicle designed to carry 8 soldiers and 2 crew.
Weaknesses: Expensive, requires dedicated maintenance.
Cost: Approximately £1.2 million per vehicle.

Toyota Hi Lux
Defences: Some carry RPG launchers, heavy machine guns.
Strengths: Hard-wearing, fast, reliable off-road transport for up to 10 Taliban fighters.
Weaknesses: No armour, variable levels of mechanical support
Cost: Approximately $10,000 in local terms



MANPOWER

Fighting units of Taliban consist mainly of Afghans, though numbers of Arab and Uzbek fighters are also be involved. Groups of fighters are usually organised along local/tribal lines and led by a senior, experienced commander.

Taliban units are sometimes merged to form bigger contingents for more large-scale operations.

Afghan fighters are renowned for their tenacity and ability to fight in high-temperatures and often at high-altitude.

Colonel Langton said: "If they have a weakness, it's that they're a very much traditional organisation and by looking at their fighting and cultural traditions, you can see some things that are predictable.

"They're not easy to combat though because their low-level fighting skills are highly developed."

British soldier
Main weapons: Standard issue SA-80 rifle, L1A1 12.7 mm Heavy Machine gun, 81mm Mortar
Strengths: Highly-trained, well-supported professional soldier with modern equipment. Air support available
Weaknesses: May struggle to adapt to fighting in the harsh Afghan environment. Lacks intimate knowledge of local landscape, may face hostility and distrust from civilian


Taliban fighter
Main weapons: Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifle, Rocket-Propelled Grenades
Strengths: Tenacious, well-supplied guerrilla force highly adapted to local climate and geography. Can blend in with local population when required
Weaknesses: Vulnerable to air attack. Few heavy weapons. Factional nature can mean shifting loyalties. Poor weapons-handling skills



KEY WEAPON

The weapons used by the opposing forces in Afghanistan are the products of two very different eras.

The SA80, mainstay of British forces for around 20 years, has been dogged by problems involving its design and reliability but reports of battlefield problems have diminished since a multi-million pound re-fit.

By contrast the AK-47 has been in service in one form or another since the 1950s and, although the weapon of choice in many standing armies, has become a symbol of guerrilla struggle thanks to its reputation for ruggedness and simplicity of use.

SA80
Developed: 1970s/ 1980s
Calibre: 5.56mm
Magazine capacity: 30
Loaded weight: 5kg (11lbs)
Range: 500m (1,641ft)


AK-47
First made: 1947
Calibre: 7.62mm
Magazine capacity: 30
Loaded weight: 3.6kg (7.9lbs)
Range: 300m (984ft)

BBC NEWS | South Asia | Afghanistan: Taliban tactics

 

[M.harris]

Interesting I like the comparison part.

 

[Marwat Khan Lodhi]

The Taliban's Internet Strategy (a 2011 article)

The Taliban once banned photography, movies, and use of the Internet on the grounds that they were all "un-Islamic." Now, however, the terrorist group's perspective has radically changed.

Throughout the duration of their government (1996-2001), which was toppled after the 9/11 attacks, social media did not exist.

There was not even a mobile-phone service. Nonetheless, over the past decade, the Taliban has dramatically groomed its public-relations skills.

It possesses several Internet domains, which host official content and have backup domains in case of an attack on the main website. Taliban members also use e-mail on a daily basis to communicate with journalists.

Despite persistently launching attacks on officials and killing civilians, the Taliban has yet to have a decisive military success. However, it has been trying hard to compensate for its military losses with effective propaganda warfare. The militant group cannot deny the potential of such media as tools of propaganda and recruitment.

Aiming At The Heart Not The Body

"Wars today cannot be won without media," said Abdul Sattar Maiwandi, the web editor of a Taliban website, about the importance of media in the battlefield during an interview for Al-Emarah, the Taliban's official website.

"Media aim at the heart rather than the body, [and] if the heart is defeated, the battle is won," he added, sounding just like an experienced public-relations professional.

The Taliban has even established an official "media committee" to oversee the effort, according to Maiwandi. He said a professional production studio called Al-Shahamat had been set up to produce videos.

From there, the films are distributed on Taliban websites, passed from mobile phone to mobile phone, and reach broader audiences through other outlets, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.

The Taliban has numerous accounts on Twitter, but the most active is @alemarahweb. This is the official Taliban account, which also has a link to its official website.

It is apparently run by someone with the name Mustafa Ahmadi, @alemarahweb, who initially started tweeting in Pashto and began using English last year.

The latest tweet posted from the account while this commentary was being written had the following wording: "5 puppets killed in Awba district: HERAT, Sep. 06 - At 10:00 pm last night...."

This was linked to a short article on the Taliban's website, which is named after the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan."


A Dissemination Tool

As of the morning on which this article was being prepared, 5,487 people were following the account -- and that number was quickly rising. There were also nearly 1,700 tweets.

The account follows four other Twitter feeds; including @alsomood, which is another Taliban Twitter account focusing on Arabic tweets.

It does not interact with its followers and is mainly used as one-way dissemination tool.

Ahmadi, who seems to be the Islamist group's social-media expert, has a Facebook account where he provides links to videos of suicide bombings and guerilla attacks on Afghan and coalition forces.

His Twitter account, @alemarahweb, is linked to his Facebook account and therefore regularly updates more than 450 friends and the public.

His Facebook settings seem to be public so that anyone, even those who are not members of Facebook, can see his activities.

Mustafa Ahmadi is also the administrator of a fan page for Mullah Mohammad Omar Mujahid, the Taliban's supreme leader. As of September 6, 196 people "liked" him.

In addition to helping it reach foreign financers and sympathizers (whom it can incite all over the world to carry out terror attacks), social-media networks also serve as the Taliban's communication centers.

The insurgents may not be able to contact each other directly, so these websites can be used to communicate with followers and sister groups in other corners of the world, and vice versa.

Although the Taliban has numerous blogs and websites, two of their official websites, Al-Emarah.net and Shahamat.info (mostly videos), are their main official tools of propaganda.

Primary Target Group Is Foreigners

Along with pictures and videos, they provide text materials in Arabic, Pashto, Dari, Persian, Urdu, and English.

As not many people have access to the Internet in Afghanistan, the primary target group is foreigners.

The Taliban reaches Afghans through pamphlets, brochures, mobile radio, audio and video CDs, magazines, and religious sympathizers.

Just like all propaganda information coming from the Taliban, their tweets and Facebook status reports are full of exaggeration.

The insurgency is gaining support not only among the Afghan people but sympathizers abroad.

The Brussels-based International Crisis Group pointed out in a 2008 report that "using the full range of media, [the Taliban] is successfully tapping into strains of Afghan nationalism and exploiting policy failures by the Kabul government and its international backers."

To some extent, the Taliban has been successful in portraying President Hamid Karzai's government as one run by corrupt, former warlords who care little for their people, and showing that it has little reach outside the capital.


Propaganda At A Miniscule Cost

The Taliban benefits from spreading these stories, at miniscule cost compared to the billions of dollars spent by the United States and its allies on development projects.

Some analysts believe the Afghan government and the international community have deliberately allowed the Taliban to communicate freely because they want to gather intelligence about the group. Even if this notion were true, the United States and its Western allies should not risk their reputation among Afghans.

When speech incites violence and murder it must be stopped. At the same time, Afghan officials need to communicate more freely: they must reach out to the media in an open and timely manner.

If there is a terrorist incident or assassination attempt, the authorities should be the first to issue a press release, not the Taliban.

Usually, the media becomes aware of attacks via the Taliban and not through Afghan or NATO officials.

Through its Twitter account, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force mostly tweets about the training of Afghan police, or soldiers distributing candies and pencils among Afghan children.

They rarely address their own casualties and when they do it's often too late. This gives an opportunity for insurgents to step up, fill in the blanks, and reach the public first with their side of the story.

I recently asked an official at Afghanistan's Ministry of Information and Technology why this was so. "It is up to people how to use the means of communication," he answered. "Everybody can share his heart's secret or anything he wants. It does not come under any law."

Neither Afghan officials nor U.S.-led coalition forces seem to be interested in blocking the Taliban's incitement to murder and dissemination of hate across the web.

While freedom of speech is obviously a democratic value for which the West is fighting in Afghanistan, attacking Taliban propaganda head-on should be just another front in a multipronged war.

The Taliban's Internet Strategy

 

[420canada]

hmp.... when your in a valley or open field or hills that is when they strike.

 

[Rana4pak]

Once a coward always a coward these mother ****** always fight 4rm behind sometime dress in burka some time tie a bomb some random person if he didnot push the button than they did it,,,,,always crying why every one come n fcuk them shameless traitor have no gharat always crying infront of arabs, russian,,irains, ,,amercian, ,pakistan etc

 

[Marwat Khan Lodhi]

Forecasting Taliban Strategy: 2012-2014 August 2, 2012

As the U.S. begins to wind down its military operations in Afghanistan, the Taliban is likely to adopt a multi-pronged strategy for 2012–2014 to ensure its continued survival and future relevance. While the Taliban ideally aims to pressure the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) into a rapid and complete departure, overthrow the Karzai government, and reinstall itself as the dominant actor in the country, most high-ranking officials within the organization likely hold more pragmatic short-term objectives. In the 2012–2014 period, during which ISAF will remove the vast majority of its troops and shift its focus from combat missions to training Afghan personnel, the Taliban will likely concentrate on minimizing risks to its core operational capabilities and disrupting the ISAF withdrawal. By complicating NATO plans for a smooth transition to Afghan government control of the entire country, the Taliban likely seeks to compete with the Karzai regime in the post-2014 era as the strongest domestic power and maintain dominance within its traditional strongholds in southern and eastern Afghanistan.

Expect persistent Taliban attacks in Kabul and other major urban centers against high-profile Afghan and international targets in the next two-year period. The Taliban has a history of such operations, most recently carrying out the April 2012 attacks against foreign embassies, ISAF installations, Afghan government and security buildings, hotels, and other targets. While Afghan security forces have demonstrated increased effectiveness in responding to and minimizing damage from such attacks, the Taliban will likely continue to carry out operations against prominent targets in a bid to demonstrate the weakness of the Afghan government, erode Karzai’s public support, and combat ISAF security objectives.

Despite the Taliban’s frequent assaults in Kabul, the organization has largely shied away from engaging ISAF forces in major armed hostilities, instead employing insurgent-style tactics. Facing a more capable adversary and attempting to preserve its manpower, the Taliban will likely continue to avoid large-scale military confrontations, which are extremely costly in terms of personnel and materiel. Instead, Taliban militants prefer to allow ISAF and its Afghan allies to take territory, then disrupt their presence through suicide attacks, roadside bombings, surprise raids, and improvised explosive devices.

Close tactical coordination with the Haqqani network is also an important component of Taliban strategy. Based in Pakistan along the Afghan border, the Haqqani network is a well-financed and trained militant organization supporting the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, and played a crucial role in the September 2011 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. The Haqqani network conducts extensive smuggling operations across the Afghan-Pakistani border and has helped facilitate and execute Taliban attacks. Despite this alliance, the group maintains its own command and control structure and is believed to be more motivated by a desire for future influence in eastern Afghanistan, particularly within Khost province, rather than an ideological agenda.

The Taliban will also likely continue its propaganda effort through a variety of print, online, and telecommunications media to undermine the legitimacy of the Afghan government and its ISAF partners. This initiative aims to denounce the international presence in Afghanistan as an occupying, anti-Islamic force and the Karzai government as its puppet. Recently, the Taliban has highlighted the January 2012 video of U.S. troops urinating on dead Taliban fighters, the February 2012 Quran burnings, and the March 2012 alleged killings of Afghan civilians by U.S. soldier Robert Bales as prime examples of U.S. hostility and nefarious objectives in its efforts to gain further support among the Afghan populace.

Green-on-blue attacks, in which Afghan security force members attack ISAF personnel, are the final component of Taliban strategy. As of February 1, 2012, ISAF documented 42 green-on-blue attacks since May 2007, resulting in 70 coalition member deaths. While many of these attacks are driven by personal motives, some are executed through Taliban co-option and infiltration. These incidents further erode the credibility of the Afghan security forces and strengthen the narrative of the Taliban’s power.

Several factors will impact Taliban strategy in the next two years. Factional differences within the organization, particularly over whether and how to pursue a political agreement with the Afghan government and the U.S., will likely become more apparent. Substantial progress toward a comprehensive reconciliation deal, which thus far has been minimal, would likely drastically alter Taliban strategy by moving the group away from militancy. Within this context, U.S.–Pakistani relations and Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan are key drivers of future Taliban decision-making. The effectiveness and professionalism of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police are also important variables in limiting the Taliban insurgency and its ability to carry out high-profile attacks. Finally, the size and scope of future ISAF and international commitments to provide military and economic assistance to the Afghan government will factor into the Taliban’s strategic approach.

Forecasting Taliban Strategy: 2012-2014

 

[Wright]

I think conventional armies are obsolete concepts - the future of warfare is geurella war.

 

[Marwat Khan Lodhi]

How Taliban's lethal IEDs keep troops guessing in Afghanistan

Scroll through the list of Britain's dead in Afghanistan and time after time the cause of death is low-tech bombs made with fertiliser and a little know-how.

About 70% of Nato casualties have been due to improvised explosive devices and last year there were a record number of makeshift IEDs .

In the regional command of which Helmand is part, the number of IEDs jumped 13% between 2010 and 2011, despite attempts to smash the networks of insurgents manufacturing, distributing and planting the bombs.

That probably reflects the effect of the US "surge" of troops into the province in 2010, which pushed the Taliban onto the back foot and forced them to rely ever more on the deadly weapons.

"It's a great device to use against a conventional force," said Doug Czarnecki, deputy commander of Task Force Paladin, which counters the IED threat. "The insurgent can't fight that with conventional which means they have got to find something to attack."

Insurgents have been able to get hold of fertiliser without difficulty, turn it into bombs and move across the very porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The US is trying to find ways to alter chemical fertilisers made in Pakistan so they are harder to turn into explosives. In Helmand, where most British troops are based, a higher than average number of IEDs are detonated by the weight of the victim who unwittingly stands on them.

Not only has there been a remorseless rise in the number of devices pouring out of backroom bomb factories, the insurgents have become ever more adept at making them more lethal.

"When we come up with measures to defeat their tactics, they change them," said Czarnecki. "When we introduce new counter-measures they change again."

When extra armour was added to vehicles the insurgents responded with bigger bombs. Then, when radio jamming equipment was introduced to foil remote control detonation, the rebels increased their use of command wires.

But the development that makes the bombs so difficult to counteract is the emergence of IEDs containing only tiny quantities of metal. They now tend to have no metal shrapnel, relying instead on damage caused by rocks surrounding the explosive hurtling into the body of the person who sets off the bomb. Metal triggers have also been abandoned. That means traditional metal detectors used to find buried bombs are largely useless.

Troops have responded with what officials call "better tactics and training". British troops arriving in Helmand will spend at least two weeks training at Camp Bastion before being sent out to the forward operating bases (FoBs). At Bastion there is a purpose-built training area that should help them identify in different types of terrain whether an IED has been planted . It will be drilled into them that little things really count – telltale clues of where to look, and what to look out for.

Better still, the troops will be told they need to build relationships with villagers, who may know where IEDs are hidden.

In recent months, within the three districts where the British are operating, commanders have come to rely upon this type of intelligence. If the villagers aren't talking to you, watch which routes they are using – and which ones they are avoiding too.

The constant need for vigilance makes the work of patrolling the villages of southern Afghanistan incredibly arduous, but it seems to be paying off. Despite the increasing number of IEDs, the number of casualties caused by the bombs in the military region that includes Helmand declined by 20% between 2010 and 2011, officials said.

Another factor has been the speed and quality of treatment given to troops wounded in IED blasts.

The medical emergency response teams that fly from Camp Bastion have saved countless lives, not least because they take consultants out with them in adapted Chinook helicopters.

Specialist treatment begins as soon as the helicopter lands, not when the patient gets back to the operating theatre.

Many British troops badly injured in Afghanistan choose to have amputations even when their limbs can be saved, because recovery can be quicker and less painful.

Some soldiers who have lost their legs can be running within six weeks, while those with supposedly less severe wounds can need multiple operations over months before any improvement.

An estimated 300 troops have had amputations in the past decade, and 3,000 more need help with serious long-term injuries.
How Taliban's lethal IEDs keep troops guessing in Afghanistan | UK news | guardian.co.uk

 

[Gandhi G in da house]

I think conventional armies are obsolete concepts - the future of warfare is geurella war.

Drones are the future.

 

[RescueRanger]

Drones are the future.

100% on that!

 

[Zarvan]

by least means they have brought a super power and it 26 allies off NATO on their needs because Taliban have determination and motivation to stand for Islam and their cause which USA and NATO lack

 

[Asian.Century]

The Taliban's killer tactics
As ISAF troops prepare to leave Afghanistan next year, a new UN report blames insurgents for a sharp rise in civilian deaths. Experts say the Taliban are employing increasingly bold and deadly tactics.


"We were out on patrol in the volatile province of Baghlan, when we suddenly heard gunfire coming from an adjoining street. We hit the ground, as we had learned in training, but it didn't take long for us to return fire. The assault ended just as suddenly as it had started. However, the insurgents had mingled with passers-by, making it impossible for us to distinguish them from the civilians."

The accounts of German Lieutenant Christian B., who has served in Afghanistan as part of the ISAF mission, provide insight into one of the Taliban's preferred guerrilla-style tactics: the ambush. Experts believe the adaptability of their combat is what makes the militants so dangerous."Their strategies have become increasingly brutal and sophisticated," says Rolf Tophoven, director of the German-based Institute for Terrorism Research & Security Policy.

And their attacks have also turned deadlier, as the Taliban are increasingly targeting civilians in a bid to regain the control over territory from the departing US-led coalition forces. According to a recent UN report, Afghanistan's civilian casualty toll in the first six months of 2013 jumped by 23 percent, compared to the same period last year.

The report stated that the insurgency was to blame for 74 percent of all civilian casualties. Most of the casualties are said to have been caused by so-called improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Experts say the homemade bombs have also become one the Taliban's main weapons when fighting international and Afghan government forces.

Different factions

However, the Taliban, which in Arabic means students (of Islam), are not a homogeneous fighting group. Marvin Weinbaum, an Afghanistan expert at the Washington-based Middle East Institute explains they are mainly a network of local insurgencies operating in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, using the Taliban "brand."


The Taliban consist of several factions in Afghanistan and Pakistan

They constitute a generally diverse force of fighters who mount operations across most of Afghanistan, Weinbaum explained. They are "mainly concentrated in the eastern and southern provinces" but "fighters also cross from safe havens in Pakistan."

When the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001, the Afghan Taliban was ousted from power. Some of them stayed put and some went to Pakistan, creating the Quetta Shura, which operates under Mullah Omar. Other groups of the Pakistani Taliban emerged and are now loosely organized under the structure of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Weinbaum pointed out that, although they share similar religious doctrines, there are important distinctions between the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban. The expert explained that, at least for the time being, their political missions are separate, one aiming to overthrow the Kabul regime, the other to impose Sharia-driven ideology on the Pakistani state. "While the Pakistani Taliban do contribute to the Afghan insurgency, the Afghan Taliban refrain from attacking the Pakistani state."

The Taliban do not operate under a command structure similar to that of nation's army. "The evidence points to an insurgency lacking tight organizational control. Most operations occur independently, planned and executed by local commanders," Weinbaum added. The closest any of the insurgent groups come to a coherent fighting force is believed to be the largely autonomous Haqqani Network in North Waziristan. The group, led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, is responsible for many of the high profile attacks in Kabul and elsewhere.

Readjusting tactics

The Taliban have been readjusting their combat tactics. "The targets are military and police installations and softer targets" says Weinbaum. The attacks are designed to cripple or co-opt local authority structures and intimidate villagers. For instance, the extremists rarely mount conventional assaults on heavily defended positions anymore. Instead, they increasingly rely on sniper fire, suicide bombers and roadside bombs.


The Taliban recently launched a massive attack in Pakistan to free 250 of their comrades from prison

And they are becoming bolder. Just hours before Pakistani lawmakers began voting to elect a new president on July 30th, the Taliban launched a massive attack on a prison in the northwestern town of Dera Ismail Khan. Up to 40 gunmen dressed in police uniforms bombed the outside wall of the jail and opened fire on the security guards, managing to free at least 250 of their comrades, including some who had been considered to be dangerous terrorists.

Experts believe that a key aspect of how the Taliban wage war is their ability to study their opponents. Tophoven points out this has been true for both past and present military campaigns: "They have access to Soviet-era and US military manuals that help them understand the enemy," Tophoven explained. They are also believed to rely on a vast network of local informants to keep a close watch on the movements of foreign troops.

Experienced fighters

But while the Taliban's knowledge about foreign forces may come in part from manuals, their fighting skills and experience come from decades of warfare. "In many areas of Afghanistan, being surrounded by violence is a major part of growing up. Many people belonging to Taliban groups learned to fight and use their weapons at a very young age, says Michael Kugelman, a South Asia expert at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The predominantly Pashtun movement emerged in the early 1990s after the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan.

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After defeating the Northern Alliance in a bloody civil war, the Taliban rose to power in Afghanistan in 1996, creating an austere regime that, among other things, forced women to wear fully concealing burkas and banned television, music, dance and photography.

But the government was toppled by a US-led military coalition after the Taliban's refusal to take action against Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network, believed to be behind the attacks on the US on September 11, 2001. However, the US-led intervention and subsequent regime change also paved the way for the militants' relentless campaigns which have lasted to this day.

'Local support is crucial'

Although they are supported by foreign fighters from Uzbekistan and Chechnya, most Taliban fighters are believed to be recruited from the madrassas (religious schools) and refugee camps dotting the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

Taliban raids are not confined to attacks on foreign fighters. The group has launched attacks against anyone or anything not sharing its views. These include government offices, mosques, hospitals and schools, Kugelman pointed out. A prominent example is the case of Malala Yousafzai, a Pakistani teenager shot by the Taliban for promoting education for girls.

Despite the brutality of the attacks, the Taliban also seek to win hearts and minds and have had considerable success in recruiting fighters through financial incentives. Most of the sources of financial support within Afghanistan are believed to come from taxing drug trafficking, payoffs from foreign forces for protection of assets, and smuggling goods.


Local support plays a key role in the Taliban's strategy

The movement has remained resilient in the region, rendering vast parts of Afghanistan insecure and often operating under parallel governance structures.

Weinbaum believes local support, which is also gained by intimidation and physical force, has become crucial to the Taliban's strategy, in particular because the Kabul government is not perceived as legitimate by many locals.

Pakistani support

Another reason for Taliban's resilience lies in the support they reportedly get from neighboring Pakistan. "Just as before the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban continue to receive training, funding, munitions and supplies from the Pakistani Intelligence Agency, ISI," Tophoven told DW.

This view is shared by many analysts, including Matt Waldman, from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. In a discussion paper titled "Sun in the Sky" Waldman writes: "Directly or indirectly the ISI appears to exert significant influence on the strategic decision-making and field operations of the Taliban; and has even greater sway over Haqqani insurgents." The Pakistani government has repeatedly denied the allegations.

Awaiting the withdrawal

Furthermore, Waldman accuses the ISI of having operated training camps for Taliban recruits, and "facilitating the supply of funds, equipment and arms from Gulf countries." Analysts explain the Taliban play a key role in Pakistan's efforts to maintain a political influence in Afghanistan and counter India's increasing clout in the war-torn country.


ISAF troops are set to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014

Despite plans to hold peace talks, distrust between the Taliban and the Afghan government remains high. "The Taliban feel they have plenty of time, and expect they will be able to mount larger scale operations once most foreign troops have departed", says Weinbaum, adding that the extremists are also counting on the Karzai government to lose credibility in the coming years and for its security forces to begin to fracture along ethnic and regional lines.

The Taliban′s killer tactics | Asia | DW.COM | 08.08.2013

 

[django]

The Taliban's killer tactics
As ISAF troops prepare to leave Afghanistan next year, a new UN report blames insurgents for a sharp rise in civilian deaths. Experts say the Taliban are employing increasingly bold and deadly tactics.


"We were out on patrol in the volatile province of Baghlan, when we suddenly heard gunfire coming from an adjoining street. We hit the ground, as we had learned in training, but it didn't take long for us to return fire. The assault ended just as suddenly as it had started. However, the insurgents had mingled with passers-by, making it impossible for us to distinguish them from the civilians."

The accounts of German Lieutenant Christian B., who has served in Afghanistan as part of the ISAF mission, provide insight into one of the Taliban's preferred guerrilla-style tactics: the ambush. Experts believe the adaptability of their combat is what makes the militants so dangerous."Their strategies have become increasingly brutal and sophisticated," says Rolf Tophoven, director of the German-based Institute for Terrorism Research & Security Policy.

And their attacks have also turned deadlier, as the Taliban are increasingly targeting civilians in a bid to regain the control over territory from the departing US-led coalition forces. According to a recent UN report, Afghanistan's civilian casualty toll in the first six months of 2013 jumped by 23 percent, compared to the same period last year.

The report stated that the insurgency was to blame for 74 percent of all civilian casualties. Most of the casualties are said to have been caused by so-called improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Experts say the homemade bombs have also become one the Taliban's main weapons when fighting international and Afghan government forces.

Different factions

However, the Taliban, which in Arabic means students (of Islam), are not a homogeneous fighting group. Marvin Weinbaum, an Afghanistan expert at the Washington-based Middle East Institute explains they are mainly a network of local insurgencies operating in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, using the Taliban "brand."


The Taliban consist of several factions in Afghanistan and Pakistan

They constitute a generally diverse force of fighters who mount operations across most of Afghanistan, Weinbaum explained. They are "mainly concentrated in the eastern and southern provinces" but "fighters also cross from safe havens in Pakistan."

When the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001, the Afghan Taliban was ousted from power. Some of them stayed put and some went to Pakistan, creating the Quetta Shura, which operates under Mullah Omar. Other groups of the Pakistani Taliban emerged and are now loosely organized under the structure of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Weinbaum pointed out that, although they share similar religious doctrines, there are important distinctions between the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban. The expert explained that, at least for the time being, their political missions are separate, one aiming to overthrow the Kabul regime, the other to impose Sharia-driven ideology on the Pakistani state. "While the Pakistani Taliban do contribute to the Afghan insurgency, the Afghan Taliban refrain from attacking the Pakistani state."

The Taliban do not operate under a command structure similar to that of nation's army. "The evidence points to an insurgency lacking tight organizational control. Most operations occur independently, planned and executed by local commanders," Weinbaum added. The closest any of the insurgent groups come to a coherent fighting force is believed to be the largely autonomous Haqqani Network in North Waziristan. The group, led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, is responsible for many of the high profile attacks in Kabul and elsewhere.

Readjusting tactics

The Taliban have been readjusting their combat tactics. "The targets are military and police installations and softer targets" says Weinbaum. The attacks are designed to cripple or co-opt local authority structures and intimidate villagers. For instance, the extremists rarely mount conventional assaults on heavily defended positions anymore. Instead, they increasingly rely on sniper fire, suicide bombers and roadside bombs.


The Taliban recently launched a massive attack in Pakistan to free 250 of their comrades from prison

And they are becoming bolder. Just hours before Pakistani lawmakers began voting to elect a new president on July 30th, the Taliban launched a massive attack on a prison in the northwestern town of Dera Ismail Khan. Up to 40 gunmen dressed in police uniforms bombed the outside wall of the jail and opened fire on the security guards, managing to free at least 250 of their comrades, including some who had been considered to be dangerous terrorists.

Experts believe that a key aspect of how the Taliban wage war is their ability to study their opponents. Tophoven points out this has been true for both past and present military campaigns: "They have access to Soviet-era and US military manuals that help them understand the enemy," Tophoven explained. They are also believed to rely on a vast network of local informants to keep a close watch on the movements of foreign troops.

Experienced fighters

But while the Taliban's knowledge about foreign forces may come in part from manuals, their fighting skills and experience come from decades of warfare. "In many areas of Afghanistan, being surrounded by violence is a major part of growing up. Many people belonging to Taliban groups learned to fight and use their weapons at a very young age, says Michael Kugelman, a South Asia expert at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The predominantly Pashtun movement emerged in the early 1990s after the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan.

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After defeating the Northern Alliance in a bloody civil war, the Taliban rose to power in Afghanistan in 1996, creating an austere regime that, among other things, forced women to wear fully concealing burkas and banned television, music, dance and photography.

But the government was toppled by a US-led military coalition after the Taliban's refusal to take action against Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network, believed to be behind the attacks on the US on September 11, 2001. However, the US-led intervention and subsequent regime change also paved the way for the militants' relentless campaigns which have lasted to this day.

'Local support is crucial'

Although they are supported by foreign fighters from Uzbekistan and Chechnya, most Taliban fighters are believed to be recruited from the madrassas (religious schools) and refugee camps dotting the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

Taliban raids are not confined to attacks on foreign fighters. The group has launched attacks against anyone or anything not sharing its views. These include government offices, mosques, hospitals and schools, Kugelman pointed out. A prominent example is the case of Malala Yousafzai, a Pakistani teenager shot by the Taliban for promoting education for girls.

Despite the brutality of the attacks, the Taliban also seek to win hearts and minds and have had considerable success in recruiting fighters through financial incentives. Most of the sources of financial support within Afghanistan are believed to come from taxing drug trafficking, payoffs from foreign forces for protection of assets, and smuggling goods.


Local support plays a key role in the Taliban's strategy

The movement has remained resilient in the region, rendering vast parts of Afghanistan insecure and often operating under parallel governance structures.

Weinbaum believes local support, which is also gained by intimidation and physical force, has become crucial to the Taliban's strategy, in particular because the Kabul government is not perceived as legitimate by many locals.

Pakistani support

Another reason for Taliban's resilience lies in the support they reportedly get from neighboring Pakistan. "Just as before the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban continue to receive training, funding, munitions and supplies from the Pakistani Intelligence Agency, ISI," Tophoven told DW.

This view is shared by many analysts, including Matt Waldman, from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. In a discussion paper titled "Sun in the Sky" Waldman writes: "Directly or indirectly the ISI appears to exert significant influence on the strategic decision-making and field operations of the Taliban; and has even greater sway over Haqqani insurgents." The Pakistani government has repeatedly denied the allegations.

Awaiting the withdrawal

Furthermore, Waldman accuses the ISI of having operated training camps for Taliban recruits, and "facilitating the supply of funds, equipment and arms from Gulf countries." Analysts explain the Taliban play a key role in Pakistan's efforts to maintain a political influence in Afghanistan and counter India's increasing clout in the war-torn country.


ISAF troops are set to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014

Despite plans to hold peace talks, distrust between the Taliban and the Afghan government remains high. "The Taliban feel they have plenty of time, and expect they will be able to mount larger scale operations once most foreign troops have departed", says Weinbaum, adding that the extremists are also counting on the Karzai government to lose credibility in the coming years and for its security forces to begin to fracture along ethnic and regional lines.

The Taliban′s killer tactics | Asia | DW.COM | 08.08.2013

What type of rocket launcher/ bazooka/recoiless rifle is the talib using, and is it more effective than an rpg7, in terms of range and impact.

 

[bdslph]

comparison is good
but the future is different warfare