pakistani342
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Another excellent piece here by Anatol Lieven on The New York Review of Books.
excerpts below:
What on earth is Hamid Karzai up to? When I visited Afghanistan in October, most people with whom I spoke assumed that the Afghan president would resist signing a long-term military basing agreement with the United States until the Loya Jirga (grand national assembly) had approved it. At that point, having burnished his credentials as an Afghan nationalist, it was thought that he would sign, since the Loya Jirga would give him cover and since he must know that the entire future of his state and his own Pashtun ethnic group probably depends on it. But now that the Loya Jirga has approved the agreement, Karzai has instead announced he might not sign until after the presidential election in April—thereby putting at risk the willingness of the US and the West to remain engaged in Afghanistan at all.
...
The most important question about the election, touching on Afghanistan’s long-term survival as a country, concerns the Pashtuns, the powerful ethnic group to which Karzai belongs and from which the Taliban also draw most of their support. At about 45 percent of the population according to most estimates—most Pashtuns themselves believe they are in a large majority—the Pashtuns are the country’s largest ethnic group. But they must vie for power with Tajiks, who make up another 30 percent or so, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and other groups. Will the Pashtuns accept a non-Pashtun (or someone seen as non-Pashtun) as president? And if not, how much rigging will be necessary to ensure a Pashtun victory, and what will be necessary to reconcile the losers?
...
All in all, then, the election is not going to be a pretty sight; and Karzai may perhaps imagine that his signature on the basing agreement with the US could be decisive in getting the Obama administration to ignore the less savory aspects of the contest and accept the outcome that he desires.
...
In other words, the choice Afghanistan faces is not between some idealized version of Western democracy and a corrupt Afghan state; it is between a corrupt but more or less consensual Afghan state and the horrors of no state at all. Nor should it ever be forgotten that the US and the West bear much of the blame for what happened after 1992. Washington and its allies stuffed the Mujahedin parties with arms and money, helped to block any chance of a peace settlement between them and the Afghan government, and then lost any pretense of interest in what happened to Afghanistan the moment the Soviets withdrew.
...
excerpts below:
What on earth is Hamid Karzai up to? When I visited Afghanistan in October, most people with whom I spoke assumed that the Afghan president would resist signing a long-term military basing agreement with the United States until the Loya Jirga (grand national assembly) had approved it. At that point, having burnished his credentials as an Afghan nationalist, it was thought that he would sign, since the Loya Jirga would give him cover and since he must know that the entire future of his state and his own Pashtun ethnic group probably depends on it. But now that the Loya Jirga has approved the agreement, Karzai has instead announced he might not sign until after the presidential election in April—thereby putting at risk the willingness of the US and the West to remain engaged in Afghanistan at all.
...
The most important question about the election, touching on Afghanistan’s long-term survival as a country, concerns the Pashtuns, the powerful ethnic group to which Karzai belongs and from which the Taliban also draw most of their support. At about 45 percent of the population according to most estimates—most Pashtuns themselves believe they are in a large majority—the Pashtuns are the country’s largest ethnic group. But they must vie for power with Tajiks, who make up another 30 percent or so, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and other groups. Will the Pashtuns accept a non-Pashtun (or someone seen as non-Pashtun) as president? And if not, how much rigging will be necessary to ensure a Pashtun victory, and what will be necessary to reconcile the losers?
...
All in all, then, the election is not going to be a pretty sight; and Karzai may perhaps imagine that his signature on the basing agreement with the US could be decisive in getting the Obama administration to ignore the less savory aspects of the contest and accept the outcome that he desires.
...
In other words, the choice Afghanistan faces is not between some idealized version of Western democracy and a corrupt Afghan state; it is between a corrupt but more or less consensual Afghan state and the horrors of no state at all. Nor should it ever be forgotten that the US and the West bear much of the blame for what happened after 1992. Washington and its allies stuffed the Mujahedin parties with arms and money, helped to block any chance of a peace settlement between them and the Afghan government, and then lost any pretense of interest in what happened to Afghanistan the moment the Soviets withdrew.
...
