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South China Sea Forum

By the looks of Vietnam's air defense, China could just launch standoff missiles in safe range.

Anyway, I just hope no one attacks first

Let Japanese rule you again.:enjoy:

ONly if you let the French come back and rule you
 
By the looks of Vietnam's air defense, China could just launch standoff missiles in safe range.

Anyway, I just hope no one attacks first



ONly if you let the French come back and rule you

We beated them ran away.
 
^ You are still waiting for USA to help you against PLAN attack on Scarborough Shoal last year :lol:
Don't worry we'll get back at Scarborough Shoal. While we're beefing up our Armed Forces by way of procurement of modern equipment. We are also waiting for the decision of UNCLOS. Once there's a final decision to legitimize our claim. We can enforce our sovereign rights over the shoals that will soon cannot be disputed and your refusal to comply with the decision will make lose your honor, standing and credibility in the world. We may call on the UN to help us enforce the decision with the help of our allies. :P

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Pag-Asa or Thitu Island is a different case because we have a military and civilian population living there.

The long standing Mutual Defense Treaty especially the Article 4 that gives power to the US to act, an attack on the Philippine registered air, ships or land especially if that is a military assets will be an attack also to the US sovereignty. The Visiting Forces Agreement, another arm of that MDT that will make rapid response of the US since their assets are already here in the Philippine waters. The US can easily call a coalition of forces if needed.

so Good Luck to your first shot
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Chinese tourists sail to disputed islands
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The CPC is very business oriented, I must say.
9,000 yuan for the four-day voyage? crazy! who will visit the islands? corrupt CPC officials probably.
 
Chinese defense minister meets senior Philippine military officer

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Chinese State Councilor and Defense Minister Chang Wanquan (2nd R) meets with Philippine Defense Undersecretary Honorio Azcueta (2nd L) in Beijing, capital of China, April 28, 2013. (Xinhua/Wang Ye)
 
A Vietnamese is US Consulate General to Vietnam. He visits Hoang Sa (Spratlys) administration recently. Hope the Americans will support Vietnam to increase the pressure on the Chinese in the dispute.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/An_Le




US Consul General works with Hoang Sa (Spratlys) administration


Updated : 4/26/2013 10:42:28 AM
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(VOV) - A delegation of the US Consulate General led by Consul General Le Thanh An recently visited and held a working session with the Hoang Sa island district People’s Committee.

Dang Cong Ngu, Chairman of the Hoang Sa district People’s Committee, briefed his guests on the local administration’s operations and future development orientations.

The US Consulate General voiced their support for peaceful settlement of sovereign disputes in the East Sea.

They stressed the need for close cooperation between concerned parties to ensure sovereignty, peace, stability, maritime security and freedom, as well as normal trade liberalisation in the East Sea, in line with international law, especially the 1982 UN Convention o the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The Hoang Sa island district was established in January 1997 under the management of the Danang municipal People’s Committee.
 
PH sovereignty based on Unclos, principles of international law

The Department of Foreign Affairs

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(Editor’s Note: The following is the position paper from the Department of Foreign Affairs on the Philippine standoff with China at Panatag Shoal, also known as Bajo de Masinloc and Scarborough Shoal, in the West Philippine Sea.)

Bajo de Masinloc is an integral part of the Philippine territory. It is part of the Municipality of Masinloc, Province of Zambales. It is located 124 nautical miles (220 kilometers) west of Zambales and is within the 200- nautical-mile (370 kilometers) exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and Philippine continental shelf.

A Philippine Navy surveillance aircraft, patrolling the area to enforce the Philippine Fisheries Code and marine environment laws, spotted eight Chinese fishing vessels anchored inside the Bajo de Masinloc (Panatag Shoal) on Sunday, April 8, 2012. On April 10, the Philippine Navy sent the BRP Gregorio del Pilar to the area. In accordance with established rules of engagement, an inspection team was dispatched and it reported finding large amounts of illegally collected corals, giant clams and live sharks in the compartments of the Chinese fishing vessels.

The actions of the Chinese fishing vessels are a serious violation of the Philippines’ sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction. The poaching of endangered marine resources is a violation of the Fisheries Code and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES).

Basis of sovereignty

Bajo de Masinloc (international name, Scarborough Shoal) is not an island. Bajo de Masinloc is also not part of the Spratlys.

Bajo de Masinloc is a ring-shaped coral reef, which has several rocks encircling a lagoon. About five of these rocks are above water during high tide. Some of these rocks are about three meters high and can be seen above the water. The rest of the rocks and reefs are submerged during high tide.

Bajo de Masinloc’s chain of reefs and rocks is about 124 nautical miles (220 km) from the nearest coast of Luzon and approximately 472 nautical miles (850 km) from the nearest coast of China. Bajo de Masinloc is located approximately along latitude 15°08’N and longitude 117°45’E. The rocks of Bajo de Masinloc are situated north of the Spratlys.

Obviously then the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc are also within the 200 nautical mile EEZ and the 200 nautical mile continental shelf of the Philippines.

Distinction

A distinction has to be made between the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc and the larger body of water and continental shelf where the geological features are situated. The rights or nature of rights of the Philippines over Bajo de Masinloc are different from the rights it exercises over the larger body of water and continental shelf.

The Philippines exercises full sovereignty and jurisdiction over the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc, and sovereign rights over the waters and continental shelf where the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc are situated.

The basis of Philippine sovereignty and jurisdiction over the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc is distinct from that of its sovereign rights over the larger body of water and continental shelf.

A. Public international law

The rocks of Bajo de Masinloc are Philippine territory.

The basis of Philippine sovereignty and jurisdiction over the rocks is not premised on the cession by Spain of the Philippine archipelago to the United States under the Treaty of Paris. That the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc are not included or within the limits of the Treaty of Paris, as alleged by China, is therefore immaterial and of no consequence.

Philippine sovereignty and jurisdiction over the rocks is likewise not premised on proximity or the fact that the rocks are within its 200 nautical mile EEZ or continental shelf under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos). Although the Philippines necessarily exercises sovereign rights over its EEZ and continental shelf, the reason why the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc are Philippine territory is anchored on other principles of public international law.

As decided in a number of cases by international courts or tribunals, most notably the Palmas Island Case, a mode for acquiring territorial ownership over a piece of real estate is effective exercise of jurisdiction. In the Palmas case, sovereignty over the Palmas Island was adjudged in favor of the Netherlands on the basis of “effective exercise of jurisdiction” although the island may have been historically discovered by Spain and historically ceded to the United States in the Treaty of Paris.

In the case of Bajo de Masinloc, the Philippines, since it gained independence, has exercised both effective occupation and effective jurisdiction over Bajo de Masinloc.

The name Bajo de Masinloc (which means Shallows of Masinloc or Masinloc Shoal) itself identifies the shoal as a particular political subdivision of the Philippine province of Zambales, known as Masinloc.

Maps

One of the earliest known and most accurate maps of the area, named Carta Hydrographical y Chorographica de las Yslas Filipinas by Fr. Pedro Murillo Velarde, SJ, and published in 1734, showed Bajo de Masinloc as part of Zambales.

The name Bajo de Masinloc was given to the shoal by the Spanish colonizers. In 1792, another map, drawn by the Alejandro Malaspina expedition and published in 1808 in Madrid, Spain, also showed Bajo de Masinloc as part of Philippine territory. This map showed the route of the Malaspina expedition to and around the shoal. It was reproduced in the Atlas of the 1939 Philippine Census.

The Mapa General, Islas Filipinas, Observatorio de Manila published in 1990 by the US Coast and Geodetic Survey, also showed Bajo de Masinloc as part of the Philippines.

Philippine flags have been erected on some of the islets of the shoal, including a flag raised on an 8.3-meter high flag pole in 1965 and another Philippine flag raised by Congressmen Roque Ablan and Jose Yap in 1997. In 1965, the Philippines built and operated a small lighthouse on one of the islets in the shoal. In 1992, the Philippine Navy rehabilitated the lighthouse and reported it to the International Maritime Organization for publication in the List of Lights (currently this lighthouse is not working).

Bajo de Masinloc was also used as target range by Philippine and US naval forces stationed in Subic Bay in Zambales. The Philippines’ Department of Environment and Natural Resources together with the University of the Philippines has also been conducting scientific, topographic, and marine studies in the shoal. Filipino fishermen have always considered the shoal their fishing grounds because of its proximity to the coast of southwest Luzon.

Archipelagic baselines

In 2009, when the Philippines passed an amended Archipelagic Baselines Law fully consistent with Unclos, Bajo de Masinloc was classified under the “Regime of Islands” consistent with the Law of the Sea.

“Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as “Regime of Islands” under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the Unclos:

a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and

b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.”

Comments on Chinese claims
Question:

But what about the historical claim of China over Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal)? Does China have superior right over Bajo de Masinloc on the basis of its so-called historical claim? China is claiming Bajo de Masinloc based on historical arguments, claiming it to have been discovered by the Yuan Dynasty. China is also claiming that Bajo de Masinloc has been reflected in various official Chinese maps and has been named by China in various official documents.

Answer:

Chinese assertions based on historical claims must be substantiated by a clear historic title. It should be noted that under public international law, historical claims are not historical titles. A claim by itself, including historical claim, could not be a basis for acquiring a territory.

Under international law, the modes of acquiring a territory are: discovery, effective occupation, prescription, cession and accretion. Also, under public international law, for a historical claim to mature into a historical title, a mere showing of long usage is not enough.

Other criteria have to be satisfied, such as that the usage must be open, continuous, adverse or in the concept of an owner, peaceful and acquiesced by other states. Mere silence by other states to one’s claim is not acquiescence under international law. Acquiescence must be affirmative such that other states recognize the claim as a right on the part of the claimant that other states ought to respect as a matter of duty. There is no indication that the international community has acquiesced to China’s so-called historical claim.

Naming and placing on maps are also not bases in determining sovereignty. In international case law relating to questions of sovereignty and ownership of land features, names and maps are not significant factors in the determination of international tribunals’ determination of sovereignty.

Question:

What about China’s claims that Bajo de Masinloc is traditional fishing waters of Chinese fishermen?

Answer:

Under international law, fishing rights are not a mode of acquiring sovereignty (or even sovereign rights) over an area. Neither could it be construed that the act of fishing by Chinese fishermen is a sovereign act of a state nor can it be considered a display of state authority. Fishing is an economic activity done by private individuals. For occupation to be effective there has to be clear demonstration of the intention and will of a state to act as sovereign and there has to be peaceful and continuous display of state authority, which the Philippines has consistently demonstrated.

Besides, when Unclos took effect, it has precisely appropriated various maritime zones to coastal states, eliminating so-called historical waters and justly appropriating the resources of the seas to coastal states to which the seas are appurtenant. “Traditional fishing rights” is in fact mentioned only in Article 51 of Unclos, which calls for archipelagic states to respect such rights, if such exist, in its archipelagic waters.

It should also be noted, that in this particular case, the activities of these so-called fishermen can be hardly described as fishing. The evidence culled by the Philippine Navy showed clearly that these are poaching, involving the harvesting of endangered marine species, which is illegal in the Philippines and illegal under international law, specifically the CITES.

B. Basis of sovereign rights

As earlier indicated, there is a distinction between the rocks of Bajo Masinloc and the waters around them. The question of ownership of the rocks is governed by the principles of public international law relating to modes for acquiring territories. On the other hand, the extent of its adjacent waters is governed by Unclos. The waters outside of the maritime area of Bajo de Masinloc are also governed by Unclos.

As noted, there are only about five rocks in Bajo de Masinloc that are above water during high tide. The rest are submerged during high tide. Accordingly, these rocks have only 12 nautical miles maximum territorial waters under Article 121 of Unclos. Since the Philippines has sovereignty over the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc, it follows that it has also sovereignty over their 12 nautical miles territorial waters.

Question:

But what about the waters outside the 12 nautical miles territorial waters of the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc, what is the nature of these waters including the continental shelves? Which state has sovereign rights over them?

Answer:

As noted, Bajo de Masinloc is located approximately at latitude 15°08’N and longitude 117°45’E. It is approximately 124 nautical miles off the nearest coast of Zambales. Clearly, the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc are within the 200 nautical miles EEZ and continental shelf of the Philippines.

Therefore, the waters and continental shelves outside of the 12 nautical miles territorial waters of the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc appropriately belong to the EEZ and continental shelf of the Philippines. As such, the Philippines exercises exclusive sovereign rights to explore and exploit the resources within these areas to the exclusion of other countries under Unclos. Part V of Unclos, specifically provides that the Philippines exercises exclusive sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage resources whether living or nonliving, in this area. Although other states have the right of freedom of navigation over these areas, such rights could not be exercised to the detriment of the internationally recognized sovereign rights of the Philippines to explore and exploit the resources in its 200 nautical miles EEZ and continental shelf. To do otherwise would be in violation of international law, specifically Unclos.

Therefore, the current action of the Chinese surveillance vessels within the Philippine EEZ is obviously inconsistent with its right of freedom of navigation and in violation of the sovereign rights of the Philippines under Unclos. It must also be noted that the Chinese fishermen earlier apprehended by Philippine law enforcement agents may have poached not only in Bajo de Masinloc but likely also in the EEZ of the Philippines. Therefore, these poachers have violated the sovereign rights of the Philippines under Unclos.

PH archeological vessel

The Philippine National Museum has been undertaking an official marine archaeological survey in the vicinity of Bajo de Masinloc.
The archaeological survey is being conducted by the Philippine National Museum on board the Philippine-flag MY Saranggani.
Chinese maritime surveillance vessels have been harassing the MY Saranggani. The Philippines has strongly protested the harassments by the Chinese side. The actions by the Chinese vessels are in violation of the sovereign right and jurisdiction of the Philippines to conduct marine research or studies in its EEZ.

Endangered species

The Philippine Navy, during a routine sovereignty patrol, saw eight fishing vessels moored at Bajo de Masinloc on April 10. The Philippine side inspected the vessels and discovered that they were Chinese fishing vessels and on board were illegally obtained endangered corals and giant clams in violation of the Philippine Fisheries Code

The Philippines staunchly protects its marine environment from any form of illegal fishing and poaching. It is a state party to the CITES and Convention on Biological Diversity.

This illicit activity has also undermined the work of the Philippine government as a member of the Coral Triangle Initiative.

The coral colonies in Bajo de Masinloc have been in existence for centuries.

Current situation

The Philippines is committed to the process of consultations with China toward a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the situation.

As the Department of Foreign Affairs works toward a diplomatic solution, the Philippine Coast Guard is in the area and is continuing to enforce relevant Philippine laws.

PH sovereignty based on Unclos, principles of international law | Inquirer Global Nation

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It seems the phillipino here are apt to believe the US would join in to fight china for illigal possession of chinese island by ur 2 Country Philipino and Viet in Southern sea of China.What a group of idiot.
The US never do business at a loss.It hardly to imagine they would involve a risk of nuclear war with China just for the stolen islands.

Not to mention the others ,maybe only the Japanese dog will,and we will happily on present of all the people who are love peace and justice on earth to give them A devastating blow and perish them who launched the WWII and millions of innocent people(including a considerable amount of philipino ,and vietnamese as well.) been massacred by these Japanese bitches.so go on,Japanese bitches.

So pls go to bed ,and have a good US help dream ,hahahaha
 
I would very likely to tell ur philipino and viet friends.
what the core policy to China by US govrn it to restrain the development of the chinese.Its by no means to them to involve a direct confrontation to China .
 
It seems the phillipino here are apt to believe the US would join in to fight china for illigal possession of chinese island by ur 2 Country Philipino and Viet in Southern sea of China.What a group of idiot.
The US never do business at a loss.It hardly to imagine they would involve a risk of nuclear war with China just for the stolen islands.

Not to mention the others ,maybe only the Japanese dog will,and we will happily on present of all the people who are love peace and justice on earth to give them A devastating blow and perish them who launched the WWII and millions of innocent people(including a considerable amount of philipino ,and vietnamese as well.) been massacred by these Japanese bitches.so go on,Japanese bitches.

So pls go to bed ,and have a good US help dream ,hahahaha
You are making a severe error in your perception of the US-Filipino alliance and history. There is no other nation that owes its independence, culture, and history to the United States as the Filipino nation does.

Even your international legal experts know too well that we can invoke our Mutual Defense Treaty with the US even if only a vessel or aircraft is fired upon. What more if you fired and invade our island with military assets and civilian population?

The US honors its obligations and would be forced to oblige and protect us. To not do so, would do irreparable harm to its position worldwide. Its commitment to other alliances (e.g. NATO) would be called into question. Political and military stability in South East Asia is shaken and the balance of power especially in Asia is no longer true. U.S. guarantees would lose their value and I don't think that will happen.

So if you think you have enough courage to invade our Pag-Asa or Thitu Island go ahead.

Wish you luck
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I would very likely to tell ur philipino and viet friends.
what the core policy to China by US govrn it to restrain the development of the chinese.Its by no means to them to involve a direct confrontation to China .
China says: "Philippines and Vietnam" to use “diplomatic wisdom” to resolve tensions in the West Philippine Sea," while you are maintaining your "diplomatic greed" in claiming the whole South China Sea.

Do you expect the Vietnamese and the Filipinos just to say amen to your insinuation that you owned the whole Sea and islands by virtue of historic rights?

Ok Let's reverse the situation, if the Vietnamese and the Filipinos claim the sea lane from your shore up to the distance equivalent to what you Chinese claims what would you say?

Tsk tsk Well truly, truly your country is a peace loving country.

You love to take a piece of Philippines, piece of Vietnam, piece of Malaysia, piece of Japan and India.
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Bad news from the ASEAN summit last week.

ASEAN’s procrastination in the South China Sea
Yeremia Lalisang, Jakarta | Opinion | Tue, April 30 2013, 10:59 AM


A South China Sea discussion was expected to be the highlight of the 22nd ASEAN Summit in Bandar Seri Begawan last week, considering the increased assertiveness of both China and claimant states from Southeast Asia, but the discussion did not materialize.

The summit did not conclude with a strong statement on the issue, discouraging any future efforts to settle the dispute peacefully.

Scholars agree that ASEAN–China relations have never been better in the last 16 years. This is mainly a result of increased economic ties and the considerable growth in trade volume between the two parties.

Such a phenomenon is one of the most important pillars of both China and ASEAN member states’ economic growth. China is regarded as the new center of attraction, offering the member states wide-ranging flexibilities, fruitful economic relations and openness to multilateral frameworks that are significantly different from the US–Japan
alliance model.

However, China’s engagement with ASEAN states has been continuously limited and filled with uncertainty. Until now, the region has not fallen within Beijing’s sphere of influence. In this regard, ASEAN has been successful in restraining China’s influence in the region. ASEAN has relentlessly engaged China through institutional involvements and multilateral frameworks.

Within such limitations, China’s objectives remain clear and consistent. Chinese officials aim at create a stable periphery that would contribute positively to its economic growth. The quest for a strong economy has encouraged China to offer flexibility and be more accommodating in its interactions with Southeast Asian states.

In doing so, China expects to counter the “China threat theory” that finds fertile ground as its economic and military capability continues to grow. As former premier Wen Jianbao once said, China should be viewed as a “friendly elephant”. Such an image will support China’s long-term interests as a potential superpower in the international system.

______________________

The South China Sea would certainly be regarded by China as a strategic interest in its energy security framework.


The image of a “friendly elephant”, however, fails to manifest in the case of South China Sea disputes. While both sides took the confidence-building measure of signing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties
to the South China Sea in 2002, ASEAN states have been haunted by China’s pattern of assertiveness in managing the territorial disputes in which it is involved.

The Taiwan Missile Crisis in the mid-1990s and the occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995 and 1998 demonstrated the way an assertive China tends to deal with territorial disputes.

These examples suggest that it is even more plausible that a stronger China in the 21st century will use force as an instrument in the settlement of territorial disputes.

As if confirming such a belief, China declared in 2012 that the South China Sea was its “core interest”, meaning that China’s claim to the territory is non-negotiable. Beijing seems willing to use military force to respond to any party who challenges the status quo.

China’s policies and behavior in managing the recent disputes will prove how strong Beijing’s commitment is to maintaining stability in the region. In other words, they will test the lower limit of Beijing’s interest in its interactions with ASEAN.

The issue of national unity is frequently utilized by the nationalist faction in China’s domestic politics to push the government to be more assertive, which limits the flexibility of policymakers in Beijing. On the other hand, it is clear to them that such a move could be counterproductive to the country’s interests in advancing its national economy.

This highlights the urgency for ASEAN to push China to make significant progress in addressing the territorial disputes in the South China Sea for at least three reasons.

First, with regard to its slowing economic might, Beijing should be concerned with preventing any potential conflict on its periphery that could negatively impact its economic performance. In line with its significant role as a source of legitimacy, China’s economic development is still the priority of the Communist regime in Beijing.

Second, any non-cooperation measure leading to the failure of maintaining peace and stability in the region would allow other major powers, such as the US and Japan, to intensify their influence in the region, at the expense of Beijing’s leadership and position in the regional balance of power. Moreover, internationalizing the dispute is something that Beijing has always tried to avoid.

Finally, it would be better for ASEAN to accelerate its progress now before China grows even bigger, as its demand for energy will also increase to support its economic wheel. The South China Sea, with its potential energy reserves, would certainly be regarded by China as a strategic interest in its energy security framework.

In its relations with ASEAN, the way China manages the South China Sea issue will showcase how China, as a great power, treats its neighbors. Assertiveness and inflexibility would only create a negative image of China, which is projected to play a more considerable role in global affairs in the future.

On the other hand, how ASEAN proceeds in managing this dispute will show what kind of regional institution ASEAN is. Having failed to achieve any significant development last year in Phnom Penh with ASEAN unable to merge contending interests internally, less meaningful progress was made in Bandar Seri Begawan this year.

With both internal and external limitations facing policymakers in Beijing, ASEAN still appears reluctant to issue the kind of strong statements necessary to show its commitment to making significant progress in managing the dispute.

This strategy of buying time, from the perspective of ASEAN–China relations, will not result in peaceful dispute settlement. China is continuing to grow larger both militarily and economically.

Any further delay in settling this dispute will only allow China to raise its bargaining power relative to ASEAN’s.

When the situation arises in which ASEAN cannot catch up with China, that will be the time when peaceful dispute settlement is no longer plausible.

The writer is managing director of the ASEAN Study Center at the University of Indonesia’s (UI) school of social and political sciences in Depok, West Java.
 
Bad news from the ASEAN summit last week.

ASEAN’s procrastination in the South China Sea
Yeremia Lalisang, Jakarta | Opinion | Tue, April 30 2013, 10:59 AM


A South China Sea discussion was expected to be the highlight of the 22nd ASEAN Summit in Bandar Seri Begawan last week, considering the increased assertiveness of both China and claimant states from Southeast Asia, but the discussion did not materialize.

The summit did not conclude with a strong statement on the issue, discouraging any future efforts to settle the dispute peacefully.

Scholars agree that ASEAN–China relations have never been better in the last 16 years. This is mainly a result of increased economic ties and the considerable growth in trade volume between the two parties.

Such a phenomenon is one of the most important pillars of both China and ASEAN member states’ economic growth. China is regarded as the new center of attraction, offering the member states wide-ranging flexibilities, fruitful economic relations and openness to multilateral frameworks that are significantly different from the US–Japan
alliance model.

However, China’s engagement with ASEAN states has been continuously limited and filled with uncertainty. Until now, the region has not fallen within Beijing’s sphere of influence. In this regard, ASEAN has been successful in restraining China’s influence in the region. ASEAN has relentlessly engaged China through institutional involvements and multilateral frameworks.

Within such limitations, China’s objectives remain clear and consistent. Chinese officials aim at create a stable periphery that would contribute positively to its economic growth. The quest for a strong economy has encouraged China to offer flexibility and be more accommodating in its interactions with Southeast Asian states.

In doing so, China expects to counter the “China threat theory” that finds fertile ground as its economic and military capability continues to grow. As former premier Wen Jianbao once said, China should be viewed as a “friendly elephant”. Such an image will support China’s long-term interests as a potential superpower in the international system.

______________________

The South China Sea would certainly be regarded by China as a strategic interest in its energy security framework.


The image of a “friendly elephant”, however, fails to manifest in the case of South China Sea disputes. While both sides took the confidence-building measure of signing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties
to the South China Sea in 2002, ASEAN states have been haunted by China’s pattern of assertiveness in managing the territorial disputes in which it is involved.

The Taiwan Missile Crisis in the mid-1990s and the occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995 and 1998 demonstrated the way an assertive China tends to deal with territorial disputes.

These examples suggest that it is even more plausible that a stronger China in the 21st century will use force as an instrument in the settlement of territorial disputes.

As if confirming such a belief, China declared in 2012 that the South China Sea was its “core interest”, meaning that China’s claim to the territory is non-negotiable. Beijing seems willing to use military force to respond to any party who challenges the status quo.

China’s policies and behavior in managing the recent disputes will prove how strong Beijing’s commitment is to maintaining stability in the region. In other words, they will test the lower limit of Beijing’s interest in its interactions with ASEAN.

The issue of national unity is frequently utilized by the nationalist faction in China’s domestic politics to push the government to be more assertive, which limits the flexibility of policymakers in Beijing. On the other hand, it is clear to them that such a move could be counterproductive to the country’s interests in advancing its national economy.

This highlights the urgency for ASEAN to push China to make significant progress in addressing the territorial disputes in the South China Sea for at least three reasons.

First, with regard to its slowing economic might, Beijing should be concerned with preventing any potential conflict on its periphery that could negatively impact its economic performance. In line with its significant role as a source of legitimacy, China’s economic development is still the priority of the Communist regime in Beijing.

Second, any non-cooperation measure leading to the failure of maintaining peace and stability in the region would allow other major powers, such as the US and Japan, to intensify their influence in the region, at the expense of Beijing’s leadership and position in the regional balance of power. Moreover, internationalizing the dispute is something that Beijing has always tried to avoid.

Finally, it would be better for ASEAN to accelerate its progress now before China grows even bigger, as its demand for energy will also increase to support its economic wheel. The South China Sea, with its potential energy reserves, would certainly be regarded by China as a strategic interest in its energy security framework.

In its relations with ASEAN, the way China manages the South China Sea issue will showcase how China, as a great power, treats its neighbors. Assertiveness and inflexibility would only create a negative image of China, which is projected to play a more considerable role in global affairs in the future.

On the other hand, how ASEAN proceeds in managing this dispute will show what kind of regional institution ASEAN is. Having failed to achieve any significant development last year in Phnom Penh with ASEAN unable to merge contending interests internally, less meaningful progress was made in Bandar Seri Begawan this year.

With both internal and external limitations facing policymakers in Beijing, ASEAN still appears reluctant to issue the kind of strong statements necessary to show its commitment to making significant progress in managing the dispute.

This strategy of buying time, from the perspective of ASEAN–China relations, will not result in peaceful dispute settlement. China is continuing to grow larger both militarily and economically.

Any further delay in settling this dispute will only allow China to raise its bargaining power relative to ASEAN’s.

When the situation arises in which ASEAN cannot catch up with China, that will be the time when peaceful dispute settlement is no longer plausible.

The writer is managing director of the ASEAN Study Center at the University of Indonesia’s (UI) school of social and political sciences in Depok, West Java.

I didn't know the summit was last week. Anyway, it shows us that ASEAN is not strong enough, even if we are united. Anyway, it is too late, since China is growing fast, and even united, we might not see a settlement in the dispute.
 
It seems the phillipino here are apt to believe the US would join in to fight china for illigal possession of chinese island by ur 2 Country Philipino and Viet in Southern sea of China.What a group of idiot.
The US never do business at a loss.It hardly to imagine they would involve a risk of nuclear war with China just for the stolen islands.

Not to mention the others ,maybe only the Japanese dog will,and we will happily on present of all the people who are love peace and justice on earth to give them A devastating blow and perish them who launched the WWII and millions of innocent people(including a considerable amount of philipino ,and vietnamese as well.) been massacred by these Japanese bitches.so go on,Japanese bitches.

So pls go to bed ,and have a good US help dream ,hahahaha



I would very likely to tell ur philipino and viet friends.
what the core policy to China by US govrn it to restrain the development of the chinese.Its by no means to them to involve a direct confrontation to China .

Paracel and Spratly belong to Vietnam from long time. Chinese robbed our Islands 1956 and 1974, dirty aggressors, don't open big mouth to bullying us.
 
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