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Gradually, despite many hurdles, Indo-Iranian relations are acquiring a momentum largely on account of the USs ****** approach where the Indian role is being made out to be of a lesser strategic value, writes Saeed Naqvi
The Nuclear Security Summit in Washington from April 12 to 13 and the Nuclear Disarmament Conference in Tehran from April 15 to 16 had one thing in common: Israel attended neither meet. It did not attend Teheran because it believes Iran is busy manufacturing nuclear weapons to attack Israel. It did not attend the Washington conference because there were suggestions that some Arab countries would raise the Israeli nuclear arsenal and Israel would not know where to look.
New Delhi attended both the meetings. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh attended the Washington summit while Gaddam Dharmendra, a joint secretary in the external affairs ministry dealing with disarmament, attended the Teheran meeting.
Contrary to the popular impression, the conference hall in Teheran was not empty. Indonesia, Syria, Oman, Lebanon, Turkmenistan, Iraq and Uganda were represented by foreign ministers. Energy ministers of Armenia and Tajikistan took part. Deputy foreign ministers of Russia, Turkey, Emirates, China, Malaysia, Kyrgyzstan and Venezuela were present. As were the secretary general of the Islamic Conference (on this the Saudis wield considerable clout), representatives of the United Nations and the IAEA, chairman of the NPT review conference attended.
It cannot be described to have been a scantily attended conference, even though comparisons with the much more advertised show in Washington would not help one arrive at conclusions.
While on the one hand momentum is being built up to strengthen the sanctions regime against Iran at the UN, the number of sceptics on that score is not negligible.
Even on the eve of the NPT review conference, officers from the National Security Council have identified Teheran as a capital to visit for consultations. To imagine that these meeting are undiluted nuclear discourses would be fanciful because second and third track approaches to Teheran are proceeding.
Deputy national security adviser Alok Prasads visit to Teheran has the nuclear issue in its contents, but it can also be seen to be a precursor to foreign minister SM Krishnas forthcoming visit to Teheran.
Iranians are sensitive on protocol. They are still nursing the wound inflicted on them in Vienna. Moreover, visits by President Ahmadinejad, Chief Justice Hashemi Shahrudi (the job has since been taken over by Ayatullah Larjani) have not been reciprocated.
At Thimphu, foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki sought a meeting with Manmohan Singh but he could not be slotted into the prime ministers busy schedule. They were, however, able to exchange greetings at the kings banquet.
Gradually, despite many hurdles, Indo-Iranian relations are acquiring a momentum largely on account of the USs ****** approach where the Indian role is being made out to be of a lesser strategic value.
Recently, the US ambassador in New Delhi, Timothy Roemer, made a helpful statement. To allay Pakistani fears that in the guise of developmental works in Afghanistan, the Indians may, with Brahminical guile, be up to tricks inimical to Pakistans long-term interests in Afghanistan, Roemer suggested that Indians and Americans would take up developmental works jointly in Afghanistan. What are the implications of this coordination? As in soccer, every Indian in play will be marked allaying Pakistani fears of inimical activity behind their back!
The basic interests of the Pakistanis are transparent: They would like to have strategic depth in Afghanistan, a turf on which they have considerable experience since 1980.
Consolidation of this strategic depth entails a confirmation of a government in Kabul which is deferential to Islamabad. It rules out Karzai.
To facilitate this scenario a strategy of good and bad Taliban has been devised. The good Taliban, in this sequence, are people like Mullah Omar or those of the Taliban who are hard on Karzai and soft on al-Qaeda.
A bonus American action in Afghanistan and Iraq conferred on Iran was the defeat of the anti-Shia Taliban in Afghanistan and the removal of anti-Iran Saddam Hussein in Iraq. But the subsequent chaos that has spread far and wide is giving Riyadh nightmares. Not only a bloated Shia entity in Iraq abutting the oil-rich Saudi (also Shia) area of Dammam but also al-Qaeda in Yemen is a menace.
The spaces created by the two occupations became hatcheries for al-Qaeda, feeding on anti-Americanism the US rule had bred.
Separation of the al-Qaeda from the Taliban is easier said than done. True, al-Qaeda consists of non-Afghan, foreign jihadists from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Xinxiang, etc. But this lot made a beeline for Afghanistan since the 1980s, when the plot to expel the Soviets by Islamic fervour was first hatched. Over the years, oppression against Muslims in the host countries Chechnya and Uzbekistan, for instance caused an augmentation of the al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
But over the 30 years since the first al-Qaeda trudged his way into Afghanistan, the foreigners have got enmeshed by ties of marriage and blood. So, how does one separate al-Qaeda from the local population, say, Taliban? Further, how does one separate the good from the bad Taliban? Or, indeed, a Pushtoon from Taliban?
Strangely, Indias growing equation with Iran is not a source of anxiety to Riyadh, Irans rival in an overarching sense. In fact, al-Qaedas ultimate aim at one stage was to upturn the Saudi monarchy, and it is precisely these hard-line elements upon whom Pakistan hopes to structure its so called strategic depth.
It is early days yet. One should not begin to distance oneself from the torrid romance with the US simply because ****** has exposed the first chinks in what the citys town criers have been celebrating as the Indo-US strategic partnership cast in stone.
Meanwhile, remember one golden role: neither Afghanistan, nor Iraq or even Balochistan can be managed without Iranian support. Invite Zalmay Khalilzad on the lecture circuit to enlighten you on just this theme.
Editorial
The Nuclear Security Summit in Washington from April 12 to 13 and the Nuclear Disarmament Conference in Tehran from April 15 to 16 had one thing in common: Israel attended neither meet. It did not attend Teheran because it believes Iran is busy manufacturing nuclear weapons to attack Israel. It did not attend the Washington conference because there were suggestions that some Arab countries would raise the Israeli nuclear arsenal and Israel would not know where to look.
New Delhi attended both the meetings. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh attended the Washington summit while Gaddam Dharmendra, a joint secretary in the external affairs ministry dealing with disarmament, attended the Teheran meeting.
Contrary to the popular impression, the conference hall in Teheran was not empty. Indonesia, Syria, Oman, Lebanon, Turkmenistan, Iraq and Uganda were represented by foreign ministers. Energy ministers of Armenia and Tajikistan took part. Deputy foreign ministers of Russia, Turkey, Emirates, China, Malaysia, Kyrgyzstan and Venezuela were present. As were the secretary general of the Islamic Conference (on this the Saudis wield considerable clout), representatives of the United Nations and the IAEA, chairman of the NPT review conference attended.
It cannot be described to have been a scantily attended conference, even though comparisons with the much more advertised show in Washington would not help one arrive at conclusions.
While on the one hand momentum is being built up to strengthen the sanctions regime against Iran at the UN, the number of sceptics on that score is not negligible.
Even on the eve of the NPT review conference, officers from the National Security Council have identified Teheran as a capital to visit for consultations. To imagine that these meeting are undiluted nuclear discourses would be fanciful because second and third track approaches to Teheran are proceeding.
Deputy national security adviser Alok Prasads visit to Teheran has the nuclear issue in its contents, but it can also be seen to be a precursor to foreign minister SM Krishnas forthcoming visit to Teheran.
Iranians are sensitive on protocol. They are still nursing the wound inflicted on them in Vienna. Moreover, visits by President Ahmadinejad, Chief Justice Hashemi Shahrudi (the job has since been taken over by Ayatullah Larjani) have not been reciprocated.
At Thimphu, foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki sought a meeting with Manmohan Singh but he could not be slotted into the prime ministers busy schedule. They were, however, able to exchange greetings at the kings banquet.
Gradually, despite many hurdles, Indo-Iranian relations are acquiring a momentum largely on account of the USs ****** approach where the Indian role is being made out to be of a lesser strategic value.
Recently, the US ambassador in New Delhi, Timothy Roemer, made a helpful statement. To allay Pakistani fears that in the guise of developmental works in Afghanistan, the Indians may, with Brahminical guile, be up to tricks inimical to Pakistans long-term interests in Afghanistan, Roemer suggested that Indians and Americans would take up developmental works jointly in Afghanistan. What are the implications of this coordination? As in soccer, every Indian in play will be marked allaying Pakistani fears of inimical activity behind their back!
The basic interests of the Pakistanis are transparent: They would like to have strategic depth in Afghanistan, a turf on which they have considerable experience since 1980.
Consolidation of this strategic depth entails a confirmation of a government in Kabul which is deferential to Islamabad. It rules out Karzai.
To facilitate this scenario a strategy of good and bad Taliban has been devised. The good Taliban, in this sequence, are people like Mullah Omar or those of the Taliban who are hard on Karzai and soft on al-Qaeda.
A bonus American action in Afghanistan and Iraq conferred on Iran was the defeat of the anti-Shia Taliban in Afghanistan and the removal of anti-Iran Saddam Hussein in Iraq. But the subsequent chaos that has spread far and wide is giving Riyadh nightmares. Not only a bloated Shia entity in Iraq abutting the oil-rich Saudi (also Shia) area of Dammam but also al-Qaeda in Yemen is a menace.
The spaces created by the two occupations became hatcheries for al-Qaeda, feeding on anti-Americanism the US rule had bred.
Separation of the al-Qaeda from the Taliban is easier said than done. True, al-Qaeda consists of non-Afghan, foreign jihadists from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Xinxiang, etc. But this lot made a beeline for Afghanistan since the 1980s, when the plot to expel the Soviets by Islamic fervour was first hatched. Over the years, oppression against Muslims in the host countries Chechnya and Uzbekistan, for instance caused an augmentation of the al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
But over the 30 years since the first al-Qaeda trudged his way into Afghanistan, the foreigners have got enmeshed by ties of marriage and blood. So, how does one separate al-Qaeda from the local population, say, Taliban? Further, how does one separate the good from the bad Taliban? Or, indeed, a Pushtoon from Taliban?
Strangely, Indias growing equation with Iran is not a source of anxiety to Riyadh, Irans rival in an overarching sense. In fact, al-Qaedas ultimate aim at one stage was to upturn the Saudi monarchy, and it is precisely these hard-line elements upon whom Pakistan hopes to structure its so called strategic depth.
It is early days yet. One should not begin to distance oneself from the torrid romance with the US simply because ****** has exposed the first chinks in what the citys town criers have been celebrating as the Indo-US strategic partnership cast in stone.
Meanwhile, remember one golden role: neither Afghanistan, nor Iraq or even Balochistan can be managed without Iranian support. Invite Zalmay Khalilzad on the lecture circuit to enlighten you on just this theme.
Editorial
